ALEXANDER CAMPBELL

AT

GLASGOW UNIVERSITY

1808-1809

ALEXANDER CAMPBELL
AT
GLASGOW UNIVERSITY
1808-1809

Transcribed with an Introduction
by
LESTER G. MCALLISTER

DISCIPLES OF CHRIST HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Nashville, Tennessee
1971

Printed by
MITCHELL-FLEMING PRINTING, INC.
Greenfield. Indiana

12-11-2003

My appreciation is expressed to the Disciples of Christ Historical Society for granting me permission to include "Alexander Campbell at Glasgow University." DCHS retains the copyright to this book and is free to use this digitized file as they see fit.

Bennie Johns

DISCIPLES OF CHRIST HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Peter M. Morgan
President
Sara Harwell
Director of Library and Archives

1101 19th Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37212-2196
Phone (615) 327-1444
Fax (615) 327-1445
E-Mail: mail@dishistsoc.org
www.dishistsoc.org

December 3, 2003

Mr. Bennie Johns
309 Washington Avenue, NW
Russellville, AL 35653

Dear Mr. Johns,

In response to your request to digitize the Campbell item for which we hold the copyright, you have our permission to digitize the materials with the following stipulations:

1) You will donate a copy of the digital file to the Historical Society.

2) The Disciples of Christ Historical Society will retain copyright to this item and will be allowed to use the digitized file in any way we see fit, including placing it on our web site.

3) You will give credit to the Historical Society on the digital copy.

If you agree to these provisions, please let me know in writing (an e-mail message will be fine), and then you may feel free to proceed with your digitizing.

Thank you for contacting us about this project.

Sincerely,

Sara Harwell

Sara Harwell



5

Essay first on Genius

1. It is proposed to define 1st what Ge=
=nius is, 2d what are its criteria, 3 upon
what faculties it more emphatically
depends, 4 what Relations have these
with its Criteria, 5 what are the Con=
comitants of Genius, and 6 to des=
cribe the early indications of it in
the Minds of Youth — — —

1st What genius is, the Etymology of the
term genius, is somewhat ambiguous, some
derive it from the latin ingenium,
which signifies wit, humour, or dispo=
=sitions as horace says, "indulgere ingenio"
to indulge his humour, and at another
time "deterere culpa ingenio" to spoil it
through any natural defect: others
derive it from genius, or genii, a word
from the heathen mythology; which the
heathens used to denote a good, or
bad angel; that was appointed to guide,
assist, or to punish, the men; over whom
it presided, as they deserved —

Facsimile of Typical Page in Journal

INTRODUCTION

Alexander Campbell, born in northern Ireland in 1788, died at Bethany, West Virginia, in 1866, the respected leader of the American religious movement known variously as Disciples of Christ, Church of Christ, or the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ.) Campbell wrote many volumes and spoke often on his religious views on the then frontier of the United States. He attracted many followers who, with evangelical zeal, organized congregations of Christians for the purpose of reuniting the Church on the basis of the New Testament.

Many studies have been made of Alexander Campbell, of his writings and of his movement. Until fairly recently, however, little has been known ring the winter of 1808-1809 which he and his family spent in Scotland. During that time he availed himself of the opportunity to study at the celebrated University of Glasgow. For the first time, the young Campbell's notes of his winter's work are presented publicly.

It is hoped that this transcription, making his essays and notes available for reading and study, will lead not only to an appreciation of the discipline Alexander received in his months at the University but also to some insight into the course of study available to the young students at the University of Glasgow in the first decade of the nineteenth century. There is both specific and general interest in such documents. It is possible they will prove helpful to all scholars interested in this period of church history.

The existence of Alexander Campbell's essays and notes from his days as a student at Glasgow University has been known since 1952 if not before. In that year a hand-written manuscript entitled "Juvenile Essays written at University of Glasgow 1808-1809" was sent from Australia to E. Hugh Behymer, then Librarian of Bethany College, and was placed in the college's historical collection. It is supposed it was a part of the Campbell materials taken to Australia by the Barclay family in 1920-21. Since then additional materials were discovered (in 1965) and were given into the custody of the Disciples of Christ Historical Society.

The "Juvenile Essays" were called to my attention shortly after I joined the faculty of Bethany College in 1953. Work on the transcription of the essays was begun early in 1955 but one claim to duty and another made it necessary to put them aside. Only with a recent research leave from Christian Theological Seminary has it been possible for them to be finished at this time.

The transcription was not as easy as might be assumed. The hand-writing is that of a twenty-one year old student. The essays and other materials were undoubtedly hastily written and the quality of the writing

varies from page to page. There are the usual differences between the British and the American style of spelling. There are oddities of spelling and handwriting typical of the late eighteenth century but difficult for twentieth century eyes to decipher. There are faded words and even pages. The work was done mainly with the aid of a large magnifying glass.

The transcription is presented as nearly as possible just as Campbell wrote it. The archaic (also the British) spelling and most of the punctuation is left so that something of the flavor of the original is retained. It is hoped that this gives interest to the reading and will leave no question as to exactness and accuracy.

A word is in order here about the quality of the essays and notes. They are typical of the college and university student; neither better nor worse. They should not be expected to reflect maturity. They are "juvenile." Young Alexander's vocabulary is admirable when compared to today's standards and reflects classical training. He uses words such as "analogous," "contiguity" and "perspicuous" with ease (and spells them correctly.) When it is considered that at this time in the United States most literate persons wrote and spelled poorly it is noteworthy that the young Campbell could spell and express himself so clearly. One is amazed not that there are occasional mistakes in spelling or grammar but that there are so few. It is to be remembered also that this is a period when spelling and grammar were just being standardized. The reader will notice occasional touching references to his recent experiences in leaving his Irish home.

In a "Preface" apparently written some years after the main body of material, Campbell reveals that the essays were "given out" to the students of the first Philosophy Class for exercise "in order to bind those subjects on the minds of the students and to enable them to compose, and write down in a distinct manner, what they knew." Campbell admonishes a future generation that, ". . . if at any time this book should fall into the hands of any critick or censorious persons, he may know that it is not the perfect production of the author but only the bold sallies of Youth towards improvement. . ."

The young Alexander Campbell is described at this time as "tall, athletic and well built." There was about him an air of frankness and of self-reliance. This was well because his father, Thomas, was in America, and with his mother devoting her attention to the six younger children, it was necessary for the oldest son to give general oversight to family affairs and look after many details of family life. This was the way things stood when late in the summer of 1808 the family was ready to leave Ireland and to join the father in the United States. At Londonderry they had taken passage on an ill-fated ship which was wrecked off the coast of Scotland. For various reasons, but especially because it would permit Alexander to take courses at the university, the family decided to winter in Glasgow. They made their way to the city armed with letters of reference and taking lodg-

ing, early in December, young Campbell was enrolled in the University of Glasgow. They stayed in Glasgow the remainder of that school year (the last essay is dated June 1, 1809) and in August, 1809, the family sailed for New York. It was during the period from December, 1808, to June, 1809, these essays and notes were written.

Before going further into the background of the essays let us turn to a brief history and description of the University of Glasgow. It is important to know something of the university's organization and curriculum.

The winter of Alexander Campbell's matriculation in the University of Glasgow was near the three hundred and fiftieth year of its birth. It had been founded in the middle of the fifteenth century by the medieval church on authority of Pope Nicholas V. Through the years its fortunes had fluctuated but during the eighteenth century, it had become a very famous center of learning. In 1808-1809 the university was still riding the crest of this wave.

The governing body at that time included a chancellor, elected for life; a principal, also elected for life; and a rector with his council of four deputies, elected triennially by the students voting in "nations" according to their birthplace. Other officers of the university were the scribe or registrar; the bursarius or treasurer; the promoter, corresponding to the modern admissions officer; and the bedellus, who combined the offices of sergeant-at-arms and janitor. In the beginning there were only four faculties or colleges: Arts, Theology, Canon Law, and Medicine; and each was organized separately. All the teachers in these colleges were required by oath to maintain peace and harmony among the various faculties. At first all the officers of the university had lived together in one building; but through the centuries many buildings and faculty members had been added.

Alexander Campbell's months at the university were just at the end of a period of brilliant intellectual stirring. Scotland was now reaping the rich harvest of past struggles for intellectual and religious freedom. It was a remarkable period in literature, in philosophy, in commerce, in economic and social science, as well as in the development of the church. There was indeed great progress in almost every department of human activity. This was due partly to the better understanding existing between Scotland and England, to commercial expansion, to the growing sympathy between the Highlands and the Lowlands; but largely it was the result of increased educational interest.

Scotland was small, but, out of all proportion to its size, greatly influenced the intellectual world of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Skepticism and rationalism were rampant in England and on the continent but Scotland stood as a stronghold of the faith. The teachers of the University of Glasgow were more or less successful in relating the principles of inductive reasoning and the Christian faith, while other teachers and universities were sacrificing either one or the other.

The University of Glasgow, at the time of Alexander's studies there,

was in the forefront of those institutions teaching the new science and as Bacon and Newton were studied more and more, Aristotle was studied less. However, as the reader will see in the essays of the young Campbell, Aristotle's logic was still important in the general studies. Several of the university's outstanding professors either taught or influenced Campbell.

In 1808, when Alexander matriculated in the university, the influence of the famous Thomas Reid was still heavy on the curriculum. Reid taught at Glasgow from 1764 until his death in 1796 and probably taught Thomas Campbell, the father of Alexander. Starting with the empiricism of Locke and the rationalistic philosophy of Hume, Reid contended that the eye of the mind conveys irresistible and necessary convictions, which we both feel and judge to be true, and his emphasis on the power of spiritual perception gave rise to the intuitionalism by which his philosophy was described. This "common sense" philosophy was a conservative reaction against the skepticism of Hume, and Reid's school was about the only current British philosophy which gave hearty support to orthodox Christian faith. Ried's philosophy undoubtedly had a profound influence on the later developments of Alexander Campbell's deepest convictions.

The highly respected John Young, professor of Greek at the university from 1774-1820 was one of Thomas Campbell's teachers and quite possibly taught Alexander in 1808-1809. Young was spoken of at the time as "the profound grammarian and master of elocution" and apparently gave lectures in science as well as Greek, adopting ingenious methods of instruction. Another of the great Glasgow teachers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century was George Jardine, professor of logic and *belle-lettres*. If he was not teaching in 1808-1809 someone who used his methods definitely was. The essays in Alexander's note-book follow Jardine's methods precisely. Jardine believed students should know Latin and used the writings of Quintilian as a textbook in rhetoric. (Quintilian is quoted in several of the essays.)

Jardine was a great educationalist and introduced many improvements in university teaching. He had great faith in oral examination and held that written essays plus such an examination were more useful to the student than hearing lectures. Carrying his theory into practice Jardine required papers to be written weekly for homework, to be gone over later by him and returned to the student with comments and criticisms added. The essays of this collection are essentially that kind of exercise. It was said of him that he had "plain downright common sense, and his great aim and object was to make his pupils think for themselves on a variety of subjects."

It should be pointed out that the university, though emphasizing the scientific method, strongly repudiated the natural theology which attempted to make science the basis of religion. The professors took care to insist that science only gave a method and that the world must continue to look to revealed religion for spiritual motivation.

The manuscript consists of about 180 pages of fine bond paper (with

a crown and "C.W. Mott" as watermark) written in ink. It may be supposed the pages were bound in boards at some time after Campbell's arrival in America; probably after he established a printing press and bindery at Bethany, perhaps in the 1830s. Towards the end of the book there is a "Contents" which reveals the titles of the essays. The subjects covered a range from "On Genius" and "The Causes that gave rise to a Written Language" to the "Construction of Sentences" and the "Verb."

Of special interest are the essays "On Logic," "On the Socratic Dialogue," "On the Syllogysm," and "On the Aristotelian Method of Dispute." Alexander Campbell, the university student, learned his lessons well. Here is revealed for the first time the fact that he was drilled in the best grammatical construction, the use of logic and, most important of all to the future church leader and debater, the use of the syllogism and Aristotelian argument. Thus we see that Campbell arrived on the American frontier in 1809 with superior equipment for the work that lay ahead of him. How many American church leaders of this time were one-half so well prepared in logic and debate?

The essays and writings as a student in Glasgow give new and vital information about the young Campbell not previously known. Of even more interest to church historians, however, are the materials in the manuscript written at the same time but not directly related to university study. There is an extensive series of notes from an address by John Walker of Dublin, the noted early nineteenth century evangelical, taken on some occasion when Campbell had heard him address the Methodists in Ireland. These reveal Campbell's early interest in "taking the Scriptures alone for the standard of faith." There is an interesting section entitled "General Observations on Church Government: derived from the Scriptures." It is not clear if these are Campbell's thoughts or notes taken by him from another source, but they are important in the light of his later work in this area. The question of an ordained eldership and the equating of elders with bishops is treated extensively. This is an interest of Alexander's developed much earlier than previously supposed.

At the very end of the book there is a complete account of Campbell's sermons preached in the second year of his ministry beginning July 15, 1811. In addition to the text used, the date and place of delivery is also given. The statement "with wine" in the margin refers undoubtedly to an observance of the Lord's Supper. These facts will help historians better understand Alexander's activities during his first years in America, the formative years.

For some reason Campbell was interested in the growth of the Methodist church in the United States. The final entry in the manuscript gives a brief history of the Methodist church in America and a table showing its growth from 1773 through 1810, the last year for which there is a figure. This may have been written during Campbell's first year in America as he

sought to understand religious development on the frontier of western Pennyslvania and Ohio.

Here, then, is a new primary source for the use of students of the history of the Campbell-Stone movement. Such a source sheds new light on the formation of a great Christian leader in America on the frontier in the nineteenth century. It reveals his early thoughts and interests and discovers his early training in logic and debate as well as attempts at expressing himself in effective manner. From these materials grew the future editor, educator and debater.

A study of these materials should suggest many lines of future research for Campbell scholars and for church historians. What effect did Campbell's notes on Walker have on his later writings on faith and theology? Scripture passages were frequently cited as authority for particular observations on church government. These biblical references should be compared with Campbell's early preaching texts. Is there a relationship? Other topics will undoubtedly suggest themselves to the reader as Campbell's early ideas on various subjects are discovered. In these essays and notes for the first time, many of the formative influences on Alexander Campbell are revealed. It is my hope that the transcription and publication of these early Campbell materials will assist in our continued effort to understand an earlier period in American Christianity.

Lester G. McAllister
Christian Theological Seminary
December 1, 1970

manuscript

B.

Juvenile Essays

on various subjects

by

Alex r. Campbell

in

The University

of

Glasgow 1808-1809

3 PREFACE—

The following essays were given out to the students of the first Philosophy Class for exercise upon the various subjects discussed in that class in order to bind those subjects on the minds of the students and to enable them to compose, and write down in a distinct manner, what they knew. The subjects are in general upon useful parts of literature; and are Written in a simple clear style keeping close to the subject under discussion, for such Essays are required. No diviation from the subject in hand; no digressions are acceptable in such a class;—The intension of writing them out here in the following manner is to preserve the Essays for the sake of retrospection that at any future period the author may look back at former states of mind and habits of composition and may

4 from thence judge of improvement in composition knowledge of those subjects, style, etc. etc.

