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and usurpations of papal domination. The name, *Chaldeans*, was given to them by the Pope, on their embracing the Catholic system; an epithet which the Nestorians deny them the right thus exclusively to appropriate, claiming an equal title to it themselves in consequence of their lineal origin. Many of these Catholics continue to speak the language of the Nestorians, as well as the Arabic, and some of them speak only the former; but as family quarrels are usually the most violent, the Nestorians are separated from the Chaldeans by a hostility, even more rancorous than that which divides them from the Jacobites. It is to the Nestorians, as distinct from both Jacobites and Chaldeans, that this article has reference.

The existing remnant of the Nestorian Christians is found principally among the mountains of Koordistan, and in Ooroomiah, an adjacent district in the western part of Persia. Geographically, they are situated between 36° and 39° of north latitude, and between 43° and 46° of east longitude.

Koordistan is the ancient Assyria, embracing also a part of Armenia and of ancient Media. It consists mainly of wild ranges of mountains, which divide the Turkish and the Persian empires. Its western sections are nominally subject to Turkey, and its eastern, to Persia. The inhabitants, however, pay but a limited allegiance to either; and some of them—the Hakkary tribe, in central Koordistan, in particular—are nearly or quite independent. The Koords—the Carduchi of Xenophon, who gave him so much trouble, on his retreat with the ten thousand—consist of a great number of tribes, who, from time immemorial, have been keepers of flocks—wild, fierce barbarians, given to plunder. Much of their country is exceedingly rough, and admits of but little cultivation. This, added to the fierceness of the people, renders portions of it well nigh inaccessible, and consequently but little known to civilized nations.

The Nestorians of Koordistan inhabit the wildest and most inaccessible parts of the Koordish mountains. Some of the districts are so rough, that no beast of burden, save with the utmost difficulty, can travel over them. The least populous districts of these Nestorians, as Garvar, Somai, Chara, Mamoodiah, and some others are subject to the Koordish tribes who dwell in the same districts, and by them are sorely oppressed and often

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tell yet more powerfully on their less civilized brethren, and, through them, on all classes of the wild mountaineers.

It is very difficult to arrive at even tolerable accuracy, in estimating the number of the Nestorian Christians. The methods of obtaining such statistics among Orientals are very indefinite and unsatisfactory. The population of a town, village or district is usually estimated by the number of families; a given number of individuals being assumed as the average in each family. But in the primitive, patriarchal style of living which obtains in these countries, where three, four and even five generations, as the case may be, dwell together—the number of persons in a family varying from five to thirty and even more—it is impossible to fix accurately on an average. Ten is the number often assumed for this purpose. In the Koordish mountains, the population is frequently computed by the soldiers that can be rallied on an emergency, every male adult being reckoned as a soldier. But this method is even more indefinite than the other; and in those wild, inaccessible regions, there is this additional difficulty, that the number of houses and soldiers is but very imperfectly known.

The number of the Nestorian Christians, as nearly as I can ascertain it, is about one hundred and forty thousand. Tiaree—by far the largest and most populous district—has about fifty thousand inhabitants. It is inhabited exclusively by Nestorians, and, as already stated, is quite independent of the Koords. In all the other districts of the mountains, there may be sixty thousand Nestorians. And in the province of Ooroomiah, including the adjacent districts on this side of the mountains, there are about thirty thousand. One hundred and forty thousand is certainly a small number for a nation, or an ancient sect of Christians. But the history of this people, in connection with their present circumstances and character, as was suggested at the commencement of this article, invests this little remnant with an interest independent of numbers.

To the Christian scholar, the *language* and *literature* of the Nestorian Christians are objects of much interest. Their ancient language was the *Syriac*—the common language of Palestine in the days of Christ, and the same doubtless in which the Saviour himself conversed and preached.* This is still the

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literary language of the Nestorians; in it their books are all written, and in it they conduct their epistolary correspondence. Though a *dead language*, the best educated of their clergy converse in it with fluency. Their *written character* differs considerably from that of the Western, or Jacobite Syrians, which is the character best known to European scholars. The former was never, to my knowledge, in type, until A. D. 1829, when an edition of the Gospels was printed in it by the British and Foreign Bible Society. It much resembles the Estrangelo, and the Nestorians have some old books written in this character, and they still use it for *capital letters*. The common Nestorian character is very beautiful, and so agreeable to the eye, that members of our mission, when incapacitated by ophthalmy from reading English without pain, are able to read it with but little inconvenience.—The *vowels* used by the Nestorians are *points*, and *not* the *Greek vowels inverted*, as used by the Western Syrians.

The *vernacular* language of the Nestorians is a modern dialect of the ancient Syriac, much barbarized by inversions, contractions and abbreviations, and by the introduction of a great number of Persian, Turkish and Koordish words, each class prevailing, in given districts, according to their proximity to either of those nations. Thus corrupted, however, the body of the language comes directly from the venerable Syriac, as clearly as the modern Greek does from the ancient. Some critics have questioned this opinion, supposing that the language of the Nestorians is a modern dialect of the ancient *Chaldaic*, though all their literature is in the ancient Syriac, and their written correspondence is still conducted in that language. It is incumbent on such as sustain this view, to point out the difference between the Chaldaic and the Syriac, and to show that the spoken language of the Nestorians is more allied to the former than to the latter. I will insert in this connexion a brief extract from a letter which I received from the first editor* of the Repository; whose learned researches on this and kindred subjects entitle his opinion to the highest deference. "Professor Roediger,"† he says, "proposes to go on and publish a fuller account of the Syriac language as now spoken among the Nestorians. The views contained in your letter leave no room to doubt of the

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refined, by a reference to the ancient language, so far as possible." We have, from the first, been fully impressed, in attempting to reduce this spoken dialect to writing, with the high importance of shaping it, so far as is practicable, to the very perfect model of the ancient Syriac; and we strenuously urge on the Nestorians the continued study of the latter, as a learned language. It is visionary, however, to suppose that they could ever be brought to adopt this as their vernacular tongue. By the blessing of God on our labors, we have succeeded in putting considerable portions of the Scriptures and some other matter into this new, and, to the Nestorians, attractive costume.

Of the venerable ancient Syriac, once so highly and extensively cultivated and so rich in its literary stores, as of the unfortunate people who use it, we now find but little more than its ashes. The number of works at present extant among the Nestorians is very limited, and copies of these are extremely rare. The library of the Patriarch,—which had often been represented to us as absolutely prodigious, and might actually appear so to these simple-hearted people, who are acquainted with no method of making books save by the slow motion of the pen,—is found to consist of not more than sixty volumes, and a part of these are duplicates. And no other collection, to compare with this, exists among them. Three, five or ten books, for a large village, or a district even, has been regarded as a liberal supply. The few which they do possess, however, are objects of deep interest. Among them are found the whole of the Holy Scriptures,—save the book of Revelation, which exists in none of their manuscript copies, and seems not to have been known to them, until introduced by us in the printed editions of the British and Foreign Bible Society. They make no objection to it in that connexion, but readily recognise and acknowledge it as canonical. Their Scriptures do not occur in one volume, but usually in six, the division being as follows. 1. The Pentateuch (*Ovrata*), copies of which are not so rare as of some other portions. 2. The remaining books of the Old Testament to the Psalms, with the exception of the two books of Chronicles (*Bitmetwee*)—copies rare. 3. The two books of Chronicles (*Pharagmin*)—copies of which are very rare. 4. The

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They have books of wise and moral sayings (Akuldaree, Shaper Doobaree), and books of philosophy (Peelâsoopa), but "falsely so called;" and they have rare copies of ponderous Dictionaries (Lexicona) and Grammars (Grammatika).

The Nestorians have some very ancient manuscripts. There are copies of the New Testament written, some on parchment and some on paper, which date back about six hundred years. Some of these are written in the Estrangelo, and others in the common Nestorian character. The very ancient copies of the Scriptures are regarded with much veneration, and preserved with great care. They are kept in envelopes, and when taken into the hands, are reverently kissed as very hallowed treasures.

I find it interesting, in translating the Scriptures, to compare the printed Syriac version, as also our own, with these ancient manuscripts. Slight diversities sometimes occur, not such as at all to invalidate the authority of either as a standard version; but, by the different location of a single *dot*, new light and vividness are often thrown upon a passage of Scripture. A case of this kind occurred a day or two ago. It was in Luke 24: 32, in relation to the conversation between Christ and the two disciples on their way to Emmaus. "Did not our hearts *burn* within us?" In the printed version it is *yakeed*, *burn*, the same as in English. But my translator, a Nestorian priest, questioned the correctness of this reading; and on referring to a manuscript copy of the New Testament about five hundred years old, instead of "*yakeed*," *burn*, we found "*yakeer*," *heavy*, or *dull*; the difference being simply in the location of a point, which, in the one case, being placed *below* the final letter of the word made it Daled, and in the other case, placed *above* it, made it Raish. According to the ancient manuscript, the verse in question would read: "And they said one to another, Were not our hearts *heavy* (or *dull*,—reproaching themselves for being slow of understanding), while he talked to us by the way, and while he opened to us the Scriptures;" a reading which certainly loses nothing of beauty and force when compared with our own version.

Few as are the books of the Nestorians, their *readers* are scarcely more numerous. Not more than one in two hundred

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is strictly episcopal. Its ecclesiastical head is a Patriarch, with the title of Mar Shimon, i. e. Lord Simeon. The residence of this Patriarch is at Diss, about twenty miles from Julamerk, in the Hakkary district, one of the most inaccessible parts of the Koordish mountains. He formerly resided at Kochanes, still nearer to the town of Julamerk. He is clothed properly with only spiritual power, though his influence is in fact far more general. Among the mountaineers, his word is usually law in both temporal and spiritual matters. Among the Nestorians of Ooroomiah his control is much more limited. He never ventures down among them, probably from the apprehension that he might suffer embarrassment from their Persian rulers. And being thus beyond the reach of the full exercise of his authority, the people of this province have become rather lax in their regard even for his spiritual prerogatives. Still they look up to him with respect and veneration, and requite the visits of his brothers, which are usually annual, with liberal pecuniary contributions. Under the Patriarch are eighteen bishops; four of whom reside in the province of Ooroomiah.

The canons of the Nestorian church, require celibacy in its Patriarch and bishops. They also require, that from childhood they abstain entirely from the use of animal food, save fish, eggs and the productions of the dairy. Indeed, they go a step farther back in the latter requisition. The mother of the candidate for the episcopal office must also have observed the same abstinence, during the period of gestation. This requisition of abstinence from animal food is, however, like many other of their ceremonials, in some cases softened down. One of the bishops of Ooroomiah was never a candidate for episcopacy, until he was forty years old, having eaten animal as well as vegetable food until that period. He was then made a bishop, as a token of the Patriarch's favor, for important services rendered when a deacon, in opposing the influence of papal emissaries. Since becoming a bishop, he has practised the required abstinence. I have sometimes questioned the Nestorian bishops, in relation to the reasons for their practising celibacy and restriction to vegetable diet. They never attempt to found the requirements of their church on the precepts of Scripture; but reply, that in

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implied in a statement of its principles and leading positions. It is not, however, complete so far as its cumulative power is concerned. A large number of facts still remains, which, in their proper place, will strongly confirm every main position I have assumed. But here the regular operations of the mind are interrupted by the entrance of disturbing forces of great and bewildering power. In every fundamental investigation of the mode of baptism, three inquiries are commonly involved and combined. 1. The import of the word *βαπτίζω*. 2. The original practice of the church. 3. The full and perfect signification of the rite. The influences of these two last inquiries on the question of philology, I call bewildering and disturbing forces—not because they are not important and legitimate objects of inquiry in their proper sphere; and not because they have no bearing on the main question of the mode—but because they have exercised over the question of philology, an unauthorized though unsuspected power. No attentive observer of the operations of the human mind can have failed to notice, that the impression of an argument, true and sound in itself, is often destroyed by the secret influence of some fact or principle, which does not appear in the discussion. These deep under-currents have frequently a power entirely superior to the logical force of the argument presented, and produce a state of mind which, if expressed in words, would be in substance this: "All this looks well enough; it is quite plausible, to be sure; but still *it cannot be true;* there must be an error somewhere." States of mind like this—felt but not announced—often do more to break the strength of an argument, than any direct perception of its falsehood. So now,

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this discussion, in a part of the edition, which the reader is requested to correct, viz.

Vol. III. page 41, line 1, after erect, add *each.*
" " " 42, line 8, for *models* read *modes.*
" " " 46, line 2, for *word* read *mode.*
" " " " line 3, for *more* read *mode.*
" " " " line 11, for *word* read *mode.*
" " " 47, line 35, for *rigorous* read *vigorous.*
" " " 51, line 38, for *ναχινθινο*, etc. read *ναχινθινο* etc.
" " " 63, line 28, for *natural* read *mutual.*
" " " 64, line 8, for *adopted* read *adapted.*

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that the philological argument has been stated, I have no doubt that the thought will arise in many a mind: "Well, after all, it is a fact that the early Christians did universally immerse, and did attach great importance to that form; *and they surely understood the import of the word as well as we.* Besides, the rite is designed to represent, not merely purification from sin, but purification in a way significant of the death and resurrection of Christ, as we are expressly told in Rom. 6: 2, 3, and Col. 2: 12. All these learned philological inquiries are no doubt very fine, and quite plausible; but the single expression, "*buried with Christ in baptism,*" is enough to dissipate them all. Now, while these under-currents of thought are overlooked, it is in vain to attempt to give to the philological argument, however sound in itself, any power at all. As some mighty stream, undermining banks, trees and houses, precipitates them together into the flood, and hurries them along in promiscuous ruin, so do these deep under-currents undermine and lay prostrate the walls of the best-compacted logical fabric. Considerations like these, indeed, produce a greater popular effect than reasonings, however profound. The ideas lie upon the surface, and are therefore easily stated and easily apprehended.

It is essential, then, to inquire what are the facts on the first of these points, and what is their bearing on the philological question? Having done this, we may resume and review our investigations.

§ 23.

What, then, are the facts, as it regards the practice of the earlier ages of the church? I am willing freely and fully to concede that, in the primitive church, from the earliest period of which we have any historical accounts, immersion was the mode generally practised, and, except in extraordinary cases, the only mode. I do not mean that these remarks shall apply to the *apostolic age*, but to the earliest historical ages of the uninspired primitive church. The practice of the apostolic age, I shall consider by itself. After all that has been said upon this point by learned men, it will not be deemed necessary for me to advance proof of the position, that, in the primitive church immersion was the general mode of baptism. No one who has candidly examined the original sources of evidence, will enter-

external act spoken of is *outpouring ;* and surely, to call this an immersion is absurd. Here, then, an *impossibility* of the sense immersion is clearly proved. 4. But, give to baptisma the sense καθαρισμὸς and all is harmonious and plain; for an outpouring of blood is a καθαρισμὸς in the sacrificial sense, i. e. an atonement. In Heb. 1 : 3, καθαρισμὸν ποιησάμενος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν is applied to Christ in this very sense. Let now the passages from Chrysostom, Gregory Naz., and Theophylact be re-examined, and carefully compared with this. § 21 : 2, 3. Those from Chrysostom and Theophylact both relate to the baptism of blood, and refer to passages in Matthew and Mark, parallel in sense to that in Luke, to which Origen refers—Mark 10 : 38, 39, Matthew 20 : 22, 23. So that their usage of βάπτισμος to denote καθαρισμὸς, is certainly and undeniably the same with that of Origen. By Gregory Naz. this same sacrificial sense is just as clearly extended to the baptism of water ; for he says : "He did not need purification, i. e. forgiveness of sins, who taketh away the sins of the world." Two points are now perfectly established. 1. Βάπτισμος has the sacrificial sense καθαρισμὸς. 2. In the description given of the rite by Gregory Naz., not only are καθαίρω and κάθαρσις used in the place of βαπτίζω and βάπτισμος, but they are used as perfectly synonymous. Here, then, a flood of light is thrown over the whole subject, not only as it regards the baptism of blood, but of water also ; and we may now consider it as indisputably proved, that βαπτίζω is a perfect synonyme of καθαρίζω, in the sacrificial sense. With this compare the argument in § 8, and see how every position there assumed is irresistibly verified and sustained. Not only in the days of John was καθαρισμὸς regarded as a synonyme of βάπτισμος, but the same usage is found running down, in a stream of light, for many centuries. Indeed, it goes beyond the period commonly assigned to the Fathers, even as low as the eleventh century.

§ 26.

But let us look once more at this same usage, not only in the case of Christ, but also of the martyrs who followed his steps. In order to do this the more clearly, let us for a moment con-

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ples were soon to be called to endure the same fate. 3. Both by his example and also by his spirit-stirring words, he provided great and powerful motives to excite his disciples to meet death, in its most terrific forms, without weakness or fear. 4. These motives were not only effectual to produce the desired result in multitudes of instances, but the minds of the early Christians were so deeply affected and so highly excited on this subject, that soon they went even to the extreme of undue eagerness for such a death. 5. This disposition was increased by a false construction put on the words of Paul: "I am ready to be offered."—2 Tim. 4: 6. "Yea, and if I be offered up," etc.—Phil. 2: 7. Also on the words of Christ: "Can ye be baptized with the baptism wherewith I am baptized?" which, as we have shown, they understood as: "Can ye be purified with the purification wherewith I am purified?" and regarded as an inquiry, whether they were ready to be purified in their own blood, as he was in his. See, in the preceding passage of Origen: "loti sanguine nostro." Hence they ascribed to the death of a martyr a kind of atoning power, and spoke of it as a καθαρισμὸς or βάπτισμος, in the sacrificial sense. 6. This purification was supposed to avail especially for the martyr; so that, if he had never been purified in water for the remission of his sins, they were remitted by his purification in his own blood. Hence, the universal idea of a bloody baptism was, that the martyr was purified, or purged from sin, by his own blood. 7. It was also supposed, that the deaths of martyrs had a purifying power in behalf of others. Now the correctness of these views is not the question. They were evidently false. Our only inquiry is: In what language were they expressed? And the answer is as before; βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα are freely used to denote the act of purifying, or purging from sin by the shedding of blood; and that in such circumstances, all attempts to introduce the idea of immersion are vain. Origen, on John 1: 29, speaking of Jesus, the Lamb of God, says: "Et sane hujus victimæ cognatæ sunt cœteræ, quarum notæ sunt legales: per cœteras vero victimas huic victimæ cognatas, effusiones intelligo sanguinis generosorum martyrum;" and after a few lines he adds: "Quæ purgant eos pro quibus offeruntur." Again, in his notes on Matthew 20: 22, 23, he says: "Quod autem quis in passione remissionem accipit peccatorum baptis-

nothing strange, and might even be expected in writers so numerous and so various. Still, when I consider the extreme power of the usage which I have proved, when I find it clearly and decidedly, even in the eleventh century, I am inclined to believe that a general perception of the true sense was lost or not observed, till the Greek language itself sunk in the ruins of the Eastern empire; and that the present state of opinion has been produced by party spirit, and by the mistakes of learned men to whom the Greek was a dead language, and who, being familiar with the style and usage of classic Greek, as that which holds the earliest and primary place in the modern systems of education, have allowed it to expel the true spiritual and sacred sense of the word, and in place of it, to introduce a merely physical, and, too often, barren and profitless external act.

In opposition to this, the opinion of the Greek church is often alleged as decisive in favor of the meaning immerse. Being by *name* the Greek church, it is inferred that they must, of course, be good judges of the import of a Greek word. In reply to this, I would ask: Is modern Italian ancient Latin? If not, neither is modern Greek ancient Greek. That modern Greek resembles its parent stock, more than modern Italian does the Latin, I do not deny. But the resemblance is not such that the opinion of a modern Greek scholar, on a point like this, is worth any more than that of a modern German, Italian or English scholar. No man can form an opinion on this subject except by a study of the facts found in the ancient writers who exhibit the usage in question; and his opinion is worth most who most carefully investigates, compares, classifies and judges in view of the whole case. And if this be so, the opinions of the modern Greek church, unsustained by argument, ought to have no peculiar weight. Their proficiency in philological studies certainly does not exceed that of other European scholars, to say nothing of those of America.

The passage in 2 Kings 5: 14, is often alleged as decisive proof that *βαπτίζω* means immerse. The facts are these. The prophet commanded Naaman to wash seven times in Jordan, using רָחַץ. In obeying the command it is said וַיִּטְבֹּל, Sept.

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nence believe and affirm that it did. Of these it is enough to mention Suicer. He affirms that the word is here the equivalent both of טָבַל and *βαπτίζω*, in the sense to wash. Nor can it be disproved, for it is in perfect analogy with other known facts in language. Even if the sense immerse is here admitted, it only proves the coexistence of the secular sense immerse with the religious sense purify, and that in this case there was a desire to fix the mind on the mode of washing. Take a parallel case. Mr. Carson admits the coexistence in *βάπτω* of the sense to dye and to dip. Suppose now an order to dye a cloth is given, and in narrating its execution, it is said, a man dipped it seven times in a dye-tub, and in each case *βάπτω* is used. Does the fact that it means dip in the last case prove that it does not mean dye in the first? Cannot two different meanings of a word coexist even in the same sentence? Can it not be said, I drank out of this *spring* last *spring*? How then could the use of the word *βαπτίζω* to denote an act *here*, prove that it does not mean purify *elsewhere?* On neither ground, then, has the passage any force. For first, it cannot be proved that the word here means to dip; and secondly, if it could, it would be nothing to the purpose.

§ 28.

It only remains that I adduce, as I proposed, a large amount of coincident facts, sustaining and giving verisimilitude to the whole.

1. The early and decidedly predominant idea of the rite was, that it was the appointed, and almost the only means of obtaining the remission of sins. How natural, now, that its name should indicate this idea. It does, if *βαπτισμὸς* is taken in the sacrificial sense *καθαρισμὸς*, but not if taken in the sense immersion. A proof that *βαπτισμὸς* is taken in the sacrificial sense is found in ts equivalents in Latin and Greek; remissio peccatorum, *ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν*, *ἁμαρτιῶν κάθαρσις*, *ἄφεσις πλημμελημάτων*. These and similar phrases are used as the names of the rite, and are obviously mere equivalents of *καθαρισμὸς*. Instances of this usage abound in Tertullian and Augustine; they occur also in Gregory Nyss. and other Greek Fathers.

2. The words with which *βαπτίζω* is interchanged, in giving variety to the style, and preventing the too frequent repetition

fundamental idea of the leading term to be retained; or some one into which it easily passes, and with which it has a natural affinity. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea *καθαρίζω*, is very large. In Greek they are *λούω*, *ἁγιάζω*, *ἁγνίζω*, *ἀναγεννάω*, etc.; in Latin, purgo, mundo, emundo, lavo, abluo, diluo, eluo, perfundo; together with the nouns and participles derived from them, as *λουτρὸν*, *ἁγνισμὸς*, etc., purgatio, lavatio, lavacrum, emundatus, ablutus, etc. The class of words that has an affinity to the idea immersion is small, as it is a mere external act. Now let three facts be noted. 1. The range of equivalents, or substitutes for *βαπτίζω*, is in fact large. 2. They are all of the class having affinity to *καθαρίζω*; and there is a great readiness to pass into any mode of speech equivalent or analogous to it, or derivable from it. 3. There is no readiness to use equivalents of immersion, except in cases in which, for some particular reason, it is intended to give prominence to the form of purifying. Let any one read Augustine's controversies with the Donatists, and his various works on baptism, the works of Origen as translated, and any of the Greek Fathers who have written much on the subject, and he will easily find the same thing. It is impossible by a few quotations to give an idea of the impression produced by noticing such facts in passages of considerable extent.

3. When it is desired to speak definitely of immersion as an act, *βαπτισμὸς* is not generally used, but *κατάδυσις*; and for immersion, *ἀνάδυσις*. See Suicer on these words. Why is this, if *βαπτισμὸς* never means any thing but immersion?

4. On the other hand, in the Apostolic Constitutions, Can. L., the expression *τρία βαπτίσματα μίας μυήσεως* occurs, in which *τρία βαπτίσματα* denotes three acts of immersion, but not the name of the rite; for in trine immersion, three immersions are necessary to one purification. And if the expression were understood to mean three purifications, the idea would be false; for three immersions make but one purification. Lest any misunderstanding should arise, a note was deemed necessary by Zonaras, informing the reader that *βαπτίσματα* here means *καταδύσεις*, and *μύησις* denotes the rite as a whole, i. e. is used for *βάπτισμα*. He therefore says, *τρία βαπτίσματα, ἐνταῦθα τὰς*

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sacramento salutari delictorum contagia, ut in lavacro carnali et seculari sordes cutis et corporis, abluuntur, ut aphronitris et cœteris quoque adjumentis et solio et piscina opus sit quibus ablui et mundari corpusculum possit. Aliter pectus credentis abluitur, aliter mens hominis per fidei meritum mundatur." Notice now that this whole passage, designed to prove that a man may be baptized by sprinkling, depends for its force entirely on assigning to the word the sense of purify. His argument in brief is this; the power of baptism to purify from sin, does not depend on the quantity of water used, but upon the internal faith of the person baptized. "In baptism," he says, "the pollution of sin is not washed away, as the pollution of the body and skin is washed away in an external, physical bath, so that there is need of saltpetre (or nitre, see Jer. 2: 22), and other auxiliary means, and a bath or a pool, in which the body can be washed and purified. Far otherwise is the breast of the believer washed; far otherwise is the mind of a man purified from sin by the merits of faith." From all this he inferred that a man might properly be baptized, if necessary, by sprinkling. But how could he do this if he knew that the command was not to purify but to immerse? On this ground all such reasoning would be vain. Any one could have replied: "The command is not *to purify*, but *to immerse;* and you cannot immerse without immersion; and sprinkling is no immersion at all." But such an idea does not seem to have entered Cyprian's mind. To him plainly the only command was a command to *purify*. The word baptize does not indeed occur; but evident synonymes of it are used, as abluo and mundo. I know not how we can obtain stronger testimony to the prevailing opinion of the age than this; and it is the stronger because indirect and undesigned.

6. In explaining the similitude between baptism and the salvation of Noah in the ark, also between baptism and the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea—1 Pet. 3: 20, 21, and 1 Cor. 10: 1, 2—Noah and the Israelites are not looked on as immersed, but merely as *purified*, or *saved;* and that too by the same element which overwhelmed and destroyed the enemies of God. They even go so far as to speak of *the wicked as im-*

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them was equivalent *to being sanctified*, or *being saved;* and in looking at baptism, their minds were fixed on this idea. "Now," said they, "as in baptism water saves, so in the flood it saved, and so in the Red Sea it saved; not by overwhelming Noah or the Israelites, but by dividing them from the enemies of God, and by overwhelming and immersing those enemies. And its similarity to baptism lies only in the fact, that it *saves* or *purifies* the people of God. Augustine (Sermo de Cataclysmo, Vol. 9, p. 320, Paris, ed. 1586) speaks of the Israelites delivered out of Egypt, as hastening to the Red Sea, "*that they may be saved by water;*" the Egyptians follow, the sea opens, the Israelites pass through, the Egyptians enter, then, "Unum elementum aquarum, auctore totius, creatore jubente, judicavit utrosque; separavit enim pios ab impiis. *Illos abluit, istos obruit; illos mundavit, istos occidit.*" "One element, water, by the command of the Creator, judged both; for it separated the righteous from the wicked. The former it washed, the latter it overwhelmed; the former it purified, the latter it destroyed." He then speaks of Moses as a type of Christ, his rod as a type of the cross, and the *Red* Sea as a type of the waters of baptism, *purpled* by the blood of Christ. Now compare with this the anxious efforts of our Baptist brethren, to prove that in some way the *Israelites were immersed.* Augustine says, they were *washed* and *purified*, and the Egyptians overwhelmed (and of course *immersed*) and destroyed.

It is quite certain that no man, who believed and was anxious to prove that immersion was the sense and the only sense of *βαπτισμὸς*, would ever have used this language. In like manner, comparing the salvation of Noah and his family to the salvation effected by baptism, he often calls the flood a sacrament; and compares its effects to those of baptism. He compares the church to the ark; and one out of the church, and unbaptized, to one out of the ark; and his fate to the fate of one so excluded. Concerning the one who perishes out of the ark, he says: "*submersus est* diluvio *non ablutus.*" Hence he regarded those in the ark, who were saved, as *abluti*, i. e. *purified* or *saved*, and those out of it, as *submersi*, i. e. *submersed*, or *immersed* and *destroyed.* All this he says in commenting

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and regards one as *saved by purification*, and the other as *destroyed by immersion*. Would any modern advocate of immersion have ever written so? For the true sense of 1 Pet. 3: 20, 21, see § 18.

7. Elias is spoken of by Origen as baptizing the wood in the sense of purifying it. In this case I was misled by not noticing that Origen regarded the act of pouring on water as designed to purify the wood. Obviously this was not its end, but to drench it with water, so that when God should burn it by fire the miracle might be more undeniable. Nor did it occur to me that Origen could take any other view of the case. But I find that he did. Dr. Wall and others have quoted this as a case in which *βαπτίζω* means *pour*. But, being convinced that when it denotes an external act it never means pour or sprinkle, I resorted to the idea to *envelope* or *overwhelm*, as in § 3. That opinion I am obliged now to retract, having found evidence that Origen looked on the transaction as a purification of the wood, however strange and incorrect such an idea may be. The passage is this. Origen is commenting on John 1: 25: "Why baptizest thou, if thou be not the Christ, nor Elias, nor the prophet?" He is aiming to show that they had no reason to suppose that Elias would baptize in person when he should come. The reason is this. Although the wood needed *purification*, yet he did not baptize, *purify*, it himself, but told others to do it. His words are: *Οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ θυσιαστήριον ξύλα, κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ Ἀχαὰβ χρόνους, δεόμενα λουτροῦ ἵνα ἐκκαύθῃ ἐπιφανέντος, ἐν πυρὶ τοῦ κυρίου βαπτίσαντος; ἐπικελεύεται γὰρ τοῖς ἱερεῦσι τοῦτο ποιῆσαι.* "Who did not baptize—*purify*—the wood upon the altar in the days of Ahab, although it needed to be purified, in order that it might be burned when the Lord should be revealed in fire; for he commanded the priest to do this." In this case the words *ξύλα δεόμενα λουτροῦ*, beyond all dispute, fix the sense, and show that he regarded the pouring as a rite of *purification*, and used *βαπτίζω* in its usual religious sense. In this view the passage remarkably falls in with and confirms the reasoning in § 9; and proves that Origen understood them to inquire in John 1: 25: "Why *purifiest thou?*" This passage also is in perfect accordance with those already quoted from his writings.

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8. It was a natural inquiry of old, as now: "Why was Christ

dii. Beatus qui *lavacrum* accepit spiritus sancti, et ignis *lavacro* non indiget. Miserabilis autem, et omni fletu dignus, qui, post *lavacrum* spiritus, *baptizandus* est igni." A little after he speaks of "peccator qui ignis indiget *baptismo*, qui combustione *purgatur*." In his Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Lib. 8, he says: "Ut ignis gehennæ in cruciatibus *purget* quem nec apostolica doctrina, nec evangelicus sermo *purgavit*, secundum illud quod est scriptum, *purificabo* te igni ad *purificationem*." Here, baptizo, purgo, purifico, and lavo (involved in lavacro) are all used as synonymous terms in describing the baptism of fire. If Gieseler is correct (Vol. 1., § 119, note 14), this purgation of Origen is not to be confounded with the Roman Catholic purgatory, first suggested, as he says, by Augustine. Neither the opinion of Origen or of Augustine is correct; yet they show as clearly as if true, that by the baptism of fire, a *purgation* by fire, and not an *immersion*, was meant. Clearly they had in mind the words of Malachi: "he is like a refiner's fire," and, "he shall *purify* and *purge*." These words gave rise to the expression in the gospel: "He shall purify you with the Holy Ghost and with fire." Taking the word βαπτίζω in this sense, we can clearly see how the various and erroneous forms of the doctrine of *purgatory* grew out of it. Compare §§ 9, 10.

13. In speaking of the baptism of tears, the Fathers regard it as a *purification* by tears, and not as an *immersion* in tears. The very nature of the case shows that it must have been so, and the language of the Fathers proves that the purifying power of tears did not depend on having a quantity sufficient for an immersion. Says Nilus, a disciple of Chrysostom, *Δουτῆρ ἀγαθὸς τῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς προσευχῆς τὸ δάκρυον.* "The tear of prayer"—not a flood, or river, or ocean of tears—"the tear of prayer is a good wash-basin of the soul." For this use of *Δουτῆρ*, see § 16, and the idea there given of washing the hands of the soul. So Gregory Nyss. calls tears *λουτρὸν κατοικίδιον καὶ κρόνους ἰδίους δι' ὧν ἐστὶ τὰς κηλίδας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπονίψασθαι*, "a domestic washing place, and fountains of your own, by means of which you can wash off the spots, or pollution of your soul." *Ἀπονίπτω*, as no one can deny, never denotes immer-

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they passed the Cape of Good Hope the sun when rising must have been on their right hand. This same voyage, if we may credit ancient history, was performed by other descendants of the Phenicians. Pliny states (Lib. II. 67, v. 1), that "Hanna, a Carthaginian, circumnavigated the continent of Africa, from Gades to the extremity of the Arabian Gulf, and wrote all the details of the voyage, which was undertaken at the period when Carthage was most flourishing, and that he founded several towns on the coast."* If this be so, then it follows that the Cape of Good Hope was passed more than 2000 years before it was discovered by Bartholomew Diaz, in 1487. These were voyages of curiosity; and they made no perceptible change in the commerce of the world. Still they show the adventurous character of the Phenician mariners. It excites our wonder that without compass or chart such a voyage should have been made. I may add here, as an interesting fact, that Cadiz in Spain was one of the colonies of Tyre; and from this country an expedition went out which discovered the new world.

The great importance of Tyre as a place of trade, and the prominence which the mention of its commerce has in the Scriptures, as well as the remarkable facts which have occurred to annihilate that commerce for ever, and to fulfil the prophecies respecting it, require a somewhat more extended notice than we have given to other places.

Of all ancient cities, Tyre was probably the most favorably situated for navigation. No situation could be more favorable for forming a navy,—situated as it was in the vicinity of Lebanon, and having the forests of Senir and Bashan also accessible. Bashan was celebrated for its oaks (Isa. 2: 13, Zech. 10: 1, 2, Ezek. 27: 6), and Lebanon could furnish a great quantity of timber, not only to be exported as an article of commerce, but to be used in the construction of ships. Ancient vessels were often constructed of fir; cedar supplied masts; while oak was used for those long and powerful oars, which were the chief instruments of navigation. "They have made all thy shipboards of fir-trees of Senir; they have taken cedars from Lebanon to make masts for thee; of oaks of Bashan have they made

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thine oars." Ezek. 27: 5, 6. Tyre was adjacent also to fruitful countries. It was the natural *outlet* of Judea, the only port on its coast of much importance. But its chief distinction arose from the fact, that it was the port to which naturally tended the rich productions of India; and when this commerce was diverted or ceased, it lost its importance and sunk into decay. For a long time it was the place through which that traffic passed on its way to Europe; and the rich commodities that were brought by the way of Babylon, Palmyra and Damascus here found their centre.

Tyre, at one time, possessed the best harbor on the coast of the Mediterranean; and it was this fact which gave it so much importance. The change which it has since undergone in this respect, as I shall show in another part of this article, is one of the most remarkable circumstances in history, and demonstrates that the prophecies *must* continue to be fulfilled. Tyre was at first built on the coast or main land, and is commonly known by the name of *Palæ-Tyrus* (*Παλαίτυρος*), or ancient Tyre, to distinguish it from insular Tyre, subsequently built on the island. There is abundant evidence that the former was first built; though it is probable that the island was early occupied as a place of anchorage. Insular Tyre was built on an island or *rock* that was about three quarters of a mile from the coast. The passage from the coast to the island was probably in boats only, until the time of Alexander; who, in order to reduce the city, by a mole two hundred feet in width joined it to the main land. This was built mainly of the rubbish and stones of the old city, and became a permanent embankment or breakwater; and thus, it is probable, added much to the natural advantages of the harbor. Alexander was occupied eight months in reducing the insular city; and it became a subject of contention among his followers after his death. That the harbor of Tyre had uncommon advantages, is not only demonstrated by the unbroken current of testimony, but by the fact, that it so long maintained the dominion of the sea, and eclipsed every rival.

We have in the Scriptures a more full account of the traffic of Tyre than of any other ancient city; and it will throw light on our subject to consider more minutely the articles of its commerce.

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and is probably here synonymous with תְּאַשּׁוּר, meaning *sherbin* —a species of cedar that grew on Mount Lebanon. Using the word בַּת in its common signification, the passage may mean, according to Gesenius, "thy benches they made of ivory (שֵׁן), the daughter of Sherbin cedars;" that is, they *inlaid* the cedar of the benches with ivory; they ornamented the seats of the rowers with ivory—a fact which is by no means improbable, though it seems incredible that they should make the benches wholly of ivory. Jarchi proposes to arrive at the same interpretation by reading בַּת־אַשּׁוּרִים as one word; and then it would mean, 'with cedars;' that is, "they made thy benches ivory with cedars brought from the land of Chittim." Chittim is a name of large extent, like the word Levant, and is applied to the cities and coasts of the Mediterranean, without denoting any particular part. Josephus makes it Cyprus; the first of Maccabees applies it to Macedonia; the Vulgate to Italy; Bochart makes it the same with the islands around it; Jerome ascribes it to the islands of the Ionian and Ægean Seas. Any of these places may be understood as included in the word "Chittim;" and as Tyre traded with them all, there can be no difficulty in understanding that either the ivory or the box that was used, was brought from them. Pict. Bib. on Ezek. 27: 6.

The articles of commerce mentioned by Ezekiel, in which Tyre traded, together with the countries with which its traffic was conducted, are the following:

1. Blue and purple from the isles of Elishah." Ezek. 27: 7. *Elisha* אֱלִישָׁה was one of the sons of Javan (Gen. 10: 4), and settled a part of Greece. The word here denotes a region situated on the Mediterranean, most probably *Elis*, or *Hellas*—a part of the Peloponnesus. In the Samaritan it is written אלישׁ. It seems remarkable that the Tyrians, who were so celebrated for their own purple, should have imported the article from Elisha. But the purple of Laconia was the finest dye next to the Tyrian; and the purple cloth of that province was possibly employed because it was cheaper than that of Tyre, which was reserved for the use of kings." Vincent. That this purple of Laconia was an article of luxury, is apparent from Horace:

> Nec Laconicas mihi
> Trahunt honestæ purpuras clientæ.
> Odes, II. 18: 7.

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been used for awnings and coverings. It will be remembered that the famous galley in which Cleopatra went to meet Anthony, had an awning made with cloth of gold. According to the description of Ezekiel, the appearance of the Tyrian vessels, whether in the harbor or at sea, must have been exceedingly magnificent.

2. The inhabitants of Zidon and Arvad traded with Tyre. Ezek. 27: 8. "The inhabitants of Zidon and Arvad were thy mariners." This passage proves, that while the Tyrians were devoted to commerce, the Sidonians furnished them with mariners. Arvad or Aradus was the name of a Phenician city upon an island of the same name, not far from the coast, founded, according to Strabo (XVI. 2, §§ 13, 14), by Sidonian deserters. Its name now is *Ruad*, and the island is about two hundred paces from the continent. Compare Gen. 10: 17. Among the places which are mentioned as trading with Tyre, besides the above, were Gebal, Persia, Lud, Tarshish, Javan, Tubal and Meshech, Togarmah, Dedan, Syria, Judah, Damascus, Dan, Arabia, Sheba and Raamah, Haran, Canneh, Eden, Asshur and Chilmad. Ezek. 27: 9—25. The whole object of the enumeration of these places is, to show the countries to which Tyre traded, that is, to nearly all the known parts of the world. Most of these places are well known; and little would be contributed to the design of this article, were we to designate the others. A remark or two is all that is necessary. Tarshish here is probably the same as Tartessus, in Spain; but I shall advert to it again when I speak of the commerce of the Jews. Javan is used to denote Greece in general, perhaps Ionia in particular. Tubal and Meshech probably denote countries situated near the Black and Caspian Seas. Dedan is supposed to have been on the southern coast of Arabia; or, as Michaelis thinks, it may have been an island, or commercial town in the Persian Gulf, established by the Tyrians to secure the trade of the Indies.

3. In regard to the articles of commerce in which the Tyrians were engaged, much light may be derived from the chapter in Ezekiel above referred to. Silver, iron, tin and lead were brought from Tarshish.—From Javan, Tubal and Meshech,

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not seen in all Caffraria; for even the king's houses are of wood, daubed with clay, and covered with straw. The natives, and especially the Moors, have a tradition from their ancestors, that those houses belonged to the queen of Saba, who carried much gold thence down to the Cuama to the sea, and so along the coast of Ethiopia to the Red Sea. Others say that these ruins were Solomon's factory, and that this Fura, or Afura, is no other than Ophir, the name not being much altered in so long a time. This is certain, that round about that hill, there is much fine gold. The navigation might in those times have been longer, for want of so good ships or pilots as now are to be had, and by reason of much time spent in trucking with the Cafares, as even in this time the merchants often spend a year or more in that business, although the Cafares be grown more covetous of our wares, and the mines be better known. Much time is also spent in the voyage by the rivers, and by that sea, which hath differing monsoons, and can be sailed but by two winds, which blow six months from the east, and as many from the west. Solomon's fleet had, besides those mentioned, this let, that the Red Sea is not safely navigable but by day, by reason of many isles and shoals; likewise it was necessary to put into harbors for fresh water and provisions, and to take in new pilots and mariners and to make reparation; which considered, with their creeping by the shore for the want of compass and experience in those seas, and their Sabbath rests, and their truck with the Cafares, might extend their whole voyage, in going, staying and returning, to three years. Further, the ivory, apes, gems, and precious woods (which grew in the wild places of Tebe within Sofala), whence they make *almaidias*, or canoes, twenty yards long of one timber, and much fine black wood grows in the coast, and is carried thence to India and Portugal; all these may make the matter probable. As for peacocks, I saw none there, but there must needs be some within land; for I have seen some Cafares wear their plumes on their heads. As there is store of fine gold, so also is there fine silver in Chicona where there are rich mines." These circumstances are so striking and so full of probability, and the difficulties respecting any other place have been so great, as to appear conclusive to many in regard to the situation of Ophir; and accordingly

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(3.) Others have supposed that the Ophir of Solomon was in the Persian Gulf; and that the commerce extended down the Red Sea, and around Arabia to the Gulf. Calmet adopted the singular theory that Ophir was in Armenia, and that the fleet of Solomon proceeded up the Persian Gulf, and thence up the Euphrates or the Tigris as far as those rivers were navigable, in order to receive the productions of Armenia. In this opinion, he is probably destined to stand alone. Nor has the opinion that the Ophir of the Scriptures was within the Persian Gulf much to recommend it. The articles enumerated are not those which would naturally be found in the islands of that Gulf, or on the adjacent shore. The gems and spices, the precious stones and aromatics of the Indies would be the productions which would naturally find their way to the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf.

(4.) India has been commonly regarded as the country where Ophir was to be found. To this opinion the large majority of authorities refer the Hebrew-Phenician voyage. But it is almost needless to say, that there has been an almost infinite number of opinions as to the part of India where Ophir was to be found; and that scarcely two persons have fixed on the same place. But the objections to India as the country of Ophir are, in my view, insuperable. The material one is, the difficulty of the navigation. Those who have read Dr. Vincent's account of the voyage of Nearchus from the river Indus to the Persian Gulf, will be satisfied that it is highly improbable that a voyage to India was undertaken and accomplished more than six hundred years before that time. Arrian denies that any voyage had ever occurred from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf by sailing around Arabia; Eratosthenes (apud Strabo lib. xvi. xvii.) also denies that any vessel proceeding from the straits of the Red Sea (Babelmandel) had ever gone more than about six hundred miles. Strabo says that before his time scarcely twenty ships had ever dared to adventure beyond the straits into the open ocean. See Huet in Ugolin, tom. vii. p. 302.

(5.) The editor of the Pictorial Bible (on 2 Chron. 20) supposes, that no particular country is intended by the Ophir of the Scriptures; but that the term is used, like the word *Thule* in the classics, to denote some indefinite, distant region, or a certain region of the world—like the East or West Indies. In

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me, however, it seems most probable that the country designated was on the eastern coast of Africa; and to this the opinions of most writers now converge.

3. The articles of commerce which Solomon conveyed to his dominions by his fleet were the following. (1.) Gold. How it was procured or paid for, or what constituted the articles of *export* for which Solomon received this in return, is nowhere intimated. (2.) Silver—an article which he made exceedingly abundant in Jerusalem. (3.) Ivory—also, as we have seen in speaking of the commerce of Tyre, an important article. (4.) *Apes*, קוֹפִים. What *species* of those animals was imported cannot be determined. The word קוֹף is applied to any species of the simia or monkey race. *Why* they were imported, is not known. As they were objects of curiosity, then as now, it is possible that it was a mere matter of speculation. As Solomon gave much of his time to Natural History (1 Kings 4: 33), it may have been with some reference to that study. (5.) *Peacocks*, תֻּכִּיִּים. It has been doubted whether peacocks are intended or *parrots*;* and it is not very material. Both are produced in Africa and in India; and both would have answered the purpose contemplated by Solomon. If the object was gain, they would be valuable objects of merchandise, as curiosities in the land of Palestine. If the object was the study of natural history, the fact is more interesting. Other kings and princes, we may suppose, would collect foreign quadrupeds and birds as objects of curiosity or wonder—to beautify a park or decorate a garden. But as we know that Solomon was devoted to study, it is not unreasonable to suppose that, while his main object was gain, he might have instructed his navigators to bring home, whatever they might meet with that was unusual or rare, which would serve to enlarge the empire of science. If so, the fact shows that amidst all that was splendid and luxurious in that reign, the useful was not forgotten, and that while Solomon sought to increase the works of art, he, at the same time, sought to extend the bounds of knowledge, and to diffuse an acquaintance with the works of God.

This commerce was, however, of short duration. The civil wars which succeeded the death of Solomon turned the attention

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the East was borne by caravans; nor would any thing, but the destruction of ships and steamers, and the restoration of caravans, ever make Petra what it was. *Tyre*, too, is a place of ruin; nor, on the whole coast of the Mediterranean, is there a single place that would not be as commodious a haven as this once celebrated port. Robinson says of its harbor in 1830: "It is a small circular basin, now quite filled up with sand and broken columns, leaving scarcely space for small boats to enter. The few fishing boats belonging to the place are sheltered by some rocks to the westward of the island." Travels in Palestine and Syria, Vol. I. p. 269. Shaw, who visited Tyre in 1738, says of the harbor: "I visited several creeks and inlets, in order to discover what provision there might have been formerly made for the security of their vessels. Yet, notwithstanding that Tyre was the chief maritime power of this country, I could not discover the least token of either *cothon* or harbor, that could have been of any extraordinary capacity. The coasting ships, indeed, still find a tolerable good shelter from the northern winds, under the southern shore, but are obliged immediately to retire when the winds change to the west or south; so that there must have been some better station than this for their security and reception. In the N. N. E. part likewise of the city, we see the traces of a safe and commodious basin, lying within the walls; but which at the same time is very small, scarce forty yards in diameter. Neither could it ever have enjoyed a larger area, unless the buildings which now circumscribe it were encroachments upon its original dimensions. Yet even this port, small as it is at present, is notwithstanding so choked up with sand and rubbish, that the boats of those poor fishermen who now and then visit this once renowned emporium, can, with great difficulty only, be admitted." Travels, pp. 330, 331. Ed. fol. Oxf. 1738. Of *Babylon* it would be easy to show the same thing. The earth does not contain a more unpropitious site for a city than this; and whatever other places may flourish, Babylon is destined to be a heap of ruins.* Some other place on the Euphrates *may* rise to affluence and splendor, but Babylon has lost all its advantages. The steamboat may

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* I refer those who may be desirous of seeing a full proof

it is changing its place and its form in accordance with laws which may be understood, and that the past furnishes important lessons in regard to those laws; that prosperous commerce is connected with high moral character and public virtue;—that it exists only in the spirit of liberty, and of mutual confidence; and particularly, that commerce tends to equalize all nations, and to diffuse to all the blessings enjoyed by few. On board the vessel that we send from our ports there may be the elements of all that is fitted to change the face of nations. There is science, directing its way across the ocean; there is the mariner's compass, that has produced so many changes on the earth; there is the quadrant; and there may be the press; and there may be those who are imbued with the love of liberty; and there may be the heralds of salvation, bearing that gospel to which we owe public virtue and civil liberty, to distant and barbarous climes.

I have said that the great prize sought in ancient and in modern times has been the wealth of the Indies. In seeking that prize, the New World—more rich in its native resources, and in all that contributes to human happiness than the East—was disclosed. That moment, when Columbus placed his foot on St. Salvador—supposing that he had reached the Indies—changed the destiny of commerce and of nations. With what purpose, with what heart did he come? With what feelings did he place his foot on the long-sought land? He came as a Christian. He came to give thanks to God. "No sooner did he land," says his elegant biographer—Irving—"than he threw himself upon his knees, kissed the earth, and returned thanks to God with tears of joy. His example was followed by the rest, whose hearts overflowed with the same feelings of gratitude." "O Lord God, Eternal and Almighty," said he, "thou hast by thy sacred word created heaven, and earth, and sea; blessed and glorified be thy name; lauded be thy majesty, who hast deigned to grant, that by thy humble servant thy sacred name should be known, and proclaimed in this the other part of the world." Irving's Columbus, Vol. I. p. 150. With these views *he* trod the New World; for the honor of the name of the Creator he had crossed the ocean; with a desire that the true religion should spread all over that new world, he lived and died.

Just one hundred and twenty-eight years after this, another

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And the latter can hardly be expected, except in the former, any more than the jewel can be safe in its case, when that case is broken and crushed about it. And yet how often do we entirely overlook and forget this subject;—thus preparing for ourselves years of suffering, or at least greatly limiting our mental and social and moral growth. This is true, for example, of parents. This one, from mistaken tenderness, confines his child almost entirely to warm apartments; as though the pure air of heaven were never intended to be breathed till it had been shut up within walls and heated by a furnace. That one allows his child freely, and at any hour, whatever is most agreeable to the palate; as though the digestive system were one vast and devouring whirlpool, into which, at all times, every thing was expected to be swept, and might be with safety. That one, with an honest but mistaken desire to improve the mind of his child, permits it to be cooped up in the ill-ventilated school-room, or bent down to studies three-fourths of its time, at an age when it is all important that the chief care should be given to the physical system;—to studies, too, which are often varied and difficult enough to task the powers of a full grown intellect. From the pride of having a superior child, he inconsiderately sacrifices its health, and of course a large share of its happiness, to its premature, precocious mental growth. And from such causes it is that we have, in modern days, so many cases of wilted and feeble and sickly children, or of remarkable and wonderful children, who grow up, by this forced and hot-bed action of the brain, to be prodigies by their second or third year, and die by the next! And by the continuance of this neglect, as we ourselves go on in life, by ignorance and heedlessness of physiology, by the neglect of water in its purity, and of air in its freshness and abundance, and of exercise in its vigor and regularity—from stooping with the shoulders till the lungs from very friction might well become diseased—from eating at all times, and all things, and almost in all quantities—from these things is it not that there are so many cases of nervous and hypochondriac disease, and spinal and consumptive affections, and ruined digestive organs? And is it any wonder that, from the strong healthfulness of our English sires, we have become a feeble

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self-reproach. And we should see to it that our social character is such, that we shall feel it to have been a blessing and not a curse to others, when they are gone from us, or we from them, for ever. To this end, then, as well as for our own sake, we should seek to unfold and enlighten, and purify the social affections—those that bind us to the parent whom we almost worship, to the brother and the sister so fondly beloved, to the family, to the friend, to the neighbor, to the land of our birthright, to the world. Those affections we should elevate from instincts to principles, from impulses to deep and eternal attachments; inweaving them with all that is right and faithful, and generous and true; making them, as far as possible, like the love of God to his own children. Growth and improvement as social beings—this is alike due to our nature and enjoyment, and to our fellow-beings.

4. *Self-cultivation should also be* MORAL *and* RELIGIOUS. Let it be physical without this, and it does but make us finer animals, with no regard to the great end of our being. Let it be intellectual without this, and its intelligence may be perverted, like that of devils, only to blight and destroy. Let it be social without this, and it may be used, or rather abused to the vilest ends, sneering in secret at the moralities of life, and trampling them all in the dust for the sake of self-indulgence. There is too great a tendency with many to separate these things—to cultivate the physical, the social and the intellectual, while the moral and the religious are neglected. Not without reason has it been said, "that the tendency to exalt talent above virtue and religion is the curse of the age." And for this very reason it is, that we the more need to cultivate our moral, our religious part, as the guide and the check, the perfection and the glory of our nature. Not that our religion should be, as too many seem to think it was designed to be, morose and gloomy, and divorced from common life. On the contrary, it should gather the spirit of heaven only that it may walk the more cheerfully, and gracefully, and usefully, on earth. As sacred and spiritual, and as principled it should be, as the very spirit of the Redeemer himself. But it should also be such that we can take it with us to

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merely as the generic and abstract "love to being in general," but also as the more familiar grace of "love to some beings in particular." It should be drawn not merely from "systematic treatises on theology, written in schools and garrets and cloisters, many of them by those bearing the title of bachelor in divinity, and the character of bachelor in humanity too;" but from the Bible, which is full of sympathy with common life, and which not only permits but directs us to all things which are pure and lovely and of good report—to all in social life which makes the intellect more pliant and versatile, the manners more polished and affectionate and winning, the man more human, and the entire life more joyous and blessed.

And besides all this, we should mount still higher in the scale. Truth and duty—for these we should ever and earnestly seek, that we may know the one and do the other. Every wrong propensity we should strive to subdue—every evil habit to lay aside—every good one to cherish. Conscience and principle we should enthrone within us, and ever hearken to their voice. Often should we ask as to our nature and destiny as immortal beings; and, bound as we are to a future and invisible world, and to a deathless existence, we should seek, as the gospel directs, to prepare for the scenes that are before us. Nowhere has self-cultivation so glorious a field as when she whispers of our destiny—as when she reminds us that we are to live for ever—as when she unfolds the idea of God and of duty, clearly and livingly within us; moving us to reverence and love and obey him, to hunger and thirst after his likeness, to be a blessing to ourselves and to all around us, and thus to make progress in the noblest growth whether of human or angelic natures. And never do we appear so noble, so like the bright intelligences of heaven, as when we are thus bound to God in deep and holy affection, in joyful obedience and heavenly hope; when religion sits enthroned on our brow, and pride has given way to meekness, and benevolence reigns within us, and glows in our looks, and breathes in our words, and lives in our conduct;—when our whole life is one continual process of self-elevation and improvement—when principle regulates every act, and all our plans take hold on eternity,—and when all around us feel that religion has made us noble and [illegible] we may be; and [illegible]

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us. Self-culture no more demands the sacrifice of our judgment, than of our individuality. We are not to feel as if we were all to be cast into the same mould, and conformed to the same likeness; as if perfection could be the same to all. Each is to develope himself and perfect himself as he is, not as the imitator of others. And to do this, each must think for himself, and judge for himself, in all his readings. Otherwise, whatever the extent of his information, his character will be spiritless and tame, as if he were but a fragment of the mass, rather than an individual man. We should commune with thinkers, not to adopt all that they may say because they say it, but that we may learn to be thinkers too. In all our reading, we should cherish the art which is one of the highest attainments of self-cultivation—that of uniting that childlike docility which thankfully welcomes light from every human being who can give it, with the independent and manly rejection of every opinion which does not commend itself to our own deliberate judgment. Ever should we strengthen our reason by that of others, but never should we blindly bow to them, however high their talents or reputation. Ever should we be true—sacredly and firmly true to our own convictions; and then shall we be conscious of "a spiritual force, and independence and progress unknown to the vulgar, whether in high or low life, who march as they are drilled to the step of their times."

7. *We must in all things and ever be intent upon it.* We are not to feel, as we are too prone to do, that self-improvement is a thing of books and studies merely, but rather as something to be prosecuted everywhere; as if life, in its every aspect, and in its every contact with us, were the intended means to it. Every condition—every position and employment of life is, as already remarked, full of the means of progress, if we will but seize and use them. Our business, our reading, our social intercourse, our minglings with our fellow-men, our political relations and duties, our joys and sorrows, the aspects of nature, the movements of Providence, and the means of grace, all bear to us the elements and means of self-development and growth. And as the digestive system lays hold on every variety of food,

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tion of man has not been idle, and human ingenuity has been taxed to the utmost to discover resemblances and point out typical relations. Ponderous volumes have been filled with types and antitypes, which, it is believed, never had any existence but in the fancy of the writers. Scarcely an individual of note is mentioned in the Old Testament, no matter what may have been his character, that has not been held up as a type of Christ or of Satan, of the church or the world, of the friends or the enemies of God. Hardly an ordinance or a circumstance is spoken of in the Jewish Scriptures, which has not been regarded as an adumbration of something in the Christian Scriptures. The Jewish Rabbies held that nothing would occur under the new dispensation which had not its corresponding outline in the old. Christian expositors have not only admitted the correctness of this principle, but they have gone much farther, and maintained that nothing actually transpired under the earlier dispensation which has not its counterpart under the later. Hence events, persons and things, without number, have been regarded as prefigurations. The comparison has been extended to the minutest particulars, and, in some cases, even to acts confessedly immoral and wicked. That there is nothing of exaggeration in this statement will be evident from the following examples, selected from a mass which may be found in the various works that relate to this subject.

We are told that the extraction of Eve from the side of Adam, while he was in a deep sleep, was typical of the Roman soldiers piercing our Saviour's side, while he slept the sleep of death. Abel was a type of Christ; Cain, of the Jews who crucified him. Pharaoh and the Egyptians were types of sin and Satan. All the victories of the Jews over their enemies were typical of the victories of the church over infidelity; and, of course, the various defeats of the Jews were typical of the defeats of the church and of the triumphs of infidelity. Jacob supplanting Esau prefigured Christ supplanting sin and Satan. Samson typified Christ, not only in the fact of his being a Nazarite and the success of his skirmishes with the Philistines, but his carrying away the door and posts of the gates of Gaza to the top of a hill signifies Christ's resurrection; and his

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to Timnath was a type of Paul.* Even the adultery of David and the incest of Lot and of Ammon have been explained as types of the salvation procured for us by Jesus Christ.† Justin Martyr makes the tree of life in Paradise a type of the cross; others conceive it to be a type of the Lord's Supper. Justin also discovered that Moses with his arms extended (Ex. 17 : 12) was a type of the cross. The dove which Noah sent out of the ark was a type of the Holy Spirit sent down from above.‡ The waters of the Red Sea signify affliction and death. The strong east wind which, by its violence, drove the waters before it for the benefit of the Israelites, was a type of the spirit of Jesus. The ark of the covenant (says Witsius), being partly of wood and partly of gold, aptly represents the two natures of Christ.§ The oak on which Absalom hung by the hair of his head was a type of the cross of Christ. Hanging was itself typical of the cross; consequently Absalom, together with every Jewish malefactor, who happened, whether justly or unjustly, to suffer capital punishment in this way, was a type of the crucified Saviour.‖ Theophylus of Antioch tells us that the three days preceding the creation of the two great lights (Gen. 1: 14) were *τύποι τῆς τριάδος.*¶ Speaking of the sun and moon (p. 105) he says, *ταῦτα δὲ δεῖγμα καὶ τύπον ἐπέχει μεγάλου μυστηρίου ὁ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐν τύπῳ θεοῦ ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ σελήνη ἀνθρώπου.* Innocent III. discovered that the sun which ruled the day was a type of *papal* authority, and the moon which ruled the night, a type of regal authority.** Haldane and others find in the sun a type of Christ, and in the moon a type of the church.†† The promise made to David: "I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever," has been adduced as predictive of the endless duration of the papal power, of which Solomon and even Christ himself are assumed to be types.‡‡ The tribe of Levi is

* Vitringa, Obs. Sac.

† Horne's Introduction, Vol. II. pp, 525, 531., 7th Lond. ed.

‡ Witsius on the Covenants, Vol. II. p. 208.

§ On the Covenants, Vol. II. p. 208.

‖ Keach's Scripture Metaphors, Vol. II. p. 44. Horne's Introd. Vol. II. pp. 231, 532.

¶ Ad Autolycum, Lib. II. p. 106, ed. Oxon. 1684. Bishop

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typical of their profession as preachers of the gospel; and their taking many fish typical of their success in winning souls to Christ.* Such extravagant opinions are calculated to expose the whole doctrine of types to ridicule, and to lead many to doubt whether there is any foundation whatever for this doctrine in the inspired volume. And such has actually been the result. Some modern theological writers have denied altogether the existence of prophetical types; while others have either studiously avoided all allusion to the subject in their systems of divinity, or in their efforts to reduce the types of Scripture to the least possible number, have stripped persons and institutions of their typical character, which have been regarded as prefigurative by the most enlightened interpreters in every age of the church.

No valid objection, we apprehend, can be alleged against the existence of types abstractly considered. The declared connection of two persons or series of events in the relation of historical type and antitype, is simply one of the various modes employed by the Deity to convey information respecting future events, and record their accomplishment. Now, it is surely no more impossible for the omniscient God to *prefigure* events than to *predict* them. And if it is not impossible, how can it be shown to be improbable that he would avail himself of this method of imparting instruction to mankind, and of strengthening the faith of believers in the truth of his word! The only question then, is, whether, in point of fact, God has employed this method of conveying truth; in other words, whether one person or thing is taken as the representative or type of another person or thing, in the Bible? To this question, it seems to us, but one answer can be given. The perusal of the Epistle to the Hebrews is alone sufficient to convince every candid and unprejudiced mind, that the New Testament lays claim to a preconcerted connection with certain events and persons recorded in the Old; and that this connection, although in some cases obscure, and perhaps in none fully understood by the ancient Hebrews, is in other instances clear and unequivocal.† The same mode of ex-

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in this passage, seems not to be taken from the art of *founding*, as these critics suppose. The prevailing idea is the emancipation of slaves, or at least, an improvement in their condition,—equivalent or rather superior to an emancipation,—by a change of masters. Rosenmueller and Bretschneider think it signifies a *stamp* or *impression*, alluding to the doctrine as being impressed on the mind (comp. James 1: 21), a sense, however, which is not in accordance with the usage of Paul, nor does it so well suit the passage in question, as the meaning given to it above.—3. *Prototype, pattern*, after which any thing is made—applied to a building, Acts 7: 44, Heb. 8: 5. These passages refer to Ex. 25: 40, where the LXX has *τύπον*, answering to the Heb. תַּבְנִית. Tropically, it signifies *an example*. Phil. 3: 17. 1 Thess. 1: 7. 2 Thess. 3: 9. 1 Tim. 4: 12. Tit. 2: 7. 1 Pet. 5: 7. 1 Cor. 10: 6, 11.—4. It is applied to a person *as bearing the form and figure of another person*, i. e., as having a preordained resemblance and connection in certain relations and circumstances, Rom. 5: 14, where Adam is called *a type* of Christ. This signification belongs generically to the second meaning given above; but the specific idea attached to it in the passage here referred to, is peculiar and exclusively biblical. Here, then, the biblical and theological meaning coincide. The same idea is expressed by other terms in the New Testament—as *σκιά*, Col. 2: 17, Heb. 8: 5, 10: 1, and *παραβολή*, Heb. 9: 9, which is well explained by Chrysostom and Theophylact, *τύπος καὶ σκιαγραφία*, and by Hesychius, *πραγμάτων ὁμοίωσις*. The correlative term—that which corresponds to the type and is represented by it—is *ἀντιτύπος*, *antitype*. See 1 Pet. 3: 21, where the water of baptism is represented as, in a certain sense, the antitype of the waters of the deluge, i. e., it is that which the waters of the deluge were designed to typify in the work of man's salvation. According to the definition we have given, one person is the historical and prophetical type of another, when some one or more of the actions of the former designedly prefigure or adumbrate the actions of the latter. An event or institution is typical of some future event or institution, when the first has the same designed connection with the second. Some writers employ language adapted to produce the impression that they hold to a typical sense of words. Thus, Horne

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ing into the rest and enjoyment of heaven.* Properly speaking, however, there is no *typical* sense of *words*. Types are not *words*, but *things*, which God intended to be significant signs of future events. "When we explain a passage typically (says Pareau), we only subjoin one sense to the words: the typical sense exists in the things."† Persons and things only can be types: the language of the Old Testament, relating to typical persons or prescribing typical things, has no double sense,—the one literal and the other typical; nor is it to be interpreted in a manner different from any other part of the Bible.