The intention of writing this preface is: if at any time this book should fall into the hands of any critick or censorious person, he may know that they it is not the perfect production of the author but only the bold sallies of Youth towards improvement, let him consider that he himself, though wise as he is, was once upon the same ladder and had to rise up to his high station step by step, and tho' he have gained the steep ascent let him not look with scorn upon him who follows hard in the same path knowing that perseverance will subdue all the difficulties and bear

the bold adventurer to the same
height, and perhaps in circling months
the day may come that the author
will bid diffiance to him who
should demean himself to criticise
the attempts of Youth — —

———————
———————

5 ESSAY **First**
on
Genius

1 It is proposed to define what genius is, 2d what are its criteria, 3 upon what faculties it more emphatically depends, 4 what relation have this with its Criteria, 5 what are the concomitants of genius, and 6 to discribe the early indications of it in the Minds of Youth. —

1st. WHAT GENIUS Is. The etymology of the term genius is somewhat ambiguous. Some derive it from the Latin *ingenium*, which signifies wit, humour, or disposition ; as Horace says, "indulgere ingenius" (I indulge his humour,) and at another time "detere culper ingenio," (to spoil it through any natural defect;) others derive it from genius, or genii, a word from the heathen mythology; which the Heathens used; to denote a good, or bad angel; that was appointed to guide, defend, or to punish, the men; over whom it presided, as they deserved—

6 The latter would seem the most natural and specious derivation.
Genius is not used to denote any new faculty of mind. We dont say a man possessed of the faculty of genius but we say a man of genius, — — — —
hence genius when applied to the understanding of men implies a su-

perior degree of knowledge excellency
in all the faculties of the mind, a
Readiness and clearness of perception
and Reflection, a hardiness and proneness
of attention, a facility of abstraction &
Generalization, tenacity of memory
but above all a strength and warmth
of Imagination, with a soundness of
Judgement and depth of Reason.
A man who desires the honorable
appellation of a man of genius must
be possessed of the above endowments
not only of some of them but of all
for if there be the least weakness or
defect in any of them he may be a
man of abilities but can lay in no
claim for a Man of Genius, for as
the least defect in any wheel or

7 spring of a machine would derange
and disconcert the whole, so the least
breakup in any even the least service-
able faculties of the understanding would
discompose and debilitate those higher
and more important faculties of the
mind which are the very bases and
pillars of GENIUS. But as the cause
may often be better examined and illus-
trated in the effect we shall proceed
to examine the effects of genius in
the productions of those men whether
in science or not; who in all ages and
in all nations; have been esteemed
men of genius; and first we observe
that their productions have been
characterised for Invention, Discovery
and Creation, hence for the second
part of the subject we state — — — —
Invention, Discovery and Creation
to be the Criteria of genius — —
But as these terms are of an am-
biguous signification it will be
essentially necessary to define them
in the sense here received.

8 INVENTION is here used to denote a forming of new combinations and relation out of materials that were never combined or existed in the same relation before; as for example the invention of gunpowder. Here is a combination of charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre that never existed before in the same relation. This term is mostly used in arts. Discovery signifies a finding out of new combinations and relations that did exist but were never known before, such as Newton's & Herschial's discoveries in Astronomy in finding out the magnitude, order, motion, and distance of all the heavenly bodies; the time & quantity of eclpyses and all the other celestial phoenomena, also the discoveries of natural philosophers and mechanicks. This term is mostly used in the sciences.

Creation. This term is more ambiguous than the 2 former being applicable to the works of the Author of Nature and to the production of Men of Genius — — — —

9 When applied to the Works of God it means a forming things out of nothing that never existed before in any nature. But when applied to mens invention signifies the same with invention nearly making combinations and Relations that never existed before. These are the Criteria of Genius — — —

—— 3 ——

Upon the faculties genius more emphatically depends---------—

It was before stated that genius depended on the perfection of all the faculties, but the faculties upon which it strongly depends are Imagination and Reason, especially on Imagination, but Imagination is that faculty in which almost all the other faculties concentrate; a vigorous, warm,

prolifick Imagination active in its exertions from the field of memory collects, combines, and reproduces such materials as may best suit the end in view. Thus, for example, Homer when he began to write the Trojan war in an epick poem, being well acquainted with the history and traditions of those times respecting it--------

10 having read them over frequently and being much impressed with the several tails in those histories and traditions he thought of forming the whole into an epick poem and accordingly set about it. Now his WARM PROLIFICK Imagination collects and combines all the circumstances, characters, events, battles, etc., and reproduces them to his mind. Thus from his Reason his mind choses such parts as best suit his intentions, rejecting those that do not. In this manner Imagination befriends the Genius. —Reason too being inventive in finding out judgements, invents new Relations and intermediate steps to the acquirement of the Judgment to form this invention which is one of the Criteria of genius; and the assistance reason gives in choosing and Rejecting from the field of memory such materials as the subject requires. These are the pillars of genius, in fine these 2 faculties include all others in a certain degree — — — —

11 4

What Relation have these 2 faculties with the Criteria — — — —

———————

Imagination is closely related to Creation and Invention, 2 of the Criteria of genius, in the following respects;
first, it is in itself inventive and Creative. It is the combining faculty, all the new

Combinations which so much distinguish
Genius originate in Imagination, from
the materials formerly acquired by
perception & reflection and reclaimed by mem-
ory. Imagination forms all the new
combinations: thus for example—
I perceived, sometime since, a certain
machine, in which, upon reflection
I find there are some defects; which are
susceptible of improvement; therefore
there is room for improvement —
but by perception and reflection I cant
discover what this improvement
may be, but by imagining it first
in one situation then in another
I find out at length wherein these
deficiencies may be corrected

12 and the whole machine improved.
This is an Invention upon an Invent-
ion ; by this act of Imagination I
can either find out new inventions or improve upon
old Inventions one which Imagina-
tion by abstracting certain qualities
from numberless objects, combines
them in a manner unknown by
one at another time by generaliz-
ing where the Imagination gets
full scope: and from a thousand
kinds of things formerly perceived
extends its wide domain to number-
less objects unperceived and presents
them in as clear & conspicuous manner
to the mind as those we actually
perceived before and from which
we got lively impressions—
for example, let us look to the
memorable Milton whose warm
vigorous and unbounded Imag-
ination

13 now quickly soars through the
blest abodes and descends big
with heavenly Vision; next
gently descends down to the

dark abodes, regions dark &
terrible with borrow, acting swollen
with infernal apparition; and by
a quick transition reverts Eden
the delightful mansion of the other
happy parents of mankind. Thus
did his eager keen Imagination
fly from earth to heaven, from
heaven to hell, and through the
dark abyss sought our father's
Paradise. Then his genius blazes
forth with a poem, the pride, the
glory and the boast of British genius.
Reason is the other pillar
of Genius. The issue of Reason is
Discovery the other grand Criteria
of Genius.

14 In every act of Reason then is
Invention and in some of the
more complex acts Invention
appears in full lustre: —
The end and intention of all our
reasoning is to discover things
unknown: if we knew and could
understand all things intuitively
Reason would not be requisite to
our existence—but in our present
existence this faculty is that which
distinguishes us from the brutal
Creation; all our discoveries depend
on it. It is this for example: It
is proposed that a straight line falling upon
another straight line makes then
either 2 right angles or are together
equal to 2 right angles. This
upon a small process of Reason
appears quite obvious but in my
demonstration of this proposition
I discover if the straight lines be
produced the other angles
on the other side of the base

15 are equal to 2 right angles. Here is
a discovery from Reason. Now Invention,

Discovery and Creation are the
Criteria of genius and depend
upon and are closely united &
related with these 2 faculties
Imagination and Reason—

5

What are the concommitants of
Genius?
Taste is, in a certain sense, a con-
commitant of Genius: altho it does
not follow that taste is an indi-
cation of genius, yet genius always
is accompanied with taste. Many
can lay in a claim for Taste, at least
a degree of it, who can lay in no
claim for a man of Genius—
Men of genius dont always possess Taste
in a high degree but all in a certain
degree. Homer has displayed a
want of taste in some instances—
he introduces histories of genealogies,
wounds, etc., which a correct taste

16 would have omitted; also Milton the
boast of Brittain introduces some
pieces of scholastick Divinity and
theological discussions that
good taste would have passed over.
Yet all men of Genius have a certain,
a good, degree of Taste— —
Closeness and keeness of attention
is also a concommitant of genius.
Tis admirable how far close atten-
tion will go in creating Genius.
Even persons of only midling endow-
ments from nature, by a well
regulated attention or close appli-
cation, have performed in science
and art so as to merit the name
of Genius.
Warm ardour of feeling, and a
degree of enthusiasm are concom-
mitants of genius. An ardour of feel-
ing is a sure concommitant of Genius
and Poets. Men of genius have

thought themselves ever influenced
from their enthusiasm—

17 Homer begins with invoking the
goddess:
***"Mhnin, aeide, qea, phleiadew acileos
oulomenh"***
(Achilles wrath to grace the direful spring,
Of wars unnumbered heavenly Goddess sing.)
And Milton:
"Of mans first disobedience and the
fruit of that forbidden tree whose
mortal taste brought Death into the
world etc." "sing heavenly Muse."
6 Early Indications of
Genius:
1st an ardent desire of improvement
expressed by an inquisitive curi-
osity, attention to instruction,
patience and pleasure of improvement.
An early fondness for Reading,
a Distinctness and tenacity of memory,
sensibilities of our nature; as well as
Intellectual turn; a love of fame,
with a keeness and activity in juve-
nile Recreation—these are all
strong indications of Genius in Youth—

18 I conclude with this saying in
favor of youthful indication, this
same is made use of by Quintilian
in his "Marks Favorable in Youth to
Improvement"—
"Puerille mihi delux, quem laus
excitat, quern gloria juvat qui
victus fleat"
"Give me the boy whom praise
Excites, whom glory assists &
who weaps when conquered."

19 ESSAY 2d

On the causes that gave rise
to a written language. Also
the differences between written
or visible, and spoken, or

audable language— — — —

In the infant state of Nations, when countries were thinly inhabited, the few Inhabitants congregated themselves into those parts of the Countries that were most delectable to themselves, and congruous to their conjoined Intensions—being thus formed into small societies, they in a great measure lived independent, each society finding a competent supply for all its demands within itself, rarely communicated with any others....

20 In this situation then, language was very scant, having little to communicate any more than what respected external sensible objects; and some of their strongest passions. Their sensible signs were very few, but in general most expressive, —but when population increased, and man began to multiply upon the earth, their wants, desires, & sensible signs increased. — Men began by degrees to emerge out of those rude and uncultivated Societies, and to become more refined. And in a short time states and nations began to flourish. Politeness, complaisance, and some of the liberal Arts began to be cultivated, and Rudeness, barbarity, and incivility were completely exterpolated—In language new signs were invented, and old ones improved.—But now from this happy reverse,

21 on the general face of things

an entire change took place
among families and societies. Fami-
lies, and intimate members of society,
were severed: one was constrained
to remove here; and another to go
hence; the beloved son, and tender
parents were seperated; and all the
close connections completely broken
up. Now what could be more
natural than that the tender
parent should long and vehemently
disere, to communicate with their
darling child; and the child with
its affectionate parent. No doubt
but the husband with the wife
and the lover with his mistress—
Even amongst men of business,
when business obliged them to sep-
erate, and then to communicate.
Now it was absolutely impossible that
all these upon every important, much
less every trivial, circumstance which
might be desirable to communicate,
which set out upon long expeditions

*21 journeys by land and voyages by
sea; the former with difficulty,
and the latter owing to the infant
state of navigation, most perilous—
and verbally face to face to commu-
nicate—All this surely suggested
some new art, to facilitate and
obviate all these difficulties -
Another obvious invention, that
love of fame, and ambitious disere
that is implanted in some noble
breast, and most in the breasts
of heroes, and great men of renown
these wished to perpetuate the
remembrance of their mighty deeds
and to transmit to posterity their
many valorous actions—and even when
consigned to the bosom of their
parent Earth they wished to

**Note:* Campbell has two p. 21 s in the manuscript.

have that spot made almost
sacred, or at least to be rendered
memorable to posterity.—
This they attempted to do by
erecting statues, and monuments
crusted with Hierglyphicks—

22 But these they saw unable to wrestle
with times cankering hand; they
see them tumble down, " and the
deep cut stones unsteady to the
test give up their charge"—
All then corroberate to the invention
of a more lasting remembrance.
Some happy genius at length
found out an art to answer all
whose names lie buried in
oblivion entombed with the
wreck of nations. Yes that happy
genius who discovered one of the
most important and useful arts
to which society is so much
indebted for much of their happiness,
lies in some neglected spot, "neither
distinguished by a monumental
pile, or by the historick page"—
I now proceed to the second part
of the subject, to point out the
difference between an audable and
visible language which is done
in a few words — —
1st Audable language is composed

23 of sounds that address the ear
and of course all communications by
audable signs must be face to face,
or at least within the reach of hearing
and the organ or instrument made
use of is the tongue. Now for as the
nature of sounds being of an
immediate perishing nature,
it behoves the hearer to be attentive
and to exert his memory else he has
heard in vain. The sound part cant be
reheard, and when memory fails

all our acquirements by hearing
are lost for ever—Not so a writ-
ten language. This addresses the
eye, and the instrument is the
hand, this can be reseen and
compared and had in lasting
remembrance. This is lasting and
certain, that is fleeting, transitory
and uncertain; this speaks when
the speaker is dead—that dies
with the speaker—so is visible
and audable language.

24 ESSAY 3d
on the
ALPHABET of every Language
December 30th, 1808

When we take a retrospective glance,
into the brighter ages of remote
antiquity, and view the con-
catination of events, that gave
rise to the present state of writing
by an Alphabet; we are struck
with admiration, and astonishment.
No human invention ever was so
replete with universal utility. Its advan-
tages are inumerable, its importance
of the first magnitude, and the
happiness, pleasures & comforts that it hath
diffused through society, are un-
utterable; and what is most remark-
able it must have been the Invention
of the first, and rudest nations.

25 Having in a former essay pointed
out the reasons that gave rise to a
written language: we shall
now proceed to give an account
of the rise and progress of it —
WRITING is an improvement upon
speech, and of course must have
been posterior to it. At first men
thought only of communicating
face to face by means of sounds
which addressed the ear, and

were uttered: Afterwards they
thought of communicating when
absent and far distant, and this
was performed by mark or char-
acters that addressed the eye,
and were performed by the hand.
These characters were of various
kinds; —The first sort of char-
acters made use of were outlines
or pictures of the things which
they wished to communicate.
By means of them they gave
some imperfect information to

26 others at a distance of what had
happened or made use of them for preserving the memory
of facts, which they disered to,
perpetuate. This is confirmed by his-
tory. The rude savages of South Am-
erica, alarmed at the appearance
of British ships approaching their
coasts, sent rude drafts of them
to the back parts of the country
to inform their companions that
such was coming. This method
was very tedious and laborious which
suggested the necessity of abridging
by drawing out a part of the
object, such a part, as was best
calculated to convey the idea of
it; as the head of an animal which
generally gave an Idea of the whole
animal, etc. But this method only
extended to external material things,
which showed the imperfection of it
and gave use to emblymatical or
hieroglyfical characters, which

27 consisted in certain symbols,
which were made to stand for
invisible objects; an account of
an anology, or Resemblance which
such symbols, were supposed to
bear to the objects being represented. Many traces of
these hieroglyphical marks are

found among the Egyptians and
Mexicans; For example, ingratitude
was denominated by a viper, wisdom
by an ant, eternity by a circle, which
has neither beginning or ending.
After these 2 stages writing became
more arbitrary in some nations—
The Peruvians made use of silken
cords of different colors, and by knots
upon these, of various sizes, and differ-
ently ranged; they invented* signs of* contrived
communicating, and giving infor-
mation to one another. —
The Chinese also make use of signs
of the same nature to this day —
They have no Alphabet of letters or simple
sounds which compose their words.

28 But every single character which they
make use of in writing is significant
of their Ideas concerning that object which
it represents; it is a mark that stands
for some one thing, or object. By conse-
quence, their characters must be immensely
numerous, and as their knowledge in-
creases, their characters will increase —
Our cyphers or arithmetical figures
1, 2, 3,4, 5,6,10 etc which we have
derived from the Arabians are significant
marks previously of the same nature
with the Chinese—They have no depend-
ance on words, but each figure repre-
sents an object; represents the number
for which it stands, and accordingly
on being presented to the eye, is equally
understood by all nations who have
agreed in the use of those cyphers
however different the languages of
those nations any promise, anything,
and whatever different names they
give to their cyphers, in their respect-
ive languages —

29 All those characters are signs for

things, no use is made yet of the
medium of sounds, or words,
either signs by representation
as the Mexican pictures, or signs by
analogy as the Egyptian hiero-
glyphicks; or signs by institu-
tion, as the Peruvian knots, the
Chinese characters, and the
Arabian cyphers — — —
By degrees at length men be-
gan to become sensible of the am-
biguity, the Imperfections, and the
tediousness, of each of these me-
thods of communication.
They began to think of employing
signs for words & not for things.
They reflected farther, that tho
the words of a language be very
numerous, yet the simple sounds
that compose them are very fine.
They thought of inventing signs

for sounds, not for words by themselves.
They then joined these signs. They
saw that it would be practicable, to
express in writing, the whole com-
binations of sounds which our words
require; —probably an invention
of syllables preceeded an Alphabet
of letters. This still was reducing
writing to a smaller compass—
TILL at length some happy
genius arose, and tracing the
sounds of the human Voice to
their simple elements, to which simp-
le sounds he gave particular
visible characters, and thereby joined
the office of the 2 organs, seeing and
hearing. —
To whom we are indebted for
this noblest, this most important,
of inventions does not appear. His
name was concealed amidst the
wreck of those darkened ages
of Antiguity, else how much

31 all true lovers of learning immortalize his Memory and honor him with with everlasting eulogies. Not only the Inventor but the time, the Country, are consigned to the darkened tomb of oblivion. Even tradition is very imperfect respecting it. The universal opinion is they were brought into Greece by Cadmus the Phoenician; who according to chronology was contemporary with Joseph, but according to Newton with King David. Cadmus only brought 16 letters in his Alphabet to Greece 1000 years before Christ, and it remained in the same state till the seige of Troy; and Palymides added 4 letters, and Symonides 4 letters.—But as the Phoenicians were never reputed for Invention, but a people of

32 extensive commerce we would be led to think that they propagated this; as well as other discoveries of other Nations. We think Egypt the great seat of Art and politics, among the Nations of old, to be the Country of the Inventor. The letters were originally written from the right hand to the left; the Greeks adopted a new method; writing their lines alternately, from the right, to the left, as oxen plough the ground. The inscription of the Aegaean monument, seems a monument, of this sort of writing: But afterwards the present method of writing, from left to right was adopted, and continues to be practised. In China and other eastern countries, they place them perpendicular; from top to bottom; no points were made use of among the Ancients.—

33 Writing at first was a kind of
engraving. Pillars and tables of
stone were first employed for this
purpose; then plates of softer metals
as lead, but as writing became
more common, lighter and
more portable substances were
employed. The leaves and bark of
certain trees, tablets of wood, cover-
ed with a thin coat of wax
on which impression was made
with a stylus of iron. In later
times hides of animals, prepared
and polished into parchment,
were made use of. At last in the
14 Century, Paper was found out.
Doctor Houston of Nanbz in
Germany found out printing in
the year 1450. The first Book that
was printed was the Bible. The second
Cicero de officius, and the 3 De
Authoritato Dei. About the same
year Glasgow College was
founded. Manuscripts were

34 very dear and rare before printing,
one Bible to a parish, and would cost
more than the building of a Church.
Shortly after printing, before the
duties upon paper, one dozen of Bibles
might be purchased for 15 shillings.
What a pleasing reverse! Printing
paper and Ink then are
within these last 500 years.

Thus have we traced written lan-
guage from the ages of antigu-
ity till the present day and may we
not exclaim happy we! who live
in an age of such knowledge and
when the beams of intellectual know-
ledge shine on us on every side.
Thus hath Ignorant superstition in
a good measure been banished away.
We have seen the darkness dispelled,
the day dawn and shine forth

until this perfect day and mid-
night darkness flee away—

———————
———————

35 Jany 2d
ESSAY 4th 1809
On the Verb

As the differences in the classes of signs
must be taken from differences in
the things represented by them,
so every different sign must be ab-
solutely necessary and must perform
an office peculiar to itself which
no other sign can perform for it.
The most common sign division is into
Noun, Pronoun, Article, Verb,
Participle, Adverb, Preposition,
Conjunction, Interjection.
This division has been the result
of much deliberation, comparison
and improvement; it was not the
first or 2d division but addition and am-
endments to the first division.
But upon a retrospective glance 1, the
first division by Philosophers, we
see there are some classes of sign,
that from their most important
functions which they perform struck the most
ancient Philosophers and through
all ages to the present day still retain

36 their force, while some of the more mod-
ern divisions have been scrupled at,
and by some rejected.
The most ancient division was into
Noun and Verb. The Names and Rela-
tions of things then were so absolutely
necessary, as that no judgement, no
simple sentence, no proposition could
possibly be without them. To them the
Hebrews added a conjunction, Aristotle
the Article, the Greeks and Latins
have eight. But as the verb is
the subject of this essay we shall fix

our attention upon it. And—

A verb is commonly defined a word that signifies to be, to do or to suffer. But more extensively is that part of speech which serves to express that which is attributed to the subject, in describing the being or conduction of the things or persons spoken of, the actions which they do or the impressions they receive. Its office is to express judgements of existence, action, suffering and relations belonging to object. The clearest notion of the Verb may be acquired by attending

37 to the operation of judging. We observe the first act of mind after perception is a judgement of the existence of the object, as I perceive a Rose. I judge that the Rose exists, hence the existence of the object is the first judgement and of course that Verb which denotes existence must be the original, the Radical Verb and is commonly called the substantive verb. All other verbs have this for their Radix and essentially employ in them the Verb of existence ... and this verb then in union with attributes and qualities, express also judgements. As for example, Table-round. Here are two things, a substance or substantive, an attribute or an Adjective. Now with the substantive verb "is" you have a judgement expressed, a proposition. "The Table is round"—"The Table exists round." "I love" is called a verb because it denotes existence in it. Yet upon investigation

38th it will be found equivalent to the verb "I am loving" or "I exist loving." Hence all other parts of speech called verbs are only verbs so far as they include existence

or comprehend the substantive verb.
"I love," then, may be called a complex
verb because it denotes energy and exist-
ence in a complex manner. Judgements
are formed also concerning Energies
existing in objects or actions exerted or
received; as "I love him." "I" is a subject or
agent. "Love" is a faculty or power exerted
and is called an Energy. "Him" is the
object that the energy acts upon,
hence when an energy is exerted there
are 3 things to be observed. 1st, the agent
or Exertor, the energy or thing exerted
and the object or thing acted upon.
In this example energy or action
is exerted and communicated and
is called action; that is, assumes an
active form or voice; as "he is
loved by me," which is equivalent to
"I love him." Hence complex verbs have both
active and passive voices in forms, and

39 hence action and passion so much
spoken of among Philosophers and
Books of Philosophy have origination
from these ancient divisions of signs,
namely the Verb.
When actions or energies are im-
parted or received suppose an
Agent, and a patient or object of
the energy. These are always con-
nected in their nature and ought to
be connected in the expression of them,
but they can and may be seperated.
When energy is stated as an attri-
bute of the subject the verb it is an active
verbe, as "I love him." Here "love" is
an attribute of the subject.
But when the former object becomes
the subject and the energy is
stated as an attribute of the
Subject the verb is passive—
as "I am loved." When simple
state or condition is the only
attribute the verb is active

as "I live." The subjects of energies are most frequently persons. Even inanimate things assume action and passion and of course

40 persons, hence the verb becomes more complex in form, denoting existence, Energy, Personality and even numbers for the subject of energy may be one or more. When I perceive a Rose I see it exists, in such a manner is moved and in such a time. Which gives this important part of speech mood and tense or time, But upon these we cant enter at present.

A
POETICAL
ESSAY
on
The Advantages and Disadvantages
of
HOLYDAYS
Jany. 6, 1809

The following poem was given out at the Commencement of the holydays to such students as might be pleased to work the Muse Dec. 27th, 1808, Glasgow —

41 As from a flower nice-spreading fair and gay,
The busy bee (much fam'd for industry)
The fragrant honey draws, while from the same
The poisonous Asp extracts the deadly balm,
And youths who bold aspire in wisdom's ways
Salubrious pleasures reap from holidays,
While those who spurn both wisdom and her path
Contract idle habits, indolence and sloth.
Who most the sweets of holydays enjoy?
Sure not the Idler, but the Studious boy,
Who most attentive places his precious honors
Careful to improve his mental powers.
As hard fatigue and long vexatious care
For balmy sweat upon the man prepare.
So studious keep—dedicated application

Prepare for all the sweets of Relaxation.
But this advantage sure to all is plain,
Of value far beyond both wealth and fame,
God hath the bright principle of bliss,
Not riches, wealth or fame compare with this.
When this is lost, were tasteless all thats given
Ah! what await the largest gifts of heav'n
When this is lost, the powers of knowledge fail
Genius, wit, and humor don't avail
That body acts on mind and mind on body
42 A maxim true in all Philosophy.
Hence when the mind oppressed with studious care
As on the nerves, the nerves the force cant bear
The life strings fail. The body soon decays,
Pale sickness comes and Death destroys our days,
While exercise and alternate study
Refresh the Mind and Recreate the body.
Amusement youth requires—'tis nature's call
In every class, that fly, that swims that exceed
Behold the lambkins frisking through the mead.
Their joy and joy exceeds, wanton with life
The scaly brood, their own amusements hain
They sport and play beneath the swelling main
In Reasons, Natures, Instincts loudest call
In vain, Tis evil to deny them all.
Given on Jany. 7th, 1809.

43. ESSAY 6th Jany. 7
On the Construction of
SENTENCES

SYNAX is the ordering of words
in speech in such a manner as is
best calculated to express our thoughts
and convey our Ideas in a clear
perspicuous energetick manner. Words or
signs used seperately would not ans-
wer the intention of language. In
a disconnected state they are quite
insufficient to answer the grand
end of Communication. But to
under signs subservient to this imp-
ortant object, they must be arranged
in a certain order and connection
in such a manner as sense and
Reason requires. For example,

these signs: "man, good" and "will happy
be," express no Idea or judgement

44 of the mind, but when arranged in
a proper order they express a judgement
or Proposition, as: a good man will
be happy. Syntax consists in
the concord and government of
Words; in the agreement of words or
the power one word has of directing
the mood, tense, number, person, case,
etc. of another.

CONSTRUCTION

is derived from the Latin words *con-*
and *struo,* to build together. Then
Construction, when applied to lang-
uage, signifies the building together of words.
But the term building brings along
with it the idea of materials in a
seperate disconnected state. In lang-
uage then the materials are words
or signs in a disconnected situation,
hence the term Construction in its

45 proper signification when applied
to language is a collecting of words
that formerly were unconnected
and building them together in an
methodical manner so as to form
a complete whole, the result of which
is called a sentence. Construction
may be divided into 3 divisions
or there are 3 kinds of construction
which arise from the intention of
the builder or constructor. A house
may be built from 3 motives: from
necessity, for ornament or for a par-
ticular use. So a sentence may
be composed from mere necessity, as, "I am
hungry," or from ornament, as "The
sun rises, shedding refulgence,
diffusing light and life in every
ray." Now, "shedding refulgence
and diffusing, etc." is an ornamental
sentence, or from Reason such

46 as, "The proper study of mankind is
Man." The first is called natural,
the 2d artificial, 3d, Philosophical.
And first, Natural, is that construction
which necessity suggests. It is prompted
by nature, men at first express from
Instinct. The arrangement made
use of in this kind of composition
would be first the sign that would
represent the thing wanted—
or that word which is the subject
of the Sentence as instead of saying
"Give me fruit," we would say "fruit
me give;" almost as the Latins do:
"fructum mihi da," etc.
2d The Artificial, oratorical or Poetical,
Construction has more in View
than simply stating the fact
or expressing the want, Desire,
or passion, but has also for its end

47 to instruct, persuade and phrase,
in short, to command the passions.
As for example, Milton in the
beginning of his poem introduces
it not with stating the fact
but with an Exordium to persuade
to attention and to please, as
"Of man's first disobedience and the
first of that forbidden Fruit,
sing heavenly muse" —
And in some of Demosthenes, etc.
Cicero's Orations, we find them
address the Passion from the same
motives and the Imagination.
3 Philosophical Construction
is dictated by Reason and in which
the Words follow the connections of the
Matter, as "in 6 days God made
the heavens and the earth and
all things and pronounced all very good."

49* The proper study of Mankind is Man.
General Observations on

* *Note:* Campbell omitted page 48.

the foregoing—the Natural is that
art of construction that Rude Nations
make use of and was prior to the
Artificial. The Artificial came
next as after necessity is alleviated
Pride and ornament what is more
than necessary, and Philosophical
posterior to the former 2 and is
the Result of Both.

ESSAY 7th
On this proposition:

Logic is the art of directing the
Powers of Knowledge in the
Search of Truth and Communi-
cation. METHOD
1st Explain the leading terms.
2. Point out the powers of know-
ledge most susceptible of im-
provement by the art of Logick.

49 3 Point out truth and false-
hood and the Relations that
the Art of Logick has with
the acquisition of truth and
detection of falsehood.
4. What relates to Communi-
cation. — — — —

First explain the leading
terms—1st LOGIC is derived
from the Greek *logos*, oration or
sermon, a collection of words framed
in a certain form; to answer a cer-
tain end and that from *lego*, colligo, to collect
because this art is a collection of
rules methodized and formed
into a complete Logos or collection.
ART is a collection of Rules, or
laws, verging towards a certain
end as a cause to produce an effect,
in a regular, methodical manner
and may be called a system of Rules.

50 DIRECTING signifies a commending
in a straight proper manner so as
to acquire a certain object unob-

tained; here it may more properly
signify an arresting of the atten-
tion and fixing it upon a
certain object. — — — — —
POWERS is a term so abstract in
its nature as to render it difficult
to explain. It is logically speaking
an inference drawn in the mind
from the observation of objects by the
external senses. It denotes 2 things:
a superior ability that one thing
has over another in making impres-
sion on it and 2, a susceptibility
that the object impressed has of receiving
impression. This may be called passive
power and the former active. By asso-
ciation it means here those constituent
faculties of the mind that compose
the human Mind.

51 The powers of knowledge are Perception,
Attention, Reflection, Abstraction,
Generalization, Memory, Imagina-
tion, Judging and Reasoning. —
All of these powers of knowledge
are in a greater or less degree
susceptible of improvement from
the art of Logick but some of them
much more especially than others.
The most improvable of them by
this art are Attention, Reflection,
Reasoning and judging. By this
art we acquire unhabituated atten-
tion, a habit of fixing the atten-
tion closely and keeping it closely
fixed to the object. By the assistance
of this art we can Reflect clearly,
closely, and powerfully and as
for Reasoning this is its very object,
also called the art of Reason and
when improvement is acquired in this,

52 the art of judging; to form judge-
ments in a really clear and true
manner, so these powers are particu-

larly assisted, improved, expanded
and enlarged by this art. Memory
and Imagination receives little
improvement from this art. Imagina-
tion is not so susceptible of being
filled or assisted or directed by
Rules. —
WHAT is TRUTH. The actual exis-
tance of objects or Bodies is not
truth. But truth refers to our judge-
ments of existences and qualities;
for instance, I perceive snow. Now
the actual existance of snow is not
truth but if I say "Snow is white"
here is a judgement expressed of
a certain quality existing in snow,
and is a true judgement for that
quality actually exists in Snow.

53 But if I say "snow is black" this
is a falsehood for the quality
black does not exist in snow hence
the judgement is false.----------
Hence a lover of truth is a lover of true
judgement and a lover of falsehood
is a hater of true judgements.
SEARCH is the quest or looking
out for something unacquired.
It supposes 3 things: a person de-
prived of some object, the actual
existance of that object, and the
effort made to acquire it. —
These are the leading terms
that compose the Proposition
and is all that is required
in the Essay, namely, to explain
the terms in this Proposition:
that Logic is the art of directing
the POWERS of Knowledge
in search of Truth. Com-
munication we dont attempt now.