Types have not unfrequently been confounded with the moral *allegory*, or *parable;* but they are obviously dissimilar, and should be carefully distinguished. An allegory or parable is a *fictitious* narrative; a type, on the contrary, is something *real*. The former are pictures of the imagination; the latter is an historical fact. A parable, like a modern romance or novel, may be founded on fact; but historical verity is essential neither to an allegory nor to a parable. They may be, and usually are entirely fictitious. Of this nature are the parables of our Saviour, Bunyan's allegory of the Pilgrim's Progress, and Hannah More's allegory of Parley the Porter. Not so a type. This must necessarily be an historical verity. Whatever it be which is designed to prefigure something future, whether a person, thing, institution or action, the first not less than the second must have a real, and not a merely imaginary existence.

"The essence of a type," says Holden, "consisting in its foreordained similitude to something future, requires it to be a reality; otherwise it would want the first and most important kind of resemblance, viz., truth. Fiction may resemble fiction; one ideal personage may be like another; but there can be no substantial relationship between a nonentity and a reality. If that which is prefigured be a fact, that which prefigures it must be a fact likewise. Hence, between the type and the antitype there is this correspondence, that the reality of the one presupposes the reality of the other."‡

There are, it is true, some points of similitude between a type and an allegory. The interpretation of both is an interpretation of *things*, and not of words; and both are equally founded on

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resemblance. The type, moreover, corresponds to its antitype, as the protasis, or *immediate* representation in an allegory or parable, corresponds to the apodosis, or its *ultimate* representation. A material difference, however, exists in the *quality* of the things compared, as well as in the design of the comparison. When, for instance, Joshua, conducting the Israelites to Canaan, is described as a type of our Saviour conducting his disciples to heaven; or when the sacrifice of the passover is described as a type of the sacrifice of our Saviour on the cross; the *subjects* of reference have nothing similar to the subjects of an allegory, though the comparison between them is the same. And though a type, in reference to its antitype, is called a *shadow*, while the latter is called the *substance*, yet the use of these terms does not imply that the former has less of historical verity than the latter.* But while there is a material difference between a proper type and a proper allegory, there may be supposed to exist a close affinity between *typical interpretation* and the *allegorical interpretation of historical facts.* The custom of giving to the incidents of Scripture, especially in the Old Testament, a secondary application to other facts, in some respects similar, for the purpose of illustration or instruction, was introduced at a very early period of Christianity, and is warranted to some extent by the authority of the sacred writers themselves. Thus Paul allegorizes the history of Hagar and Sarah, in his Epistle to the Galatians.† But this species of allegorical interpretation does not necessarily destroy the historical verity of the narrative. It by no means converts the facts into emblems. The allegorical, figurative or secondary interpretation is merely superinduced on the historical. Thus, the history of the creation and the fall of man has, by some, been allegorized for the purpose of moral instruction, who still regarded it as historical truth, and gave it a literal interpretation. "It was usual," says Holden, "in the early periods of Christianity, with the ministers of religion, with a view to excite the piety and devotion of the

* Marsh's Lectures in Div., Lec. XVII. p. 89.

† Chap. 4: 24. Ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα, "*which are* [*thus*] *allegorized* [*by me*"], i. e., accommodated for the purpose of illustration to the case of the Law and the Gospel. Philo often

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hearers, to extract spiritual meanings from the sacred history. They expounded Scripture facts in a mystical or allegorical manner, which, by awakening attention, facilitated the way for a moral application to the hearts of the people. Such expositions were adopted as the best means of warming the affections and inflaming the devotion of the faithful; and they may now occasionally be employed in Christian assemblies with effect; but they were never meant to vacate the literal sense of the Scriptures. The reality of the facts was unimpeached, and was, in truth, the only firm foundation upon which their allegories were raised, and without which they would have been no better than empty fables, and baseless creations of the fancy."*

We may then, as Bishop Marsh has remarked, *allegorize* an historical narrative, and yet not *convert* it into an *allegory*. This method of deducing spiritual instruction from particular passages of Scripture, when employed with sobriety and discretion, may be productive of no evil, provided there is no claim of divine authority for such interpretation, and no impression on the mind of the reader or hearer that the accommodated sense is the true sense of the passage. But how often are the bounds of propriety transgressed in this matter, especially by preachers of limited information? And how frequently is the caution which we have suggested disregarded? For that which is purely the work of human invention there is claimed, not unfrequently, the authority of Scripture; and the mystical or allegorical meaning takes the place of the literal and only proper meaning. Thus the Bible is converted into a mere collection of allegories.

Typical interpretation, however, stands upon different ground, and, when properly understood and explained, produces very

* Diss. on the Fall, p. 296. "Our argument," says Berriman, "from the typical interpretation of the ancient rites, and the allegorical explication of ancient history, must depend upon the supposition of their having been literally prescribed and transacted; and in vain shall we look after the hidden meaning, if the fact, under which it is said to be concealed, be fictitious and without foundation. If the history of the

different effects. The relation of the type to the antitype is not a matter of fancy and human invention, but of divine authority; and the application of the one to the other leaves the truth of history unimpaired. Many excellent commentators, we are aware, have understood Paul to assert, in the passage in Galatians already referred to, that the historical facts to which he alludes were proper types. If this opinion be correct, still it would not justify us in attaching to any portion of Scripture an allegorico-typical sense, without the express authority of an inspired writer for so doing. But the correctness of this opinion, we think, may well be doubted. Paul, in applying the history of Sarah and Hagar to the Jewish and Christian covenants, certainly does not call it a type, but merely affirms that, in giving such an application, he had allegorized the history. And if to allegorize a portion of history does not necessarily convert it into an allegory, neither does it necessarily convert it into a type.

Again: Types have been often confounded with mere *symbols* or *emblems*. A type is indeed a kind of symbol, but differs in certain respects from every other species. The term symbol is equally applicable to that which represents a thing past, present or future. The images of the cherubim over the mercy-seat, for example, were symbols; the water in baptism and the bread and wine in the eucharist are symbols; but none of these are types. A type has reference in every case to something future, and hence is virtually a *prediction* of its antitype. But there is nothing predictive in the bread and wine, or in the baptismal water. They are merely *emblems*, not types: symbols and types, therefore, agree in their *genus*, but differ in their *species*. An ordinance, however, may at the same time be commemorative and prefigurative; it may have both a retrospective and a prospective reference, and consequently exhibit the specific character of an emblem and also of a type. Such was the case with the Jewish passover. It was partly intended to perpetuate the remembrance of the miraculous deliverance of the Hebrews from Egyptian servitude. Thus it had a retrospective reference. It also prefigured the propitiatory sacrifice of the Son of God. Here we perceive its prospective and typical reference.

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what are intended by significant actions. When Ahijah was commissioned to predict that the kingdom of Israel should be taken from Solomon, he clad himself with a new garment and met Jeroboam in the way. Taking hold of the new garment he rent it into twelve pieces. Ten of these he gave to Jeroboam, to signify by *action*, as well as by word, that the kingdom would be rent out of the hand of Solomon, and that ten tribes would acknowledge him as their head. 1 Kings 11: 30. Again: when Elisha the prophet became sick with the disease which terminated his life, King Joash made him a visit and wept over him. The prophet by divine direction informed him, by means of a symbolical action, of events which were about to take place. He commanded the king to take a bow and arrows, and put his hands upon them, to indicate his war with Syria. Then the prophet placed his own hands upon the king's hands to intimate that victory cometh from God alone. He next directed the king to open the windows facing the country east of the Jordan, which was at that time in possession of the Syrians, and to shoot. The king having done as directed, the prophet said to him: "The arrow of the Lord's deliverance and the arrow of deliverance from Syria; for thou shalt smite the Syrians in Aphek till thou hast consumed them. And he said, Take the arrows; and he took them. And he said unto the king of Israel, Smite upon the ground; and he smote thrice and stayed. And the man of God was wroth with him, and said, Thou shouldst have smitten five or six times; then hadst thou smitten Syria till thou hadst consumed it; whereas now thou shalt smite Syria but thrice." 2 Kings, 13: 14—19. We have another example of the same nature in the case of Jeremiah, when, by breaking a potter's vessel in the valley of Hinnom, he intimated to the Jews the destruction of their chief city. Jer. 19: 10—13. By making bonds and yokes, and putting them first upon his own neck, and then sending them to the kings of Edom, Moab, Ammon and Tyre, he declared their subjugation to the yoke of the king of Babylon. Jer. 27: 2—8. In the New Testament the same method of conveying prophetical intimations occurs. Agabus took Paul's girdle,

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ical, and unquestionably they have a striking resemblance to such as are typical. In common with types, they are *actions* as distinguished from words; they are *symbolical* and *prophetical* actions. Hence we commonly find them classed under the head of *prophetical types*. But notwithstanding these points of resemblance, the two are not identical. The significant acts in question, were avowedly performed for a specific purpose, and with reference, for the most part, to some event or events near at hand. In every case they were *insulated* acts, and not interwoven into the ordinary transactions of the prophets' lives. Indeed they had no relation to the prophet himself; he performed them in an assumed character and with exclusive reference to future events. But *typical actions*, properly so called, arise directly out of the transactions in which the typical person is engaged. They often form a part of the ordinary occurrences of his life. The character in which he performs them is his own proper character, and not an assumed one. The acts themselves are performed without any consciousness of their prospective and prophetical reference, and the persons or events which they prefigure are remote.

It is hardly necessary to say that a type is wholly distinct from a *metaphor*. Many things, to which our Saviour is compared, are in no sense instituted with a particular and designed reference to him. He is called *a door*, *a vine*, *a foundation*, *a corner-stone*; but what reasonable man would hence infer that doors, vines, foundations, and corner-stones are types of the Messiah? But when our Lord is called *the Lamb of God* which taketh away the sin of the world, the assertion is much more than the application of a metaphor. It intimates a designed connexion between the lamb slain in sacrifice under the Mosaic dispensation, and the great expiation to be made in the person of the Messiah. So when Christ is called *our Passover* which is sacrificed for us, the assertion is not a mere figure of speech; but it implies that the passover, in all its circumstances, bore a designed resemblance to the death of Christ.

From what has been said, it will be perceived that *three things* must conspire to make one person, institution or action, the type of another. There must be a *resemblance*; the resemblance must have been *designed by God*, and it must have a

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made this too exclusively the object of attention. Accordingly when a resemblance, real or imaginary, has been discovered between two persons or events, this has been deemed quite sufficient to establish a preordained connexion between them. In this way it is easy to see how such persons as Job, Bazaleel, Aholiab, Phineas, Boaz, Absalom, Eliakim, Daniel, Zerubbabel, Antiochus Epiphanes, the unmarried brothers of him who left his widow childless, and the hanged malefactors came to be regarded as types.

When it is said that similarity, in certain respects, between the type and the antitype, is requisite to place them in the relation of corrolates, one to the other, this does not preclude the idea of *dissimilarity* in other respects. And when the points of dissimilitude are brought under our notice, in the way of contrast, the type is called *antithetic.* We have an example in Rom. 5: 14.

2. The second requisite in a type is, that *it be prepared and designed by God to prefigure its antitype.* Similarity between two persons or things, no matter how numerous may be the particulars to which it extends, is insufficient by itself to make them type and antitype. A resemblance in certain circumstances of the history of two individuals, living at different periods, may exist without the remotest connexion between them. One person, for instance, may successfully *imitate* the actions of another. One may casually be placed in circumstances like those of another, and the conduct of the two may be very similar. Mankind are pretty much alike in all ages. Nations and empires rise, flourish and decay, very nearly in the same manner. And what is true of nations, applies to individuals. Numerous instances have occurred in history of a remarkable similarity between individuals. Yet, however close and striking the agreement may have been, it is very different from that of type and antitype. The connexion in the latter case must have been originally preconcerted and preordained by God himself. And it is this original design and preordination, which constitutes the peculiar characteristic of a type. Where this does not exist, the relation between any two persons or things, however similar, is not the relation of type and antitype.*

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3. The last requisite in a type is, *that it have respect to something future.* This feature, as we have seen, constitutes the specific difference between a type and a mere symbol or emblem. Those institutions of Moses which partook of the nature of types, are called by the apostle *the shadow of good things to come;* while the antitype is the substance. Col. 2: 17. Heb. 10: 1. The daily and annual sacrifices of the patriarchal and Jewish dispensations adumbrated the great sacrifice, which, in the fulness of time, was to be offered effectually, and once for all. The ulterior and prophetic reference was not, indeed, the only purpose for which a religious rite was anciently appointed. It might, and generally did, subserve other purposes, subordinate perhaps to this, but nevertheless in themselves highly important and beneficial. Nay, further, the subordinate purpose may have been the only one which at the time was clearly and distinctly understood by the persons who observed the rite. Many, if not most of the Mosaic ordinances, in point of fact performed the two offices of symbol and type. So far as they signified to the Hebrews any religious duties or moral virtues which they were to practise, they were *symbols;* and so far as they were divinely appointed to represent things future, they were *types.*

It is evident, from the nature of a type, as here defined and explained, that it is *a species of prophecy.* It differs from a *direct, verbal* prophecy only in this; in one case, the future person or event is *prefigured,* in the other, *predicted.* In both there is the same display of the foreknowledge of God, and of his moral government over the world. This species of evidence for the truth of revealed religion, like what is called the experimental evidence of Christianity, addresses itself rather to believers than to skeptics. From its peculiar character, it is less likely to make an impression on the mind of an unbeliever than direct verbal prophecy. It assumes—as a fact previously established—the inspiration of the Scriptures; which the objector might first require to be satisfactorily proved. But to one

type must be instituted by God, who alone can establish the

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the one was *designed* to prefigure the other, is the authority of that work in which the scheme of divine Providence is unfolded. Destitute of *that* authority, we may confound a resemblance, subsequently observed, with a resemblance *preordained*. We may mistake a comparison, founded on a mere *accidental* parity of circumstances, for a comparison founded on a *necessary* and *inherent connection*. There is no other rule, therefore, by which we can distinguish a *real* from a *pretended* type, than that of Scripture itself. There are no other possible *means*, by which we can *know*, that a previous design and a preordained connection *existed*. Whatever persons or things, therefore, recorded in the Old Testament, were expressly declared by Christ or by his apostles to have been designed as prefigurations of persons or things, so recorded in the *former*, are types of the persons or things with which they are compared in the *latter*. But if we assert, that a person or thing was designed to prefigure another person or thing, where no such prefiguration has been declared by *divine authority*, we make an assertion for which we neither *have*, nor *can* have the slightest foundation."*

Bishop Van Mildert: "It is essential to a type, in the scriptural acceptation of the term, that there should be competent evidence of the divine *intention* in the correspondence between it and the antitype,—a matter not to be left to the imagination of the expositor to discover, but resting on some solid proof from Scripture itself."†

Ernesti: "Those who look to the counsel or intention, as they call it, of the Holy Spirit, act irrationally, and open the road to the unlimited introduction of types. The intention of the Holy Spirit can be made known to us only by his own showing.‡

Prof. Stuart: "If it be asked how far we are to consider the Old Testament as typical, I should answer, without any hesitation, just so much of it is to be regarded as typical as the New Testament affirms to be so, and *no more*. The fact, that any thing or event under the Old Testament dispensation was designed to prefigure something under the New, can be known to us only by revelation, and, of course, all that is not designated

* Lectures, pt. 2, Lec. 6.

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by divine authority as typical, can never be made so, by any authority less than that which guided the writers of the New Testament."*

Prof. Stowe: "In regard to types and allegories, we know of none, excepting those which are explained as such in the Bible itself. All the rest are merely conjectural, and though often ingenious, are worse than idle, leading the mind away from the truth, perverting it by false principles of interpretation, and making it the mere sport of every idle fancy."†

T. H. Horne: "Unless we have the authority of the sacred writers themselves for it, we cannot conclude, with certainty, that this or that person or thing, which is mentioned in the Old Testament, is a type of Christ, on account of the resemblance which we may perceive between them."‡

Chevallier: "The connection of typical events with those which they foreshow, can be determined by authority only. For unless the Scripture has declared that the connection exists, we can never ascertain that any resemblance, however accurate, is any thing more than a fanciful adaptation, and we may go on to multiply imaginary instances without end." Again: "The error of those who suffer their imagination to suppose the existence of types where they are not, should warn us that no action must be selected as typical of another, unless it be distinctly declared or plainly intimated in some part of Scripture to possess that character."§

Christian Observer (London): "The truth of the whole matter (viz. of types) unquestionably lies in a short compass. The interpretations of this nature, which are adopted by Scripture itself, are infallible; but when they stand alone upon the authority of human invention and imagination, or, what is sometimes absurdly introduced as the analogy of faith, they are simply fallible, and often very simple indeed. No man of common sense will pretend, on such points, to any superior inspiration or judicial authority over another. Here the right of private judgment must take its most legitimate stand. The Scriptures, no doubt, are suited to every turn of mind and taste. The very large place which the imagination occupies in the mind of man

* Stuart's Ernesti, p. 13.

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cannot have been unknown to him who framed the Scriptures *for* man. Hence we may justly admire that ineffable wisdom which has given forth enough for the dullest and most sterile understanding of the wayfaring man, to guide him; and has superadded an abundance of most instructive and impressive analogies for every higher grade of intellect or imagination, not even refusing food to the most soaring and aerial of all minds, by the construction of narratives, occurrences and doctrines, which, with almost a miraculous closeness of application, may be made to fit into one another, and into *the analogy of faith*. It is, however, we repeat it, where these applications are warranted, and made to our hands, by the words of inspiration itself, that we deem them either positively certain or absolutely wise and safe."*

Types have been divided by different writers into various classes, as natural, moral, historical, legal, prophetical, etc. But for several of these distinctions there is no foundation whatever. It may well be doubted whether there are properly any types which have been called *natural*,—such as the sun, the moon, the creation, the earth, etc. Those rites which have been called *moral* types, are either mere emblems, or they properly belong to the class of historical types. What have been denominated prophetical types, are merely symbolical actions. All types are prophetical; and the utility of arranging them under the heads of legal, historical, etc., seems very questionable. Chevallier, however, has proposed a classification of a different description, which, so far as the prophetical character of types is concerned, may not be without its advantages. His division is into three classes, as follows: 1. "Those which are supported by accomplished prophecy, delivered previously to the appearance of the antitype;" e. g., Moses, Deut. 18: 15; Joshua the High Priest, Zech. 3: 8. 2. "Those supported by accomplished prophecy, delivered in the person of the antitype; e. g., the brazen serpent, Num. 21: 5, 9 (comp. John 3: 14); the manna which the Israelites ate in the desert, John 6: 32, 49; the paschal sacrifice, Cor. 5: 7, 8 (comp. Luke 22: 14—16); the miraculous preservation of Jonah in the fish, John 11: 32, Matt. 12: 40. 3. "Those which in Scripture are expressly declared, or clearly assumed to be typical, after the pre-

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of Christ only as regards his intended sacrifice on Mount Moriah. Jonah was a type of Christ only in reference to his remaining three days unharmed in the belly of the fish. Now, as we are not justified in pronouncing, without scriptural authority, one person or thing to be typical of another, simply on the ground of resemblance between them; so, on the same principle, we are not warranted in extending the comparison to every particular in the private history of a really typical person, merely on the ground that we can discover a resemblance. We cannot be sure, without adequate authority for it, that the correspondence in every particular was preordained and not casual. Yet, nothing is more common than the extension of the comparison in such cases to every minute particular. There is no way of avoiding this error but by strictly confining our expositions of types to those express points in which the Scripture itself authorizes us to consider them as typical, or which immediately flow from the nature of the particular relation or character, which we are taught to regard as constituting the analogy between the type and its antitype.*

2. *No doctrine should be taught as necessary to salvation which is founded solely on typical analogy.* The great and fundamental truths, of the word of God, are taught in plain and unequivocal language, and not left to be deduced from obscure and figurative passages. The typical manifestations of the divine counsels will be found in perfect harmony with these truths. The former, therefore, may be profitably adduced in confirmation and illustration of the latter Our belief in the doctrine of the atonement, for instance, may be greatly strengthened by contemplating the fact that it was not only revealed to the fathers of our race by the clear intimations of verbal prophecy, but prefigured in the numerous sacrifices which were offered from the time of Adam to the death of Christ. But it is highly improbable that God would conceal, under the veil of types and shadows, truths which are essential to our salvation, and nowhere disclosed in plain and literal terms. No person consequently can be bound to receive, as a necessary article of faith, any doctrine which has no evidence in its support, except what is drawn from the types and shadows of the

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public sacrifices to Jupiter. This, of course, he could not do; and, consequently, his religion brought upon him the most cruel persecutions. The religion of *Mohammed* was in its outset, and is now, sustained mainly by intolerant fanaticism. The sword early carried the Koran over almost half the globe; and persecuting bigotry is now ready to stifle every inquiry which would reveal the folly of Islamism. A multitude of minor religious sects have arisen among the Mohammedans themselves. Their feuds are equalled in rancor only by those which have existed among Christians. It is matter of grief, but it is most probably true, that what has been called the *odium theologicum* has never risen to such a degree of acrimony—never flamed forth with such vehemence as it has among those who profess to be the followers of Jesus. Strange, that a religion whose sum and essence is *love*, love even to our enemies, should have served as a pretence for the direst *hate!*

As early as the year A. D. 259, Christianity was declared, by the Emperor Gallienus, a lawful religion. Still it was subject to more or less molestation under various pretexts. Constantine, by publicly professing adherence to Christianity, first gave it civil ascendency over every other religion. He issued a decree of *general toleration*,* which is of so liberal a nature as to give offence to bigoted Romanists, who have complained of it as placing Jews, Samaritans and heretics on the same footing with true Catholics. It was not long before Constantine was induced to modify his policy, so as better to suit the narrow spirit of his ecclesiastical counsellors. From this period the principle of toleration seems to have grown gradually weaker, and to have finally disappeared, until it was revived by the Protestant Reformation.

The despotic pretensions of the Popes, which obtained general acknowledgment throughout the western church as early as the eighth century, tended to crush the exercise of private judgment. The Romish hierarchy, gaining by degrees the complete control of the civil power in most Christian states, finally insisted on the infliction of death for every sentiment which it chose to brand as heresy. In earlier times, indeed, it had contented itself with enjoining penance, or at most with decreeing excommunication; but its boldness augmenting with its power,

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scribed faith, the penalty of imprisonment, and, in case of final contumacy, the forfeiture of life. The horrors of the Inquisition are familiar to all. The characteristic taciturnity of the Spaniards is attributed by Voltaire, to the influence of this diabolical institution. Even the researches of the natural philosopher were restrained by ecclesiastical intolerance.

As late as the 17th century, Galileo, who, in a work on the sun's spots, had advocated the Copernican system, was denounced as a heretic. He appeased his adversaries for a season by promising not to advocate a system which was generally regarded as derogatory to the Bible. Fifteen or twenty years afterwards, however, in 1632, he published his celebrated "Dialogue," in which the comparative merits of the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems were ably discussed—a manifest preference being given to the latter. Though express permission to print the work had been obtained at Rome, its publication drew upon the author the severest persecution. A congregation of his enemies having examined the treatise, declared it pernicious, and summoned him before the Inquisition. After some months of imprisonment, he was forced to disavow positions which he knew were eternal truths. "Are these, then, my judges?" he once indignantly exclaimed, when withdrawing from the examination of men whose ignorance disgusted him. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Milton visited him during his confinement. The philosopher was then poor, old and blind. About the same period Descartes suffered much persecution in Holland on account of his opinions. He opposed the prevalent Aristotelian metaphysics with great boldness, and advocated the Copernican system. Voetius, a bigot of great influence at Ut echt, accused him of atheism, and even menaced him with death.

In these and many other recorded cases of persecution for opinion, it is clear that the true ground of hostility was not so much a sincere apprehension of mischief from the novel sentiments avowed, as displeasure at the independence which dared to break away from prescribed forms of thought. It was the *spirit* rather than the *views* of Galileo and Descartes which

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the Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's day, in 1572. On this and thirty days ensuing, it is supposed that thirty thousand victims were offered up at the shrine of bigotry.

Protestantism finally gained the ascendency in many Christian countries. But even here, it is in vain and worse than in vain to shut our eyes to the workings of perverse human nature. The impartial historian must record, that no sooner was Protestantism triumphant, than it turned against the disaffected the very weapons from which it had itself suffered so severely. No wonder that some, seeing the supposed legitimate fruits of the two systems of religion to be equally horrible, were at a loss to decide which deserved the preference. English history affords ample justification of what I have just said. Fox's "Acts and Monuments," in three folio volumes, contain the martyrology of the Protestants under Catholic domination; and, by way of counterpart, Dodd's "Church History of England," also in three folios, presents the martyrology of the Catholics.

Singular it is, to notice how surely and closely religious persecution has followed religious power in its various mutations. The sufferer no sooner becomes the master, than he forgets the liberal principles he maintained in his humiliation; and partly, perhaps, from a natural, though wicked, desire of revenge, and partly from mistaken ardor in the cause of supposed truth, assumes the very character he abhorred and deprecated. Calamy has recorded, in four sad volumes, the sufferings of the two thousand non-conformist ministers under the *act of uniformity*, which was issued on St. Bartholomew's day, 1662. Much as the French Bartholomew's day of 1572 exceeded in horror the English one of 1662, the Presbyterians did not fail to draw a parallel between them. The non-conformist divines were indeed driven to difficult straits. Several were forced to become tradesmen. Among these was the celebrated Samuel Chandler, the author of numerous literary productions, who kept a bookseller's shop in London. Opposed to Calamy's account stands Walker's "attempt towards recovering an account of the clergy of the church of England who were sequestered, harassed, etc., in the late times," i. e. during the government of Cromwell.

Of late, toleration of religious opinion has made great progress in Christendom. It is a long time since any man has been put to death for his theological sentiments in a country

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of passive obedience. But the idea was vain. The press proved a hydra. Its inherent resources transcended the utmost power of destruction which could be brought to bear upon it. Crushed in one spot, it exhibited itself with new terrors in another.

Catalogues of prohibited books were early compiled. The Spanish Inquisition issued one in 1558, at the command of Philip II., and in 1559 the Holy Office at Rome published another. At the Council of Trent, Pius IV. was presented with a catalogue of books which the members denounced as unfit for perusal, and a bull of prohibition was accordingly issued. These catalogues were called *Indexes*. A simple *Index* is a list of books, no part of which was allowed to be read; an *Index Expurgatorius* is a list of books allowed to be read, if printed with certain omissions or other alterations. This expedient of tyranny, however, recoiled upon its authority. The Protestants reprinted and diligently circulated the Indexes; which served the convenient purpose of pointing out the books most worthy of their perusal.

Unfortunately for the success of these Indexes, moreover, they did not agree with each other. Being published at different places—Rome, Naples, Venice, Madrid, Antwerp, etc.—the discrepancies between them occasioned much scandal among heretics. As the publishing of lists of condemned works was found to be inadequate to their suppression, more frequent recourse was had to the expedient already in use—of burning them in public. This was fully as ineffectual as the former. Indeed, it promoted the sale of the prohibited books to such a degree, that the publisher of the Colloquies of Erasmus is said to have used strenuous effort to procure the burning of his book, and to have reaped his reward.

An amusing anecdote relating to this subject, I will here present in the words of D'Israeli; to whose "Curiosities of Literature," I am indebted for several facts which I have already mentioned. "Tonstall, Bishop of London (whose extreme moderation, for the times, preferred the burning of books to the burning of their authors), to testify his abhorrence of Tindal's principles, who had printed a translation of the New Testament—

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employed an English merchant there for this business, who happened to be a secret follower of Tindal and acquainted him with the Bishop's intention. Tindal was extremely glad to hear of the project; for he was desirous of printing a more correct edition of his version, but the first impression still hung on his hands, and he was too poor to make a new one. He furnished the English merchant with all his unsold copies, which the Bishop as eagerly bought, and had them all publicly burnt in Cheapside, which the people not only declared was a 'burning of the word of God,' but it so inflamed the desire of reading that volume, that the second edition was sought after at any price. When one of the Tindalists, who was sent here to sell them, was promised by the Lord Chancellor, in a private examination, that he should not suffer if he would reveal who encouraged and supported his party at Antwerp, the Tindalist immediately accepted the offer, and assured the Lord Chancellor that the greatest encouragement was from Tonstall, the Bishop of London, who had bought up half the impression and enabled them to produce a second."

English literature was long subject to a state-censorship; and even now, the formality, with little or none of the substance of the old inquisitorial jurisdiction, is seen in the *Licensers* and *Imprimaturs* of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. But there has never been an English statute for controlling the press,—only a decree of the star-chamber. The royal prerogative was freely exerted by Elizabeth, to suppress or mutilate works which contained any thing obnoxious to censure, in her estimation. Authors and publishers were not unfrequently adjudged to very severe penalties, and, in one instance at least, to death itself. The regular institution of licensers in England, is supposed to owe its origin to Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury. During the commonwealth, the system of literary censorship was upheld with as much rigor as ever by the very men who, before they attained the ascendency, were clamorous for the freedom of the press. It was not till the Revolution of 1688, that licenses for the press were discontinued. While they lasted they were ineffectual. Many unlicensed books were published, and of course read with the more avidity from this very fact.

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reign of William and Mary the press was declared by parliament to be completely free, and no legal restraint has been since imposed upon it. The law of libel, however, still inflicts upon wanton defamation of character those penalties which are required by justice and sound policy.

We may properly mention, in this connexion, the unfairness and abuse with which the history of literary controversy is stained. The scholastic disputes of the middle ages were conducted with a violence and ferocity, which it almost makes one shudder to observe. Among these disputes the most celebrated was that between the Nominalists and Realists. The subject of controversy between them seems to us not very important; but the contest was then prosecuted almost as though life and death depended upon the issue. An eye-witness declares that it was not at all uncommon for parties in this literary quarrel to resort to the argument of the fist, the club, and even the sword, when they had exhausted their resources in the way of personal vituperation; so that severe wounds were a usual, and death itself not a very unusual consequence of their intolerant acrimony.

The writings of most of the principal Protestant Reformers are disfigured by coarse abuse of their opponents. Those who exclaimed stoutly and justly against the arbitrary inroads of the papacy upon the right of private judgment, were themselves, unconsciously indeed, but really infringing the same right by their uncharitable denunciations. Such is the weakness and deceitfulness of poor human nature! Next to Melancthon, Erasmus was probably the mildest of the prominent Reformers of the sixteenth century. But he was not always treated with as much courtesy as he extended to others. Scaliger, in reply to a dialogue written by Erasmus to discountenance the prevailing rage for imitating Cicero, poured out upon him a torrent of personal abuse—calling him illiterate, a drunkard, an impostor, an apostate, a hangman, a demon hot from hell! The writings of Luther, Calvin and Beza are marked by the too free use of invective. These celebrated men scruple not to call their opponents liars, asses, knaves, drunkards, lunatics, dogs, apes, devils, etc. The famous controversy between Milton and Sal-

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The civil war between the Catholics and Huguenots in France sprang in reality from political motives. Those who kindled and controlled it took advantage of prevalent religious hostility to accomplish their own schemes of aggrandizement. James II. of England stoutly insisted on the principles of *toleration* and *liberty of conscience*, when he was striving to bring about the repeal of the test-act. But his real object was to give the Catholics the ascendency, and thus, in the end, annihilate liberty of conscience. From the time that religious toleration was first practised by a considerable community on a tolerably impartial basis down to the present moment, it has frequently been an instrument of selfish policy in the hands of governments and individual statesmen. Holland may be considered as the birth-place of true practical toleration. The establishment of this principle attracted multitudes of conscientious and industrious dissenters of all sorts from the various countries of Europe; and wonderfully promoted the trade and wealth of the United Provinces.

I think it may be asserted with truth, that toleration of opinion has seldom been advocated from unalloyed love for it as a principle applicable to the most dissimilar and discordant sects. In a Protestant country the Catholic argues for toleration; in a Catholic country he will have none of it. The dissenter has too often been changed by prosperity into a bigot of the most exclusive character. What he once pleaded for with earnestness will then seem to him "a cursed, intolerable toleration,"—as it did to the English Presbyterians when they attained to predominance in the State.