54 ESSAY 8th
on the
Socratic Dialogue

Before the days of Socrates this sort of Philosphy had taken a very unfavorable turn. From the days of Zeno, the father of the Stoicks, it had gradually degenerated till at length it became mere ostentatious sophistry. Greece, the most renowned seat of Art and Science, appears to us to be the country where this art was first framed. Moral and Natural Pry were cultivated in Greece at first; and while in their infant growing state various opinions concerning different subjects in this

55 caused various disputations among the Graecians. The Greeks were wonderfully delighted with these disputations in while defending their own opinions at another opposing the opinions of their opponents. They hoped by this means to render themselves memorable to Posterity. That these Philosophers might the more easily effect these things the art of Logick or Dialect was invented by Zeno, the Aeolian. He divided it into 3 parts. The first was concerning consequences. This was an obscure and useless part little known in this age. The 2d was into Dialogue or Colloquy, the one that Socrates adopted, whence it is called the Socratick Dialogue. The 3d was into or

56 concerning Contention, whence came the many species of Sophistry. — This Sophistry was cultivated and gained much ground among the Greeks and being accompanied with an ostentatious Rhetorick affected the passions and like a torrent swept all before it till at length Socrates the son of

Sophomescus, a stone cutter and
Panarite, an *avoucheuse,* arose
and stemed the torrent. A man
revered for his love of truth, a man
of keen genius and a man of a steady,
decided and inflexible character.
His keen intellectual eye and deep
discerning judgement soon discovered this
false Sophistry and like the sun
rising in the morning before whose face
Darkness and night fly away; and
safe, clear and pleasant day arose —

57 This method was, as was the Man,
of an humble disposition, and of
a temper the most happy, not to
ruffled by contradictions, only false
Propositions. Altho a lover of truth,
he put himself in the character
of a learner not a Teacher. His
first attempt was to plan to
persuade to one hearing in which
he scarcely ever missed; for he
always gave a little run
to that Passion that seemed the
most predominant and having
once commanded the attention
and passions of his hearers, he
proposed such questions as seemed
quite unconnected with his end
in view or intentions. The answers
of which from the hearer or opponent
generally wounded themselves
by making concessions, which

58 he made use of as foundation for
future agreement, still proceeding
in his argument or Dialogue acc-
ording to that most happy premisse
of Rhetorick-Inversion that makes
the Adversaries plea; a strong, nay,
best defence that urged can be; in
one word he made use of the
"Luaviter in Modo et fortiter."
He came off in general victorious,

never disgusting his opponents for too
well be knew the frailties of human
nature, and early touched the
tender part.

The Socratic Method of Disputation
and argumentation differs from
Aristotle in the following
respects. In the Aristotelian method
the same person proposes the
premisses and draws the

59 conclusions.—But in the
Socratic method the disputant
asks his Antagonist the ques-
tions and having received answers
to them, from these answers,
as from new premisses, he draws
conclusions. In this manner the
premisses cannot be denied because
they are the preconceptions of the
Antagonist himself and if
the conclusion be properly drawn
there is no room left for future
disputation. This method was
also used by Socrates to communi-
cate knowledge. The strength
of this argument depends on these
principles. But a false conclusion
cannot be drawn from truth
and 2 contradictions cannot at the
same time be false.

60 for if the conclusion be false, the falsehood comes
from the premisses and vice versa.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE
SOCRATIC DIALOGUE

In the following Dialogue
Philomathes stands in the char-
acter of Socrates and Aladzonia
a conceited young man who had
travelled over a good part of Europe
and pretended to know much of
Astronomy, Geography, etc. enters
into a discourse with him on some
parts of Astronomy but his opinions

upon these subjects dont seem so just
as will appear in their Dialogue —
Phil, meeting with Aladzonia on
his evening walk thus addressed him:
Phil. Dear Friend Aladzonia I
am happy that I have met with you
as I understand you are an Astronomer
or one who delights much in the study
of the motions, distance, etc. of the heavenly bodies.

61 And convinced from the opportunities
you have had of these things you'll
have acquired a very considerable
knowledge of them. I shall therefore
be much obliged to you for your
opinion on some subjects as I have
not had the same opportunities
of improving in these things as you
have had.
Aladz. Indeed Philomathes, I have
made these subjects much my study
and have acquired very considerable
knowledge of them, especially as
I have been in many countries and
in most of the much famed seats
of Literature. I have been at Rome,
Paris, Lisbon, Madrid and many
other places much famed for
science and art too tedious to
mention.
Phil. And Pray, Aladzonia, what
is your opinion of the sun, the center
of our system, and the immense
fountain of light, and heat?

62 *Aladzonia.* As to his immensity, his
extraordinary size and distance as
is generally said, I dont by any manner
accord. I think that he is a consider-
able globe of fire, not very far distant
from the earth that moves round us
every day rising in the morning in
the east and by degrees travelling on
in the west till he go round this
earth, etc.—And this is more than a

thought with me. As I have seen him
perform this same course in every
country and always appear the
same size, not exceeding more than
a yard at most in Diameter, or may
be not so much.
Philo. Strange, Alad. I had thought
him exceedingly large and at an
immense distance.
Aladzonia. By no means, I have observed
him accurately in every place and
found him still the same size
and at the same distance much
about the size of the moon at full.

63. *Phil.* And did he appear always
the same size to you, Aladzonia?
Alad. Yes, just the same in London
and Lisbon, the same in Sweden and
Turkey, the very same in every
place. —
Phil. That surprizes me out of
measure, that a body so small
as you think the sun, should app-
ear the same size at so many miles
distance.
Alad. Tis really True. I can assure
you of the truth of the fact—
Phil. And have you never observed
Aladzonia that a house, nay,
a mountain, at a few miles distance
appear exceeding small;
Yea, an Island, a Continent, I am
sure at a few leagues distance
at Sea seem to appear but
as it were a mote.
Aladzonia. Tis a just remark.

64 *Phil.* Well, then Dear Aladzonia, is
not a miracle in appearance that
the sun who is so small, not more than
a yard in Diameter, should appear the
exact size not varying one inch, in
countries so many thousands miles
distant from each other.

Aladzonia. I declare Phil, you have
confounded me; this is an Idea
never struck me before.
I am now convinced Phil. I am
wrong the sun must indubitably
be immensely larger and incon-
ceivable distant and must move
prodigiously fast seeing he describes
such a Circular path in so few
hours. —
Phil. Take care Aladzonia dont
say he moves so fast.
Aladz. Moves so swift? You question
that? Do you not see him rise in
the morning in the east and soon
move to the west and disappear?

Phil. Indeed, Aladzonia, it at a first
sight appears somewhat strange.
Yet I think upon a minute inves-
tigation it will appear most obvious.
When you consider how incompati-
ble it would be with the Divine Wis-
dom who wish not to create so many
worlds, who never thus light
and heat from the Sun to think
that the sun in complaissance to
our Earth should leave the centre
of its system and move round
us to show us light and afford
us that while those other worlds
many of them no doubt superior
to us in excellence must be left
to starve with cold and mould-
er in Darkness. Besides you know
when you approached land and
fixed your attention upon it
you thought the land moved
and the ship stood still so

we upon the earth carried around
from west to east immagine we
stand still and the Sun goes round.
Alad. In truth now Philomathes I am
amazed. I'm sure this all may be true

as far as I am able to comprehend
but as to these words you speak
of I pray you explain yourselve
and I shall be your scholar —
Phil. At a more favorable oppor-
tunity, Aladzonia, we shall
talk of these things, farewell—
Jany 21st 1809.

67

ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MEMORY

"MEMORIA excollenda augitur"
To ascribe bounds to the improve-
ment of memory is out of the
reach of an Individual —
The innumerable Terms, objects,
circumstances, persons, places, and
things that it can retain
are unquestionable proofs of its
extent and improvement —
The time was when the most exten-
sive memory retained but one
object. The first mark of memory in
Children is when they cry. Doubtless
the first time a child cries it is
sensible that it feels some unpleasing
sensation that it remembered it
did not feel before, hence, it cries
to have that greivance redressed and
to be replaced in that situation
where it is sensible it did not
experience that disagreeable sensation.

68 The memory at this time being very weak
is a proof that it Receives all its strength
and Activity from exercise. This is that
faculty which is still receiving new
improvement. Every new thing that presents
itself to us is a proof and addition to
its extension and an acquisition of
more strength. In those infant years
when children are only thought to breathe
or just like the young of every other animal

its memory is every day encreasing, it
is imperceptibly cultivating this faculty,
and perhaps the Memory receives more
improvement in these younger Years than
any other faculty and many more than at
any other period of life. When a child is
2 years old it is almost incredible what
knowledge it has acquired by
means of this faculty alone, none of the
other faculties being scarcely employed,
By claiming former perceptions and reflect-
ing, which are the employments of the
mind in those Younger Years —
And how is it that the child improves
this faculty? How is it that it has
acquired its early knowledge?

69 By this most important of all Rules
for improving this faculty,
Attention by. It remembers no
object to which it did not attend.
Did not the child attend to sounds
and closely apply the organ of
hearing it never could distinguish
one name from another. Did it
not attend to the objects of sight
it never could distinguish its nurse
from a lion. It would smile at the
opening jaws of a lion as soon and
as contentedly as at the smiles of
its nurse. Did it not attend to
touch and to sensations derived
therefrom, it would as easily walk
into the fire as to its chair.
In short, did not the child attend
to every thing that impresses its
senses and the impressions of its
mind it never could remember
any one object any more than
if it had been born blind and Deaf
or than if it spent its days
in some dark suberaneous vault

70 where light never entered. Hence attention
is the first and indeed the only means

of improving Memory. Without attention the Mind can neither associate, select, or arrange and this it will do naturally by attention. The child, when it hears the term "apple" seperated and applied often to a certain kind of fruit, it Remembers the fruit— its taste, colour, shape, etc. from its attending to it. Afterwards when you present the apple to the child it Remembers its name, its taste, etc. and when you present the name to its ear it remembers the fruit, etc. and also of a pear or Cherry. It associates in its mind the qualities of the one and of the other and selects or chooses the pear perhaps for its taste or the apple for its colour.—When the child advances a little older it can associate in a much greater and more extensive manner. —

71 It can associate whole classes etc. from some one quality which it discovers in one and all the classes.
By antiquity in objects, by arrangments, and by selection, the Memory is brought to the highest degrees of improvement and first by contiguity or Association in General. —
But of Attention more particularly. Attention is either voluntary or involuntary. A person may see or hear an object and not attend to it but he's perfectly in the same situation with him who never heard or saw the object, but if he attend to the object which he may do it he can remember it. As for example, I am passing through a crowd of people and thr're on all sides of me; but there is one person among them of some particular Differance, perhaps 3 hands, etc. He strikes

my attention. I, out of all the
crowd, remember him.

72 I may observe a number of houses with
out remembering any thing of them;
but if one of them be on fire I
remember because I attend to it.
It is as impossible to attend to an
object and not to remember it
as to remember an object to
which we did not attend. —
There are moderate degrees of
attention, and greater degrees of
attention. That to which we mode-
rately attend we only remember
in a faint manner and not long.
That to which we attend with
our utmost attention we well
remember and long.
There are many objects to which
we must attend from our interest
in them, because this interest
presses us on and is immediately
felt. There are other objects
that interest us but it is not

73 immediate, therefore, not felt
so acutely, to these we may or
may not attend. We may
read a page of a book over
an innumerable number of
times and mind nothing
of it. We may at another
time remember it all with
one half of the number remem-
ber it accurately as hence our
retention of objects depends
altogether upon our attention
to them—'tis by attention
we associate and arrange.
We may Divide Association
into 2 Divisions, association
of sound and of sight —
of mind, from the Rhyming
of lines I can remember

them much easier—I can
commit to memory 40 lines of

74 Rhymes sooner and with more ease than
30 lines of Prose. Contiguity
of objects of sight assist the
memory. I can remember the
fields, hills and valies, houses, etc.
of my paternal residence
from their contiguity. If I call
up, many other objects of sight
they occur and all at
once crowd into my memory.
In the same manner analagous
mental objects come into the
mind together as Beauty in
one object or some particular quality
occurring to my mind in some
objects excites the memory of all
objects that forms that beauty. —
Of Arrangement and
Selection, in a more convenient
time. Jany. 24th, 1809.

75 ESSAY 11—Jany. 24th, 1809

The Perfection of Imagination
consists in its activity, strength
and Regularity. Can these be
improved and how?

Whether or not the
Imagination be susceptible of
improvement has been a Doubt
and Dispute among men of
learning. Some have said
that a strong and active
Imagination belonged pecularly
to Poets, that men were born
so, that Nature had gifted
some in a particular manner
with a warm, vigorous active
Imagination, while she had too
sparingly conferred it on others.
Some have gone a little further
and allowed that Philosophers
and Astronomers as well as Poets

had been favoured in a peculiar
manner with this faculty. —

76 But in this we rest, that in ordinary
cases all men possess all the faculties
in at least a certain degree and
that all the active faculties of
the mind are susceptible of improve-
ment and that no man possesses
any one faculty in a degree so
extraordinarily superior at
first but that much depends
on culture; for example, some
fields will in a more productive
manner and with very little cul-
ture, will produce in a very liberal
manner, while others with double
labour will produce in a much
inferior manner. Yet neither the
good field nor the bad field
will produce without such
labour—likewise Marble in the
quarry, some sorts of it is more sus-
ceptible of polish and will admit
of a much more elegant polish
than others yet they both need the
skill of the polisher to bring to
light every ornamental vein & spot
in it —

77 Hence, the Imagination is susceptible
of improvement and does not differ
in individuals so much materially
as from Culture—But Activity
is the first grand characteristic
of a good Imagination. Activity
necessarily implies objects to act
upon; Active in reproducing objects,
active in forming new combinat-
ions and active in the manner
of reproducing them while con-
trasting objects, seperating them,
joining them and bringing
them to the bar of Reason.—All
this and more falls under the head

of activity—let us contrast this with
an inertive, dull, slow Imagi-
nation. It is slow in combining, repro-
ducing and barren in its production
while a good Imagination is prolifick
and fertile—Strength, another
of the Perfections of a good Imagin-
ation, both this and the former
are the result of habitual exercise.
The strong Imagination can act on

78 whole groups of Ideas and objects
can hold them up in a steady
manner to the Mind as a giant
with his right hand would hold
up a separ—steady, fierce and
bold, while the weak Imagination
holds up objects as a Dwarf in his
left hand would hold up a sword,
trembling, weak and ready to
fall.—For a patern of a strong and
active Imagination let us look to Milton
(see Essay on Genius, Page 12th)
The 3 and last of the marks of a good
Imagination is Regularity. This is
the effect of a strength. The object is
reproduced in a regular, clear and
conspicuous manner, not confused. All the
parts of it appear in due proportion,
symetry and regularity. Look to
Homer whose strong, active and
Regular Imagination, so clearly
paints Character and event. He forms
all his descriptions from his Imagina-
tion in a forcible, clear and perspicuous
manner which denotes, the strength,
activity, and regularity of his Ima -

79 Having demonstrated that the
Imagination is susceptible of imp-
rovement, we now proceed to point
out a few Rules for the improvement
of it. And first —
1. Lay in much materials—universal
knowledge as essentially

requisite for Imagination to act
upon in order to discover the name
of a warm, vigorous prolifick
Imagination. It is impossible
for the best Imaginations to form
Combination of materials with
out having materials
and a sufficient quantity of
them, —hence let him who wishes
to improve his Imagination get
well acquainted with persons
and things. —
2. Study the grand and the sublime.
Observe the grand and sublime
appearances of nature, be well
acquainted with the grand
and sublime in composition.

80 3. Make choice of such objects as can
afford the widest and most extensive
range for the fancy, and let the
Imagination work upon these —
4. From the first attempt to form
new combinations, let all over Imagi-
nation be subservient to reason,
observe method, regularity and order.
5. Begin as early as possible to cultivate
the Imagination. The Reason of
so many weak and unproductive
works of Imagination is that this
power is seldom cultivated in Youth
and is allowed to lay by till it
rust and never after will take
a Polish —
6. and last, make choice of proper
seasons for to exercise it and
dont fatigue but oft relief the Imagi-
nation with sensible objects.
By a strict observance of these
Rules, almost every common Imagi-
nation will in a short time derive
the name of strong, active and fertile.

81 A SHORT ACCOUNT OF
AND DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN A JUDGEMENT AND PROPOSITION

A judgement of the mind is the knowledge of a fact. A knowledge of the existing relations between two objects, of their agreement or disagreement is called a judgement; as for example, Snow is white. Having acquired an Idea of Whiteness and an Idea of Snow, by a comparison I observe that there is an agreement betwixt this quality of colour and the same quality in the snow, and by this act of the mind I am led to make this expression (which is called a proposition) snow is white, I affirm whiteness exists in snow. — — —
I may say snow is not black. By the same act of mind I am led to observe that the quality

82 blackness does not exist in snow, hence, I infer or I agree, that snow is not black. This is a negating or denying the existence of this quality in snow, hence the judgement snow is not black. This is called a negative-judgement. All our judgements are with affirmative or negative. But this act of the mind is variously exerted in acquiring of judgement which gives rise to a difference in judgements. The first act of the mind, or the first kind of judgement, is when the agreement or disagreement of 2 objects appears at first look is called intuitive, as a whole is greater than a part. Here all that is required is a notion of whole & part. This is called intuition. This kind of judgement is the foundation of that species of Reasoning which we call Demonstration; hence, the knowledge acquired in this manner is called Science —

*82 because in every step of the procedure
it carries its own evidence with it
and leaves no room for doubt or
hesitation. This class of judgement
expresses between our Ideas and
the same Relations must ever and
invariable exist between the same
Ideas. Our deductions in the
way of science constitute what is
called External, necessary and im-
mutable truth. Of this nature are
all the truths of natural Religion,
morality, of mathematicks, and
in general what ever may be gath-
ered from the mere view and con-
sideration of our Ideas. —
The second ground of human
Judgement is Experience —
from which we infer the existence
of those objects that surround
us and fall under the immedi-
ate notice of our senses—As
when I see the sun. I not only have
an Idea of this object within myself
* *Note:* Campbell has two p. 82s.

83 but ascribe to it a real existence out of
the mind. It is also by the information
of the senses that we judge of the quali-
ties of Bodies, as when we say the
snow is white, and when we say the fire
is hot or Iron is hard.—For as we are wholly
unacquainted with the structures of their
internal constitution of these Bodies, that
produce this activity in us, nay, and
are unable to have any connection between
that structure and the sensations them-
selves. It is obvious that we build our
judgements altogether by experience
or observation as ascribing to Bodies
such qualities as are answerable to
the perceptions they excite in us. —
By experience also we acquire our
knowledge concerning coexistence of
sensible qualities in objects and the

operation of Bodies one upon another. —
From what has been said Intuition
is the foundation of what we call
scientific knowledge. So is Experience
of Natural—for this lat being
wholly taken up with the objects of sense
or those Bodies that constitute the natural
world and their properties in so far as we
can discover them.

84 Being to be learned only by a long and
painful series of observations, it is ap-
parent that in order to improve this
branch of knowledge we must betake
ourselves to the method of trial and
experiment. Accordingly we find while
this was neglected little advance was
made in the philosophy of nature.
Whereas a contrary proceeding has
enriched the present age with many
valuable discoveries, insomuch that
natural knowledge in allusion to
the foundation on which it stands
has been very aptly called Experi-
mental Philosophy —
The third ground of human judge-
ment is Testimony, but though
experience be what we may term
the immediate foundation of natural
knowledge, yet with respect to par-
ticular persons, its influence is very
narrow and confined. The bodies
that surround us are numerous.
Many of them lie at a great distance
and some quite beyond our Reach.

85 Life too is short and full of cares
that little time is left for any one
man to unfold the mysteries of nature,
Hence it is necessary to admit many
things upon the testimony of others,
which by this means becomes a great
part of our knowledge of Body.
No man doubts of the power of *aqua*
regia to discover gold, though

perhaps he never made the experiment. However as we can have recourse to experience where any doubt or scruple arises this is justly considered as the true foundation of Natural Philosphy, being indeed, the ultimate support upon which our assent rests and whereto we appeal when the highest degree of evidence is registered.—But there are many facts that will not admit of an appeal to the senses, and in this case Testimony is the true and only foundation of our judgements — All human activities of what ever kind

86 when considered as already past are of the nature here described. From this we derive historical knowledge by which I mean not merely a knowledge of the civil transactions of states and kingdoms but of all facts whatsoever when testimony is the ultimate foundation of our belief. — It is necessary to observe that judgements in the sense here received denotes all acts of the mind, where only 2 Ideas are compared without the immediate interposition of the 3d, for when the mind joins or seperates 2 Ideas, though perhaps this is done in consequence of a hair of Reasoning previous — Yet if the understanding proceeds upon established notions without attending to that hair of Reasoning its determinations are still considered as acts of judgement. All our judgements when expressed in words are called

87 propositions. Let us now proceed to consider a little more particularly the nature and variety of these our Judgements.—A Proposition

therefore is a sentence expressing some
judgement of the mind whereby 2
or more Ideas are affirmed to agree
or disagree. Now as our judgements
include at least 2 Ideas, one of
which is affirmed or denied of the other
so must a proposition have terms
answering to these Ideas, —
the Idea of which we affirm or
deny, and of course, the term exp-
ressing that Idea is called the
subject of the proposition. The Idea
affirmed or denied, as also the
term answering it, is called the
Predicate.
The word that connects in the
proposition is called the *copula* and
the word used as the substantive verb
as God is omnipotent—it is often in
one word in Latin—the whole 3 as
Amo—I love—to *Ego sum amans* —
I am loving — — —

88 ESSAY 13

On the Quality, the Quantity,
the Materiality, the Substance,
of all Propositions—Rules
for Deleniating the quantity
of the Subject and Predicate,
Illustrated as particularly
Requisite for the study of the
Syllogism. Jany. 28th, 1809.
All propositions are either Affirmative
or Negative, as all our Ideas must
agree or disagree, when we affirm
that a certain quality as wholeness
exists in a certain subject as snow.
We make an affirmative judgement
as snow is white—but if we deny
the existence of a certain subject as
blackness in a certain subject as
snow, the proposition is negative:
as snow is not black. Hence,
Affirmation and Negation is
the quality of all proposition.

They are all affirmative or negative —

89 The quantity of Propositions is their universality or particularity, hence quantity is universal or particular. On account of quantity propositions are divided into universal, particular, indefinite & singular.
The universal proposition is when the subject is an universal term taken in its fullest extension and for the most part has these marks of universality prefixed to it—as all, now, every, etc., as "omnis homo est animal," "every man is an animal."
The particular proposition is when the subject is an universal term taken in a part of its extension. This has often then restrictive particle before it as "some, certain, etc." as "alqius homo est justis" "some man is just."
An indefinite is that whose subject is an universal term without the addition of any mark of quality, as "homo vive," "man lives."
The singular proposition is that whose subject is a singular term; as "Socrates fuet sapiens," as "Socrates was wise."

90 Logicians reduce indefinite Propositions to universals in necessary matters as "angels are incorporeal," and to particular in contigent matters as "a soldier defends the camp," but they always reduce a singular to an universal because they take their subjects in the whole of their extension, therefore they have only 2 sorts of Propositions in respect of quality; universal and particular. The best rule of distinction between universal and particular is where the predicate agrees to all the individuals comprehended under

the notion of the subject. There
the proposition is universal; where
it belongs only to some of them or to
some of the species of the general
Idea then the proposition is parti-
cular. This is an infallible criter-
ion and of easy application, and
much safer than to depend on the
common signs of all, some, every, none, etc.

91 because these being different, in different
languages, and often varying in their
signification, are very apt in many cases
to mislead the judgement. Thus if we
say "All the soldiers when drawn up
formed a square of an hundred
men aside," it is evident that the
predicate cannot be affirmed of the
several individuals but of the whole
collective idea of the subject; whence by
the Rule given above the proposition
is not universal but particular.
Note on singular propositions, some
say they are universal, others particular,
as, "This Book contains some useful
truths," "Sir Isaac Newton was the
inventer of fluxions." The subject of such
being taken in its whole extension has
the same effect in Reasoning as universals
but if it be Considered in truth that they
are the most tender of all propositions
particular, and that no proposition can
with propriety be called universal whose
subject is not an universal Idea, we
shall not be long in determining to
what class they justly belong.

92 When we say "Some books contain
useful truths," the proposition is parti-
cular because the general term
appears with a mark of restriction.
If therefore we say "This book contains
useful truths," 'tis evident that the
proposition must be still more
restricted, as "this" is more restrictive

than "some." There are instances
where the singular proposition has
the same effect as the universal
yet this is not by reason of any
proper universality belonging
to them but because the conclusion
being always in such cases singular
may be proved by a middle term
which is also singular. —
On account of quantity and quality
Propositions are divided into four kinds
or classes, which are denoted by the
4 first vowels A-E-I-O. A—denoting
an universal affirmation, as
"Every man is an animal." Here it
is first affirmed that man is an animal
2, universally of the whole class, every man
and 3d, according to the first Rule for discovering
the quantity of the Predicates, the predicate

93 is taken particularly; here the
predicate "animal" is taken particularly of
every man, i.e., any man is an animal
and every man is animal-or some animal
is every man, or one animal is every man not every animal is a man.
E-denotes an universal nega-
tive as "no man is a stone." Here it
is first denied that man is a stone,
2, universally, that no man is a stone,
and according to the 2 general Rule for
discovering the quantity of predicates in
negative propositions, "stone"
is taken in the its whole extension that no
stone of any kind is a man.
I—denotes a particular affirmative, as
"Some man is just." Here is is not universally
"every man is just" but it is affirmed of
some particular men that they are just. Here
according to the above Rule, the predicate is
particularly, as Justice is not only in some
man but "some man is just."
O-Particular negative, "some man is not
just," Here it is not denied of every man
but of some particular man. But according
to the 2 Rule the predicate is taken
universally as "no justice is in some man."

Whatever is affirmed or denied of a genus,
is affirmed of every class, every individual,
under that genus.

94 as, "Every animal lives. Men live. Brutes
live. Birds live. A cock sparrow lives, etc.
AN ORATION
to be delivered on Saturday the
4th Feby. in the Society of
Logicians—to prove that murder
is the only crime to be punished by
Death ——
We do not intend to examine
whether it be consentanious with Divine
Revelation or compatible and congruous
with the laws of our Nation that
a man should suffer punishment
by death for any crime
save homicide. From both I'm debarred.
And what have I left to prove my
assertion which is that a man should
not suffer death for any crime save
homicide—nought but whether it
be consonant with Reason or no;
Reason then is the only standard,
the only criterion! Alas, a standard
often crookened, often twisted, pliant.
Reason let us bid her well beware
lest by some fair appearing good
she dictate false and

Note: Here two leaves (four pages) have been torn out of the book. The numbering is continuous and shows that the pages were numbered after the pages were torn out. Did Campbell tear out what he had written on capital punishment because he later came to a different conclusion?

95 OF THE SYLLOGYSM

A Syllogysm is a sentence that expresses
a simple judgement of the mind
or it is the inference drawn from two
Propositions which inference is the 3d propo-
sition in the Syllogysm, the 3
propositions of a Syll are thus re-
solved. Before a Judgement can be
formed there must be a comparison of
2 things with a third. The first

proposition is the observed agreement
or disagreement of the first of the 2
things compared with the 3d or the
standard as it is called, as if I say
"every animal lives,
every man is an animal,
hence every man is a living Creature." Now
the comparison of the 2d thing with the
3d is the 2 judgement or proposition and
the expression of agreement or disagree-
ment is the 3 Proposition in the Syl,—
In every syllogysm there must be 3
terms, and these are generally repeated
but there are but 3 different terms, namely
the 2 extremes and the middle term
to which they compared. "Is man a
living creature," this is called the

96. syllogystick question. Man
and living are the 2 extremes,
because they are the most remote
in their agreement or disagreement.
As it is not yet known, the middle
term is this: "Every man is an animal."
Therefore every man is a living creature.
Animal is the term to which man
and living is compared and is
called the middle term.
Of these 2 Extremes one of them is
more extensive than the other. The
more extensive is called the Major
Extreme and that of the less Extension
the Minor Extreme, as "Is Man
an accountable Creature."
"All Reasonable Creatures are accountable"
"Man is a Reasonable Creature"
Ergo, "Man is an accountable Creature."
The Major Extreme here in this syll.
is "accountable." Why? Because its
extension is greater than the other
extreme "man." How? Angels are account-
able and men. The minor term
here is "Man." It hath less extension
than accountable.

97 When the syllogystick question is asked
the magus extreme is the Predicate of
the question and of the conclusion, so
that it hath the greater Extension.
The minus extreme is the subject of
the conclusion. In the premisses
the major extreme is found in
the magus proposition & the minus in
the lesser proposition, Q.E.D. The third
is called the Middle term to which
the 2 extremes are compared, but to
point them out more perspicuously
as the Relation between the Ideas of
Man and accountableness comes
not within the immediate view of
the mind. We must compare them
with the third term. The 2 premisses
and the conclusion compose the whole.
1st minus extreme was 2 major extreme
"accountableness," then are to be compared
with the Middle term which is "Reason-
ableness." These are the premisses, Man
accountable, Reasonableness, whence the
conclusion, "Man is an accountable Crea-
ture" is drawn.

98 The conclusion is that other proposition
in which the Extremes themselves are
joined or seperated, so that the pre-
dicate of the conclusion is the major
term and the subject of the
conclusion is the minus term,
but that proposition that compares
the Major Extreme or the
predicate of the conclusion with
the middle term is called the major
proposition and when the subject
of the conclusion or lesser extreme
is compared with the middle term
is called the Minus proposition.
When a Syllogysm is proposed in
due form the Major proposition
is always placed first, the
minor next and the conclusion last.

The 3 grand axioms of the
Syllogysm are
1st What soever things agree
with the same middle term
agree with one another or
in other words, the extremes
that agree with the same
third agree with one another.

99 This is one of the Geometrical
axioms of Euclid in matter.
Although different a little in
words, his axiom is: things
that are equal to the same are
equal to one another. This is a
self evident truth.
2 When one of the Extremes or
terms agrees with the same middle
term and the others do not then
do not agree but disagree among
themselves as things that are
not equal with the same
are not equal with one another.
3 When neither of the terms agrees
with the same third, the Extremes
may or may not agree among
themselves, as 2 things that are
unknown may or may not agree.
We can't say which.
Examples to each —
Man is an accountable creature
Every creature possessed of Reasonable-
ness is an accountable creature,

100 The 2 extremes are man and accountable:
man the minus and accountable
the magnus extreme. Reason-
ableness the middle term, now
compare the minus extreme to the
middle term. We see it agrees.
Man is a Reasonable creature.
This is the minus proposition. The
minus is compared with the middle.
Now compare Accountable the
magus extreme with the middle

term reasonableness. We see they agree. This is the magus proposition, for the above reason. Now both the extremes agree with the middle term, ergo, man is an accountable creature by the 1st Axiom. Extremes that agree with the same middle term agree with one another.

Example to the 2 Axiom—
A stone is an accountable creation. Everything possessed of Reasonableness is accountable.

101 I compare the minus extreme, to wit, stone, with the middle term Reasonableness. I find they disagree. I compare accountableness with Reasonableness. I find they agree, hence the one agrees with the middle term and the other disagrees, hence the extremes do not agree but disagree. By 2 axiom I draw this conclusion: stones are not accountable.

When John died he was happy.
Every one who is regenerated is happy.
I compare the minus extreme John to the middle term regenerated. I don't know whether John was regenerated or no. I don't know whether they agree or disagree. When I compare happy with regeneration I don't know whether happiness agrees or disagrees with regeneration or not. I cant say whether John is happy or miserable according to the 3 axiom.