The Protestant Reformation itself, even in the minds of its most enlightened promoters, was, to use the words of the author of Spiritual Despotism, "an assault, much rather upon the *Papacy*, and upon its special errors and superstitions, than upon the theory and principles of the spiritual despotism, of which the Papacy was the accidental form." It was the abuses of Popery, rather than its essential character, which led to its downfall. The worldliness of the ecclesiastics, from the highest to the lowest, the introduction of the traffic in indulgences,—such were the

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predominant,—it could not be otherwise than that some correct notions of toleration should be elicited. Thus, liberty of conscience, so far as it was attained, was rather an incidental result, than a main, definite purpose of the Reformation.

Real intolerance, the intolerance of the heart is seldom or never seen by the possessor in its true light. It is sincere, indeed; but there can be no more hurtful form of bigotry than that of deluded fanaticism. Instigated by this spirit, men are guilty of unrighteous oppression, and verily think they are doing God service. Persecutors and persecuted, in multitudes of instances, have been alike animated with sincere zeal for what they considered the right. "There can be no doubt," says the persecutor, "that my views are correct, and that he who does not adopt them endangers his spiritual welfare. It must be a benevolent act to appeal to the temporal interest of my neighbor for the good of his soul. Therefore I am bound to try, by pains and penalties, yes, if it be necessary, by the menace of death itself, to bring him from his errors into the true faith; and if the actual infliction of death upon him will deter others from injuring their own souls by the same or like errors, does not philanthropy require the stroke?" One of the popes, in a letter enjoining all true followers of the church to ferret out heretics, and punish them with death if they proved obstinate, sustains his injunction by the following argument: "The man who takes away *physical* life, is punished with death. Now, *faith* is the source of *eternal* life; for it is written: 'The just shall live by faith.' How much more guilty, then, than a common murderer, and how much more worthy of death must a heretic be, who robs people of their faith—of eternal life!"

Such is the sophistry with which intolerance has, in all ages, deceived, or sought to defend itself. Once set up in the heart as a proper principle, it is almost impossible to dislodge it. It finds nutriment in the worst passions of human nature. When we have come to call evil good, or good evil, there is but little hope of reformation. We cannot doubt that excellent and pious men have cherished a spirit of intolerance. How far, even among the Catholics themselves, it may have been prompted by genuine zeal for supposed truth, it belongs to God alone to determine. Let us not be intolerant ourselves in considering

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the sainted dead. They are the antitypes and counterparts of thousands in the Protestant world, and of millions in the Papal, who have submitted their reason to the *dicta* of some real or imaginary great men, to councils falsely called ecumenical, to traditions turbid and uncertain at their very source, or to formulæ and creeds, not drawn up by apostolic men, but by some melancholy misanthrope, or furious bigot. We should, however, recollect, that it is *original temperament* which is concerned, at least in part. There are idiosyncrasies, or native peculiarities, over which the individuals themselves have but a partial control. Common candor demands that we should make all proper allowances. A considerable measure of this conservative spirit is, also, one of the principal elements of the English character. It is no more unphilosophical to expect, sometimes, a sudden outbreak of it in Britain, than it is, in our country, to behold, occasionally, choice specimens of democracy. The well-being of the British empire may depend on this earnest love of the Past.

Again, the perversion of the Protestant principle of free discussion accounts, in a measure, for the recent developments of the Oxford *tractators*. They have seen the evils of Dissent. They have gazed on the bitter conflicts of non-conformists, contending for the right of free discussion—for the privilege, every man for himself, of interpreting the Bible. The Wesleyan has been arrayed against the Whitefieldite, the Congregationalist against the Plymouth Brethren, and the close communion Baptist against his more liberal brother, Toplady anathematizing Wesley, and Wesley leaving Toplady to the uncovenanted mercies of God, Hall and Kinghorn measuring their weapons together, Fuller lifting up his huge battle-axe against all and several who should wilfully impugn the standard Calvinism or the primitive mode of baptism, while some old Scotch claymore was ever and anon falling upon every Southron indiscriminately, who would not canonize John Knox, or sturdily maintain the divine right of ruling elders. At this horrible braying of arms, the retired Oxford Fellow stands aghast. He is amazed that these men, who are all agreed in renouncing the apostolical succession, should so belabor and bespatter each other. The

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and representatives of the apostles by successive transmission of the prerogative of being so; every link in the chain being known from St. Paul to our present metropolitans."*

Some of the opponents of Dr. Pusey and of his friends have expressed their surprise, that the doctrines in question should emanate from Oxford. Nothing, however, could be, in our opinion, less a matter of astonishment. Oxford was founded in the palmiest days of the Papal supremacy. The University was confirmed by Papal authority, and received such privileges as the See of Rome claimed the power to confer. It was mentioned in the constitutions published by Clement V., after the Council of Vienne, A. D. 1311, in company with Paris, Bologna and Salamanca. It was ordained that schools should be erected, and that all prelates and ecclesiastical corporations in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland should be taxed for the maintenance of professors at Oxford. Matthew of Paris ranked Oxford as an ecclesiastical school next to Paris, and called it the foundation of the Roman Catholic church. It is well known that this University has retained many of the features of the times of its foundation. The dust of centuries is accumulated on its walls. It has steadily resisted all innovations. It adhered with deathlike tenacity to the schoolman's logic, to the *trivium* and *quadrivium* of the good old days of Aquinas and Scotus. It is the University which had Laud for a chancellor, which hated the Puritans, which denounced, in unmeasured terms, the late Reform Bill, which, on all occasions, takes, as by instinct, the highest tory ground, which was ready to impale Dr. Hampden for his liberal opinions, which, in short, in the language of a late writer, " has experienced but few symptoms of that revival which has been manifested at Cambridge."

The Fellows of both Universities are by statute *unmarried* men. Perhaps this is a necessary regulation. Families could not be maintained on the foundations. We do not complain of the exclusion of married incumbents.† We simply state that the regulation must have certain moral effects. Oxford is a cloistered establishment. It is shut out, in a great measure, from the social world. Its learned doctors necessarily sympa-

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greater purity of the virgin state. We do not deny to the Cyprians and Basils of Oxford unimpeachable morality, tenderness of conscience, and a delicate shrinking from every moral contamination. Yet having resided long in a University which has been fixed to her moorings almost a thousand years; conversant with the dim and shadowy past; reminded at every corner and in every leaf of the statute-book of a venerable antiquity; cut off, in a great degree, from the charms of social life and the living world; it is not strange that such men should idolize the fathers, and cling to the apostolical succession, and speak tenderly of monks and nuns, and advocate the re-introduction of fasts and vigils, and prayers for the dead, and cry out against the degenerate and stirring times in which they are called to live and toil. The movement is, in part, owing to the *place* where the movers live. Who would look for an apologist of celibacy in London, or an earnest defender of the divine right at Manchester or Sheffield?*

Poetry has had something to do with the new movement. Prof. Keble, one of the principal *tractators*, is a genuine child of song. His "Christian Year" was, in one sense, a precursor of the Tracts. It strowed the way with the sweetest flowers of poesy. It burnished the apostolical chain to a wonderful brightness. It intermingled and hallowed the usages of the church with the most delicate affections of the heart, and the most musical cadences of the voice. It almost beguiled the stern nonconformist into a love for the feasts and the fasts of the usurping church. As we read the soothing and mellow verses of Keble, our affections flow, involuntarily, towards the objects of his passionate admiration. We cannot stop to analyze the sentiment which is couched beneath the delicious strain. It seems like Vandalism to hunt for heresy amid the flowers scattered along by one so gentle and so loving. With the poet, we can hardly forbear to loathe every thing which would interrupt the strains of melody that seem to have been caught near heaven's door. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the volume contains not a little in which a zealous Papist would most cordially sympathize. Witness the following:

"Ave Maria! Thou whose name
All but adoring love may claim,

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Yet may we reach thy shrine;
For He, thy Son and Saviour, vows
To crown all lowly, lofty brows
With love and joy like thine."*

The poetry of Wordsworth is not wholly free from expressions of the same general tenor with many in the Christian Year.† The general spirit is strikingly congenial with the tendencies of some of the writers of the Oxford Tracts. The poetry is meditative, calm, soothing, peaceful, utterly unallied to the noisy, forward, assuming spirit of the present times. It loves the past. Its voices linger and quiver among the Gothic aisles and towers and arches of the old cathedrals. It is full of ecclesiastical sympathies and recollections. One of the prominent effects of the immortal Excursion is to hallow in the reader's mind the observances of the church of England, and, in no small degree, of the church of Rome, for the English ritual is a transcript, in many respects, of that used by the earlier communion. The poet does not stop with the present life; in the Church-yard among the Mountains, we are carried forward to the life beyond the grave. Our dearest hopes are indissolubly linked with the solemn words of the prayer-book, words imperishably associated with the sublime cadence of the faithful poet. The same remarks, in a certain degree, are applicable to his great contemporaries, Southey and Coleridge. All have contributed, in no slight measure, to awaken a fondness for antiquity, a reverence for the noble army of martyrs, an undying attachment to what is time-worn and venerable in the church. We can trace an intimate acquaintance with their works in some of the Oxford theologians. There is a grace and a freshness in the style, a rhythm in the periods, a delicacy and a thoughtfulness in the observations, and a correspondence in the spirit, which prove that the prose writers have sat at the

* See the whole hymn, entitled, The Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, p. 315, of the 1st American edition of Keble's Christian Year.

† We refer to such passages as the following, which happily are rare:

"And when the pure
And consecrating element hath cleansed

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feet of the poets. We think that this is apparent in some of the productions of Pusey, Newman and Keble.

It has been affirmed by some, who would rather apologize and palliate than abet and defend the Oxford views, that the aim of the authors is mainly to pave the way for a separation of the church from the state. It is supposed, that they have become disgusted with the unholy and unnatural alliance, that they loathe the impurities which it introduces into the most sacred things, that they dread the spoliations actual and threatened of a whig administration, who will go as far as they dare in reforming the church, and that feeling little hope that kings and queens and parliaments will become true and hearty defenders of the faith, they choose to abandon the connection altogether. Rather than be subjected to the supervision of the *friend* of the Hon. Mrs. Norton and of his compeers, rather than be supplied with prelates by ministers who neither fear God nor love the church, they prefer to stand on their own independent ground, leaning on the Everlasting Hills for support, and looking to no earthly Head.

We doubt, however, whether these apologists can make out their charitable supposition. The writers of the Tracts do, indeed, advert to the mischiefs of state interference; sometimes with a strong and indignant voice.* But this is not the great object of the publications. It is a subordinate affair, and but rarely adverted to, and never directly advocated. The authors state, and we have no doubt honestly, that the Tracts were published with the object of contributing something towards the practical revival of doctrines, which, though held by the great divines of the English church, at present have become obsolete with the majority of her members. The practical evils which are the subject of reiterated complaint, are the neglect of the daily service; the desecration of festivals; the eucharist

* Thus in Tract No. 12, it is asserted and proved, that the church is treated far more arbitrarily, and is more completely at the mercy of the chance-government of the day, than ever Englishmen were under the worst tyranny of the worst times. It is stated, that the three acts of election, confirmation and consecration, instead of being rendered more efficient checks

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men on the continent,* if not in England, who have studied the Fathers in the Latin and Greek originals as patiently and profoundly as the *patriotic* student who resides at Stanford Rivers. Nevertheless, his boasts are not empty. He opens his dusty folios with the arm of an Ajax, and reads homilies from them before his Oxford auditors, with the practical and strong sense of an Englishman. His learning is affluent, and his logic cogent. He shows remarkable skill in making the most of his quotations. He does not deal in dry abstracts, nor string together long series of barren excerpts. Every thing is made to bear on his grand design; arguments and facts are *dove-tailed* together. Every page is vital with the writer's purposes and feelings. We do not see, moreover, how his conclusions can be resisted. We know that the apologists for the Oxford men affirm that Mr. Taylor is fighting straws; that he is meeting an enemy of his own imagination; and that his antagonists will assent substantially to his facts and to his conclusions. But it is easier to say this than to prove it. It is more agreeable to denounce Mr. Taylor than to refute him. Is it not the undoubted aim and tendency of the Oxford writers to magnify the fa hers; to set them up as guides in doctrine and in practice, and to place them almost on a level with the inspired apostles? We think that every candid reader of their pages must acknowledge this. Besides, it is not mere general admiration of the fath rs. Their merits are particularized and amplified. Their rites and usages are mentioned in considerable detail, and they are described as judges who must end the strife. There are expressions, not by any means obscure, in favor of celibacy. The Remains of Mr. Froude have, most plainly, this anti-social tendency. Dr. Pusey, in his letter to the bishop of Oxford, remarks, that the "preference of celibacy as the higher state is scriptural, and, as being such, is primitive." These positions Mr. Taylor controverts. He shows what Ancient Christianity is. He meets the question fairly and fully. He demonstrates that the primitive Christians cherished radically unsound opinions and followed most pernicious practices in relation to the holiness of the virgin state, thus anticipating some of the worst evils of full-grown popery. He also shows that this ascetic

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the men of no religion, the fox-hunting clergymen, the pleasure-loving gentry, the profane naval commander, the dissipated gownsman. We are inclined to think that the number of individuals in this class is proportionably much less than in the days of archbishop Cornwallis. Still, the terms of communion are such, the rite of confirmation is so often thoughtlessly administered, so miserably loose are the notions which prevail, to a great extent, on the identity of baptism and regeneration, and, in short, so close is the connection of the church with a "godless ministry," as the Oxford writer terms it, that the church will always be a receptacle of the good and the bad—of the openly and notoriously bad—of men who unblushingly break every one of the commandments of God. How can it be otherwise? There is no such thing as church discipline, according to the confession of the members of that church herself. Every church-warden, in every parish in England, is called on, once a year, to attend the visitation of his archdeacon. At this time oaths are tendered to him respecting his different duties, and, among other things, he swears that he will present to the archdeacon the names of all such inhabitants of his parish as are leading notoriously immoral lives. This oath is regularly taken once a year by every church-warden in every parish of England; yet such a thing as any single presentation for notoriously immoral conduct has scarcely been heard of for a century.*

The only remaining division in the establishment is the evangelical school. This class have had for their organ, almost from the commencement of the century, the London Christian Observer. This very respectable publication, which has been received with much favor in this country by men of all denominations, was edited till about 1816 by the excellent Zachary Macauley. Since that year, it has been under the charge of Rev. S. C. Wilks. It has been, in general, distinguished for candor, judgment, moderation, a firm adherence to the doctrines of the gospel, and a considerable degree of learning. Within a few years, however, there has been some change in its tone towards the Dissenters. It has lost something of that courteousness and amenity which formerly distinguished it.† It has

* Tract for the Times, No. 59.

† The editor recently mentioned, somewhat cavalierly, that

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become a little more piquant and aristocratic in its style. It has verged somewhat towards that dignified *non-intercourse* spirit which is not wholly unnatural in all Englishmen, but which John Newton, Wilberforce and their sainted contemporaries would have abhorred. Even the excellent bishop of Calcutta, if we are rightly informed, does not bear his honors quite so meekly as the rector of Islington did. This gradual change in the evangelical body is what Isaac Taylor means, we suppose, in the following sentence: "It is true that the modern disciples and successors of Romaine, Fletcher, Milner, Cecil, Scott and Newton have, by the sheer force of the current of church affairs, been carried towards a new position, and have been led *greatly* to modify and to *tighten* the ecclesiastical notions professed by their departed leaders." Of the relative, or the real strength of the evangelical body in the establishment, we have no means of judging with accuracy. The Church Missionary Society, one of the most flourishing charitable institutions of the day, is wholly supported by them. They are, also, prominent contributors to the treasury of the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Religious Tract Society, and other national institutions. They number among their supporters, we believe, all the East Indian bishops, also, the bishops of Chester, Winchester, Ripon, etc. Under the guidance of Wilberforce, Macauley, Buxton, Stephen and others, they have been among the most stable and earnest friends to the extinction of slavery. We do not remember many eminent literary names in their ranks. Dr. Isaac Milner occupied Newton's chair at Cambridge. The late Mr. Farish, professor of natural philosophy at Cambridge, and the present professor of Greek in the same university, Mr. Scholefield, acquired no inconsiderable reputation. Mr. Simeon, of Cambridge, was a very voluminous author. As a writer on practical religious subjects, bishop Wilson, of Calcutta, has been prominent. A few eminent men among the nobility have not been ashamed to profess evangelical sentiments, and to live a life of faith on the Son of God.

Magazine, or the Patriot. A strange and ungracious boast! The leading journal of one great class of evangelical Christians never, or but occasionally, reading the leading journals

Many distinguished merchants have also contributed their money and their influence in the diffusion of these sentiments.*

* We will subjoin in a note some statistical facts in relation to the established church. Its fundamental doctrines and tenets are embodied in the thirty-nine Articles, agreed upon in convocation in 1562, and revised and finally settled in 1571. These articles are said to have been chiefly compiled from others drawn up shortly after the Reformation in 1552, in the reign of Edward VI., and which had been repealed by Mary. But though this is the state religion, all others are tolerated under certain restrictions. The only class of Christians at present proscribed on account of religious opinions are the Jesuits, and members of religious orders bound by monastic or religious vows. The ecclesiastical divisions of England and Wales are provinces or archbishoprics, dioceses or bishoprics, archdeaconries, deaneries and parishes; each of which divisions has its functionaries, who preside over the functionaries of the inferior divisions; the queen, as head of the church, presiding over all. The number of archbishoprics is two, bishoprics twenty-five, benefices 10,533, parishes 11,077, churches and chapels 11,825, population 13,897,187. The nett revenue of the different sees, as returned to the commissioners of ecclesiastical inquiry, at an average of the three years ending with 1831, amounted to 160,292 pounds sterling a year. But as a considerable portion of the revenue of some of the sees arises from tithes, the value of which has fallen since 1831, the entire nett revenue of the different sees may now be estimated at from £10,000 to £15,000 less. There is a striking difference in the income of the different sees, owing in part to circumstances connected with the original establishment of the various sees, and, in part, to the property attached to some, having, from various causes, become in the course of time much more valuable than that attached to others. Thus the bishop of Durham has a nett revenue of from £18,000 to £20,000 a year, while the bishop of Llandaff's revenue does not exceed from £900 a year to £1,300. The right of presentation, or the distribution of the patronage of benefices in England and Wales, is vested as follows:—in the crown, 952 benefices; in the archbishops and

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We will now proceed to offer some remarks on various classes of Dissenters in England and Wales. Our limits will compel us to be more brief than we could wish. In the estimation of the law, all persons are regarded as Dissenters, whose religious principles or modes of worship differ, in any degree, from the standards of the church of England. The differences, however, between one class and another, and between certain classes and the church of England, frequently depend on minute points, which it is very difficult to define.

The Methodists originated between 1730 and 1740. They are divided into two great bodies, the followers of John Wesley, and the followers of George Whitefield. The creed of the Wesleyan Methodists is Arminian. Wesley always objected to the practice of classing his followers with the Dissenters, and required them to attend the worship of the established church when they had no opportunity to hear their own preachers. Hence they might be called Separatists rather than Dissenters. The Wesleyan Methodists are very numerous, especially among the lower classes. There has always been a strong opposition to an educated ministry in this denomination. Mr. Wesley was not able to realize a favorite project for the establishment of a "Seminary for Laborers," which was made a topic of discussion as early as 1744. For a number of years there has been a strenuous debate on the subject in the Annual Conference. In 1815, certain incipient measures were resolved upon. Some of the older preachers, however, steadily resisted the project, and it was not till 1834, that the "Wesleyan Theological Institution for the Improvement of the Junior Preachers," was established. The number of resident students is between thirty and forty. The leading man among the Wesleyans is the Rev. Jabez Bunting, D. D., president of the institution, and also of the conference. The great names among the dead are Mr. Wesley, Richard Watson and Dr. Adam Clarke. Mr. Watson is highly regarded by the Wesleyans as a theologian, and Dr. Clarke as a

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vate owners 5,096. More than a third of all the benefices in the country are under £150 a year; 297 are below £50 a year. There are only two livings of £4,000 a year, the rectory of Stanhope in Northumberland, which is £4,843, and

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commentator. The learning of the latter was multifarious and discursive, rather than correct and profound. The denomination have exhibited an excellent spirit in their efforts to diffuse the gospel at home and abroad. Their missionary operations are carried on with system and energy. Many a solitary place has been made glad,—many a fierce heart in Great Britain has been tamed by them. From the general theological discussions which take place among the other classes of Dissenters, and in the established church, the Wesleyans keep nearly aloof. They are spread over almost the whole kingdom, but are particularly numerous in Yorkshire, Lancashire, Lincoln and Cornwall. The number of the followers of Whitefield is not large, except in Wales, where, in many places, they outnumber the adherents of the established church. According to Mr. Macculloch, the number of all kinds of Methodists may be estimated at about 1,200,000. The disciples of Whitefield have an institution of a mixed character, partly theological and partly literary, at Cheshunt, near London.*

The Independents or Congregationalists maintain, as the name implies, the independency of each congregation or society of Christians, and their right to elect their clergymen, and to lay down rules as to discipline, etc., without being subjected to any foreign constraint. Their origin is traced to the sixteenth century. At the Revolution in 1688, they were, comparatively, a small body; but they have rapidly gained ground since the middle of the last century, particularly at the expense of the English Presbyterians. Macculloch states the number of congregations at 1800; the Congregational Magazine, at 1840. The present number is probably about 1900. In Wales they have 374 congregations, in Yorkshire 170, in London and Middlesex 103, in Lancashire 100. The other counties in which their congregations are the most numerous are Somerset, Essex, Devon, Kent and Wilts. Under the patronage of the Independents are a number of institutions, mainly designed to train men for the ministry. The course of study, literary and theological, varies from four years to six years. The principal seminaries of this kind are the Hackney in London, with from twelve to

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twenty students; the Airedale College, near Bradford in Yorkshire, with above twenty students; the Spring Hill College, in Birmingham, which commenced operations in 1838; Highbury College, Coward College and Homerton College. The three last named are in London, and contain from thirty to forty students, on an average, each. Some of the more affluent Dissenters have been in the habit of sending their sons to the Scottish universities. London University College now opens her doors to them. The denomination are highly respectable in numbers, wealth and general character. Their congregations are made up mainly from the middle classes in society, worthy trades-people in the cities, farmers and tenants in the country, some rich manufacturers and merchants, a few gentlemen in the learned professions, and, occasionally, a member of parliament. They are honestly attached to the constitution and government of the country, though they have acquired an enviable reputation by their uniform resistance to tyranny, and by their passionate love of freedom. Some of the greatest names in English civil and ecclesiastical history illustrate the annals of the Independents. At the present time, however, they can lay no special claim to profound or various learning. Those among the living, whose works are most known in the United States, are the Rev. Dr. John Pye Smith of Homerton, author of the valuable Scripture Testimony to the Messiah; Rev. Dr. Ebenezer Henderson of Highbury, author of Biblical Researches, Travels in Iceland, etc.; Rev. George Payne, LL. D., theological tutor at Exeter, who has written on mental philosophy; and Josiah Conder, late editor of the Eclectic Review, author of the Modern Traveller. The remarks which Isaac Taylor makes in relation to the want of scholarship among the Dissenters are, no doubt, applicable to all the sects. It is clear, as this writer well observes, that the various, but intimately connected subjects, theological and ecclesiastical, at this time likely to be discussed, all come under the common condition of involving laborious researches upon the field of Christian antiquity. But this is a field not much frequented, in our own times, by the English non-conformists of any class. It is but a few individuals, of these communions, that profess any direct acquaintance with the Greek and Latin divines; nor do the tastes of the Dissenting bodies at all favor any reference of the sort.* It should be re-

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congregations of Friends is stated at 396. They are to be found principally in the counties of York, Lancaster, Cumberland and Kent. Mr. Macculloch states that the sect is not increasing. Not a few of the wealthier individuals have laid aside the peculiar dress and phraseology by which its adherents are commonly distinguished. The number of Roman Catholics has rapidly increased within the present century. They are most numerous in Lancashire, particularly in Manchester and Liverpool, where they constitute a large class of the population. According to the details given in Mr. Lewis's valuable Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain, there were in Liverpool, in 1800, 4,950 Irish Catholics; in 1820, 11,016; and in 1833, no fewer than 24,156. The Irish Catholics in Manchester, in 1833, were estimated at about 30,000, and in Birmingham, they amounted to between 5,000 and 6,000. The number of Irish Catholics in London has been said to be as great as in Liverpool and Manchester. The English Catholics are most numerous in Lancashire, Yorkshire, Staffordshire and Warwickshire; and are widely scattered over Northumberland and Durham, some of the principal families of which belong to their communion. The Jews are found in most large towns in England; but by far the greatest number are resident in London. The total number may be estimated at from 12,000 to 14,000. Exclusive of the sects already mentioned, there are many others, whose adherents, however, are comparatively small.

The whole number of Dissenting congregations, of all kinds, in England and Wales, as computed in the Congregational Magazine above referred to, is 8,446; the number of congregations connected with the established church is 11,825. Supposing this statement to be nearly accurate, it shows that the Dissenting congregations are, to those belonging to the church, as 84 to 118, or as 42 to 59. Though some of the Dissenting

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has now an average attendance of not more than forty or fifty persons. The chapel at Chester, where Matthew Henry once preached the words of life to crowds, is but thinly attended,

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their faith in the ascetic practices which they adopt, but the influence of their course on the minds of the mass, even of the students by whom they are surrounded, must be pernicious or negative. The spiritual discipline of Thomas à Kempis can never be revived in practical, bustling England, and in the restless, upheaving nineteenth century. The piety of the Oxford Tracts—for some of the papers breathe the tender and subdued spirit of genuine devotion—must have but small attraction in manufacturing, mining, mercantile, aggressive England. She wants more substantial, tangible nourishment.

The Dissenters are becoming a thoroughly political race. Their rallying words are liberty, freedom, down with the tithes, Pym, Milton, Hampden, Sidney. This course they do not appear to take, as forced upon them by a melancholy necessity, but they glory in it, as the most honorable path of Christian duty, as eminently congenial with the free spirit of Christianity. Hence, of necessity, piety languishes. In the fierce political debate, its life must be eaten out. The heavenly Dove flies from the realms of noise and strife. He has but little sympathy with hard words and stormy harangues. We know that the Dissenters have violent provocations. They have been contemptuously denied, for ages, some of the dearest rights which belong to them as men and as Britons. That they should express themselves decidedly, and should labor strenuously for the recovery of those rights, is not to be wondered at. Religious men cannot, however, become absorbed in political discussions, without serious injury. If a necessity exists for the course which has been taken, even by multitudes of Dissenting clergymen, it is a dire necessity. So it should be esteemed by them, instead of being justified and eulogized.

If more proofs of our position were wanting, we might refer to the languid manner in which the religious press in England has spoken of the flagrant injustice of the attack on China, and of the determination, openly avowed by at least one member of the ministry, of taking violent possession of the celestial empire. In the view of all right-minded men, out of Britain, the case is one of outrage and wrong. The English nation is a smuggler in the Chinese seas. She has, for years, carried on a

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science of the nation were in a healthful state, if the lords spiritual in parliament remembered their solemn responsibilities, such a tone of remonstrance would be heard, that the ministry would not dare to prosecute the nefarious business. The British people often taunt us in respect to wrongs heaped on the Indians. But *here* it has been in the face of long-continued, powerful remonstrance, and earnest and united prayer to the God of the poor and the oppressed. Our religious publications have spoken loudly and long. Honorable senators in Congress have resisted the aggressions on the Indians inch by inch. We have not, indeed, done all our duty. Still, we have not silently and tamely acquiesced in the demands of cruelty and avarice.

No one of the Christian denominations in England enjoys adequate means for the education of the clergy. There is no peculiar course of study insisted upon by the universities for theological students. At Cambridge the Gospels and the Evidences form part of the university course for all. The Norrissian professor of divinity delivers a course of lectures on doctrinal and historical theology; and a certificate of attendance on this course is demanded by the bishops, in most cases, as a condition of ordination. The competitors for Hebrew scholarships and prizes are voluntary, no attendance being required by statute. At Oxford there are no examiners formally delegated, nor is there any system marked out by the university, for ascertaining, as in the case of the degrees in arts, the requisite qualification of candidates for divinity degrees, and which shall do that for divinity which has been done for arts. The regius professor of divinity holds certain disputations in controversial theology, called *pro forma exercises*, and which were, until lately, carried on in the Latin language. Those who expect to enter orders must attend one course of lectures of the divinity professor, after they have taken their first degree. In consequence, partly, of this lamentable deficiency of theological instruction at the two old universities, the university of Durham has been recently founded, with the professed object of furnishing instruction to students in the north of England, with a view to holy orders. The same object is sought to be accomplished, on behalf of the poorer class of students in Wales, by the modern establishment of the college of St. David's at Lampeter. How far these two institutions answer their design, we are not informed. It is per-

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He may be profoundly skilled in the Greek metres; he may make Latin verses according to the most perfect rules of prosody, while he may be totally ignorant of the original fountain of divine knowledge in the Old Testament, or the system of truth which he swears to explain and defend.

With the Dissenting clergy, the case is not much better. Most of their academies are but apologies for a Theological Seminary. The statement of one fact will amply confirm this assertion. The whole circle of arts and sciences, Greek, Hebrew, theology, pastoral duties, and the composition of sermons, are all taught by *two* persons, or at most, by three. Who can rise to eminence as a teacher in every conceivable branch of knowledge? But without eminent teachers, there will be no accomplished scholars. Or, if an exception sometimes occurs, it will be in spite of the system of study, and not in consequence of it. Two instructors teaching that which twenty men hardly suffice to do well! Besides, only five or six years are devoted to what are termed in this country academical, collegiate and theological studies, which here occupy and crowd nine years, if not ten or eleven. This mixed mode of study, partly scientific and literary, and partly theological, has never prospered in the United States. The attempt has been made again and again with full faith and fervent zeal, only to be abandoned in despair. Theology is a science. Adequately to master it demands three or four years of undivided and determined study. Preparation to preach the gospel will not spring up from the ground by accident. The age, the state of things in England demand that the Dissenting clergymen should be well-trained men in all needful discipline, able to meet their most accomplished opponents on equal ground. We would respectfully say to these brethren: It is time for you to change your policy. If you cannot educate your sons at Oxford and Cambridge, if you cannot break down the barrier there, then send them to the Scottish universities or to the London university. If you are unable or unwilling to do this, then transform Homerton academy into a proper *bona fide* college, and Highbury into a theological seminary, each on perfectly independent grounds, literary and theological. Instead of building up a mixed seminary at Birmingham, lay out your resources in making a strong college, and persuade a sister city to found a seminary exclusively for

Woods' articles only so far as is needful, either to explain misconceptions, or to suggest topics for farther discussion.

A great part of Dr. Woods' remarks are based on the supposition, that the article he criticises teaches, that emotions and desires are not under the control of the will. An article on this subject in a preceding number of this work,* exhibits the writer's views more at large, and it is supposed that nothing there presented is inconsistent with any thing advanced in the Essay on Cause and Effect. The appalling deductions made by Dr. Woods, it will be seen, do not result from any thing actually presented, but merely from a misapprehension.

Most of the remaining part of Dr. Woods' criticisms are based on another misconception of the ideas expressed in the original article. But in order to present this part of the subject clearly, the writer asks attention to the following definitions and remarks, which are either expressed or assumed to be true, in the article on Cause and Effect.

Power:—a simple idea, gained when any change takes place.

Power is spoken of in several relations, as the following illustration will show. A man may have all the power and skill needful to swim, and yet may not be able to exercise this power for want of the appropriate fluid. In this case, he has power in one sense, and no power in another; that is, he has *constitutional* power, but not *actual*. But suppose the man has power to secure the appropriate fluid, then he has actual power, in case he performs a previous act, and no power if he does not. Before he performs the act he has *indirect* actual power, and after it is performed, he has *direct* actual power. In these relations, therefore, it can be asserted, that a man has and has not power to swim. He has power in one sense, i. e. indirect actual power. He has not power in another sense, i. e. he has not power, *until* he performs a previous act. This distinction between actual and constitutional power, and between direct and indirect actual power, is very important in this discussion.

Impossible signifies without power.

Impossible, absolutely, signifies that there is no power *anywhere* to make a given change. For example:—God exists.

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sitions express things which there is no power, *anywhere*, to make otherwise. The last is called a *contradiction*. The following is another example of an absolute impossibility. *Salt* is that which has power to produce a given sensation, so that, without this power, it is not salt. It is, therefore, an absolute impossibility for salt not to produce the given sensation, for that is a contradiction. It is saying that a thing has, and has not a given power at the same time, and in the same sense.

Impossible, relatively:—That is, impossible without a previous change, but possible with it. Thus it is relatively impossible for salt to produce a given sensation, when it is not in certain circumstances, though, in relation to the possible existence of these circumstances, it is possible.

Certain, absolutely:—A thing is absolutely certain, when there is no power *any where* to make it otherwise.

Certain, relatively:—A thing is relatively certain, when there is no power, anywhere, to make it different, without a previous change.

Producing cause:—That peculiar power possessed by each individual existence, which enables it, in given circumstances, to produce a change.

Occasional causes:—Those circumstances which are indispensable antecedents, in order to enable a producing cause to act.

Producing causes are of two kinds: first, those which in given circumstances have power to produce either of two kinds of change (i. e. mind), and those which, in given circumstances, have power to produce a particular kind of change, and no power to refrain from producing this kind, or to produce any other kind (i. e. matter). These last are called *necessary* producing causes.

Changes are of two kinds: first, those changes where the thing changed had power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and to produce another instead; secondly, those changes, where the thing changed had no power to refrain from this particular kind of change, and no power to produce any other instead. The first are called *actions* of mind; the last are called *necessary changes* or *effects*. If these distinctions are correct, then the maxim: "every effect has a cause," would be more properly expressed thus: "every change has a cause."

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3. How then can God govern free agents so as to prevent their interference in his plans? Ans. By his control of *occasional causes*, so that at any time he can prevent a given volition, either by change of susceptibilities or change of circumstances.

4. But if volitions are not the necessary effects of motives, as producing causes, *how* can God foresee future volitions? Ans. This, God has not revealed, but he has revealed *the fact*, that he does foresee every volition of every one of his creatures.

5. What is the kind of inability which is asserted when it is said that a perfectly honest man *cannot* steal—that perfectly holy minds *cannot* lie—that the carnal mind *cannot* obey the law of God?

Ans. The phenomena described in the essay referred to, on the power of the will over the other faculties of mind, furnish the data for explaining this language.

A *governing volition* is one that, while it exists, makes it an *absolute* impossibility to have a contrary volition. It is perfect or not perfect, just in proportion as it controls and prevents all conflicting volitions.

A *perfectly* honest man is one who has a perfect governing volition to be honest, and *while this exists*, it is an absolute impossibility for him to steal; for it implies a contradiction. So a perfectly holy mind is one that has its governing volition to do right, perfect; and while this remains, it is impossible to choose to do wrong.

A carnal mind is one that is destitute of a governing purpose to obey the law of benevolence, and while thus destitute, it is *impossible* for all its specific volitions to be conformed to this law. But in all these cases, as the mind has power to form a new governing volition, it has *indirect* power to do what in the other sense it has not power to do.

On this theory man has power to do all that God requires, inasmuch as he has power to produce both the generic volitions *directly*, and the specific volitions, *indirectly*, that God requires. But so long as his generic volitions are not in conformity to God's law, it is absolutely impossible for his specific ones to be so.

6. But what is the "cause, ground, and reason," why a vo-

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to gain the other thing?" he will answer, "yes." Thus, he seems to assert that he felt the strongest desire for both, which is an apparent contradiction; but is made consistent by the fact that the term is used in two senses. In one case, it refers to the strongest specific desire; in the other, to the dictates of the understanding.

But in which sense does Dr. Woods use the term, when he asks if all men do not choose to gratify the strongest desire, or yield to the strongest motive? The following seems to decide his use of the term. On p. 182, he says: "I would inquire whether the writer is certain that it is not a law of our rational nature, that we should choose and act in accordance with that which appears to us as the highest reason, or strongest motive? If it should at last become evident that this is the law of our rational nature, then a power to act contrary to it would be a power to subvert the very constitution of mind, and divest ourselves of rationality. This *seems* to teach, not only that we always do choose and act according to that which appears to us as the highest reason, but that we have no power to choose otherwise. Would Dr. Woods wish to have men *not* choose in accordance with what seems to them the highest reason? And if they always do choose as reason dictates, how could they do better, and where is the doctrine of depravity?

In regard to Dr. Woods' disclaimer, repelling the charge of fatalism, the writer would inquire if the doctrine of fate, as taught in all ages, is not simply this—that *mind* (including Creator and creatures) has no power of any kind to choose otherwise than as it does in the circumstances where it does choose? And as all changes in matter depend on mind, it is *absolutely* impossible for any event to be otherwise. Now, does not Dr. Woods teach that, in the circumstances which actually exist, mind has no power of any kind to choose differently from what it does? And is there any possible theory, except that mind *has* this power, or that it *has not?* And does not every man either agree with the writer, or else agree with Dr. Woods, in holding fatalism as it is taught by the Hindoos, Mohammedans, Stoics, Collins, Priestley and Hobbes?

Dr. Woods' disclaimer does not alter the position of things, for this reason—that there are two senses to every term he uses,

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he uses these terms according to his theory; and secondly, whether his disclaimer, with his sense to each term, is not as direct an affirmation of fatalism as can be made? His disclaimer is as follows: "Fatalism is the opposite of the doctrine that teaches, that we are free moral agents, the proper subjects of law, under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God, and blameworthy and praiseworthy according to our conduct."

Of course, in claiming not to be a fatalist, Dr. Woods holds the affirmative of the above in *his sense* of the terms, viz.; we are "free moral agents,"—that is, we are under law and governed by motives as producing causes, so that we have no power of any kind to choose differently from what we do. We "are under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God," and yet he requires us to choose what we have no power to choose, i. e., the course of holiness, when we do not feel the strongest desire for it. We "are blame and praiseworthy according to our conduct"—that is, we deserve praise and blame for our actions when we have no power to choose to act otherwise. Let the reader decide if this is not a correct exposition of Dr. Woods' disclaimer, and if so, is not this fatalism? On p. 222, Dr. Woods seems to claim that his theory of free agency is an intuitive truth. If it is so, then Dr. W. can prove it such, by showing that the words and actions of mankind, in all ages, indicate that they believe that, whenever they make a choice, they have no power, in those circumstances, to choose otherwise. If he cannot show this, has he any right to claim this as an intuitive truth?

Dr. Woods claims that Calvin, the two Edwardses, West, Smalley, Bellamy, Dwight, Day and Beecher, and almost all the presidents and professors of our colleges and theological seminaries, and most of the ministers and Christians of all the orthodox denominations hold his theory, and are opposed to that presented in the "Essay on Cause and Effect." The writer is not acquainted with all these worthies, but is inclined to doubt the entire correctness of this claim. Is it not more probable that the greater part of these persons really hold the writer's theory of free agency, and, owing to great confidence in the investigations of great and good men, have not studied the

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On p. 241, Dr. Woods seems to consider *self-denial* as referring to the conflict that takes place whenever incompatible desires coexist, and the mind chooses that which is "most agreeable." His opponents consider real and virtuous self-denial to consist in that act of mind which decides to give up what excites the strongest specific desire, and to take that which, though it excites a weaker specific desire, appears to reason as the greatest good on the whole.

The writer is indebted to Dr. Woods for suggesting a defect in the definition of motives in the original essay. The writer gives the following as a substitute. "Motives are either excited desires, or those things that excite desires, or those susceptibilities which can be excited by objects of desire." In the former piece the writer omitted one of these senses in the definition.

In Dr. Woods' articles he quotes Edwards, Day and Whately, as sustaining his views of free agency. The writer supposes this presents three topics for future discussion.

1. Is teaching the invariableness of antecedence and sequence, between *strongest desire* and a *volition to secure*, teaching what *proves fatalism*—i. e., is the maxim assumed by fatalists as their major proposition really an intuitive truth?

2. Do Edwards, Day and Whately teach the invariableness of antecedence and sequence between *strongest desire* and *volition to secure?*

3. If it is a fact that the major proposition of the fatalist is an intuitive truth, does it not account for the perplexing mazes, apparent contradictions, and profound depths, which have been supposed to belong to this subject? Has it not been the fact, that the defenders of free agency have conceded that invariableness of antecedence and sequence between the *strongest desire* and a *volition to secure*, which (if the major proposition of the fatalist is a truth) *proves* fatalism, and then have vainly struggled to prevent the inevitable conclusion?

The writer would put what is involved in the above queries in another form.

May not the following proposition be affirmed as true? Whoever teaches that a particular class of desires are the invariable antecedents of a particular class of volitions (i. e. volitions

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prove that in the circumstances in which the balances move downward, they have not power, at the same time, to move upward? The only reply that can be given is, they *never did* move upward in these circumstances, therefore they have not the power. Then the writer asks: Why, if it is conceded that mind, in given circumstances, never did move but in one way, is there not precisely the same proof that it has no power to move otherwise, as there is that the balances have no power to move otherwise?

But if it is urged that mind is different from matter, and that it may invariably *choose right*, and yet have power to choose otherwise;—in reply the writer would say, that this is not a case where a particular kind of desire is the invariable antecedent of a particular kind of volition, as an invariable sequent. A free agent may invariably choose right, and yet there would not be that invariableness of antecedence and sequence that proves a necessary, producing cause.

Note. The writer found, after reading the criticisms on the Essay on Cause and Effect, that for want of more care either in the writer or the readers, it has been misconstrued in the following cases.

1. Where the writer uses the term "invariable antecedent," without expressly specifying which kind is intended, though the scope of the piece fairly shows it.

2. Where the writer says that there is no mode of proving mind to be a producing cause, meaning by it, no mode of *reasoning* can prove it. It is established as an *intuitive truth*, as the writer shows, and a fair reader would consider this exception as implied.

3. The last case is made by the omission of the generic definition of producing cause. The writer, in constructing the definition of producing cause, had in view the case in hand, where the fatalist attempts to prove that mind has not the power of free agency, by an argument that makes *motive*, instead of mind, the producing cause of volition. And as this argument, not only would make motive a producing cause, but a *necessary* producing cause, the writer gave the specific definition. But afterwards, in claiming that "the mind is the producing cause of volition," the writer did not observe, till it was pointed out, that the generic definition also was needful. The writer uses the

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that fatalists support their doctrine by attempting to prove that motive is the producing cause of volition. The preceding article supplies the deficiency by inserting a generic definition as well as the specific one.

ARTICLE IX.

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTION, AS HELD BY REV. ASA MAHAN, PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE, REV. CHARLES FITCH, AND OTHERS AGREEING WITH THEM.

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D., Prof. Theol. in the Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass.

THE attention of the religious public has, of late, been frequently called to the subject above mentioned, and much has been written and published on both sides of the question at issue between the parties. It is not my object to notice all the particular opinions and arguments which have been advanced by writers engaged in the controversy. I can promise no more than to take a summary view of the points which are regarded as of the first importance; to consider the manner in which the doctrine has been defended, and the chief arguments on which it rests, and to inquire what conclusion a candid regard to truth will lead us to adopt.

I have read several publications on the subject, particularly the Discourses of Mr. Mahan, which he had the kindness to send to me; the Letter of Mr. Fitch, and Dr. Weeks' Letter in reply; several Lectures of Mr. Finney, published in the Oberlin Evangelist; Dr. Pond's and Mr. Folsom's articles in the Am. Bib. Repository, and finally Mr. Mahan's article in reply to Mr. Folsom.* My design however is, to give the reader my reflections, and to show exactly how the subject lies in my own mind, avoiding entirely whatever might have a personal bearing. Though I must take the liberty to say, that I entertain the kindliest feelings towards the writers above named, who have advocated the doctrine of Perfection. When I cast my eye over Mr. Mahan's Discourses and Mr. Fitch's Letter, I was

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gratified with the spirit of love, tenderness and devotion, which breathed in their writings, and could not but indulge the pleasing thought, that God had granted them a high degree of his gracious influence, and raised them to an elevation of Christian affection and joy, to which they had never before attained. My interviews with Mr. Mahan, in connection with what he has written, have left the impression on my mind, that, whatever may be the natural tendency of his peculiar opinions, he himself has had the love of God shed abroad in his heart, and that the error, into which I think he has fallen, results, not from the want of Christian feeling, but from a hasty interpretation of Scripture, and a wrong method of reasoning. It is in accordance with his express desire, that I have undertaken to review what he has published on the subject; and I am persuaded that he would be far from wishing, that my personal regard to him should prevent a free and thorough examination of his system, or of the manner in which he defends it.

I begin with a general remark, the correctness of which no one will question. *When a man undertakes to sustain and propagate a novel system,—a system different from what has commonly been entertained by the best of men,—it is inadmissible for him to set forth, as a part of his system, any opinions which are held by those, from whom he professes to differ.* He may show, if he can, that the principles which are common to him and to others, when rightly carried out, involve his peculiarities, and that those who do not embrace his system are inconsistent with themselves, in holding to those common principles. He is at liberty to show, that they stop short of the mark, and must suffer loss. But can he, with propriety, mention those commonly received principles, as *peculiar* to *him*, in distinction from others? Can he take any advantage from them, to prove the excellence of *his* system, above the common system? Can he in any way properly make the impression that they belong to *him*, more than to evangelical ministers generally?

In this respect, I am constrained to say, that Mr. Mahan, Mr. Fitch and others have, however undesignedly, committed an obvious fault, and one which is likely to mislead incautious

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overlooked it! How great the mistake of those who differ from these writers, and who do not believe that God has made provision for the entire sanctification of believers!

And yet it is a fact, that devout Christians and orthodox divines have, in all ages, maintained this same precious doctrine, that *full provision is made in the gospel, not only for the forgiveness of sin, but for the complete sanctification of God's people.* I might fill volumes with quotations from evangelical writers, from Augustine down to the present day, in which this grand sentiment is strongly asserted and clearly illustrated, and is set forth as the foundation of hope and the spring of effort to believers. Let any one read the practical writings of Calvin, Flavel, Owen, Bunyan, Watts, Doddridge, President Davies, Good, and numberless other authors, ancient and modern, and he will find that they exhibit this sentiment in all its preciousness. I hope to be excused, if I take the liberty to say, that no truth has been more familiar to my mind, or more zealously inculcated in my preaching and conversation than this, *that the Saviour has made provision for the entire deliverance of his people from sin; that the gospel contains a remedy for all our spiritual diseases; that there is a fulness in Christ, adequate to supply all our need.* It has been the same with others. I could name many, whom I have known personally, who have zealously preached this doctrine, and have rested upon it, living and dying, as the rock of their salvation. By evangelical ministers generally, this doctrine has been regarded as one of the grand peculiarities of the gospel. In their view, the gospel is no gospel without it. And yet I must confess that neither I, nor my brethren generally have given this great gospel truth the place which it ought to hold in our preaching. And Mr. Mahan might, with perfect propriety, have noticed this, and might have truly said, that, in many instances, it has been so far neglected, as to make the impression upon others, that it was no part of our belief. But we do believe it, and we always have believed it; and we have sincerely and earnestly published it, as the ground of hope to man. We are, I acknowledge, under particular obligations to Mr. Mahan, for holding forth this truth so clearly, and giving it such prominence in the gospel plan. And if he had labored merely to wake up his brethren to juster views of

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to a noble object, and would not have been in vain. But for him to say, or imply, that orthodox ministers have not believed and taught this truth,—why, he might as well say, they have not believed and taught the divine authority of the Bible. The fact is, the more devoutly ministers and Christians have studied the word of God, the more they have known of themselves, and the more earnestly they have sought the teachings of the Holy Spirit, the better have they understood the provisions of the gospel, and the more entirely have they relied upon the all-sufficient grace of Christ. I am glad to see, that, as Mr. Mahan has come to entertain more exalted views of the gracious provisions of the gospel for the sanctification of believers, he has ceased to give such prominence, as he formerly did, to the ability or free-will of man, and has expressly renounced it, as furnishing any ground of hope for sinners, or any spring of holiness to Christians, and has been brought to rely wholly on the grace of Christ, and to look to him for the whole of salvation. Luther did this, when he first emerged from the darkness of popery. William Cowper did this, at his first conversion. Devout Christians have all done this, though with different degrees of clearness; and multitudes of them have done it in as high a degree and with as much comfort, as Mr. Mahan. I have recently become acquainted with the biography of Mrs. Hawkes, a humble Christian in the common walks of life, who derived special benefit from the instructions of Cecil. And I shall here make a single quotation from one of her letters, showing her cordial reliance on the grace of Christ for the whole of *sanctification*. She says to her correspondent: "You want to know how I have been conquering *self*. Alas! I have only been fighting against self, but am still very far from being a conqueror; and I am thankful to say, as you do, *Jesus shows me my strength is in him;* and my desire is, to be as a little child. When I want to act, I go to him for wisdom and strength. If I feel anger, I run to him, and show it to him. When I feel pride rising upon any occasion, I go to him, and confess it. To him I take every sin, as it arises—every want, every desponding thought. To him I go for every good thought, every good desire, every good word and work, crying, *Lord, help me in this—Lord, help me in the other. It is thy grace alone that*

we must plead the promises. How are we to be transformed in the spirit of our minds, and to be changed into his image, from glory to glory? Not by looking within, but by looking to Jesus." Now how does this differ from the views exhibited by Mr. Mahan in the following passage (Discourses, pp. 153—4). He says, just as thousands have said before: "The promises are adapted to every possible condition. They descend to the sinner in the lowest depths of guilt and depravity, for the purpose of lifting him out of the horrible pit, and rendering him a partaker of the divine nature. They meet the Christian, in a state of partial holiness, for the purpose of raising him to a state of perfect love. Now, to use the promises so as to become possessed of the blessings they proffer to us, four things are necessary: that we know our need; that we apprehend the particular promise of Christ which was designed to meet that particular necessity; that we repose full confidence in the ability and faithfulness of Christ to fulfil the promise; and that we cast our whole being upon him, for the specific purpose of securing a fulfilment of the particular promise before us. For example; the sinner is brought to feel himself to be in a lost condition. Here he is met with the declaration of Christ: *I came to seek and to save that which was lost;—and whosoever cometh unto me, I will in nowise cast out.* Let the sinner cast himself directly upon Christ, for the definite purpose of securing a fulfilment of this promise. Are you in darkness? Go directly to Christ for the fulfilment of the promise: *I will lead the blind by a way which they knew not.* Is your heart hard and unfeeling? Go to Christ and cast yourself upon his faithfulness for the fulfilment of the promise: *I will take the heart of stone out of your flesh and will give you a heart of flesh.* Do temptations beset you? Go to Christ with the promise: *who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able, but will with the temptation make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it.* Are you about to enter into new scenes, or spheres of action? Go to Christ with the promises: *lo, I am with you always; and, my grace is sufficient for thee.* In short, whatever your condition, remember that you are addressed by your Saviour with some specific promise, perfectly adapted to your case; and

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all that is wanted is, that he should have frankly said: *this is nothing new. It is the good old way, in which evangelical writers and Christians have always understood and applied the provisions and promises of the gospel.* I could easily cite many passages of the same import, and still more striking, from Bunyan's Jerusalem-Sinner Saved, M'Laurin's Sermons, Good's Better Covenant, and the writings of John Newton. And I have hoped that orthodox ministers were about to give up what remains among them of a cold, abstruse, philosophical way of preaching, and to adopt more fully the determination of Paul, *to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified*, and to make him *all in all*. May the day soon come when this shall be the case universally. And let us, who differ from Mr. Mahan in other respects, be careful to profit by his remarks on this subject; and let us copy his earnestness in holding forth the all-sufficient provisions of the gospel for the entire sanctification of believers.

My aim has been to do full justice to Mr. Mahan, in holding the great principle above considered; and at the same time to show, that orthodox writers and preachers have generally held the same principle, and that, in this respect, Mr. Mahan has made no advance upon the common faith of the Christian church. Of course it must be wrong for him or any others to suppose, that holding this principle can be turned to the advantage of his system in distinction from the system commonly received by the orthodox.

But Mr. Mahan thinks that his peculiar doctrine is inseparably connected with the fact, that provision is made for the entire sanctification of believers. He believes that his doctrine certainly follows from this, and is involved in it. This, then, shall be my next point of inquiry. *From the fact that provision is made in the gospel for the complete sanctification of believers, does it follow that they will be completely sanctified in the present life?* Let us dismiss all other points till we have disposed of this. It is a matter of reasoning. And those who are accustomed to reasoning know how important it is to give a fixed attention to the point under consideration, and to be careful not to wander from it.

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The question at issue may be taken up in two ways. First:

does, and, as I suppose, on the same conditions; that is, we *may* render perfect obedience, if we apply ourselves to the work *as we ought*, and *fully avail ourselves* of the gracious provisions of the gospel. He surely would not say that we may render perfect obedience in any other way.

I must therefore protest here, as I did in the former case, against Mr. Mahan's claiming that, as belonging peculiarly and exclusively to him and to those who agree with him, which belongs equally to others. We hold as decidedly as he does, that, in the common acceptation of the term, complete holiness is *attainable* in the present life. When we assert that a thing is *attainable*, or *may* be attained, our meaning is, that a proper use of means will secure it; that we shall obtain it, if we do what we ought; and that, if we fail of obtaining it, truth will require us to say we *might* have obtained it, and that our failure was owing altogether to our own fault. The *attainableness* of any thing surely does not mean the same thing as its being *actually obtained*. For it is very common to speak of many things, for example, the improvement of the mind, and a state of competence, as things which are *attainable*, or which *may* be obtained, but which never are obtained. The same as to the blessings of the gospel. Mr. Mahan would doubtless say, as others do, that salvation is *attainable* by all who hear the gospel; that under the dispensation of grace, any and all sinners *may* be saved; meaning, that means and opportunities are provided; that the way is prepared; that salvation is freely offered to them on the most reasonable terms; that a proper conduct on their part will secure the blessing, and that if they do not obtain it, they themselves, and they only, will be the faulty cause of the failure. When we say a thing is *not attainable*, we mean that, whatever we may do, we cannot obtain it, and that our failing to obtain it will not be owing to any misconduct or neglect on our part. It is often and truly represented, that impenitent sinners, at the judgment day, will have the painful reflection that the blessedness of heaven was offered to them, and was put within their reach,—that they *might* have been saved, but refused the infinite good.

See, now, how Mr. Mahan treats this subject in his Discourses, [illegible] and elsewhere. He says, the church and the min-

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that it is not attainable. But this is not our belief. It therefore becomes evident, that his representation is not correct, and that all the advantage he derives or seems to derive from it, is unjust.

But there is a question here which must not be overlooked. Both parties hold, that complete holiness is *attainable.* Does this prove that it is *actually attained?* Here again I shall address myself to Mr. Mahan. Do you not hold, my brother, that salvation is *attainable* by all sinners who hear the gospel? But do you infer from this, that all will be saved? Further: Do you not hold that complete holiness is *attainable* by all believers *now,* this very *day,* and this very *minute?* Doubtless you do. But your writings show, that you are far enough from thinking that all believers *are* completely holy now. If you really thought them to be so, why should you show such grief at their short-comings? And why speak, as you do, of Christians "partially sanctified?" And why labor, with such zeal, to stir them up to make higher attainments, and seek after perfection? Now, if you yourself do not think that *the actual attainment* of perfection can be inferred from its *attainableness,* can it be right for you to employ modes of reasoning which imply, or seem to imply, that you do think so?

DIVINE PROMISES.

Mr. Mahan and others place great dependence upon these for the support of their doctrine. The question which I shall now consider is, whether the promises of God, *when rightly interpreted,* do really support the doctrine.

It is hardly necessary to say that I perfectly agree with Mr. Mahan in the confident belief, that God will fulfil all his promises, taken in their *true meaning.* No one, surely, can expect them to be accomplished in a sense which they were never intended to bear. The first inquiry, then, must be, as to the true meaning of the promises referred to. The great and precious promise of the New Covenant, on which Mr. Mahan founds his fourth Discourse, is this: "I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts, and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people, etc.; and all shall know me, from the least to the greatest; for I will be merciful to"

mained unfulfilled; may he not be faithful in respect to his promise, *that his people shall be made perfect in holiness*, if he fulfils it to them *a few days hence*,—that is, when they are removed to the heavenly state,—although it may not be fulfilled during the short period of the present life?

But with respect to the promise of God, that the world shall be converted and all flesh see his salvation, we may take another view. It is manifest that the promise, in the full extent of its meaning, has not yet been accomplished. But has not something been done *towards* its accomplishment? Have not multitudes, in different parts of the world, been converted to God? Has not the kingdom of Christ been extended more and more? And may not the promise, that the whole world shall be turned from sin, be intended to include not only the final event of the universal reign of Christ, but all the events of the same kind which are introductory to it, that is, all instances of the conversion of sinners, and especially of the spread of the gospel in pagan countries? And, accordingly, may not such a promise, like many of the prophecies, have a gradual, progressive accomplishment,—an accomplishment extending through a long period of time, and leading on to a complete fulfilment in the end? And if God, in his unsearchable wisdom, sees fit to accomplish his word of promise or prediction in this way, does it become us to say either that he does not accomplish it, or that he does not show his faithfulness as clearly, as if he should accomplish it at once? Unless we fall into such a train of thought as I have suggested, we shall be under the painful necessity of admitting, that the most precious and glorious promises of God respecting the enlargement and prosperity of his kingdom, have not, to this day, been accomplished in any respect or in any degree,—that they have not even *begun* to be fulfilled.

The same remarks apply to the promises of the New Covenant respecting the sanctification of believers. Take the precious promise, that Jesus "shall save his people from their sins." And look at all believers now living. Has Jesus already saved them all completely from their sins? Is it true that, at the present time, there is no sin, no moral defilement in any of them? Mr. Mahan does by no means believe this. Has the promise, then, been *really fulfilled* in regard to the great body of Christians now living? Yes, we say, *really* fulfilled, though not as

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true holiness:—but not *completely* fulfilled, inasmuch as sin, in different degrees, still dwells in them. We can take no other view of the subject, unless we hold either that the promise remains wholly unaccomplished respecting the present race of believers, or else that every true believer is now in a state of sinless perfection. But Mr. Mahan does not hold that all believers are now perfect. He considers Christians generally as very deficient in faith and obedience, and presents complete holiness before them, as an object to be *sought*, not as *already obtained*. Will he then say, that the precious promise above named has not, in any degree, been fulfilled respecting them? I think he will rather say, whatever may become of his theory, that as the gracious Redeemer "has begun a good work in them," he has begun to save them from their sins, and so has, *in a measure*, really fulfilled the promise.

Take one promise more:—"I will sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean: from all your filthiness and from all your idols will I cleanse you." Let this be admitted to relate to all believers. Has it, then, been already *completely* fulfilled in respect to every one of them, so that no moral pollution remains? Mr. Mahan will say, clearly not. Has it, then, been really fulfilled in *any degree?* Certainly it has been. Their being true Christians implies, that God has made them clean *in some measure;*—that they are really sanctified *in a degree.* Now, who will say, that God may not cause his faithfulness to be seen and admired in regard to a promise, which has already been fulfilled in some degree, and to some extent, but is hereafter to have a more extensive and more perfect fulfilment?

But as this is one of the main points,—one of the hinges on which the existing controversy turns,—I am not yet ready to dismiss it. My wish is, to examine the question as to the accomplishment of the divine promises which relate to the sanctification of believers, so thoroughly, that all difficulties may, as far as possible, be removed, and that we may have no occasion to dwell on the subject again.

Come then, my brother, let us reason together a little farther on the subject before us. In what manner are we to understand the promises and declarations of God which you have so

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view it on all sides with the closest attention, so that we may, if possible, be sure to guard against error, and to find the truth. The truth is incomparably precious, and is worthy to be searched for with untiring zeal. Allow me then to dwell on this particular topic a moment longer. And if we should happen, in any respect, to pass over the same ground again, let us do it with increased watchfulness and care.

You have quoted many of the gracious promises which God has made as to the entire deliverance of believers from sin. Suppose now, my brother, I quote the same promises, and say, these promises plainly imply, that God will completely sanctify his people *as soon as they believe.* Suppose I say; here is the promise of God, that "Jesus shall save his people from their sins;" and this implies that he will completely save them from their sins at once, when they become believers; and unless he does this, his promise falls to the ground. And here we have the declaration of God, that Christ came to redeem his people from all iniquity; and this must mean that he will redeem them from all iniquity the very hour and minute in which they believe in him; and if they remain a single hour without perfect holiness, the declaration is not accomplished. What objection can you make to all this? Will you say, I have no right to limit the fulfilment of the divine promise or declaration to *a single hour* or *minute?* But why have not I as good a right to give to the divine promise *these narrow limits,* as you have to give it limits of a little larger extent? Show me what authority you have to say, the promise must be fulfilled in a year, or in ten or twenty years, or during the present life (which may not be half a year), more than I have to say, it must be fulfilled the present hour or minute. Take time to look at this matter carefully; and then bring forward the reason why you limit the fulfilling of the promise to the few fleeting days of the present life, and yet say it is not limited to the present hour or minute.

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other Christians have ever offered them up in faith. But we have been led to suppose, from their representations, that they would doubt almost any thing sooner than they would doubt the reality and strength of their own faith. And we have supposed that they must, times without number, have prayed in faith: "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as in heaven." And as they are confident that they have thus prayed, and confident too that God heareth them, "and that they have the petitions which they have desired of him;" why do they not come forward boldly, and say: "God's kingdom is come, and his will is done on earth as in heaven. We have prayed in faith for this; and God has not failed to answer our prayers. We prayed for this some time ago; and God has not *delayed* to answer our prayers. He *has* answered them; and "we have the petitions we desired of him." And whatever may be appearances to the contrary, his kingdom certainly *has come*, and his will is now done on earth as in heaven. Yes, it must be so; for God has heard us. And though the eye of sense cannot see it, the eye of faith must see, that the world is now filled with the knowledge of God; that his will is perfectly obeyed by the whole human family, and the earth converted into a paradise." What hinders them from saying this? They *must* say it; or they must say they have never prayed in faith for the coming of Christ's kingdom; or they must say, God does not answer prayer; or else they must adopt the principle which I have endeavored to defend; namely, that God often extends his answer to prayer over hundreds, and even thousands of years, accomplishing the inestimable good desired *gradually;* bestowing the blessing for which his people pray, in an *increasing measure;* and, in the end, bringing about a result, which will display clearly and gloriously, his unfailing faithfulness, in the *complete* fulfilment of his promise *to answer prayer.* If they adopt this principle, and apply it to the case in hand, they can no longer argue in support of their peculiar doctrine respecting perfection, from the prayers which Christians offer up for complete holiness, or from the certainty that God will answer their prayers. The Bible teaches that Christians ought to pray and do pray for perfect sanctification, and that God will answer their prayers, and grant the blessing they pray for. But where does the Bible authorize us to take the other step, and limit the time when God must give the answer, to

itself. To distinguish the animal from the spiritual part of man, and to speak of them as distinct, is common to profane and sacred writers. The apostle frequently represents the body and the spirit as possessing desires and performing actions peculiar to themselves. He speaks expressly of the *outward* man or animal nature, as distinguished from the *inward* man or the spiritual nature. 2 Cor. 4: 16. The body, thus distinguished from the spirit, may very fitly be styled *the creature.* If the material part of the universe may be designated κτίσις, may we not suppose a similar usage in relation to the material part of man? In perfect accordance with this suggestion, the body of man is the only part of his constitution which God is represented as having properly created. Gen. 2: 7. A sufficient reason for this use of κτίσις may be found in the likeness of our animal nature to the brute creation. In mere physical constitution there is no essential difference.

But is this use of κτίσις sustained by other examples? This question it is not necessary to decide. If it can be shown that this application of the term is natural, and not inconsistent with its acknowledged signification, the exigency of the passage will bear us out. Does any one mistake the force of οἰκία in 2 Cor. 5: 1, because no instance of a similar use can be found in the New Testament, or, perhaps, in the language? Does not κτίσις itself, in 1 Pet. 2: 13, properly denote an ordinance or institution?—a sense unusual, if not elsewhere unknown? The apostles employed the language of common life. This use of κτίσις, though it may be confirmed by no Greek author whose writings are extant, might have corresponded with the "usus loquendi" at that time. A usage may have prevailed among Christians similar to that which is common at the present day in relation to the English term "*creature.*"

II. Do the exigencies of the passage require or sustain this sense of κτίσις? The sentiment of the passage appears to be closely connected with the preceding context. In verses 10 and 11, the apostle assures his brethren that even their bodies, though doomed to death because of sin, shall be restored to life and immortality, by virtue of the resurrection of Christ and the indwelling of the Spirit. In verse 13, he reminds them, that, by

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of one who has subjected it in hope—who has placed it in a hopeful as well as suffering condition—hope that* even the creature itself shall be liberated from the bondage of corruption—that even the animal nature shall be delivered from its present infirmities and afflictions, yea, even from the confinement and corruption of the grave—into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.