102 The General Rules of Syllogysm explained and elucidated by examples.
Rule First
The middle term cannot be twice taken particularly but must be universal once it has. For if it be twice taken

particularly there are 2 middle
terms and four in the Proposition
"for if the middle term be taken for
two different parts or kinds of
the same universal idea then the
subject of the conclusion is compared
with one of these parts, and the
predicate with another part and
this will never show whether that
subject and predicate agree or
disagree. There will then be
4 distinct terms in the Syllogysm
and the 2 parts of the question
will not be compared with the
same 3 idea as if I say "Some
men are pious and some men
are Robers." I can never infer
that some Robbers are pious, for the
middle term men being 2
103 taken particularly it is not the same
men that (are compared with) are
spoken of in the major and minor
Proposition." (Watt)

Rule Second The Terms in
the conclusion must never be taken
more universally than they are in
the Premisses. The reason of this
will appear quite obvious when
we consider this axiom: that all
particular propositions are included
in Universals and of course may
be inferred thence, but universals
cannot be contained in particulars
nor can they be derived from them.

3 Rule From 2 negative premisses
nothing can be inferred, for neither
of the Extremes agrees with the third—
or middle term—for this reason, they
seperate the middle term both from
the subject and predicate of the
conclusion and according to the 3
general axiom when 2 things dis-
agree with the third we cant infer
whether they agree or disagree with

each other, yet where the negation
is a part of the middle term the 2
premisses may look like negatives

104 according to the words and yet one of
is affirmative in sense. What has no
thought cannot reason but a worm
has no thought and yet cannot
reason.
4 Rule From two affirmative
propositions there follows an affirma-
tive conclusion because the extremes
agree with the same middle term.
This is so plain as to need no
comment.
5 Rule The Conclusion follows
the weaker part of the proposition,
that is, negative and particular
propositions are accounted
inferior and of course weaker
than affirmative and universal.
That is, if one of the premisses
be particular the conclusion will
also be particular, and if one of the
premisses be negative, the conclusion
will be negative, because one of the
extremes does not agree with the
third term but if one of the
premisses be particular the conclusion
will be particular.

105 To be More Particular
If one of the premisses be particular
the conclusion will be particular
In the first place we observe that if
one of them be particular the other
must be universal, as there is but
2 sorts of quality—universality or par-
ticularity. Now according to this, one
of the premisses is universal and the
other is particular. According to the
foregoing rule the conclusion follows
the weaker part and particularly
the weaker proposition. Therefore
according to the same rule you see the

conclusion is particular. This is
quite evident. Now in the second place
let us observe that if the premisses
be one of them particular and the
other universal, one of them must
be affirmative for if both of them
be negative according to the 3
general Rule no conclusion can be
drawn. But one of them is particular
according then to the Rules for quantity
every affirmative proposition the
predicate is taken particularly
now one of them is affirmative.

106 The conclusion may be either a parti-
cular affirmation or a particular
negation. Now let us first sup-
pose that it is a particular
affirmation. Now in this case
the Premisses are both affirmative,
for if one of them were negative
the conclusion would according
to the 5 Rule be negative. Hence,
the premisses are both affirmative.
Now by the first Rule for quan-
tity the 2 Predicates are taken
in the premisses particularly.
Now there is truth in universal
propositions in the premisses
and that must be the middle
term for if the middle term
be not universal there must
be 2 particular middle terms
and 4 in the Syllogysm
which is absurd, now as the
middle term is the universal
proposition and therefore the
subject of the conclusion will
be a particular affirmation.

107 But if the conclusion be a parti-
cular negative one of the premisses
must be negative, for if they
were both affirmative there would
not be a negative conclusion.

Now 2 of the terms in the premisses
are particular; that is the predi-
cate of the affirmative and the
subject of the particular. Therefore
they other subject and predicate
an 2 universals but one of them
is the middle term and one of
them, to wit, the predicate of the
conclusion, is universal, therefore
the subject of the conclusion is
particular. not correct—

but this may be demonstrated
in a clearer manner thus:
When the conclusion is a particular
affirmation the premisses must be
both affirmative for by Rule 5 if one
of them were negative the conclusion
would be negative, but it is affirmative
in every affirmative proposition. The
predicate is taken particularly
hence the 2 predicates of the proposition
are particular, but the subject

108 of one of the propositions by hypothesis
is particular which makes 3 terms
particular and leaves one to
be universal which must be the
subject of the other proposition
and is the middle term which
must by Rule first be universal
but by Rule 2d the extremes cant
be taken more universaly in
the conclusion than in the premisses
and the middle term cant descend
into the conclusion hence the
subject of the proposition must
be a particular, a term taken
in a parts of its extremes.

A Particular negative conclu-
sion must have one of the premisses
affirmative, for if they
were both negative no conclusion
by Rule 3 can be drawn and
if both affirmative, no negative
conclusion by Rule 4 could be drawn,

hence one of the premisses is affirmative,
the other negative.

109 In every affirmative proposition then
the predicate is taken particularly
which disposes of one of the terms,
and in every negative proposition
the predicate is taken universally.
2 of the Extremes, as terms in the
premisses, by hypothesis, one of
the proposition is particular
whose subject must be a particu-
lar and whose predicate is
an universal. There are 2 univ—
and 2 Neg. terms in the premisses.
One of them must be the middle
term and the other because the
conclusion is negative must
have its predciate universal
and its subjects as particular
negative. —

Rule 6

If the premisses be both particular
no conclusion can be drawn—
for if one of them be a neg—
its predicate must be an univ—
and its subject particular and
if an affirmative they are both

110 particular hence the middle ter.
is particular and contrary
to all Rules. There can be no
conclusion.

Of the Form of Syllogysm

The form of a Syllogysm is
the proper disposition of the
3 terms so as to deduce
the Conclusion from the premisses.

Under this are Figure and
Mood of Syllogysm.

The Figure of Syllogysm
is the apt disposition of the
middle term in the premiss
which may be done 4 ways—
3 from Aristotle's Logick and one

from Galen—
The first is when the middle
term is the subject of the
magus proposition and the
predicate of the minor
ex omni homo sentit
omnis homo est animal
ergo—omnis homo sentes

111 As all that can be said necessarily
more is said in the 14, 15,16,17
18,19, 20, 21 22, 23, 24 Pages of the
Latin compend we pass over it here.
On the Evidence of the Senses
By Evidence is meant the grounds
of our Judgements, and is of
3 sorts—Inductive, Deductive
and Testimony. Under inductive
is included the evidence of the
senses and the Evidence of
Memory. By the evidence of
the senses is meant the
proof of the existence of the
material traits, the means
by which we acquire all our
knowledge of extensive sensible
objects, but as the proof
of the information of the
senses has been denied by
some and called in question
by others we shall proceed to
inquire into the truth of

112 the information of the senses.
We shall first inquire into the
imperfections and deceptions.
I Into the objects perceived and
the subsequent judgements.
There is no perfection in any
of the senses but they have
all their imperfections; as
I cant see a bullet in the air
or a man 20 miles off—this
is imperfection but not deception.
Deception is when the senses

deceive us by false representation
as the sun appears but a foot
broad or a picture or
canvas appears rough &
prominent whereas it is false
but then things depend much
upon the medium by which
we perceive object—
2 Although the objects may
be all perceived yet

113 the judgements formed afterward
may be incorrect and by con-
sequence we may be thus deceived
not by the perception but by
the subsequent judgement.
As if I put a straight stick
in water it appears crooked
but when taken out appears
straight again, thus the
judgements corrects and altho
the stick appeared crooked
yet our judgements correct this.
In this case the judgements
correct right, but of the rest
of this exercise in notes.

Feby 16th, 1809

{ Written in the class
in a few minutes when afraid
of being called up — —
— 2 Essays grew in one.
upon classification and exam-
pliefied by 18th chap, of Proverbs
and then upon 64 kinds of Sylogysms
and 12 concluding moods.

114 ESSAY 17th—Feb. 20th

On the various sorts of themes

A theme is a proposition that will
admit of a regular discussion
or a proper arrangement of our ideas
on any subject and is either simple
or complex.
A theme is derived from
Tiqhmi—to place or next in order and

is the regular methodical arrangement of our Ideas upon a subject worthy of our minute investigation and either simple or complex. A simple theme is a subject that is expressed in one word as Virtue, Man, or if it be expressed by more than one word has neither affirmation or negation as "the fall of the Roman Empire or the burning of Troy.— The Rules for conducting a simple theme are 5— 1st—the word or subject of the theme must be considered, its origin and different signification. If it be ambiguous the ambiguity must be

115 removed that there may be no room left for doubt or suspicion. 2d—That the qualities of the situation they may be, may be considered whether essential, proper or secondary, as in "Logick is an art to direct the powers of knowledge in search of truth" and then to point out its other qualities, etc. 3—That they rise, progress, origin and fall of the subject if the subject admits of it. 4—Concerning the Relation of that subject with other subjects as the Art of Logick with the Art of Rhetorick. 5—Divide it into its parts by the laws of division if the subject will admit of such division.

A complex theme is a whole sentence expressing an affirmation as "the human will is free" or a negation as "the human will is not free." The Rules for a simple theme are involved in the

116 complex but a complex theme may
be handled either in a solitary
or social manner.
A solitary theme is when the
subject is handled by ones self
without the aid of any person.
It is either an exegesis or analy-
sis.

An exegesis is either theological
or logical. The logical belongs
only to us at present and in the
illustration or conformation of
a dubious important proposition
as "the freedom of the human will." It
consists in 3 parts:
First, the prefatory remarks
clearing up the terms and is
called the *para kina.*
Second is the confirmation or
[? ?]
Then the [? ?] or the answer-
ing of the objections.
The other kind of solitary theme
is the analysis and in which

117 we are to observe the 5 following
particulars:
first, he must answer
who it is that speaks
what are his principles.
2d To whom is it addressed—to a
learned—to an ignorant—assembly—
to a strict or a mixed audience.
3 Concerning what
4 Upon what occasion—upon
a mournful subject as a funeral
sermon—on an action sermon—
5 With what Mind—all then
are to be attended to by the
Analysis and last of all the
style, the Composition, etc.
The Social is when there are
more than one. 2 or more engaged
as of 2 parts Dialogue and

Dispute, — of then before —

ESSAY 18 Feby 25th

118 On the ARISTOTELIAN
Method of Dispute

"An inter Disputationis Scholasticus
aut inter Sylvas Academicae
quaerere verum utilus est—"
In this exercise we shall first describe
the Aristotelian method of dispute—
2 Point out the advantages that
accrue from it.
3 The Disadvantages that arise
from it,
and 4 Examine whether the advantages
or disadvantages preponderate.
First the method of Dispute—
The persons employed in these Disputes
were denominated the Respondent,
the opponent, and the Praesis or the
Arbiter, the office of the Respondent
was at a certain time before the
Dispute to compose and
publish a Thesis. At least 2 parts of
a thesis, the [? ?] and [? ?]
As the third part was anticipating
the opponents office it was omitted.
Then he had to defend this Thesis
which was upon a dubious subject against
all objections that might be

119 offered, which he done by refuting all
the Arguments preferred.
The office of the opponent was to oppugn
the Thesis which he done in the following
manner. When the Respondent had
ascended the Rostrum and in a modest
manner read over his thesis, the oppo-
nent arose and in a polite manner
thanked the Respondent for the Informa-
tion he had given him in his thesis
and then in a modest manner oppugned
the subject which he done by bringing
forward his objections in a regular
manner and after having sufficiently

stated them concentrated them into a
Regular Syllogysm concluding
in both mood and Figure which
was called an anti-thesis, against the
Thesis. This the Respondent repeated
over before he answered it that
the opponents might have time to
make any amendements or alterations
he thought necessary. The Respondent's
terms were in his answer. If he passed
on to the Conclusion he said "trannor
major or trannor minor."
If he denied them he said,

120 "negator major or negator minor" If he
allowed them to be just he said,
"Considitor major-considitor minor." If
he desired them to be limited or distinguished
he said, "limitanda est minor or major."
3 The office of the Praesis was to address
the audience, which generally were
very respectable and numerous,
by an Introduction to the discourse
pointing out the important advantages
that resulted from such a dispute.
Afterwards by assisting the Respondent
if he stood in need as he was most
exposed to be puzzled and disconverted.
If the answers were to the point he
applauded them and if they were
ambiguous or doubtful in the least
degree he cleared off the ambiguity
and made the answer perspicuous —
and last of all concluded by some
decisive orations which concluded the
whole dispute and pointedly decides
in favor of some side of the thesis —

SECOND—on the Advantages
of this Method of Dispute —

121 1. As the Respondent had to be prepared
to defend his Thesis before a numerous
assembly and as his honor, his
litterary character, his reputation
were at stake, he no doubt

closely studied the matter of his
Thesis so that he might be able
to defend it against every argument
preferred; and the opponent in like
manner analyzed, compared and
scrutinized for the sake of finding
out arguments which improved
him in knowledge and in short
exercised both their mental powers
in a great degree which was one
very formidable advantage—
2. It sharpens the judgement,
calls knowledge
from every quarter whether classical,
historical, commercial or political and
in a moment invents new arguments,
proofs, etc. which improves the Invention.
3. It produces a steady reflected sort
of mind, a strength of memory, keeps
the mind constantly on the look out
as it knows not whence an attack
may come and by an habitual civilness
and reflection improves the mind in

122 to a great degree. —
4. Versatility of speech is a natural
consequent from such Debate. Having
first studied the subject gives us a command
of words upon it and then in the dispute
it produces a fluency and easeness of
speech, an important thing for
a Scholar—and 5h

Disadvantages that flow.

First pertinacity of mind disposes us
to be censorious. We are prone to carry
this obstinacy of temper into the world
and makes us a disagreeable
companion and a torment to society.
2. It produces a skeptical state of
mind, leads us to doubt, to call every
thing into question, and to believe
almost nother, scarcely Devine
Revelation. It leads to Deism
and even sometimes to call our
Senses in question.

3. It creates an ascent of law to truth, and leads us often to a breach of truth rather than loss of an argument. In this manner it may alienate us to truth, promote skepticism and

123 pertinacy of speech. These, however, are not, as the advantages, necessary but possible consequents, hence we may conclude in favor of it, provided those who undertake it are duly informed of their ill effects and strive to guard against them and likewise that they be equal to the task by an extensive knowledge of men & things—so we conclude by observing that by some slight improvement upon this old Art many useful valuable and important consequent as advantages would necessarily flow both to the individuals employed and to the auditors.

DIVISION OF THE 18th Chap, of Provb —By Mr. Jardan

1. Intellectual endowments, Verses 1.2.4.15.16.18-20, 21
2. Intellectual deffects, 5, 8,13,17
3. Good disposition influencing conversation and conduct 3-10-12-14-24
4. Bad-ditto-ditto 6-7-19
5. Character affected by condition of life 9-11-22-23

124 ESSAY 19th

It is required to illustrate the difference betwixt the powers of knowledge and the powers of taste; and to explain the effects of the emotions of taste upon the Imagination —

By the powers of knowledge I understand those powers of the mind by which we acquire knowledge either by immediate perception or by comparison —

By the powers of taste I mean
those powers of the mind by which
we receive pleasure from the
beauties of nature, and of Art.
The powers of taste are powers of
sensation or sensibility, and differ
from the powers of knowledge
in the following respects:
1. The powers of knowledge are
active in acquiring knowledge,

* that is, that faculty whether it be
perception, Reflection or Reasoning
(by which we acquire knowledge)
which is directed to any object
that we may know it is exerted in
the act of acquiring knowledge of
that object, but
The powers of taste, are passive in
receiving sensations; that is, those
powers of the mind which receive
sensations need not to be directed
or exerted in the receiving of those
sensations. The qualities in the
objects which cause the sensation
make the impression upon those
powers without—upon the mind as (to make
use of an external sensible example)
the seal doth upon the wax
the seal adhere as the powers of
knowledge are in acquiring nature
and the wax as the powers
of sensation is passive in
receiving the Impression.

**124 The powers of knowledge act inde-
pendent of any other assistance
only they are under the command
of the will. But,
The powers of taste can receive no
impressions from the qualities of any
object without the previous exercise
of the powers of understanding

* This page is unnumbered.
* * This is a repetition of number on page 75.

hence the powers of taste are
conferred powers because they
include powers of Intelligence
and of sensibility. The former
active and the latter passive —
The powers of knowledge, and
the powers of taste differ also
in their object and end:
The powers of knowledge in their
acts are not necessarily accompanied
with pleasure or pain but the powers
of sensibility are always affected
by agreeable or disagreeable
impressions. The objects of
the powers of knowledge may

125 be external or internal, material or
mental, but the objects of taste
are all external and their
inroads are not so numerous as
the inroads of knowledge —
But to proceed to the second
part, which is to show the effects
of the emotions of taste upon the
Imagination.
The direct and im-
mediate pleasure received from the
objects impressions made upon the
powers of taste is little when
compared to the pleasure produced
by the effect of the emotions of taste
upon the Imagination—and this
is owing to the association of
Ideas which the contemplation of
the object that produce the pleasing
emotions, suggests for this Reason
objects the contemplation of which
will produce no pleasure or very
little in one individual when compared to that which

126 others receive from the contemplation
of the same objects because the
latter has an association of
Ideas along with the contempla-
tion of the object which give

wings to the Imagination, and
it soears aloft through Regions of
pleasure which the other image cant
do for the want of having
the same Ideas to associate
along with the contemplation
to give wing to his Imagination
and to set it in flight, as
that famous Swiss song which
one can hear without almost
any pleasing emotions yet
were it to be sung to the Switz
soldiers in a foreign land
it would fire their Imagina-
tion to that degree so that the effect is
wrild heur (?)

127 we cant concur. It has to be
prohibited to be sung in their
hearing when in a distant
land. —

However, the object that
produces the first emotion must
have some qualities interesting
to give wing to the Imagination
to set it in motion which if
nothing retard will produce
great pleasure in the Imagination,
considerably augment the plea-
sure in contemplating the object,
for example, when I see those
fields where in the fervour of
youths warm emotion, my
old companions and I spent the
evening hours in pleasing
amusements; in the midst
of those fields I see the old
shady oak under which
my forefathers in their turn

128 sat—all now gone to their long
home, so that I may say
that that oak has droped
its masters as it droped its
leaves; there my Imagination

flies first to former days
and traces then my
past Ancestors from those
days when like me they
thought all mortal but
themselves. Through all
their life, even to the grave, and am next
lead to imagine that
in future days some per-
haps of my descendants
shall in like manner
view this tree with the same
emotions concerning me then —

129 gone the way of all my
ancestors. So I am filled here
with Pious thoughts to that
Being in whose hands are my
life and breath and all
my concerns.—I don know
of any object more calculated to
excite the most pleasing
emotions and to give full
scope to the Imagination as
to see a person dig a grave in some
burying place where stands
an ancient Cathedral; let me
imagine myself digging a
grave then, where in every
shovel full some atom that
once had its part in the
organization of an human
being is cast up.

130 When I find the Remains of the
Infant, the stripling, the
youth, the man of mature
age and the man of many
years, crumbled among
one another and blended
together in the same mass —
how infant smiles, beauty,
strength and youth, with
old age, weakness and de-
formity lie undistinguished

in the same promiscuous
mass of matter, I am lost
and sunk in Imagination.
I trace them through what
I would think to be their
various scenes of life, I
trace them in my Imagina-
tion so to speak from the
womb to the grave—

131 My mind is filled with
Imagination too big for
birth —

Essay 20th On the
Purpose served in our
Constitution by the Reflexe
sense of Beauty:

Doubtless the wise Author of our
nature has not endowed us
with any faculties of mind or
body that are not useful to
us and conferred on us for
good and wise ends that
we might be capable of admiring
the works of Creation and there-
in behold the wisdom, power
and goodness of the Author, that
we might be enabled to
observe the grandeur, sublimity
and beauty of all his
works and receive pleasure

132 in contemplating his goodness
in thus preparing an
habitation for us—he hath
endowed us with powers of
receiving pleasures from the
beauties of nature and Art,
these powers are called internal senses.
Each particular power differs
from another in itself in the
qualities of external objects
that make an impression on
it. In the emotions produced
in the mind and, in the

final cause, but as we are
to confine ourselves to the purposes
served in our constitution by
the internal sense of Beauty
we shall proceed to point
them out---------—
That as Man is destined for
the enjoyment of perfect beauty
hereafter it was wise and

133 kind in the wise Author of
Nature to give him a
taste for it and a sense
to feel it.
The objects that man in his future
state of happiness is destined to behold
are represented to us in Divine
Revelation, as perfectly beautiful —
(both in color, proportion and variety)
not only the objects which he is to
behold but the sounds which he
is to hear are to be harmonious
and beautiful to the ear. Were
he then entirely unacquainted
with what is beautiful in sight
or sound, had he no sense to feel
it nor taste for it, all those Dis-
criptions would be of no avail,
no inducement to him to excite
him to virtuous actions that he
might enjoy his happiness forever.

134 But that we might be excited by
these Representations, to seek for
this happiness, our present con-
sitution is so organized as to
view pleasure from these
qualities, called the beautiful, in external objects
insomuch that the eyes is not
satisfied with seeing nor the
ear with hearing. No qualities
in objects make such an impression
upon the mind, nor excite
so much desire for the possession
as the Beautiful.

2. It tends to make this present state
more pleasing —
From none of the Internal senses
do we receive so much pleasure
as from the sense of beauty—no
qualities in objects interest us
so much as the beautiful.

135 The vast variety of beautiful
qualities in the works of creation
and of Art have given rise to
this definition of taste: that it
is the power of receiving pleasure
from the beauties of Nature and of
Art. —
It produces the most refined Pleasure.
To prove this let us suppose Man to
have no sensation of Beauty, and
then where is his pleasure? —
If he have any it must be of the
most gross kind; sensual and
only pleasing as good or evil—
where would be the beauties of the
rising and setting sun, of the
Radiance of the risen day and
all the variety of color in the
speckled clouds that stand pro-
portional on the face of the vast
concave of heaven. Where would be

136 the pleasing trains of Imagination
that would naturally be associated
with such a beautiful scene.
Not possessed of a sense of Beauty
we must behold this otherwise beauti-
ful scene with as much coldness and in-
differency as we would the dark
night and irregular motion of
some ill shapen object —
not the harmony of human voices
nor the wabling melody of the
grove, would excite one more
pleasing emotion than
most ungrateful sounds or
than the most discordant sounds

or the solemn
silence of the moonless night.
3. It proves an Incentive to the
study of nature, when delighted-
ly the exterior appearances
of the works of nature

137 are convicted to study the causes
and to trace the effects of this Beauty
and in our studies we are lightened
by the beauties interfused and
our mind is every where
relieved by the occurrence of what
is beautiful, and filled with
the most pleasing sensations —
*Note: those powers are called inter-
nal sense from an analogy or
resemblance betwixt them and
the external organs of sense.
The desire for beauty is not
lessened by new gratifications.
In short all the beauties of spring
and of the blooming year with
all the variety and beauties in
the works of nature and art
would excite in us no more pleas-
ing Emotions than were all
nature a mere jargon of
discordances and a chaos of confusion.

* Whereas on the other hand we find
the most refined pleasure
in the contemplation of the beauty
of color, proportion and harmony,
of all the works of creation and
the beauties of Art than in
any other powers or capacity
of taste with which we are en-
dowed.

* What is meant by a standard.
What is meant by a standard of taste.
What is the standard of taste?
By a standard we understand

* *Note:* These pages are unnumbered in the manuscript.

that which is the test of other things
of the same kind, that to which
things of the same kind are compared,
that we may appreciate their true
value. It must be of undoubted
Authority else it cannot properly
be called a standard, such as
a yard is that standard by which
we measure certain commodities,
a quart is a standard by which
we appreciate liquids, a pound
by which we appreciate solid
bodies, etc. and a guinea of a
certain weight by which we appre-
ciate other guineas or gold —
By a standard of taste we
understand that test to which
we compare works of taste in
order to appreciate their worth.

138 To it we bring works of taste.
We compare them by it and judge
of them accordingly. That stan-
dard of taste to which we compare
works of taste that we may appre-
ciate their worth is General
Approbation, that which is
in general esteemed true taste
but as all men cannot be said
to be judges of the works
of taste, we cannot by general
approbation understand the whole
common multitude of mankind, only those of
them who from education or culture
may be so enabled to judge of
the productions of others and bring
them to that which is the opinion
of the generality of the learned -
Even not all the learned can
be properly called the true judges
or the standard bearers of taste

139 in general as there are many
works of taste of a quite different
species from one another there must

be a particular standard for each. For instance, in sculpture, in music, in poetry, in painting, they must have their seperate standards hence it must be only those whose education and practice has been most particularly applied to works of taste of this or that species that can properly be said to be the general approvers whose opinion is the standard of this or that object of taste as the poet of poetry, the painter of painting, and the musician of music. General approbation must still be qualified a little farther. As there are certain periods in society favorable to genius and improvement, favorable to improvement in taste and to fine Arts, so there are

140 certain periods in society when the General Approbation cannot be the most proper standard. For example, the General Approbation of the learned in the Scholastic Age would not be so good a standard for us to approach our works of taste as the General Approbation of the last century. When the terms General Approbation are thus qualified we admit it to be the only just and surest standard of taste.

March 30th —1809

141 Some thoughts on Sensations, etc. External objects which produce sensations in the mind make their way to the mind by means of the external organs of sense. Some sensations are more acute and permanent than others, even the same sensations reed, from the same sensible objects

differ in degrees of intensity
according to the organ through
which the impression is acquired.
For example, by two organs I
can acquire an Idea of war
or of an immediate attack. When
thirty thousand are slain on each
side I get a knowledge of this
by one of two mediums of convey-
ance—I can read or hear of it.
I can hear all the horrors des-
cribed in the most expressive
manner, hear of the Death of this
and that Captain or general
described minutely.

142 I can hear with such a degree
of pity and interest myself
so much as to weep for its dire
effects, in one word I have reed,
such an impression of it that
I feel most poignantly. But
were I to have been a party present,
had I had my hand in the martial
scene, and had seen thousands
of my fellow creatures fall at my
side and behold their garments
soiled in their own blood, I must
have felt in a manner many
times more acute than in the
former case and have received
impressons or sensations infinitely
more permanent than had I only
read of it—June 1st, 1809
— Continued Thoughts

143 Thoughts on habit —
Very powerful are the effects of habit.
In one way its effects are the most
happy and in another the most
baneful. In the former case when
its effects are most happy is when by it
we learn an useful art. With how
much facility and dexterity does the
musician lift and place his fingers

upon a musical Instrument when he
has been habituated to it for a number
of years when compared to the efforts
he made in playing the first time.
In like manner the Rope Dancer
and many other, many more valuable,
occupations are learned by habit—
such as all the fine arts and many
of the Common Arts.--------
But 2dly, as it is the baneful
and pernicious effects of habit I
wish most to illustrate—
Habit is like an Instrument, it
is good when employed to good
and valuable acts, and evil when
applied to pernicious ones but its

144 baneful effects steal much more in-
sensibly upon us than its useful
and valuable ones. With how much
sensibility of feeling and sympa-
thy do we enter into the case of the
distressed when in our life time
perhaps we only meet with one or
two distressed persons. But if we
are daily employed in visiting
the oppressed and infirm we be-
come so accustomed to their com-
plaints that our Ear is almost
insensible to all their entreaties
and our hearts calous to the
most lamentable tale —
I have heard of a young physician
when attending his first Patients
to be very much interested in his
distressed situation and to have
fainted when some serious op-
eration took place—at which
those who had been along with
him scoffed and derided.

*155 In like manner he when he became
by habit more hardened, he laughed

* *Note:* At this point in the manuscript the numbering jumps from 144 to 155. Was this an error on Campbell's part? There is no evidence of pages being removed.

at the timidity and tender feeling
of other young Practioners.—
But the hurtful effects of habit
are still more conspicuous when
we behold with how much fear,
timidity and diffidence a young
man or woman who have not had
(it may be) serious impressions all
their life till some particular occa-
sion will address their Creator
or read a portion of his holy
word while he or she who has
been educated in a religious fami-
ly all their life can read the
word of God, sing psalms
or pray with as little concern &
solemnity as if they were reading
or singing some flippant air
or speaking to some companion,
rushing into the presence of their
Creator as the horse rusheth into
the battle.

156 These and such like are the
effects of habit. Only witness the
grave digger, the hoary headed
sexton or the hearse driver who
in the language of the poet
laugh at the bugbear Death,
while may be the young mind
trembles when it beholds the funeral
scarf or equipage, While
the young heart beats when
it enters the house of the Dead,
the graveyard.

"Ill customs by degrees to habits rise,
Ill habits soon become exalted vice."

157 Extracts from Scot

1. (on Hope) I Pet. 1:17 (last clause) The Christians best
state of mind is a clear proportion of humble fear
and believing hope at an equal distance from
presumption and despondancy. *Without hope*
a man is like a ship that has *no anchor,*
without fear he resembles one who has *no ballast.*

2. on Heb. and I Pet. 1:10—Shall *holy* prophets
be so desirous to know the time when these things
should happen; and *holy* angels to look into
these glorious uncertainties? and shall we to whom
and for whose happiness this Gospel news
revealed, neglect, *not only to obtain.,* but even to know
this great salvation! (wholely in Scott) —
3. True religion consists of *Doctrine,* experience
and practice and he who seperates them destroys the
whole.
4. Religion or religious worship consists of 3 parts
adoration, thanksgiving and *supplication.*

158 Extracts from John Walker's address to
the Methodists in Ireland.

1 The writer who takes the sacred scripture
alone for the standard of his faith; and
takes the *whole* of them must expect oppo-
sition and dislike, more or less from all
sects and parties.
2 The more clearly we maintain and ex-
hibit the simplicity of the real Gospel of
Christ, the more we shall be disliked and
dispised by the *world.*
3 The Gospel which proposes a foundation for
the sinners hope altogether *out of himself*
and calls him to live a life which he is to live
not by himself, "but by the faith of the son
of God" is on this account particularly offen-
sive to the world.
4 It is no part of the work of grace to *mend*
the corrupt nature. *That* nature is as
bad—as wholly evil in a believer, as in an
unbeliever, as bad in the most established
believer as in the weakest; — as bad in Paul
the Apostle just finishing his course and
ready to receive the Crown of righteousness
as in Saul of Tarsus, a blasphemer
& a persecutor of the Church of Christ.
5 What are we to understand by being sanc-
tified, or made holy? I answer in a word
—*seperated unto God.* Successfully brought
into a particular relation unto him, ap-
propriated to his use and service. This is the
literal meaning of *qdsh.* For this reason persons,

places and things have been said to be sanctified in the bible. See Levit. 20, 24, 26. Deut. 2-6,14-27 believers are *"chosen* out of the world: *his peculiar people; a holy nation"* from the babe in Christ to the Father. I Pet. 2 cf. consider
6 I Cor. 1:30. of him & — Believers are in a *new state, "in Christ Jesus."* not of themselves but *"of him"* of God; then Christ is made unbroken *in* him "and in righteousness of sanctification and redemption—his sanctification and justification equally result from being in Christ.— — —

159 1 Pet 1-5

1 In consequence of *this union* the spirit of holiness the Spirit of life and power descends and dwells in them providing in them *the fruits of holiness* even that cluster of Heavenly affection Gal 5 22 23. and then fruits are produced because they are kept *"abiding in Christ."* John 5:4, 5. Gal 2-20, walking *in* him. Col. 2-6; and they are kept then continually in Christ by the spirits keeping them under a continual conviction of their need of him — as poor sinners who *have in themselves,* neither reighteousness nor strength; and testifying to their hearts that in him they have *righteousness* and *strength,* in whom *alone* all the sin of Israel *is justified* and shall glory sound in the Lord with an everlasting salvation, (see Is 45 17-24-25) testifying of his offices and character, they are kept by the *"powers of God through faith unto salvation."*

2 This work of the spirit which is a work of experience from beginning and then *fruits of holiness,* are indeed various in various believers, and in the same believer at various times

> 'I know no limit to them !— any more than the unsearchable riches of Christ.