In verse 22, the apostle, to confirm his argument, appeals to a fact universally known and acknowledged: "For we know that every creature in common groans and travails in pain until now." He has just said that the creature is at present subjected to vanity; and this subjection is involuntary. The former position is sustained by the fact that *all* creatures alike are in a suffering condition; the latter by their *groans and pangs* in this state of subjection. *Πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις* may denote all men considered merely as *sensitive beings*, and need not include the brute creation. We know, says the apostle, that all creatures in common—the saints in their animal nature as well as others—are groaning under infirmity and affliction even to the present time. The full liberty of children—"the manifestation of the sons of God"—has not yet been realized.

The state and feelings of Christians, as *rational and spiritual beings*, are next appealed to as proof that their inheritance is future. "And not only so, but even we ourselves, though we have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, *the redemption of our body.*" *Καὶ αὐτοὶ* and *καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*, we suppose, were designed to distinguish Christians, not so much from the *πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις*, as from their own animal nature. This supposition, indeed, is the only satisfactory explanation of this peculiarly emphatic repetition. Not only is the creature—the animal part of our constitution, subjected to vanity and waiting for deliverance, but even we ourselves—we in our proper persons, though partakers of the renovating influence of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption—our manifestation as the children of God—the resurrection and glorification of our bodies.

The passage, as thus explained, is invested with a peculiar

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interest. It furnishes an additional proof of a doctrine which was once the life of the Christian church. It makes no allusion, indeed, to the longings of the heathen for immortality. It presents no splendid description of the renovation of the material universe. But it introduces a theme far more welcome to the child of God. It points him directly to his glorious destiny—to the resurrection and glorification of his body. It derives an argument for the confirmation of his faith from facts furnished by his consciousness and experience. It reminds him that he is "a joint heir with Christ," and consequently, destined to enjoy the glory which is to be revealed. Thus he is encouraged to look beyond the grave for "the manifestation" of his real character, and the enjoyment of his promised inheritance. His very afflictions become a source of consolation, by becoming the evidence of his future bliss. He is assured, by all that is endearing in his relation to God as his Father, by all that is real in the conscious witness of the Spirit, nay, by all that is unwelcome in his present degraded and suffering condition, that he shall finally be raised in the likeness of his Saviour, and shall then participate in the glories of the heavenly kingdom.

ARTICLE XI.

Review of Wiggers' History of Augustinism and Pelagianism.

By Professor Henry P. Tappan, New-York City.

An Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, from the original sources: by G. F. Wiggers, D. D., Professor of Theology in the University of Rostock, etc. Translated from the German, with Notes and Additions, by Rev. Ralph Emerson, Prof. of Eccl. Hist. in the Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass. Andover: Gould, Newman & Saxton. pp. 383.

The history of Christianity may be taken up under two

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cally. External events have influenced philosophies and dogmas, and the latter have influenced the former.

But the point particularly to be considered under the second phasis, and one unquestionably of the highest moment, is the connection between Christianity, taken in its utmost purity and simplicity, and the philosophies and dogmas which were abroad in the world when she made her appearance upon the theatre of humanity, or which were called up and modified upon the occasion of herpresence. In this work we have to disintegrate the Christianity of Christ and his apostles from the opinions of men; and to show how these various, and often contradictory opinions were combined with the simple element of revelation, thus producing all the different forms of nominal Christianity, of sects and heresies.

The Bible is not peculiarly a book for philosophers and scholars; it is a book for benighted, erring, lost men of every grade. Coming from the purest source and on the most benevolent mission, ere we had entered upon its examination, we might reasonably expect to find it beautifully adapted to its end. Has God given a rule of duty and a revelation of truth, only to involve us in endless disputations? Has he opened to us a way of redemption, and given us a promise of eternal life, accompanied with a pressing exhortation to "lay hold" upon it; and yet, is this way enveloped in such obscurity, and this promise given so doubtfully, that we are compelled to turn away from the glory of the prize, and from the consideration of the urgency of our circumstances, in order to settle curious dogmas, and to balance nicely the "oppositions of science?"

Some of the lepers, the blind, the deaf, the halt, the maimed, the paralytic, in the days of Jesus Christ, may have been men of very curious and subtle minds, and given much to philosophical speculation; and ere they could be persuaded to avail themselves of his miraculous power, they may have thought it indispensable to determine the possibility and the modes of miraculous interposition. We find, however, that Bartimeus experienced the healing benefit, without any previous disquisition upon causes and modes: and the blind man mentioned by the apostle John, when called upon to account for the restoration of his sight, could only reply: "One thing I know, that whereas I was born blind, now I see."

ing may find much to speculate about. Still, the fact is before us, that in the days of Christ and his apostles and in all subsequent times, multitudes of our race, who were destitute of philosophical genius and acquirements, have, under the simplest presentation of "Christ and him crucified," believed unto salvation. In their ignorance, or in their neglect of philosophy, they found nothing wanting to the energy of their faith, or to the strength and comfort of their hope.

The world in which we live is wonderfully and beautifully adapted to our wants and uses. The appropriation, in the first instance, is not made by men of deep science, but by men of limited attainments and ordinary pursuits. Before philosophy, with her thoughtful brow and all penetrating eye, was born; before science had measured the earth and the heavens, and weighed the winds, the mountains and the oceans, and decomposed matter into its fine and subtle elements, there was skill in agriculture and mechanical art; there were a thousand practical rules in being and in use; and nature was extensively known, and her good things enjoyed, as the gifts of a familiar and bountiful parent.

Afterwards came philosophy and science. They expanded the mind, they elevated the nature, they extended the dominion of man. But they did not disclaim the facts which had been already observed; they did not quarrel with the practical and useful rules which had been formed by a spontaneous induction. A multitude of these rules were substantially just, and were never to be laid aside: philosophy might explain but not supersede them. Others were led on from a crude to a perfected state, by nicer experiments, and more thoughtful observations and comparisons. Others were superseded by the discovery of new rules more useful. And many fields of useful and bountiful productiveness were laid open, which were unknown before.

Philosophy and science perfected art, and gave to industry a gigantic power. The new discoveries, and the more exact knowledges, while they extended and perfected what had gone before, worked into it harmoniously and benignly. The introduction of a better implement for tilling the earth, or an im-

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facts and the inspired propositions in all their integrity, containing rules of duty and objects of faith and hope, in their sublime utility—bringing peace, salvation and eternal life to a sinful and lost race.

Paul's mind partook of that character which we call philosophical; and there is reason to believe that he was both philosophically and classically educated. Some of the writings of John, particularly a part of the first chapter of his gospel, may produce the same impression. We believe, however, that a philosophical aspect in the portions referred to will present itself strongly only to those who traverse the pages of the Bible on a philosophical hunt, and who are eager to find food and authority for preconceived theories. Paul and John, after all, only affirm truths upon divine authority; or where deductions are made, they arise spontaneously and obviously, and by no intricate and difficult logic. The spirit of all Scripture is conveyed in the noble declaration of John: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of life; that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you."

What is true of the writings of the apostles is true likewise, in an eminent degree, of the teaching of Jesus Christ. He, certainly, has nothing of the manner of a speculating philosopher. The only approach to a concealment of his meaning is found in his parables. The truths conveyed under these are very simple and striking, and were readily explained to his disciples when they applied to him in private, and would, undoubtedly, have been explained to any other persons who should have manifested the same interest in his instructions. This mode of teaching was at the time intended as a rebuke of the unbelieving Jews. The exposition of these parables the evangelists have given in full.

Few, comparatively, have the genius and the learning to enter upon the deep philosophical researches connected with the truths of the gospel. If there be any man, or any number of men who can enter upon these researches, with the true philosophical spirit, after a true philosophical method, and become to the metaphysical world what Kepler, and Galileo, and Tycho

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beauty! what a heavenly influence breathes here! Here lies a wondrous telescope: let us look through it. We see the land which is afar off:—the heavenly city stands revealed.

In the world of nature, the facts were first given, and loved, and generalized into useful rules; and philosophy came on slowly afterwards as the interpreter of the unquestionable facts. But even here the wildness of speculation often did violence to the simplicity of nature; but then, the error did not reach our common life, and the majestic voice of nature soon silenced the voices of strange children.

But when Christianity appeared, she found old religions and philosophies, boastful of their descent, proud and stern in their pretensions; all alike contending for the mastery, or forming alliances to make conquest and pre-eminence doubly sure. She came, not as a philosophy, but revealed herself as the face of nature upon the morning of creation, when light was first spread abroad: there were forms and objects to behold, and influences to feel and enjoy. There was undoubtedly a philosophy connected with all this. But as the sun with his light and warmth reached the little bud of earth, and opened its petals, and painted its colors, and presented its beauty and fragrance to the sense of man, without deigning to explain the curious and beautiful work; and as the soul of man found itself in wonderful union with a corporeal body, admirably fitted to its uses, without comprehending the nature of this union, and saw a universal life working in organic nature without comprehending its interpenetration and its plastic energy; so, in this spiritual world of Christianity, there was the union of divinity with humanity, and the communication of influences from a heavenly spirit, and the penetrating and vivifying power of a higher life, plainly given, and producing its palpable and glorious works of moral purity, beauty and order, while no explanation of the modes and conditions of this process was vouchsafed.

The first followers and adherents of Christianity received her as "little children." They were generally persons of sober minds, intelligent enough to perceive and apply facts, but carried away by no philosophical pride and enthusiasm. And while the days of persecution lasted, even the philosophical, who truly embraced the gospel, were more eager after eternal

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of church history, by his learned, judicious and impartial "Historical Presentation of Augustinism and Pelagianism." And next to him, the English public will feel themselves indebted to his learned translator, for his very spirited, graceful and lucid version; and for his ingenious "notes and additions." This work cannot be commended too highly to the attention of clergymen and theological students. The translator aptly remarks: "There are probably three classes of men who will like to read such a work as this. First, those who have been called Pelagians: for they will honestly wish to know whether they ought any longer to reject the appellation; and how far, if *at all*, they should own its justness. Secondly, those who have called them Pelagians: as they will wish to know whether, in whole or in part, they have rightly bestowed the appellation;—and whether, to any extent, it may also be applicable to themselves. Thirdly, those who have neither given nor received the name, but who would fain be better able to judge of the propriety with which it has been so currently applied and so promptly rejected, on the right and on the left." And we would add, fourthly, those who boast of the title of Augustinians; that they may know how far they are entitled to this distinction, and how far, upon serious reflection, they may be disposed to consider it a desirable distinction. Let us no longer take or give names in the dark; and although "names are things," let us learn that there are "things" which are better than their "names" purport.

The Augustinian and Pelagian controversy embraces topics which were agitated before the time of the two distinguished leaders from whom it takes its name; and which have never ceased to be agitated since their time. It does not appear, that of the earlier fathers there were any who could with justice be assigned strictly to the one form of doctrine or the other: and of the multitude of ecclesiastical writers who flourished subsequently, there was certainly a wide diversity of doctrine, bearing the same general designation of Augustinism and Pelagianism, but which, only in the case of the latter, attained to a distinctive title—that of Semi-Pelagianism.

With the aid of Dr. Wiggers—to whose authority we dare confidently appeal, and whose "presentation" we have it in

I. The Primitive State of Man.

The Augustinian Theory.

Adam possessed a rational nature made after the divine likeness. This nature was highly developed, so that he was more noble, wise and excellent than any who ever came after him. He likewise possessed free will, as a power to sin or to refrain from sinning. This free will was not sufficient of itself to enable him to stand: but the aid of grace was afforded which rendered it sufficient; and yet this grace was not irresistible grace. The free will of man was one of inferior degree. He possessed the *posse non peccare*—the ability not to sin; but not the *non posse peccare*—the inability to sin. The power to do good, and the *non posse peccare* constitute the highest form of freedom. This is the freedom of God as the immutable good, of angels, and the "just made perfect." But man, being made out of nothing, is at first an inferior and mutable good. Had Adam persevered, he would finally have attained to the higher freedom, the *non posse peccare.*

Before the fall the passions were subject to the reason. Hence there was no inordinate and evil concupiscence of any kind. "The connexion of the sexes would indeed have taken place in Paradise; but in such a way, that either no sensual passion would have been excited, or it would have been subject to the dominion of reason, and would not have risen in opposition to its dictates."

The body which he inhabited corresponded to the purity and excellence of his mind. It was majestic, beautiful, free from disease and pain, and immortal. He did not possess the immortality of angels, and of the bodies of the risen saints. It was an immortality which depended upon the fact of his not sinning. Had he persevered in holiness, with the attainment of the *non posse peccare*, there would have been conjoined the impossibility of dying; and he would have passed into a spiritual body.

Eden was the fitting habitation of a being so holy and happy. Even the beasts were tame and gentle, and lived on the com-

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death; so that death might happen to no living thing in that place of life."

The Pelagian Theory.

"The state of man before the fall was the same as it is now." He was a being of intelligence, free will and passions, with the ability to sin or to refrain from sinning. Then as now, his body was subject to disease and death. Hence, "the words, in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die, referred to spiritual death, i. e. sin." "The primitive state of the first man was superior only in this, that no example of sinning had yet been presented for imitation; and the first man who came into the world as an adult, had the full use of reason at the beginning," and the perfect exercise of his freedom. "Even concupiscence, which Augustine held as something evil, and as the mother of all evil, but which the Pelagians explained as a natural passion, was found in Paradise."

"Julian, a follower of Pelagius, admitted that Adam was created immortal, in the sense, that if he had not sinned, he would have obtained immortality by eating of the tree of life."

II. FREE WILL.

Augustinian Theory.

Augustine represents the will before the fall as an activity, entirely able and free to sin; also able and free to do good by the aid of grace actually communicated. Since the fall, it is an activity free only to sin, and totally unable to do good. The highest form of freedom is the *non posse peccare.*

Pelagian Theory.

In the original constitution of man, the will is an activity capable of both good and evil. In this lies its freedom; and in this "freedom to good and evil consists the superiority of the rational soul; in this, the honor and dignity of our nature." By the sin of Adam the capacity of good and evil action was neither lost to himself nor to his posterity. "Free will is as much

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heathen, as they are destitute of both faith and baptism, are lost. The damnation of infants will be of a milder form: and the heathen, who lived comparatively just and pure lives, will be adjudged to milder punishment than licentious idolaters.

The efficacy of baptism, in respect to infants, is to remove the guilt of original sin. All who are baptised in infancy, if they die before they are capable of actual transgression, will assuredly be saved. It is presumed, however, that the grace of the Holy Spirit is given at the time of baptism, for their spiritual regeneration. In the case of adults, baptism effects a complete redemption from sin, both original and actual. "Baptism, in Augustine's view, was the means, not only of obtaining pardon from all sin, but of being freed from all evil."

The Eucharist is involved in baptism; so that all the baptised are to be at once admitted to its participation. Hence it is to be administered even to infants.

In the case of infants, baptism alone is sufficient for salvation, because they are incapable of exercising faith. In the case of adults, faith and baptism are alike indispensable, unless the rite is clearly impossible. In the case of adults as well as infants, while the external rite was imperatively demanded, so that even faith could not, in ordinary circumstances, save without it; still the regeneration of the heart was effected by the accompanying influences of the Holy Spirit: but these influences were secured by the performance of the rite.

Pelagian Theory.

In the case of adults, the Pelagians affirm the efficacy of baptism no less than the Augustinians, except in respect to original sin, which the former deny. In the case of infants, there is no efficacy in baptism to the removal of original sin, because there is no original sin. But inasmuch as both parties practised infant baptism, and united in attributing to it an efficacious operation on the soul itself, it became necessary for the Pelagians to show the necessity and uses of baptism in an uncorrupted being. This they attempted, by making the extraordinary distinction between eternal life and the kingdom of heaven. To the first the infant is entitled, on the groun.l of

The grace afforded to man before the fall was the operation of the same "hidden causes," but it was then given merely as an aid co-operative, but after the fall as a power restorative.

Pelagian Theory.

Grace is of wide signification. It embraces the fact of our creation out of nothing, the endowments of reason and free will, and the dignity and manifold advantages which result from them. In the original and permanent constitution of our being, all men possess the power and possibility of doing good. By the promulgation of the law, and by the instructions of Jesus, the performance of good is rendered easier: Hence these are gifts of grace. The communication of supernatural influences is the highest measure of grace. As the Christian receives higher gifts than he who is not a Christian, so he can attain a higher degree of moral perfection. Supernatural influences are given only to him who merits them by the proper and faithful use of his natural powers. The understanding, and not the will of man, is the seat of supernatural influences. The death of Christ, the forgiveness of sin, and baptism are all likewise grace. There is no irresistible grace.

According to Augustine, human nature, in its best estate, is weak and imperfect, and requires the aid of grace, or the "hidden causes." The whole power and possibility of not sinning which Adam possessed depended upon grace. According to Pelagius, "human nature itself in which we are made is grace," and of itself sufficient to do good. Thus strongly contrasted are the two systems.

VI. REDEMPTION.

Augustinian Theory.

"The consequences of redemption extend to the soul, by freeing it from sin and its punishment, and to the body, by raising it to felicity." The power of the "hidden causes"—the supernatural, inward working or grace is the immediate efficient of the deliverance from sin with consequent glory and blessedness; but the death of Christ is the ground of the communication of this grace. The object of Christ's incarnation was not merely to suffer for us to free us from sin and the devil, and by his doctrine and grace redeem us from all imperfection;

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As to the extent of the atonement, Augustine is explicit. Christ died only for the elect. In Augustine's scheme of predestination, grace is confined to the elect. Hence, the death of Christ, which is made the ground of the communication of that grace, can contemplate only the elect.

Pelagian Theory.

"All *sinners* are pardoned by God simply for Christ's sake; are freed merely on his account from the guilt and punishment of their sins." Thus far this theory agrees with the preceding. "But since, according to Pelagius, men are able to live without sin, and to practise virtue by their own power, so all men are not sinners; and hence the atoning virtue of the death of Christ is imparted to those only who have actually sinned." The death of Christ, however, was not superfluous to those who needed no atonement. The teaching and example of Christ, the communication of supernatural influences, and the grace of baptism would lead to a more perfect excellence than could be attained without them.

The death of Christ, as an atonement or otherwise, is not limited to any particular class or number of men. All who will may partake of its benefits.

VII. Predestination and Perseverance.

Augustinian Theory.

"By Adam's sin the whole human race became a corrupt mass (perditionis massa), and justly subject to eternal damnation; so that no one can blame God's righteous decision, if none are saved." Of this "mass" "no one can be freed but he who has received the gift through the grace of the Saviour." The whole race is not only lost, but irretrievably lost, unless God interpose to save them. God, indeed, must be supposed to have power to save any number, or even the whole; for all must be saved to whom he imparts "irresistible grace."

Before the creation of the world, by an unconditional decree, without reference to human merit—for merit there was none—"God elected a definite number" to salvation. For these alone Christ died: and to these alone grace is imparted. The rest,

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and his habits, formed amid the elegant dissoluteness of a wealthy city, he was addicted, up to the time of his conversion, in the highest degree to sensual pleasure. His mother was a woman of exemplary piety; and had, from his earliest years, labored to restrain his hot and jovial temper, and to initiate him into the Christian life.

It appears that, from an early period, Augustine was subject to severe conflicts between an enlightened conscience and his voluptuous propensities. It is not surprising, therefore, that, in the full career of pleasure and ambition, and at the age of nineteen, he should have found strong and peculiar charms in the doctrines of the Manichæans; a sect who referred the origin of sin to the necessary weakness of man, arising from his union with matter, the great principle of evil. In such a doctrine, the voluptuous heart could find relief from the rebukes of conscience.

When he was released from the bonds of this sect, and, under the full conviction of moral obligation and the power of divine love, entered into the fellowship of Christ, the revulsion of feeling which he naturally experienced led him zealously to oppose the doctrines which he had once espoused. Hence one of his earliest works against this sect, was "his first book on Free Will;—a work which he afterwards completed while a presbyter at Hippo, and in which he endeavored to refute the theory of the Manichæans on the origin of evil. They derived evil from a distinct nature, which was coeternal with God; Augustine, from the free will of man." The composition of this treatise is a remarkable event in the history of Augustine. In it, he clearly exhibits the will as endowed with the power of choosing good or evil; and solves at once the question respecting the origin of the sin of the first man.

No man perhaps ever went through a severer ordeal in turning from the "carnal" to the "spiritual mind," than this venerable and distinguished man. After he had become a disciple of the "pious Ambrose," and had abandoned the Manichæans, and while he was drawn by sincere aspirations towards a higher life, "his heart was still encompassed by the allurements of honor, of gain and of sensual love. But he was recalled from the abyss of sensual delights, by the fear of death and the future judgment." After addicting himself to the study of Plato and

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life. "Worldly concerns, it is true, had no longer any charm for him; but love still held his heart a captive. In this disquietude, and impelled by his longing for a better mode of life, he went to Simplicianus, formerly a rhetorician, and a zealous Christian, and who afterwards succeeded Ambrose in the episcopal chair at Milan. With some emotion, he heard from him the account of the conversion of Victorianus. Soon after this, a certain Potitianus described to him the life of St. Anthony, and the conversion of two high commissaries. This made the most lively impression on his heart. He betook himself to a garden, where his friend Alypius followed him, who had been present at the conversation. A violent contest arose between his sensual and spiritual nature. He knew the better; and yet sensuality and the power of habit held him a prisoner in their chains. He fell into a violent passion. He tore his hair; smote his forehead; grasped his knees. He then withdrew a little from Alypius, and cast himself under a fig-tree. A flood of tears broke forth; and he implored the divine mercy for grace. Augustine believed he heard a divine voice, calling to him in the words: Tolle, lege; Tolle, lege:—Take up, read; Take up, read. He dried his tears; rose up; went forth where Alypius sat, and where he had been reading the book of the apostle. He seized and opened it; and the first words on which his eyes fell, were Rom. 13: 13,—not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof. Now his heart was completely changed and converted to God. He went with Alypius to his mother. With joy she learned the change which had taken place in her son. Now Augustine was at rest. External things no longer troubled his heart, and he began quietly to meditate on the manner in which he should direct his future life."

There were obviously two elements co-working to form Augustine's views of original sin;—the doctrine of the Manichæans respecting the seat of the evil principle, and his own experience of the "law in his members, warring against the law of his mind." He had indeed abandoned the sect of the Manichæans, and had even written against their doctrines, on the points where these doctrines invaded moral responsibility, and that freedom of the will on which alone responsibility can be

the Manichæan doctrines which had wrought strongly in his nature, and which wrought there still. When in the wild career of sensuality he had sought to justify himself, or at least to silence the rebukes of conscience,—the weakness and the unavoidable concupiscence of the flesh presented the expedient. And now that he had engaged in a struggle for godliness and heaven, although he no longer sought to excuse the motions of sin, and hush the accusing voice within, still the very energy and painfulness of the struggle by which the spirit endeavored to master the flesh, would revive, however unconsciously of the source from whence it sprung, the idea of the vitiosity of matter. It was not difficult to make his interpretations of Scripture correspond with opinions which had worked themselves out of the two most excited states of his strongest passions,—their conquering state, and their state of being conquered; since, in addition to the strength which these opinions derived from the circumstances of their formation, they seemed to find a support in the language of the apostle. This evil concupiscence, to his consciousness, had always been working in his nature, and had at no period been introduced by his will. What he observed in himself he found verified by his observations upon others. It was therefore an inherited concupiscence.

Again: the manner in which he had yielded to its impulses, notwithstanding the instructions, prayers and tears of his mother, and notwithstanding his own frequent perceptions of the higher beauty and excellence of godliness; and, in addition to this, the fact that even while under the instructions and example of Ambrose, with strong yearnings after spirituality of mind, he found himself unable to break away from the fascinations of pleasure, but was held in a sort of compulsive bondage until the divine voice spoke to him in the garden, and, by an interposition which appeared to him almost if not altogether miraculous, gave him freedom and peace, naturally influenced his opinions respecting the slavery of the will. And here again, it is probable that the doctrines of the Manichæans, unconsciously to him, reappeared and gave their touch to the mould of his thoughts.

The evil concupiscence and the loss of freedom consequent upon it, in the long line of inheritance, necessarily brought

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sin. But as the first man alone had a free will, how shall his posterity retain their responsibility, when they sin necessarily by a will enslaved to the evil concupiscence? There was but one way in which the difficulty could be evaded or removed. As each man, by a long but regular series of generations, had derived his being, with all its powers physical and mental, and all its vitiosity from Adam, so each man could be conceived of as in some sort existing in Adam. When therefore Adam sinned, the whole race, potentially contained in him, sinned likewise. The will of the individual was indeed enslaved to the evil concupiscence; but then, in Adam, by an act of the all comprehending free will of the race, he had freely sinned, and inherited a bondage of the will, a guilt and condemnation which were therefore justly his due. Having formed his theory, Augustine found many passages of Scripture which plainly affirm that we all have become sinners *through* or *by means* of Adam, and were therefore not difficult of accommodation,—particularly, as they appeared in the Latin version, the only one which he used.

Augustine's entire system finds its cardinal basis in his theory of original sin.

1. *The condition of infants, and the nature and efficacy of baptism.* The whole race sinned in Adam, and are condemned with him for the first sin: infants, therefore, are condemned; and dying, without divine interposition, are inevitably lost. This divine interposition appears in the rite of baptism. All baptised infants will be saved, if they die in a state of infancy. Adults, also, are saved from original sin by baptism, and cannot be saved without it.

Augustine, in his theory of original sin, creates an extraordinary form of guilt; and he creates an equally extraordinary form of purification to meet it. It certainly is not more difficult to believe, that the application of water in a solemn rite, should remove guilt and eternal condemnation, than that this guilt and condemnation should spring from a personal participation in Adam's sin by all his posterity. After this, perhaps, we ought not to be surprised even at the farther extension of the efficacy of baptism, so as to make it embrace the removal of actual sin

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diffused itself abroad, until the simplicity of Christ, and the sublime spirituality of his doctrines were supplanted by gorgeous and complicated ceremonies, and manipulatory devotions.

2. *Grace.* Salvation through the death of Christ is actually revealed. But how can it take effect with a race totally enslaved to sin, and without the slightest ability to good? Clearly, the work of restoration cannot begin with man, not even in the feeblest initiatory step; for he is incapable of forming the remotest purpose of returning to holiness. Salvation can take effect, therefore, only by a divine interposition: and as this interposition does not lie in any visible, natural influences, it must consist of "causes hidden" in God himself, and directly acting upon the human will and affections.

3. *Limited Redemption.* All men do not believe; all men are not saved. But why? Because, all men being unable to make any effort for salvation, God is pleased to provide salvation, and to communicate grace only to a part. The whole race, by original sin, are condemned, lost and helpless; and only those are and can be saved, whom God elects as the subjects of redemption and grace.

4. *Election.* According to Augustine, this cannot be a mere purpose to receive all, who, by making certain efforts, comply with the prescribed conditions, which conditions are within the scope of their ability: but, on the contrary, it is an absolute predestination, which contains within itself the only causal influence which can, in any manner or degree, lead the sinner to Christ. It is impossible that the sinner should go to Christ, unless he wills to go; but he cannot will to go, because he has no freedom of will or ability to good: he goes, therefore, only as God elects him to go, and gives him grace accordingly.

Let us now turn to the system of Pelagius. The origin of Pelagius and his early education are unknown. His life, as far as known, was unstained: he was exemplary in the practice of virtue, and earnest in its inculcation. The strength of human passions, the feebleness of human resolutions, and the fierce conflict between matured habits of dissoluteness and a quickened conscience, which characterized his great opponent, probably never appeared in him to a degree to tempt him to doubt the freedom of the will. Besides, he appears to have been under

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reason and conscience. While this opposition exists, man cannot be called good in a perfect sense. Moral responsibility, except in the case of Adam, cannot extend to the mere fact that this opposition exists; for it was induced by his act alone. His posterity are responsible only for their personal acts,—that is, the determinations and volitions of the will, together with their involved consequences as the end or aim of the acts. A multitude of these personal acts have directly for their end or aim the excitation and gratification of desires and passions at war with reason and conscience. Those acts, which resist the demands of the corrupt passions, and aim to obey the reason in the acknowledgment of its supreme authority, contain the very element of praiseworthiness.

Now, let it be supposed that an individual, up to a given moment, has, in every personal act, obeyed the reason and denied his impure propensities: it is not philosophically conceivable that he has incurred any guilt on account of the mere existence of these propensities; on the contrary, his virtues have taken a nobler cast from the stern resistance to temptation under which they were moulded. But is he perfectly good? No. The evil element is within him; and therefore we know not but the next demand of conscience may be one which he shall choose to disobey. He contains perpetually within his own nature motives to transgression.

Two forms of evil are found in man;—the evil of a depraved moral sensitivity, or a sensitivity at war with reason, wherein lie motives, temptations and inducements to personal or free acts of sin; and the evil of positive acts of the free will, transgressing the law of conscience. Pelagius obtained his perfect man by shutting out of view the first form of evil, and concentrating his idea in the second. If it were not for the first, in the absolute freedom of the will, perfection would seem an easy attainment. But inasmuch as the first is continually present, until perfection is actually gained,—besides the bare possibility of sin which attaches itself to the free will,—there is the probability arising from the subjective motives lying in the sensitivity. The man is never deprived of responsibility, because he is never deprived of free will—the power of striving after self-regenera-

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prove essentially hostile. Thus it was with Augustine and Pelagius. And what was the result? The disputant, who succeeded in gaining the suffrages of synods and councils, had all his philosophical errors baptised into the pure light of truth, and handed down to future generations, as an awful and unquestionable orthodoxy. The disputant whom synods and councils condemned, notwithstanding the degree to which he embraced the gospel, and the philosophical truths which may have been contained in his system, was branded as a heretic, and his name and doctrines were handed down to posterity as utterly accursed and anathematized.

In subsequent ages of the church, the spirit of this controversy has reappeared. Bishops and pastors have left their simple and noble work of teaching and comforting the ignorant and miserable from the pure gospel, to deal in subtle and unprofitable points of philosophy; and have changed a system of plain revelations into an elaborate and intricate Mosaic-work of dogmas. Men of high genius, of varied and extensive acquirements, of the worthiest principles, and devoutly attached to the gospel of Christ have been subjected to the severest rebukes of the hierarchy, have been degraded, driven into exile, and loaded with popular infamy, because they chose to philosophize less, or philosophized to a better purpose than the received authorities, or, perhaps, because they halted upon a mere technicality. The unlearned, the professors in the ordinary walks of life, have been drilled into the use of abstruse forms of speech; expressing their attachment to Christianity, and affording evidences of faith to their ecclesiastical judges, from their skilful and ready use of set and approved phrases, rather than from the spontaneous outbursting of inward experiences in the language of nature, and by a pure and unimpeachable life. Even children, instead of learning the simple hosannas, wherewith they were wont to greet the presence of the Saviour, have had their mouths filled with rigid formulas of nicely-balanced philosophical orthodoxy. Honest and good Christians, who had their Bibles by heart, and who could talk, and pray, and sing, both with the spirit and the understanding, if left untrammelled, have been held in fear and hesitancy lest they should use an unlucky

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may not, we cannot confine her to a sect or party, or lead her in chains after the triumphal car of some exclusive and proud philosophy. It is not enough that we satisfy ourselves, and meet the inquiries and difficulties of our own party. We must be prepared for all inquiries and for all difficulties. We may bring inquiries to a pause, and smooth over difficulties in the small orb of our own adherents, by appealing to authorities, and repeating the magic words of established expositions, but this does not stop inquiries in other spheres; this does not remove the difficulties of minds determined to think; this does not scatter the morning light over the broad face of the world.

Let Biblical criticism do for Christianity what legitimate and diligent investigation has done for nature—bring out to view her simple facts. And then, if we proceed to philosophize, let our philosophy be like that of Newton, the outgrowth of the facts under the light of reason.

5. Sacred Rhetoric. This is the Rhetoric of the Bible. In teaching to the people at large Bible truth, we ought to copy the methods and the style of the Bible. When Jesus Christ sent forth his disciples "to teach all nations," he had respect to the facts and doctrines of his gospel; and if we seek for a method and style, nothing can be more simple, pure and beautiful than his own.

It would be both a curious and useful work to examine the most celebrated sermons delivered during the different ages of Christianity. The subjects would be exceedingly various. There would be discourses, scientific, physiological, psychological and ontological. There would be opinions and truths of every kind, mingled indeed with Scripture truths. There would be all varieties of style, but for the most part either a stately and florid eloquence, or an elaborate, didactic and logical stiffness and precision, or loud denunciatory thunder, and polemical satire, keen, vivid and blasting as the lightning. There would indeed be contrasted with these, other sermons constructed after the gospel models, exhibiting a rhetoric learned at the feet of Christ, or in the assemblies where the apostles spake. But we fear they would be comparatively few.

Philosophical and even polemical discussions, under certain relations, may become the duty of every minister of the gospel, as it may be his duty to act in a variety of offices; but simply

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references, to a considerable extent, have been verified anew; and several topics have been subjected to further investigation.

3.—HARPERS' SCHOOL-DISTRICT LIBRARY; THIRD SERIES. New-York: Harper and Brothers. 1840. 50 volumes, 12mo.

The two preceding series of this Library, the *first* of 50, and the *second* of 45 volumes, were noticed with commendation in the Repository for January, 1840. At the same date, we announced the *third series* as in the progress of publication. It has since been completed and submitted to our examination. It is truly a choice selection of books. *Fifty volumes*, the works of authors of established reputation, prepared under the eye of competent revisers and readers, printed in the most economical manner and bound in an attractive and uniform style, are no trifling possession for a family or a neighborhood. Added to the preceding series they constitute a library of 145 volumes, most of which are among the best books to be found on the same or similar subjects, for popular reading and instruction; embracing *History, Voyages and Travels, Biography, Natural History, the Physical Sciences, Agriculture, Manufactures, Arts, Commerce, Poetry, Belles-Lettres, Philosophy, etc., etc.* In respect to some of these volumes, different opinions may be formed by the best judges, and some of them might doubtless be exchanged for better works; but, as a whole, the collection is admirably adapted to its object. The enterprising publishers, aided by the counsel of the Superintendent of Common Schools of the State of New-York, and other able advisers, have thus provided, for all who will avail themselves of this selection, what the organs of no single school district could have procured without their aid, a well arranged and uniform library of the most approved works on so large a variety of the topics of useful knowledge.

The *Third Series* contains several works which we have already noticed in the Repository, viz. Keightley's History of England, 5 vols.; Murray's British America, 2 vols.; Upham's Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action; and Dick's Sidereal Heavens Illustrated. The following are the remaining volumes of the series:—Hale's History of the United States, 2 vols.; Renwick's Life of Dewitt Clinton; Renwick's Practical Mechanics; Parry's Voyages for the Dis-

of the Moors of Spain, translated from the French of M. Florian; Lives of Distinguished Men of Modern Times, 2 vols.; Dr. Nott's Counsels to Young Men; Head's Life and Travels of Bruce; Page's Life and Writings of Dr. Johnson, 2 vols.; Potter's Political Economy; Life and Travels of Mungo Park; Brougham, Sedgwick and Verplanck on the Advantages of Science and Literature; Dana's Life before the Mast; History of Lost Greenland; American Husbandry, 2 vols.; History of Massachusetts, 2 vols.; History of New Hampshire, 2 vols.; Renwick's First Principles of Chemistry; Renwick's Lives of Jay and Hamilton; A manual of the Duties of Domestic Life; Dwight's History of Connecticut; Miss Sedgwick's Stories for the Young; Crowe's History of France, 3 vols.; Walter Scott's History of Scotland, 2 vols.

The influence of such a library, owned and read in the school districts of our country, would be beyond the bounds of calculation, in elevating the thoughts and promoting the intelligence and refinement of the nation. A plan so well devised cannot be too highly commended to the favor of the rising and spreading population of our great republic. It will be well if books, thus selected with care, shall be so appreciated as to take the place of much of the indiscriminate and light reading which now everywhere obtrudes itself upon the attention of the young, to dissipate and enfeeble the mind and corrupt the taste.

Several of the works embraced in this series are worthy of separate notices. Among these we would name the volumes on *Chemistry* and *Mechanics* by Prof. Renwick. But our space will only allow us to add, that we regard them as excellent elementary works, well worthy of a place in a select District or Family Library.

4.—*Essays on the Distinguishing Traits of Christian Character: by Gardiner Spring, D. D. Sixth Edition, Revised by the Author.* New-York: J. A. Hoisington. 1840. pp. 123.

This little book, we presume, is the familiar acquaintance of many of our readers. It was first published in 1813, and, as the present title-page indicates, has passed through several editions. We have read it in former years with profit, and have known it to be blessed of God in guiding inquiring minds to the knowledge of the Saviour, as well as in detecting the

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and railroads, almost without exception, desecrate the day by wholesale. In high places there is a diminished regard for the institution, and a diminished respect for the feelings of those who love its privileges. And there is a growing sentiment in the community, we fear, that the claims of the Sabbath must be compromised, and the commands of God must be reconciled to our convenience.

The first of these volumes is divided into three parts. In the first part the author presents the foundation on which the Sabbath rests; in the second, he dwells on the practical improvement of the day; and in the last, he gives a series of meditations and prayers, answering to the number of Sabbaths in the year. His leading aim is to "urge upon the church a conscientious discharge of Sabbath obligations; believing, that, when their example is right, this blessed day, if not rescued entirely from profanation, will at least exert its legitimate influence. The work makes no pretensions to great depth or learning: but the discussions are lucid, the illustrations apposite and the style uncommonly pleasing. Its influence cannot fail to be happy.

The volume of Mr. Kingsbury is exceedingly valuable as a repository of facts. If disposed, we might criticise the arrangement, and point out other defects; but we should do injustice to the author to subject his book to the rules of practised writers. Its merits are superior to those of mere style. In the first chapter, he has brought together the laws of Congress and the different States, so far as they relate to the Sabbath; the second is devoted to a detailed history of the Sunday mail question; the third and fourth are on the expediency of fearless effort, and the necessity of the Sabbath. In the fifth chapter, fifteen objections to the Sabbath are fully and satisfactorily answered. The rest of the volume contains an earnest appeal to the different classes of society in behalf of this institution.

12.—*The Family a Religious Institution; or, Heaven its Model.* Troy: Elias Gates. 1840. pp. 204.

The author of this volume is the Rev. E. Hopkins, pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church in Troy, N. Y. He justly remarks, that the subject which he discusses, "from its very

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modern science—to *sanctify* the Anglo-Saxon intellect; and, thus, to prepare the language of Great Britain for what seems to be its destiny in the future history of the world,—to become the medium of thought and influence for the greatest community of human beings that ever spoke a single dialect.

The position of Dr. Chalmers, for the last quarter of a century, has given to his powerful mind a striking inclination to a single aspect of Christianity—its relations, we mean, to the science and the cultivation of our times. And it must be admitted, that no writer has done more to recommend an unobtrusive Faith to the careful attention of the able and ambitious men who have taken the lead in modern philosophy and popular literature. Living at the very seat of modern Infidelity, and associated with the principal writers for the Edinburgh Review, who, during the present century, have given reputation to the most plausible form of unbelief with which our religion has ever had to contend, he early attracted the notice of the literary circles of Edinburgh, and of the whole English public, by his celebrated "Astronomical Discourses." These splendid productions, though inferior, in logic and in style, to the sermons of Dr. Thompson, afterwards delivered on the same occasion, are, certainly, among the most remarkable specimens of Christian eloquence.

The tone of these discourses pervades all the principal works of the author. He appears, everywhere, intent on presenting the religion of Christ, which it was becoming the fashion to despise, as not only consistent with the other works of God, but as the grandest, and most worthy of our study, among all the demonstrations of his sublime perfections. If any thing is wanting in the severity of the Dr.'s logic, or the precision of his phraseology, there is ample compensation in the magnificence of his imagination, and the grandeur of his march over the fields of sacred and of human knowledge, upon which he was formed to expatiate by natural endowments akin to the highest order of poetic genius.

15.—*Chemistry applied to Agriculture: by M. Le Compte Chaptal, Member of the French Institute, etc. etc. With a Preliminary Chapter on the Organization, Structure, etc. of Plants: by Sir Humphrey Davy. And an Essay on the Use of Lime as a Manure: by M. Puvis; with Introductory Observations to the same: by James Renwick, LL.D. Translated and edited by Rev. William P. Page.*

rably adapted to the object which is sufficiently indicated on its title-page. To those of our readers who are interested in practical agriculture, it would seem that a knowledge of the principles, which have been deduced from a careful observation of the nature and results of the physical laws, must be indispensable. "It is certainly not a little surprising," as our translator well remarks, "that while so many of the useful arts have been vastly improved, and some seemingly almost perfected, by the applications of physical science, agriculture, though immeasurably the most important of all, should still be in a state of comparative rudeness; and its operations but too generally conducted with scarcely the smallest reference to the natural laws." Yet a competent knowledge of the principles of physical science is easily attainable, and their applications may be readily understood by the practical farmer of ordinary capacity. Let any one who doubts this read *Chaptal's Agricultural Chemistry*, with the Essays incorporated with it in this volume, and his doubts will be dissipated; he will find himself in possession of a large number of facts and principles, of the usefulness of which, no one, unacquainted with them, can form the most distant conception.

16.—*Bacchus: An Essay on the Nature, Causes, Effects and Cure of Intemperance. By Ralph Barnes Grindrod. First American, from the Third English Edition. Edited by Charles A. Lee, A. M., M. D.* New-York: J. & H. G. Langley. 1840. pp. 528.

We regret that we have not had time to read this book entirely through. We have, however, read enough of it to be convinced of its immense value as a book of facts and principles on the subject of intemperance. It is a "*Prize Essay*," called forth by the offer of a *hundred sovereigns*, by the "New British and Foreign Temperance Society," and we honor the vote of the "Adjudicators" who awarded it the *premium*. We fully accord with the opinion expressed by the American editor, that it is probably the most complete and satisfactory publication, on the subject of which it treats, to be found in any language. It is divided into *six parts*, the leading topics of which are the following:

I. Nature and characteristics of Intemperance,—its his-

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which wine is mentioned; I inquired very minutely into the laws of fermentation; into the character of the grapes, and the wines, and the drinking usages of antiquity. The result of these inquiries was, that I came to the firm conclusion that few, if any, of the wines of antiquity were alcoholic. I examined Homer, Aristotle, Polybius, Horace, Virgil, Pliny, Columella, Cato, Palladius, Varro, Philo-Judæus, Juvenal, Plutarch, and others." Again he remarks: "From a careful examination of the word of God, we find, that in no single instance, can it be proved that it has mentioned intoxicating drinks with approbation," etc. We are not prepared to admit the entire correctness of our author's expositions either of Scripture or of the principles of chemistry, in respect to the "wine question." But we have no space to enter upon the discussion in the present notice. Our readers may expect a review of this book, from an able hand, in a future No. of our work.

18.—*Memoir of Mrs. Hannah More; with Notices of her Works, and Sketches of her Contemporaries: by Thomas Taylor, Esq., Author of "The Life of Cowper," "Memoirs of Bishop Heber," and of "John Howard, the Philanthropist." Second Edition.* London: Joseph Rickerby. 1838. New-York: Robert Carter. 1840. pp. 434.

It is the privilege of few to be more useful with the pen than was Mrs. More. Her writings were uniformly popular in their cast, while they were always faithful to the interests of religion and of truth. For more than half a century, she distributed, with a lavish hand, the treasures of her cultivated and versatile, yet chastened genius; and now that she is dead, her works are fulfilling her benevolent desires in every part of the world.

The plan of this volume is somewhat different from the previous memoir of this remarkable woman. The author "has endeavored to give a brief, yet complete and faithful detail of Mrs. More's life; to exhibit the features of her mind, as they are reflected from her own productions; to trace the steady growth of her Christian character, and the progressive development of her Christian principles, till they attained maturity;

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In executing his plan, Mr. Taylor "has collected his materials from all the published and unpublished records of Mrs. More, that he could avail himself of." Frequent extracts from her letters are introduced; but he has given much less prominence to her correspondence than it received from Mr. Roberts.

The chief excellence of the book consists in its giving so full and instructive an account of Mrs. More's religious history. Seldom have the pleasures of the gay, the smiles of the great, and the admiration of the learned been exchanged so willingly, as in her case, for the calm and retired walks of habitual benevolence. And seldom, too, has the piety of any individual commended itself so universally to the respect and confidence of all classes. The contemplation of such a life cannot fail to be useful. We rejoice, therefore, that Mr. Carter has made arrangements to furnish this work, in its neat English dress, at so reasonable a rate.

19.—*Exercises for the Closet, for Every Day in the Year: by William Jay, Author of "Christian Contemplated," "Family Sermons," "Prayers," etc. Two volumes in one.* New-York: Roe Lockwood. 1840. pp. 274, 330.

This is a handsome reprint of a work which was originally published in 1828. It was intended particularly for those "who love and practise retreat; who wish not only to read the Scriptures alone, but to observe their beauties and advantages, who, while they neglect not their own meditations, are thankful to derive help from others, and often exclaim, 'a word fitly spoken, how good is it!' who wish to be in the fear of the Lord all the day long, who would not have their religion a visiter, but an inmate; who would speak of divine things not by a kind of artificial effort, but out of the abundance of the heart; and who know how much it conduces to our sanctification to keep the mind filled with good things, not only as these will exclude base intrusions, but will be sure to leave somewhat of their own tinge and likeness behind." Of the success of the author in executing his design, we have no occasion to speak. The Christian public, in England and America, have pronounced an unanimous verdict in his favor.

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Witsius was a very learned and eminent divine of North Holland, who lived and published several works of great merit during the last half of the seventeenth century; among which were the "Economy of the Covenants,"—"Dissertations on the Apostles' Creed,"—his "Egyptiaca et Decaphylon," etc. He lived to an advanced age, and left a reputation for learning and piety, which have commended his works to the diligent study of divines and biblical scholars to the present time. Vol. XXV bears the following title: *Principles of Interpretation of the Old Testament; translated from the Institutio Interpretis Veteris Testamenti of John Henry Pareau, Prof. of Orient. Lang. in the University of Utrecht. By Patrick Forbes, D. D., Prof. etc., King's College, Aberdeen. Vol. II.* This, too, is a work of sterling worth to the biblical student. Besides the labors of the learned author, it contains a Treatise by the Translator on the structure and study of the Hebrew language, and an appendix illustrative of the principles of interpretation advanced by the author, which add much to the value of the volume.

22.—*History of the United States, from the Discovery of the American Continent. By George Bancroft: Vol. III. Third Edition.* Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1840. pp. 468.

The above is the comprehensive title of the great work which has been undertaken by Mr. Bancroft, and the first three volumes of which are now completed. These volumes, however, are furnished with an additional title, with which they may be separated from the whole work and bound by themselves. It is as follows: *History of the Colonization of the United States.* This portion of the work is now concluded, and our author announces, at the close of the volume now before us, his intention, if sufficiently encouraged by the "favoring opinion of the people," to go forward and write the *History of the American Revolution;* the great drama of which he considers as opening with the attempts of France and England to carry into effect the peace of Aix la Chapelle. "At the very time of the congress of Aix la Chapelle," says our author, "the woods of Virginia sheltered the youthful George Washington, the son of a widow. Born by the side of the Potomac, beneath the roof of a Westmoreland farmer, almost

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23.—*The Life of Alexander Hamilton. By his Son, John C. Hamilton.* New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1840. Two Volumes, pp. 430, 563.

The monument erected, in the grave-yard of Trinity Church, to the memory of Hamilton, is a marble pillar,—broken off, as if by violence, several feet below the height proportionate to its massive dimensions. So the rising pillar of his greatness was broken by a violent death; and as the stranger looks in vain, at the base of his monument, for the fragment which is apparently gone from its top, so it will be well if his biographers, in handing his name down to posterity, shall succeed in diverting the attention of all readers from the painful story of his decease. It is with Hamilton, that we are concerned, as the patriot, the companion of Washington, the brave General and the incomparable Statesman. In these relations his name will endure among the brightest ornaments of American history. It is intimately associated with the great events which preceded the war of the Revolution, with the protracted struggles of that war, with the achievement of our country's independence, with the formation of the Constitution of the United States, and the administration of its government during the period of its early and doubtful experiment. During the whole progress of these eventful changes, he was second to no one of his compatriots in the wisdom and weight of his counsels, the efficiency of his action and the influence which he exerted in laying the foundations of the permanent prosperity of our country. "Hamilton," says Guizot, "must be classed among the men who have best known the vital principles and fundamental conditions of a government,"—"a government worthy of its mission and of its name. There is not in the constitution of the United States an element of order, of force, of duration, which he has not powerfully contributed to introduce into it and to cause to predominate."

When it is considered that "the wealth of nations is their illustrious few," it is not a little surprising that the biography of one so distinguished has been so long delayed. The preparation of such a work, however, had been committed to several gentlemen of distinguished abilities, who, from various and sufficient causes, failed to perform it, until it has

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of 1787, in Philadelphia, when the present Constitution of the United States was formed. The work thus far is a history, not only of Hamilton, but of his *Times*. It is a history of the Revolution, and of the Constitution. The mass of information which it contains, and the documents which it preserves are highly creditable to the diligence and careful research of the author. It is written in a chaste and perspicuous style, and may be regarded as one of the most intensely interesting, as well as important publications of its class, which has ever appeared in our country. We shall wait with solicitude the completion of a work so well begun, and thus far, so successfully prosecuted.

We are happy to add that the mechanical execution of this valuable work is in the best style of the New-York press.

23.—*The Flag Ship: or a Voyage around the World, in the United States Frigate Columbia; attended by her Consort, the Sloop of War John Adams, and bearing the Broad Pennant of Commodore George C. Read. By Fitch W. Taylor, Chaplain to the Squadron.* New-York: D. Appleton and Co. 1840. Two Volumes. pp. 388, 406.

To make the circuit of the world is a much less wonderful achievement than it was in the days of our fathers. Yet the accomplishment of such a voyage is an event of no little interest, even in our times. It is of course attended with many hazards and a great variety of incidents, and affords an opportunity, to the literary voyager, of acquiring much useful information. The materials, therefore, gathered by our author, during his late voyage in the Columbia, must be supposed to be ample for the composition of a book at once entertaining and instructive. We were accordingly glad to hear the announcement of these volumes, by Mr. Taylor; and the beautiful style of execution, in which they have come from the hands of the publishers, has more than equalled our expectations. They contain also a considerable variety of interesting information, which will be valued by intelligent readers. But our author, we think, has unhappily failed in the symmetry of his work. His object appears to have been to recommend religion, and the cause of missions, to the favorable regard of the more refined circles of the worldly and the careless. But the perfection of art, for such a purpose, would

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that the "Flag Ship" is not destitute of specimens of fine composition, we cannot refrain from remarking, that the mingling of light matters, and mere prettinesses, with the grave and solemn subjects of a portion of his narrative, and the exuberance of attempted ornament, with which his style is loaded, are real incumbrances, and detract not a little from the value of the work.

25.—*Elements of Chemistry, containing the Principles of the Science, both experimental and theoretical; intended as a Text-book for Academies, High Schools and Colleges: by Alonzo Gray, A. M., Teacher of Chemistry and Nat. Hist. in the Teachers' Sem. Andover, Ms.* Andover: Gould, Newman & Saxton. 1840. pp. 360.

The design of the author in preparing this compilation is stated in the Preface. "As experience has shown that most of the text-books in general use are either too profound on the one hand for those who are commencing the study, or too superficial on the other for those who wish to obtain more scientific knowledge of the subject, he has been induced to attempt to compile a work which should be better fitted for elementary instruction." He thinks that teachers of Chemistry would be more successful, if they were to pay more attention to the principles of the science and less to its details. In this opinion we fully concur: and hence approve of his plan of giving greater prominence to the imponderable agents and the non-metallic substances, than to other parts of his work. It ought not to be inferred, however, that the book is made up of dry discussions and perplexing technicalities: numerous experiments and illustrations are introduced, which the teacher, with a very simple apparatus can repeat.

"In the arrangement of the imponderable agents, the phenomena of common and voltaic electricity and electro-magnetism are classed as effects of one agent, electricity. In the arrangement of the simple substances, each, with its combinations with those previously described, is presented to the student, in such order, that but one substance with which he is unacquainted is to be studied at the same time. The Salts occupy a separate chapter, in the arrangement of which, Turner's Chemistry is made the basis."

The book is written in a clear, lucid style, and it possesses

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ARTICLE XIII.

Recent Literary Intelligence.

Germany.

The philosophical and theological works of Daub are in the course of publication; Marheineke and Dittenberger are the editors. Though "less original and independent than Schleiermacher," he holds a high rank in Germany. He belonged to the Hegel and Schelling school of philosophy.—A new edition of Tholuck's Commentary on Romans is soon to appear. There has been a recent edition of his Hebrews; and he has lately published an excellent work on Christian Devotion.—Neander has another volume of his Church History in the press.—A Compend of Dogmatic History, from the pen of Baumgarten-Crusius, has recently appeared.—The publication of Prof. Bopp's Glossarium Sanscritum is begun.

The arrangement of the Lectures at Halle for the current semester—Oct. 19 to April 3—is, in part, as follows:—

Encyclopedia and Methodology of Theolog. Study, Tholuck.—Hist. and Crit. Introd. to the Old Test., Gesenius.—Books of the Old Test. to be explained. Job, Gesenius. Psalms and other poems, Rödiger. Isaiah and Ecclesiastes, Tuch. New Testament.—Matthew, Mark and Luke, Tholuck. John and Acts, Wegscheider. Corinthians and Hebrews, Niemeyer. Philippians and Ephesians, Tholuck. John's Epistles, Wegscheider. John (Gospel and Epistles) Peter and Jude, Daehne.—Church History, Guerike, Daehne and Thilo.—Survey of Theology, Guerike.—Dogmatic Theology, Müller and Wegscheider.

At Berlin the arrangement is, in part, as follows:—Introd. to the Old Test., Hengstenberg and Vatke. Archeology of the Old Test., Benary.—Books of the Old Test. Genesis, Benary. Psalms, Uhlemann and George. Isaiah, Hengstenberg and Vatke. Job, Peterman. Sufferings and Resurrection of Christ, Hengstenberg. Matthew compared with Mark and Luke, Neander. Romans and Galatians, Philippi. Paul's short Epistles, Twesten.—Church History, Erbkam. Dogmatic History, Neander. History of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Uhlemann.—Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Althaus. Introd. to Philos., Kahle. Anthropology, Steffens. Anthropology and Psychology, Gabler. Psychology, Trendelenburg and

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SECOND SERIES, NO X.—WHOLE NO. XLII.

ARTICLE I.

The Studies of an Orator.

By Samuel Gilman Brown, Evans Professor of Oratory and Belles-Lettres, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.

Eloquence has ever been honored. Men have admired and praised him who, by argument or persuasion, has been able to excite and guide the minds of great masses of people. The orator has stood side by side with the poet. Rhetoric, unfortunately, has held a more precarious position,—a position alternately of undeserved fame, and of unmerited neglect. At one period it embraced, within its dubious limits, all science, all literature, all that was necessary for the complete education of the scholar. At another, it paid, for a too ambitious empire, the heavy penalty of degradation and entire neglect. Some remnants of dishonor have clung to the art, even until the present time. Where criticism begins, eloquence has been thought to end. Rhetoric,—its opponents have said,—is adverse to the highest eloquence, or at least, not exactly congenial with it. It is a lifeless art; it does not teach us to contemplate beauty in a supple, living body, but, with scalpel and forceps, to examine the mechanism of the dead. In the midst of thrilling music and

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quence is a synonym for all that can persuade and excite, rhetoric is a synonym for mechanical rules; and the rhetorician is one, who, forgetting the subject, is intent only on the form and drapery of the subject: one who would construct a perfect man, wanting only a heart and vitality.

Perhaps we owe it to the practical disposition of our countrymen, who can devote little time to matters which even border upon speculation, that these ideas have not obtained much notice with us. Let us hope that another reason is, that we have a clearer insight into the nature and objects of rhetoric, and a more correct definition of its boundaries.

Doubtless the mere rhetorician is seldom an orator; still more, the age of rhetoricians has seldom been the age of orators. Rhetoric loses its beauty and fitness, advances beyond its limits, when it aspires to command, not to assist the speaker. Depending upon analysis, it must, of course, succeed the oratory which it analyzes. It clearly has no legitimate authority which it does not derive from the spoken or written word. Not till after orators and poets had moved and persuaded men, did rhetoricians inquire how they did it: and if ever the art pretends to reproduce, by mechanical means, the effects which originally came from vital powers, it becomes empirical and worthless. "The power by which poetry *is* poetry,"—and must we not also believe that the power by which eloquence *is* eloquence?—" is beyond the reach of analysis." Life is always incomprehensible. I know that I raise my arm; I know that the blood circulates; but the principle of life eludes my subtlest researches. I can make an automaton that shall raise *his* arm, and pump a crimson fluid through his leathern veins, but he will remain an automaton still. Rhetoric, like every critical art, will rather guide one in the old track than mark out for him a new one; correct his faults, rather than inspire virtues; teach the speaker to avoid bombast or obscurity; polish his rough and ungainly angles, and render him an interesting and attractive speaker: but if he have not the spirit within him, it never can make him eloquent.

Yet, to affirm that the study of the art is incompatible with its exercise, is to deny the existence of an orator since the

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ited to those upon whom, unfortunately, the mantle of the rhetorician has fallen. Let them, if need be, restrain themselves by technicalities and formulas, cramp their limbs with fetters, and mince their steps according to mathematical admeasurements, while the scholar, leaving the schools, as no longer needful for him, forgetting the rules, but not the spirit of the rules, shall walk forth among living men, and do, with a free heart and a strong hand, such work as he may find to do.

Eloquence, though, like poetry, gushing out from the fountains within, owes more than its sister art to study, to earnest, protracted effort, with which mediocrity may rise to honorable estimation, and without which, even genius may remain unnoticed. Rather, however, than assert the value of an art which, I hope, needs no formal defence, I would suggest, as briefly as may be, some of the studies most important to an orator.

The orator can attain to no very high eminence without a mastery of the resources of language. His speech must be "obedient, dexterous, exact, like a promptly ministering genius." His words must not only be appropriate, but the best. They must "trip like nimble servitors to do his bidding." His style must be pliant. He needs a majesty of diction which shall not dishonor the loftiest thought,—a plain sobriety, suited to vulgar narration,—a playfulness which may gracefully dance about the gayest subject,—a power of indignant rebuke or of elegant jesting. It is not enough that thought be clear and precise. The masters of language do not protrude the idea, meager and bald, but introduce it, vigorous in itself, surrounded by a company of kindred thoughts. Every word has a power to evoke, from the shadows where they have slumbered, a host of images and dim recollections; and, by all this host attended, the main idea moves on. A thousand chords of the human heart are attuned in unison; and if one be struck the others vibrate. Nothing in the use of language more decidedly marks the power of genius, than the ability to bring out the hidden harmony of the instrument. It is not difficult to detect, according to this suggestion, a prominent cause of the different degrees of vividness, which two men shall give to *apparently*, I cannot say

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progress of society, and, most of all, the invention of printing, have diminished the power of the orator by narrowing the sphere of his labor.

For these reasons it may be, that none can ever, in point of authority and honor, dispute the pre-eminence of the ancients. But with the change of times have changed the functions of the speaker. If knowledge be not now, as formerly, propagated mostly by public speaking, if deliberative eloquence have lost something of its importance and sincerity in the strict discipline of parties, the law demands pleaders wiser and more sagacious than ever, and the pulpit has opened a field entirely new. The free institutions of England and America have produced orators whose fame is bound up with that of their country. The deliberative eloquence of the last seventy years has afforded us models in oratory, on the whole, inferior to none the world ever saw. The times were stormy. Long wars, rapid and dangerous revolutions, questions of intense political, social and moral interest excited the public mind. In one hemisphere, a nation emerged into independence from a long, dubious and exhausting struggle. In the other, the bulwarks of national existence were to be reared, in the hearts of the people, against the gigantic scheme of the greatest of generals, against the more insidious, but not less dangerous attacks of false principles in government and religion.

In England, Lord Chatham was the leader of that splendid band, whose names are everywhere familiar. At present, there remains in that country one very remarkable orator—remarkable for energy, for sarcasm, for argument, for burning thought, for almost every oratorical virtue. The stream of his eloquence gathers strength at every interruption, deviates and hesitates not a moment, or only for a moment, to bury all opposition under the accumulated weight of sarcasm and invective. With few exceptions, these great orators have practically recommended the study of the ancients, and of the old English writers. They have made them their familiar study, have carefully translated them, have committed them to memory. I have mentioned some of Chatham's studies. His celebrated son, three years before his early entrance into public life, is said to have possessed a more thorough, certainly a more ready knowledge of the classics, than most who have devoted to them a life of toil. No living

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science. The material world is the object of our daily contact. Every sense brings in from it some intelligible information. But the soul demands a kind of study to which we do not readily submit. Though within us, it eludes our notice. We cannot fasten upon it; we cannot analyze it; we cannot decompose it. Its ethereal essence mocks our instruments. It affords the orator the most appropriate kind of discipline. Every successful artist must be acquainted with the instruments by which he works, and with the material *upon* which he works. If the chemist can have no hope of success without an acquaintance with the alkalis and gases, nor the sculptor without a knowledge of the marble and the chisel, much less has he, who would influence mind, a chance of success, if he be not familiar with the powers of mind. He deals not with matter which can be subjected to experiment, with fixed lines, with acids or earths, but with living men, active like himself, prejudiced, ignorant. He must know the nature and power of those spiritual weapons which will allay turbulent passions, remove prejudice, blunt the edge of ridicule, convince the obstinate, persuade the unwilling.

There are two powers upon which the success of the orator mainly depends; the power of reasoning and the ability to move the passions. He must convince or persuade. His argument must be enlivened by fancy, his fancy restrained by truth. Some speakers, studiously avoiding all warmth of feeling, unfold their subject with a beautiful felicity of demonstration, which will not allow a reply. They force assent. They weave close the tissue of the argument, till the careless opponent finds himself, unawares, bound in meshes which he can neither escape nor despise. It is said of an eloquent casuist of ancient times, that the gates of the eternal city were closed against him, lest, by ill directed argument, he should corrupt the youth. The sophist of our day puzzles the honest man by subtle though worthless reasoning, from the evils of which the heart only, stronger and truer than the head, may save the timid victim; but the heart cannot save him from a disturbed and fearful existence. Let not the orator despise that power, by which he can bind his opponent, by which he can successfully untwist from his own limbs the chains of false argument.

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A study of the mind affords an appropriate *kind* of knowledge.

wares to the needy countrymen who came for a weekly supply, as in prompting and listening to their discussions, or in working upon their feelings by tales of wonder and sorrow. This was the school in which he studied. Here he learned the secret which gave him such unheard of mastery over his audience,—the power to petrify them with fear, to make their cheeks burn with indignation, or to be suffused with tears,—the power of sweeping along with him, in one impetuous torrent, jury and court.

The orator must know himself; for his own heart is the epitome of every heart. He would move the crowd,—he must seek to move himself. He inquires after the character of men, and, for an answer, unrolls the mystic scroll of his own heart, and reads it there. Others are but the reflection of himself, with the shades a little brighter or darker. In his most secret spirit are inclosed the dispositions of the world. Circumstances, occasion, education have wrought some change in the development,—a blessed spirit, it may be, has guided his destiny, has cherished the good, has repressed the bad; but if he examines with patience and sincerity, he will recognise in himself the elements which have variously unfolded themselves in others. Whence but from this comes the value of the *γνωθι σεαυτον*?