3 They mistake the work of the spirit who think that it *improves* our corrupt nature or makes it cease to be corrupt, and capable of any good fruit.

4 All to whom the word of Salvation is sent
without exception and without distinction
are *warranted by his word,* Yea, command-
ed to believe called and commanded to
trust in him. All indeed will *not obey*
the Gospel, none will but them to *whom it*
is given to believe but the unbelief of others
is their great sin which it could not be
without they were commanded and
warranted to believe.

160 (1) The Doctrine of a sinners justification
as the *free gift of God in Christ Jesus* to every
one that *believes* is the essential difference
betwixt *the Gospel* and all human systems.
2 This Doctrine Luther said is the turning point
of a *standing* and *falling* Church, and
it may be truly said to be the turning
point of true religion or false religion.
3 On Conviction of sin.
The conscience may be ever too much *terrified*
without *true conviction* of sin
with respect to the difference of *terror of con-*
science, and *conviction of sin:* I would
observe that either of these may be without
the other, a man may suffer great alarm
of conscience from the condemnation of an angry
God, and from appearance of imminent
danger. When he does not see
the extent spirituality and holiness of the
Law, —no conviction of its righteousness in
divine conscience as the immutable
and deserved penalty of every transgression
of its commands—no discouragement of the
root and seat of sin in the heart.—and
there may be all these essential characteristics
of true conviction of sin here notwithstand-
ing the conscience "cleansed" by the blood
of sprinkling which speaketh peace,
without greatly apprehending and when
the spirit of adoption in the heart enables
the same to cry abba father, in him who
has borne a curse for him nay indeed
it is only in the same *believing* view of the cross

of Christ that the sinner can get the deepest
conviction of sin. It is then he believes its
most awful element and the most glorious
discovery of the Love and kindness of the
father and son in providing such a ransom.
4 On Repentance. That repentance
which is unto life is not any thing *preceding*
faith or unconnected with it; but is that
new mind of which we are made to partake
when we are given to believe with the heart in Jesus.

161 There may be a pregnant sorrow for sin
when there is no true repentance.—
1 On Party names.
I observe that the scriptures positively testify
against the practise of Christians calling
them selves by their earthly leaders. If I were to
choose any man by whose name I would call
myself, I would be apt to select Paul and
call myself a *Paulite.* but against this
Paul himself would protest: and should
I call myself a Calvinist or a disciple of
Calvin—Nor would I ever wish to
descend from the high character of a servant
of Jesus Christ, to that of a champion
for the opinions of any man —
Against Arminians
2 I am persuaded that all that *are saved*
are saved from a proud rebelliousness of heart,
and subdued to a thankful acquiescence
in the revealed way of salvation, glad to be
saved by *mere mercy* and conviced that if
it were not *mercy* saving them they would not be saved
at all. — — —
3 I would observe that to charge God
with Cruelty for not extending that same grace
and saving mercy to others is in effect to deny
the existence of his mercy altogether. The
very idea of mercy is that it is gratuitous.
That is, not the gift of mercy which may
not be justly withheld and that cannot
justly be withheld which it would be cruelty
to withhold.—
4 Alas! What a different Book would the
bible be if systematic Divines—if

uninspired men of any sect or party shared
the compliation of it—I see as many marks
of wisdom in what is (omitted?) in the bible
as what tis (included?) . ..
end of this address —

162 General Observations on Church
Government: derived from the Scriptures
In the Church of Christ at its creation
there were different officers or builders
appointed, such as Apostles and prophets
etc, tongues, etc, but in the Church as
to be regularly *governed, taught* and
regulated to the end of the word there are but two classes
of officers or two kinds of offices,
namely "Bishops and Deacons."
We have the qualifications of these
given seperately and distinctly
but for any other *office* of *human*
invention and *appointment* we
have *not one word* in the word of God
instructing us in their qualifications.
Observe *1*—that there is but two officers
in Church see Philippians, 1 chap. 1 verse.
The Greek word for bishop is *episcopus*
whence comes episcopacy. The meaning
of the word *"episcopus"* is *overseer,*
which signifies a servant. —
2 One of these officers, namely, the bishop
was to *superintend* the spiritual
concerns of the people; to *rule* them,
to *teach* them, to *find* them. In
one word see his qualifications 1 Tim.
3 chap. —1 verse to the end of the 7th.
(1) He was to *work* in his office not like
the english bishops who only *superintend*
see verse 1st *2* He must *teach* also
see verse 2d (3) He must be able to
rule or take care of the Church. See vses
4 and 5.
3 See the qualifications of the Deacon
1 Tim; 3, 8 to the end of 13 verse. —
and also Acts 6-1-7. They were
only to attend to such things.

163 Objections answered:
1. Have we not the office of an Elder spoken of in the Word of God? Yes, but it is used in the bible as equivalent to the word *bishop;* see Acts 20th—17. Paul there called *the elders* of the church and gives them an advice see verse 28th, take heed to the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you *overseers* or bishops, as we shewed. The word bishop to mean an overseer and it is the same word here which is elsewhere translated bishop.
1. The apostles called themselves *elders* see John, second epistle 1st verse & his 3d epistle 1st verse, but particularly see 1 Peter 1, 2, 3, 4, verses—the elder's office here spoken of is the same as the bishops, verse 2d, they were to find the flock; they were to *take the oversight* or the *episcopacy* as it is still the same word which denotes the bishop—and moreover—the apostles who called themselves elders had also the office of the bishop, see Acts of the Apostles l-2d verse, where their office is said to be a *bishoprick.* If need be see a still more conclusive proof: Titus 1-6 where the apostle authorises them to ordain *elders* and then verses 6, 7, 8, 9 gives Titus the qualifications of an elder and of the term *bishop.* And shews him that the elder must have the qualifications of a bishop. — They were called bishops on account of their office and *elders* on account of the advanced trend of their living; they being generally old men.

164 The Greek word translated *"elder"* is *"presbyter"* whence comes *presbytery.*
On the Number of Elders
In the seperate churches, it appears that there was a *plurality* of elders or bishops in every *church,* and we may

suppose that there more and less on
account of the largeness of the Church.
In the Church of Christ at Philppi
we read of *"bishops"*, a plural-
ity of them as well as Deacons;
Acts 20,17th we read of a plural-
ity of Elders or as they are called bishops
verse 20 in the church of Ephesus;
and in Acts, 14-23 we find that there
were a plurality of elders ordained
in *every church,* and James in his
general epistle to the Churches, tells them
if they be sick to call for the *elders of the*
church 5 chap-14 vse and in the Church
at Jerusalem Acts 15-4 we read of
elders in the church as well as the apost-
les who resided there, Titus 1-5 —
Thus John proves that there was a presby-
tery or elders in every church;—
Respecting ordination;
Acts 14.23 we read that two persons
were employed to ordain, to wit Paul &
Barnabas.
Acts 13.2 we read Paul and Barnabas
were ordained by imposition of hands
but it is uncertain whether it was by one
or more as the word "their" is not in the
original.
Acts 9-17 we read that Ananias
laid his hands only on Paul —
1 Tim. 4.14 we read of the laying on of
the hands of the presbytery on Timothy.
We read also 2 Timothy 1-6 that Paul
only had laid his hands on him—and
also we learn that Timothy and Titus

165 authority to ordain elders or bishops which
is sufficient for one example, as the laying
on of hands in the apostles time was to communi-
cate peculiar gifts sometimes to the persons on
whose heads they laid their hands, and
for the purpose of setting a part to some particular
office, such as the bishops or elders. We find
in the rules for governing the Church given
by the apostle to Timothy and Titus that

every minister of the Gospel regularly ordained
has power to ordain *bishops* or *elders,—*
see 1 Tim, *5.22. 2. Tim. 2.* Titus 1-5,
each of which shew that Timothy and Titus
had as an example to the Church power to
ordain faithful men who should be able to
teach other also, but we find many
ministers, many eminent preachers, preaching
for a long time without any ordination
at all. see Acts 8.4 and Acts 11-19, 20, 21.
2 Convictions of sin, remarks on,
1 Pestulations, sorrows, rejections, denials, fears,
are no duty unto any, they sometimes ensue
on convictions of sin. They belong not to the precept
of the Law but *unto curses.* They are no part of
what is required of us but what is inflicted on
us; 2 a conviction of sin, of a state of sin,
of a curse of sin and that the soul is satisfied
that it is thereby obnoxious to the wrath of God
is indispensably necessary. Rom. 3 19. Gals. 3.22
3 a due apprehension that there is no way of
escape but by Jesus Christ. —
Remarks on a kind of temptation
and convictions;
1. That they have not attained such a degree
of sorrow for sin and humiliation as in necess-
ary unbelievers that are called to believe in Jesus,
2 That those who persuade them to believe
know not how great sinners they are, its
enough for them that Christ save the greatest.

166 1 On the means of regenerating faith
1 This is the proper and peculiar work of the Gospel
since the giving of the first promise. John 1.18
Rom. 1.16 1 Peter 1.23 James 1.18 Eph. 1.8.9.10,
2 To this purpose that faith be wrought it is necessary
the Doctrines of redemption, righteousness and
salvation by Jesus Christ be declared and
made known to convinced sinners. Rom. 10.13.14.15.
2 Sinfulness of unbelief
1 It is a rejecting of the testimony of God which
he gives of his wisdom, love and grace; with the
excelling and certainty of the way of salvation
which is to make God a liar. 1 Jhn 5.10; Jhn 3; 2.3.4
2 a contempt of Love and Grace the highest

provocation that can be offered unto the Divine Majesty.

3 On the proposing of Christ in the evanglical proposition of him 3 things are proposed.

1. That there is a way yet remaining for sinners whereby they may escape the curse of the law and the wrath of God; which they have deserved. Ps. 130.4; Job 33:24 Acts 4.12.

2. That the foundation of their ways lies in an atonement made by Jesus Christ unto the justice of God, and satisfaction to his Law for sin. Rms 3.25, 2 Cor 5-21, Gal 3.13.

3. That God is well pleased with the atonement and his will is that we should accept of it & acquiesce in it. 2 Cor 5.18:19: Is. 53.11.12 Rm 5.10,11. —

167 Account of sermons preached 2d year of my ministry beginning July 15, 1811,

Sermons	Texts		Dates	Places
1	1 Cor. 15:49:	July	21, 1811:	Washington
2	1 John 2:1-3.	—	24, 1811:	George Archers, Buffalo
3*	Rom 3:20	—	28, 1811:	George Crawford on
4*	Acts 13:38-39	—	28, 1811.	Rush Run
5*	Math; 28:19-20	—	30, 1811.	Thos. Burns,
6*	Is. 55:1	Aug	4, 1811.	Cadiz —
7*	Is. 17:9	—	4, 1811.	Ditto,
8*	Heb. 11:1	—	6, 1811	2 miles from Cadiz.
9*	Math. 28:19	—	8, 1811.	Samuel Gilmores
10*	John 8:31-32	—	10, 1811	St. Clairsville.
11*	Rom 3:20	—	11, 1811.	Joseph Sharpes
12*	2 Cor. 5:21	—	11, 1811	Ditto
13*	Phil 3:8	—	12, 1811	Mr. Greenlees } with wine
14*	Heb. 8:11-13	—	13, 1811	Mr. McAdam } with wine
15	2 Cor. 5:4	—	17, 1811.	Brush Run
16	Gal. 6:15,16.	—	24, 1811.	Sgt. McDonaghs
17	Mark 16:15,16		Ditto—	Ditto—
18	Gal. 6:15,16	—	26, Ditto	Stuarts Wells Mill
19	Heb. 3:1	—	28, 1811	George Archers,
20	Heb. Ditto	—	Sept. 1st	Washington
21	Heb. Ditto	—	8, 1811	Brush Run
22	Heb. Ditto	—	15, 1811	Crossroads
23	Rom. 6:21	—	22, 1811	Stubenville

* In Ohio State.

24	Acts 11:26		Ditto	Ditto
25	James 1:7:	—	12 Ditto	George Archers
26	John 5:39	—	23 Ditto	Jas. McCroy's
27	Math. 11:27	—	26 Ditto	G: Archer.
28	Num. 22-24 Chap	—	29	Christian Hulmans
29	1 Cor: 1:30	—	29	Ditto—
30	Ep. 2:8—	Octob. 6.		George Crawfords
31	Exodus 15:11 with Heb. 12:14		Ditto	Ditto
32	John 5: 39		Monday 7	Rush Run
33	Rom. 6:21	—	13th	Brush run
34	Math. 11:27	—	16th	Ben Stuarts
35				
36	Ecc. 12:9—	—	18	David Carsons
37	Acts 13:38-42	—	21	Cadiz
38	Acts 2:38	—	28	Ditto
39	I Cor. 1:30	—	28	Ditto
40	Heb. 7:25	—	21	Ditto
41	Is. 53:11	—	25	Ditto
42	John 18:36	—	26	Ditto
43	Gal. 6:15.16			Jos. Sharp Wheeling

168 Texts

44	Ep. 2:8	Nov.	3, 1811	Hewetstown
45	Ex 15:11; Heb. 12:14	Nov.	3, 1811	Hewetstown
46	2 Cor. 5:17	Nov.	7: 1811:	George Archers
47	Ditto—	—	17 ——	Crossroads
48	Rom. 9:33	—	29 ——	Brush run
49	Gal. 6:14	—	15 ——	David Jones
50	Ditto	—	18 ——	Crossroads
51	John 8:31,32	—	24 ——	Washington
52	Heb. 7:25	—	25——	Mr. Gurrey
53	John 6:67	Dec.	1st 1811	Brush run
54	Rom. 10:3		8 1811	Cadiz
55	James 1:7		10 1811	Ditto
56	Ditto		22 1811	Crossroads
57	Rom. 7:4-5		12 1811	Wheeling
58	———		17 1811	McAdams
59	———		19 1811	Archers
60	Rom. 6:21-23		13	Moorestown
61	———		17	Charlestown
62	Hebrews 3:1	Dec.	15	St. Clairesville
63	Is. 73:11	Dec.	29, 1811	Smithfield
64	2 Cor. 6:21	Dec.	30	Charlestown
	End of year 1811			A. Campbell

Note: Pages 169-170 in the manuscript are blank.

171 1 Encrease of the Methodists in America
In the year 1766 Philip Embury and Thomas Webb local preachers emigrated from Europe to N. York and there formed a few small societies. About the same time Robert Strowbridge a local preacher settled in Fridonia County, State of Maryland who formed a few societies in this place. In 1769 Richard Boardman came to N. York. In 1771 Francis Asbury. In June 1773 the first annual conference ever held on this continent among this order was organized at Phila-Delphia. It consisted of 10 Preachers who were in connection with those in England. At this time the number of members in the United States were 1,160—After the American War the itinerant preachers amounted to 104 and the number of members 18,000. After the war the Methodist in America were seperated from those in Europe and Thomas Coke, L.S.D. a presbyter created bishop by the imposition of hands. In 1785 a conference was held at Baltimore, the Methodist Episcopal Church formed themselves into an independent church, i.e., independent of England. 1799, the number of itinerant preachers amounted to 170 and the members to 61,351. At present, 1810, they have 616 itinerant preachers together with about 4 times that many local preachers. They to willing preachers have commited to take charge 174,560 members.

	members
In 1773	1,160
In 1810	174,560

and this increase in 37 years, in one year they encreased 17,336, and last year 98 current preachers entered the travelling connexion.

	members
1800	64,894
1801	72,876
1802	80,734
1803	104,070
1804	113,134
1805	119,945

1806	130,570
1807	144,590
1808	150,995
1809	163,633
1810	174,560

172 CONTENTS

173

174

Note: Page 175 is blank except for the following inscription printed in pencil:

A. CAMPBELL
President of Bethany College
July 6,1845
Pages 176-180 are blank in the manuscript.