He who is master of the *secrets* of his own bosom is master of the secrets of others. He who confidently trusts the suggestions of his own heart, fearlessly rests upon them, careless of timid proprieties—he it is who will make his way directly to the hearts of others. He bears with him the true charm at which all the environments of conventional reserve will fly asunder. Men are in search of reality, however they suffer themselves to be cheated by phantoms; and many a time have they sat unmoved amidst a grand display of what, according to the rules, ought to have been eloquence, and have melted down at a homely but honest story, at an artless appeal, which they knew was not eloquent, or rather which they thought nothing about. Let a man but exhibit the elements and essence of his own character, and he is sure to find in his fellow men an ear to listen, [illegible] to sympathize. Even if an opinion be erroneous it

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reformations must be effected. The day of conflict in the world is not past. The disturbed waters have not yet found their level. Society will undergo changes. Old things will give place to new, the new, perhaps, yield again to the old. The world of mind is even now something like the world of matter during the long birth-day of our earth. Happy he, who, in the tumultuous changes which must come, shall have some fixed star to guide his perilous course. Happy he, who attempts to guide the minds of the people, if his feet be planted on a rock in the clear light of heaven. Oh, if we could but seize the true principle, and reconcile the conflicting elements in society, in morals, in religion! Oh, that one might do in the moral sciences, as Newton did in the natural sciences, when, as was finely said of him, "by the aid of a sublime geometry, as with the rod of an enchanter, he dashed in pieces all the cycles, epicycles and crystal orbs of a visionary antiquity, and established the true Copernican doctrine of astronomy on the solid basis of a most rigid and infallible demonstration."

A distinction has been taken—is it not a true one?—between the orator and the debater. The debater is familiar with the arts of parliamentary discipline, has learned the signs and artifices of the place, judges as by instinct of the temper of the house, seizes the happy moment for urging the question, is dexterous and successful in attaining his object, but that object may not be a generous nor a wise one. His influence does not extend far beyond the occasion which called it into existence. His virtue is audacity in attack, courage in action, skill in defence, elasticity in defeat. It is not so much the deep forethought and broad plan of a wise general, as the devices of a cool, ready, active, fearless partisan. It is the virtue of Marion compared with the virtue of Washington. I cannot but think that the orator moves in a higher sphere. If he would exert an extensive influence, he must possess that true philosophy which will give unity to his multifarious acquisitions, afford him a central point, about which he may move in his appointed orbit.—In this consisted the immense superiority of Burke over his great rivals and coadjutors. Fox argued as well, debated better; She-

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true and important from the accidental and worthless, in disclosing the principles of political action, and the rules which ought to govern the nation, there is none of his gigantic contemporaries but must do him homage. These, and others like these, are the virtues which make him still the oracle of British statesmen,—of statesmen everywhere. His speeches, sometimes indeed "too refined for his hearers," sometimes too warm for their excitement, yet oftentimes as effective as any ever delivered, are the great store-house of political truth. It is true that the accused governor-general confessed, perhaps honestly, certainly very adroitly, that "for half an hour he looked at the orator in a reverie of wonder, and during that space actually felt himself the most culpable man on earth." It is true that the refined and intelligent assembly, not unaccustomed to the display of oratorical ability, was shaken throughout, that men were convulsed with horror and affright, that women sobbed and screamed and fainted. It is also true that men have judged that orator the wisest man of his time,—his genius, prophetic; his political knowledge, boundless. In all matters with which he was conversant, his place, as has been well remarked, is "among the first three."

There is another study, so congenial in its influence with that just mentioned, that I suggest it here. History has been called the "letter of instructions which the old generations write and posthumously transmit to the new,—the message which all mankind deliver to every man,—the only *articulate* communication which the Past can have with the Present." It teaches us the wisdom and folly of our race,—of ourselves; for we are only wiser or less foolish than our fathers, because we are their sons and not their progenitors. In all matters of policy, we know the effect of measures only by experiment. It is given to an age, to a nation, to develop fully the operation of certain principles, in order that the next age, and other nations may be wiser. It was necessary that our fathers should have been driven from the house of bondage, in order that their sons might rejoice in the inheritance of freedom. It was needful that the privy council of Scotland should have enacted, "that, whereas the *boots* were the ordinary way to explicate matters relative to the government, and that there is now a new invention and engine, called the *thumbikins*, which will be very effectual for the

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a priori, is the process of deducing conclusions from ultimate principles or absolute truths. Although an ultimate principle partakes in nothing of the nature of an efficient cause, by the knowledge of which we might also know the certainty of its effects; yet, our reason may perceive that a particular conclusion is true as a deduction from that ultimate principle, as clearly as if it were a literal effect, efficiently caused by the principle. A logical deduction from an ultimate truth is, therefore, as legitimate a form of reasoning, as that of deducing effects from efficient causes.

The nature of this branch of *a priori* reasoning, in distinction from the *inductive*, is seen in the following facts.

A person may, by actual experiment in mensuration, take the diagram of a triangle as drawn before him, and learn that the sum of its three angles equals the sum of two right angles. He may proceed to draw another triangle of different dimensions, and again, by actual measurement, find the same result; and thus, by going through this process with a great variety of triangles—rectangular, isoceles and scalene—and finding the facts the same in all, he will, as in the case of the application of heat to bodies, feel warranted ultimately in deducing a general principle, and say that this is the general law of all triangles—the sum of their three angles equals the sum of two right angles. And if we had no other ideas than those derived from sensation and from reflection upon the experience of sense, this would be the only method in which we could possibly reason in geometry. We must get our general principles in mathematics by induction, precisely as we do in natural science; and all *a priori* reasoning would be excluded, because of our inability to discover the inherent nature and properties of the triangle; as it is excluded from natural science, because we cannot know the inherent powers and properties of physical causes.

But it is not with man in relation to a triangle, as it is in relation to heat, as a cause. He has the faculty of seeing in the very nature and properties of the triangle itself, that the sum of its angles equals the sum of two right angles; and from one triangle, he can demonstrate, without any experiment, that thus

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upon ultimate and absolute truths. The very first position, that "something must have existed from eternity," is deduced from no intuitive knowledge of the inherent nature of any efficient cause, nor from any ultimate principle in itself necessary and universal; but is inferred directly from an *effect* assumed to be such, and then reasoning from the existence of the effect to the existence of a cause, by a direct inversion of the a priori form of argument. The first step in his process is: "*Since something now is*, 'tis manifest that something always was, otherwise the things that now are, must have been produced out of nothing, absolutely and without cause, which is a plain contradiction in terms," etc. It is not meant, by any means, that this is not conclusive reasoning; but only that it is not a priori reasoning. By it we can never prove the existence of God as absolutely, but only as relatively necessary. Inasmuch as something else exists, therefore, and on that account, it is necessary that something should have existed from eternity. And if we admit this thing, which has existed from eternity, to be God, his existence is not an absolute necessity, because the existence of the effects is not an absolute necessity. We can conceive that all these effects might never have been, or, that they might now be annihilated, and thus cease to be, in which case the very ground for the necessity of God's existence must fall away. It is a necessity grounded upon a contingent fact, and not upon an absolute principle, which cannot but be, and is thus universal and necessary in its own nature.

Nor is it meant that Dr. Clarke misunderstood the nature of an a priori argument, and thought this to be such. For though he designed his treatise to be "as near mathematical as the nature of the Discourse would allow," he doubtless saw the necessity of something besides rigid a priori reasoning to carry conviction to those minds to which his work was directed. And in his "Answer to a seventh Letter, concerning the Argument A Priori," he says: "That there is, and cannot but be one, and one only, such first cause, author and governor of the universe, is, I conceive, capable of strict demonstration, *including that part of the argument which is adduced "a priori,"*—thus showing that only a "*part*" of his argument was deemed a priori by himself. It is not until the third conclusion, embracing "*self-existence*," or "*necessary existence*," that he intro-

necessary assumption which is included in every a priori argument.

First.—It is possible that the *most perfect* being exists. But real existence is a perfection, and necessary existence the highest perfection, and must belong to the most perfect being. And therefore as the most perfect being has necessary existence, he does necessarily exist.

In this form of the argument the *possibility of the most perfect being* is put as an ultimate principle, or absolute truth, which needs no proof, but is self-affirmed and undeniable; and from this it is attempted to deduce the necessity of the *actual* existence of the most perfect being. But a close examination of the argument will detect a non sequitur, unless it be assumed, that the necessary *idea* of the most perfect being is itself a ground of conclusion for the real existence of the most perfect being. The possibility of the most perfect being is ideal in the major proposition—and the including of "necessary existence" in the most perfect being in the minor proposition, must be ideal also,—and thus the conclusion to the "*real* existence" of the most perfect being is fallacious, without the assumption, that the necessary *ideal* is a valid ground for inferring the *real* or *actual* existence. All that the syllogism can logically give in the conclusion is the *possibility* that the most perfect being, including necessary existence as an attribute, does exist; and now to draw the farther conclusion that he *really* does exist, it is necessary to assume, that the necessary *idea* of its possibility is conclusive for its *reality*.

Secondly.—It is possible that there is a being whose existence is *eternal*. But unless such a being *now* exists there cannot be an eternal being: therefore an eternal being now really exists. Here too is a fallacy of precisely the same nature as in the former case, except upon the same assumption—that a necessary *ideal* is conclusive for a *real* being. The possibility of an eternal being is *ideal*; the necessity of *present* existence, in order to *eternal* existence, is only *ideal*; thus, all that we can distribute in the conclusion, is, that the *idea* of present existence is neces-

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the possibility of such a being but his real existence. What can be a ground for an almighty, self-existent being, but such a being itself? There must, therefore, be a really self-existent, almighty being.

Here again, we have the assumption of more in the conclusion, than belongs to the premise, unless we understand that what is *ideally* true necessarily, is also *really* true necessarily. The possibility of an almighty, self-existent being is ideal, and the ground of this ideal possibility is the idea of its reality; this necessary *idea* of its reality is the only warrant we have, therefore, for deducing its necessary, *actual* reality.

In the above cases we have predicated, as ultimate truths, the possibility of the real existence of the *most perfect* being, an *eternal* being—and an *almighty*, *self-existent* being: and we might continue, in the same way, with every thing in relation to God, which may be assumed as a necessary idea, and thus an ultimate truth; and, in the same manner, deduce the actual from the possible, the real from the ideal; but in all cases, we shall be obliged to make the same assumption, that what is a necessary truth in the *idea*, must also necessarily exist in the *reality*. The very essence, therefore, of all purely a priori reasoning on the being of God is contained in this short and simple proposition: *the necessary idea of God involves the necessary existence of God.*

That this is the essence of Clarke's a priori argument is clear from the following declaration: "We always find in our minds some ideas, as of infinity and eternity; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe, to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the existence of the substance to which they belong. Now, he that can suppose eternity and immensity—and consequently the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes exist—removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four."—*Being and Attrib.* Sec. III.

The same also is true of Cudworth; who says, speaking of these universal truths or necessary ideas: "For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity

for what is neither substance nor modification of a substance is a pure nonentity. And if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are; which must be either matter or mind: but they are not modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect, so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal mind. And those do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical assertion, that there would have been these universal verities though there had never been a God; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those *rationes* and verities are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing; for that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds that the *rationes* of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward, invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite, eternal and omniscient mind (that always actually comprehends himself and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things) so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it though they endeavor it never so much; but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend; that is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing, when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves and confess the thing." *Im. Mor.* Book IV. Ch. 4. Sec. 9.

So also Cousin: "You are a finite being, and you have the necessary idea of an infinite being. But how could a finite and imperfect being have the idea of one perfect and infinite, and have it necessarily, if one did not exist? Take away God, the infinite and the perfect, and let there be only man, the finite and imperfect, and I shall never deduce from the finite the idea

The simple fact of the conception of God by the reason, the simple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God." *Psych. Henry's Transl.* p. 266.

If then the position, *that the necessary existence* of *God can be inferred from the necessary idea of God,* be not true, the whole *a priori* argument is fallacious and illogical. How can it be sustained as true and solid?

In answer, we will first give the argument in its direct and positive form. Every idea—applying the word both to conceptions from sense and the intuitions of reason—involves an operation of the mind in relation to some object of thought. But objects of thought cannot be created by the mind from nothing. They are cognzied only as existing things before the mind, or, as brought in upon the field of consciousness. As the eye can see nothing, by its own energy, where nothing is, but must, in order to vision, have some real object of vision presented; so the mind has no power to form ideas from nonentities, but must have all the elements of its ideas before it as existing realities. Thus, every simple idea must have its archetype in some actual entity and reality of being.

Where then the mind has *necessary* ideas, or the intuitions of necessary truths, as in the case of all ultimate and absolute principles, these rational cognitions are a proof of the necessary existence of their archetypes. An idea without a reality is an idea of nothing; and a necessary idea without the necessity of its real archetype is an absurdity. Now the idea of God is a necessary idea, in the various forms of the infinite, the eternal, the perfect, the absolute cause, etc. The mind cannot exist, as a rational, active mind, without a development of this idea in some of its forms; and, in the possession of the idea, there is the consciousness that that, of which it is an idea, is universal and necessary. The eternal, for instance, is an idea which the mind of every person must have as the correlate to limited time; so that if he have the idea of the limited, he must also have the idea of the eternal. And while, in relation to the limited, he knows that it possesses none of the attributes of necessity or immutability, in relation to the eternal, he knows that it cannot but be. Even if he conceives of the idea as dropping from his

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may be conceived as annihilated, or as never having been caused. Their non-existence is no absurdity. But not so with the existence of absolute principles. Not so with the ideas of eternal, infinite, self-existence, etc., as elementary in the absolute idea of God. These are all necessary in their very nature, and are cognized as uncreated, enduring, changeless realities. The mind can neither create nor annihilate them. They stand forth independent of will or power.*

2. *As the idea and its archetype are not identical, they may exist independently of each other; and thus the idea may be without the archetype.* It cannot therefore be inferred that because the idea is, therefore the reality is.

To this we answer: Whether the idea and the archetype be identical or not depends upon the fact of the personality or impersonality of the intuitive cognition of ultimate truth. Does the mind get the ideas of these necessary truths by its own personal action—as in the case of material objects—through the senses? If it does, as is assumed by Kant, then it is true, as above, that the idea and the archetype are not identical; but the archetype is a distinct existence, external to the mind, and the idea is the subjective cognition of the archetype by the mind's own action. But if it does not, as Cousin maintains—and the necessary or ultimate truth is given to the mind by another agent, like any truth of inspiration, and thus this agent is emphatically "the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,"—then they *are* identical, and the idea is but the archetype itself, brought within the field of the mind's own consciousness, by the revolving of that absolute sphere which is the immutable ground of all necessary truth.

* "But it may be I still deceive myself when I say, that the idea I have of *extension* supposes an object actually existing. For it seems that I have ideas which do not suppose any object. I have, for example, the idea of an enchanted castle, though no such thing really exists. Yet, when I consider the difficulty still more attentively, I find there is this difference between the idea of *extension* and an *enchanted castle*; that the first being natural, i. e. independent of my will, supposes an object which is necessarily such as it represents: whereas the other, being artificial, supposes indeed an object,

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If the last position be the truth, the whole ground of the objection, as above given, is at once annihilated, and the idea is not merely an inseparable existence with the archetype; but is itself the archetype seen in its own absolute and eternal ground of being. Nor would the settlement of this inquiry bear alone upon the point before us, but upon the establishing of the possibility of any and all a priori and transcendental cognition; and would go more directly and effectually to the settlement of some of the most important and fundamental questions of human knowledge, than perhaps any point of mental philosophy now agitated. It would meet the speculations of Hume, in his higher skepticism of all knowledge of a God—just where the clear counter speculations of Dr. Reid met both Hume and Berkely, in their skepticism of the knowledge of an external world—by the affirmation of a direct and immediate knowledge. All conflict with the skeptic in relation to the being of a God, or with the affirmed atheist, when followed fully out to its issue, will inevitably come upon the ground of this inquiry; and, by deciding it, we shall decide how we are to combat the peers of skepticism in their very heights;—either with Kant, by taking the side of the *personality* of our rational cognition of ultimate and absolute truth, and then urging against them a *faith*, based upon all probabilities in its favor and nothing opposed to it, or with Cousin, by taking the ground of its *impersonality* or direct inspiration, and thus overwhelming them by the conclusiveness of *absolute knowledge* which is grounded upon immutable necessity. And verily, there is no way of annihilating, by human reason, the last refuge of the philosophical skeptic, but by obliging him, with the first, to feel the *folly* of standing against all probabilities, with nothing to support him, or, with the last, to feel the *absurdity* of standing against the verities which are based in absolute necessity. Now this would be the only way to *annihilate* the difficulty as above stated; but it may be most effectually *obviated* by a cheaper and easier effort. For admit, as the objection contemplates, that the archetypes are not identical with the ideas; still it would by no means follow that we can have the idea

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out an archetype. Even if one can be conceived as existing without the other, it is the idea only which can be conceived to have non-existence. The mind may lose the idea, i. e. it may be conceived as having fallen from the mind's consciousness; but the archetype, the absolute truth, cannot cease to be. If then we have the necessary idea of God, although that idea be not conceived as an inspiration of himself by himself, it would still be seen that the idea, when possessed necessarily, implied its antitype in his necessary being.

3. *The idea of God may be evolved from our own being*, and can thus be no ground for a deduction that God really exists.

This is denied as a matter of fact or possibility. The idea of the *indefinite* may be evolved from our own being, but not the idea of the *absolute*. These ideas are as distinct as any two the mind can possibly have. We may expand and augment, in imagination, the attributes which we possess, to an unconditional extent, and thus get the idea of the *indefinite*, or the *unconditionally unlimited*—a progression but never a completion. Here, however, is no idea akin to the absolute, the entire, the complete and perfect God. It is only an indefinite expansion of yourself, and not even an approach to the idea of the absolute entireness of an eternal being. If there were no other idea but that of an augmented finite, at the utmost it would be finite still, and could never give the idea which the mind actually has of an infinite God, in his absolute wholeness and entireness of being. Besides, by no indefinite expansion of self, can the mind possibly obtain the elements of *universality* and *necessity*, which now inhere in the idea of all ultimate truths, and with which our idea of the absolute God is invested. This expanded self can always be conceived as being or not being—as now and not at another time—as never having been, or if as once having been, not now, or not hereafter. But not so with the absolutely eternal, which is universally and necessarily in being.

The ground of the a priori argument is then entirely untouched by this objection; for it would be a mere *petitio principii* to say, that because you can get the idea of the indefinite

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"Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt;"——in Mark: "Nevertheless, not what I will, but what thou wilt;"——in Luke: "Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done." In the several accounts which they give of his prayer there are verbal differences; but the prayer is substantially the same in all. This difference in words shows that they were intent only on substantial, and not on verbal accuracy; and that, in our interpretation of them, their language must not always be closely pressed.

The first two Evangelists have laid the scene of this deeply interesting event in a place called Gethsemane. In Luke it is at the Mount of Olives. John passes over the agony, but speaks of the Lord's arrest, which immediately followed it in the same place, and describes it as taking place in a garden to which Jesus had often resorted.* From all these we learn that Gethsemane was a garden situated at the Mount of Olives, within a short distance from Jerusalem, where Jesus was accustomed often to spend the night with his disciples.

The season of the year was in the full-moon, after the vernal equinox, which, in Judea, immediately preceded the harvest. The occasion of the Lord's presence in Jerusalem was the festival of the Passover. It was the practice of Jesus to repair to Jerusalem with his disciples, at each of the three great festivals,—the Passover, the Pentecost, and the feast of Tabernacles,—in obedience to the law of Moses, which made it the duty of every man in Israel to spend these sacred seasons in the holy city, and to join in the solemnities which were there celebrated. We find him also in the temple at the feast of Dedication,† which was not of divine, but of human institution,—being appointed by Judas Maccabeus to commemorate the dedication of the temple after the recovering of it from the Gentiles.‡ Upon which we may observe, by the way, that a sacred season which serves a pious end, though appointed only by human authority, may have the Lord's approbation.

During these festivals it was the custom of Jesus to spend the day within the city, and at the temple, in teaching the people, whose instruction in rational piety their ordinary teachers, the Pharisees and Scribes, had sadly neglected. In the evening he retired to Bethany, or to Bethphage, upon the Mount of Olives,

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and had so recently declared his readiness to lay down his life for him; yet now, in his Master's utmost need, he fell asleep, though one hour had not yet passed since they had entered the garden, and had been exhorted to watch with him. Luke says, they slept for sorrow. They were exhausted with grief, which every thing they saw was adapted to deepen; and wearied nature sought repose in sleep. When the Lord waked them, he saw that they were conscious of the impropriety of their sleeping at such a time, and cordially willing to obey his injunction, but wanted the power to give effect to their good intentions. He was touched with their sincerity, and kindly made their apology for them: "The spirit, indeed, is willing, but the flesh is weak;" there was a willing mind to do what he desired, but the material frame, in its exhausted state, was unable to support their good purposes.

Having exhorted them again to watch and pray, he went away the second time and prayed, saying: "O my Father, if this cup may not pass away except I drink it, thy will be done." Mark says: "And again he went, and prayed, and spake the same words;" that is, the same in substance; for they were not exactly the same as before. His repetition of the same prayer, shows that he had yet obtained no relief; and his words, as they are given by Matthew, indicate that his hope, that the cup would be removed, had now grown fainter. In his first prayer, he expressed a hope that this might be done, as well as a doubt whether it could; for he says: *If it be possible*, let this cup pass from me." In his prayer as given by Mark, this hope is founded upon the divine omnipotence: "Father, all things are possible to thee." Inasmuch as all things are possible to God, he conceived that this also might be possible, though he did not see in what way it might be so. But in this second prayer he says: "O my Father, *if this cup may not pass away except I drink it*, thy will be done." This change in the terms of his prayer indicates, that, though he still entertained the same hope, it was passing away from him, and the prospect before him was growing darker.

Neither did this second prayer bring the relief he sought. He came again to his disciples, and found them relapsed into the sleep from which he had so lately roused them; "for," says Mark, "their eyes were heavy; neither wist they what to

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more earnestly now, after the angel had appeared and strengthened him; but that, when he saw the angel, and was strengthened by him, he *was* in an agony, and *was* praying more earnestly than he had prayed before. This I take to be an indication that, though Luke speaks of the prayer as one, he was aware that it consisted of more than one act, and had learned that in the several successive acts, the Lord's distress and earnestness in prayer increased, until it became, at last, a perfect agony; and his meaning is, that, in this extremity, the angel was sent from heaven with the Father's answer to his prayer, and brought the relief which his situation required.

Here the question arises: What was the cause of this agonizing and overwhelming distress? Jesus himself intimates it in his prayer: "If it be possible, *let this cup pass away from me.*" It was the cup which the Father had appointed for him. But what does he mean by *this cup?* I can only understand him to mean that death which the Father had appointed that he should die—the death of the cross—with all the attending circumstances which aggravated its horror; that scene of wo, which began with his arrest in the garden, and was consummated in his death on Calvary. Doddridge, in his Family Expositor, and others with him, think that he means the bitter anguish and distress which he was now actually suffering. But if the cup was the cause of that distress, it was not the distress itself. If, moreover, that bitter anguish and distress was a cup which the Father had appointed for him, it was a cup which he was all the while drinking, and which he drank to its dregs, while he prayed. But the cup, respecting which he prayed, was one that was then before him, which he had not yet taken up to drink, and which he desired, if it were possible, that the Father should remove. This could be no other than that scene of suffering upon which he was about to enter, and which began when Judas Iscariot appeared with his armed band. So Jesus himself explained his meaning, when, rebuking the forwardness of Peter, who had drawn his sword and smitten the servant of the high priest, he said: "Put up thy sword into the sheath: the cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?"* The cup, therefore, was still before him after his agony

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approaching, a chill of horror sometimes came over him, and found expression in external signs of distress. At one time he said: "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name."* But on no occasion did he exhibit any very striking evidences of perplexity and anguish. He was usually calm and collected, and if at any time he gave utterance to feelings of distress and horror, he still preserved his self-possession,and quickly checked the rising desire which nature put forth, to be spared from so dreadful a death. In his last address to his sorrowing disciples, he spoke with deep feeling and solemnity, but with perfect calmness. In his prayer at the close of his ministry, nothing is more manifest than a meek and quiet resignation to the Father's will: "Father, the hour is come: glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee." He did not ask to be spared; but that the Father should vindicate his honor from the reproach, so shocking to every virtuous mind, of being reckoned among the vilest malefactors. And, finally, he took no care to avoid the traitor, whose purpose he well knew, but went to the place where he anticipated that Judas would seek him; he went with a settled purpose to submit to the impending stroke; and as he went, he warned his disciples again of the mournful catastrophe which was at hand, and was soon to scatter them like the flock whose shepherd is fallen.

It is, therefore, hardly to be supposed that the near approach of his sufferings, awful as they were, apart from every thing else, could alone have wrought so great a change in the mind of Jesus and in his whole demeanor, as soon as he had entered the garden. It is true, indeed, that the nearness of the wo, which he had hitherto viewed in its approach at some distance, was adapted to give a violent shock to his feelings; but the mind of Jesus was not easily shaken; and in this case his anguish and terror were too great to be explained by such a cause. It is manifest, therefore, that something more than the cross was now before him, and that he was now placed in a new and hitherto untried situation. I have no hesitation in believing that he was here put upon the trial of his obedience. It was the purpose of God to subject the obedience of Jesus to a severe ordeal, in order that, like gold tried in the furnace, it

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him; that he was to be the sin-offering for the human race; that his death was to be the atonement for the sins of men; and that, in all its attending circumstances, it was to be a tremendous death. He knew that he must die, as he had lived, without sin, or his death could not atone for the sins of others; but if the extremity of suffering should so far prevail as to provoke him into impatience and murmuring, or into a desire of revenge, this would be sin: and if he should sin, all would be lost. If Jesus knew all this, and if these thoughts had possession of his mind before he entered into the garden, they must have borne upon him with much more oppressive weight, when the moment had arrived in which all that he had before contemplated was to be realized by actual experience. If the thought now arose, that, though his nature was unpolluted with inherent depravity, it was possible that he should sin, and if the fear was joined with that thought, that he might be overcome in that heavy trial, there was, in this thought and in this fear, a sufficient cause to produce all that mental agony which he exhibited in Gethsemane; and the same cause, superadded to the horrors of the cross, was sufficient to create the desire which he felt, that this cup should be removed.

A pious and holy man may look calmly upon death in its most terrific forms, and may endure it with silent resignation, or even with joyous triumph; and such has been the case with many Jewish and Christian martyrs. But the pious and holy man has not a world's salvation laid upon him; the pious and holy man is not obliged to be absolutely perfect before God; the pious and holy man knows, that if he sins, he has an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for his sins; and not for his only, but for the sins of the whole world. If he is entrapped in sin by some overpowering temptation, he can still be saved by the efficacy of the Saviour's death, and all the pious with him. But nothing of this consolation could be presented to the mind of Jesus;—if he should sin, he must sink forever, and the world with him; there was no other Saviour; and all that he saw before him was a dark abyss, eternal ruin and infinite despair.

Here, perhaps, it will be objected, that I do not speak of Jesus with becoming reverence when I suppose him capable of

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in all such cases as did not transcend the natural powers of a highly gifted and most holy man, he was left to himself, and acted or suffered as a man. The main design of the union of the Godhead with him seems to have been to confer dignity upon his person. It did confer upon him an infinite dignity, and thus imparted to all that he did and to all that he suffered, an infinite importance and value. But this design did not interfere with his free agency. He was constituted, with regard to his moral power, like the first man, and was fitted to take his place as the second Adam, and to repair the ruin which the first had introduced: as the first fell in his trial by transgression, so the second overcame by obedience. Like Adam, Jesus was subjected to a trial; like him, he was assailed in that trial by a temptation: the former was tempted to eat the forbidden fruit; the latter to refuse submission to the death of the cross.

The great trial of Jesus took place in Gethsemane, where the cup was placed before him, and his final decision was to be made either to drink it or not drink it. It was here that the temptation assailed him to spare himself, and to desire that God would spare him. All the circumstances were made favorable to this temptation, in order that it might exert upon him its utmost power: a cloud and darkness came over him; his view lost its wonted clearness; the will of the Father was obscured; the horrors of the cross rose up before him in their most appalling forms; his consciousness of the possibility of sinning awoke; the fear, that he might be overcome by such terrible suffering, and might sink forever, started up in his mind, and filled his soul with dismay and terror, and with a sorrow that could not be borne. It was nature in Jesus that, in these circumstances, shrunk back from such a scene of wo, and raised up the desire to be saved from such a death; and in the strength of these feelings was the power of the temptation to refuse the appointed cup.

The deportment of Jesus under this heavy trial was inexpressibly dignified, and set forth, in a clear and beautiful light, the great principle of piety and virtue that held possession of his mind. There was no stoical pride, that hardens itself against nature, and refuses to bend before God or man, by confessing

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act of obedience it was, that Jesus made atonement for sin, and repaired the ruin of the first transgression, and reopened to us the way to God, and made peace between heaven and earth, and restored to all who receive him that blissful immortality which was lost by the fall.

> Oh for this love, let rocks and hills
> Their lasting silence break;
> And all harmonious human tongues
> The Savior's praises speak.

When Jesus had received by the angel the Father's answer to his prayer, and the fearful agony was past, he came to his disciples the third time, and finding them again sleeping, he said to them: "Sleep on now, and take your rest," etc. This is according to the common English translation. But that Jesus did not mean that the disciples should now sleep on and take their rest, is evident from what he immediately adds: "It is enough; the hour is come; behold the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners. Rise up, let us go; lo he that betrayeth me is at hand." In these words he tells them plainly that there was now no time for sleeping and taking rest: the die was cast, and they must arise and go with him. Some commentators think that Jesus said these words in a taunting way, meaning that, inasmuch as they would not be persuaded to watch with him, they should now sleep on and take their rest, if they could, when the enemy was at hand. But the mind of Jesus was not in a frame for taunting and irony: every thing in this part of his history indicates tenderness, meekness and love; and it is in accordance with such a state of his feelings, that we must interpret his words. I prefer, therefore, that interpretation which understands them interrogatively, and makes them mean: "Do ye now, at such a time as this, sleep on and take your rest?" This is Luther's translation: *Ach, wollt ihr nun schlafen und ruhen?* Ah, will ye now sleep and rest? This sense agrees with the connection, and is doubtless the true one.

The words: "Arise, let us go," some infidel may choose to represent as an exhortation to flee, and a proof that Jesus wished to escape, and would have fled, if it had been in his power. It

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meet the whole of the objection. My answer is: The disciples were not *all* asleep. The text says only, that Jesus found the disciples sleeping, but does not say he found them *all* sleeping. This language could be used if two of the three were asleep: and even if the word *all* were used by the sacred historians, it would still be in accordance with the oriental usage, and with the popular style of these writers, to make the same exception. Matthew and Mark, for example, tell us that, when Jesus was apprehended, *all* the disciples forsook him and fled.* Yet both these evangelists presently afterwards say, that Peter followed him afar off. And in John's gospel we read: "And Simon Peter followed Jesus, *and so did another disciple.* That disciple was known to the high priest, *and went in with Jesus into the palace of the high priest.*"† The word *all* is therefore not to be understood, in this instance, in its strict grammatical sense. So we are told by Mark and Luke, that, on the evening of his resurrection, Jesus appeared to the *eleven*, who were assembled together.‡ But from John we learn that Thomas, one of the eleven, was not then with them.§ Consequently there were only ten; and the first named evangelists say *the eleven*, because that was the designation of the body of the apostles after the defection of Judas, and do not think it necessary to remark that one of the number was wanting. So also here, one of the three disciples may have watched with Jesus, whilst the others slept. That one, we may suppose, was John, *that disciple whom Jesus loved.* He does not appear to have left his master's side, as long as he was permitted to be with him, during his heavy trials. He leaned upon the bosom of Jesus while he lived, and stood by his cross when he died; and it is hardly probable, that his ardent affection and deep sympathy would permit him to sleep, when his beloved master was in an agony of distress, and desired that he should watch with him.

If John was the only one of the disciples that saw the agony of Jesus, we might expect that he would have recorded it, rather than the other three. This, no doubt, he would have done, if he had written before them. But as he wrote long after them, and found the record in all the three, and was satisfied with what they had written, he omitted it, as he did also

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ARTICLE IV.

PREACHERS AND PREACHING.

By Professor Henry P. Tappan, New-York.

RELIGION embraces the proper direction and regulation of our whole responsible being—our thoughts, purposes, volitions, affections, words and actions—in our relation to God. Ethics embraces the same in our relation to man. They are thus distinguishable, but are not in their nature separable: for he only can estimate aright his duty to man, who has first viewed himself in his relation to God; and he, who aims faithfully to obey the law in relation to man, cannot lose sight of God.

Religion has made its appearance in our world under three forms. First. The religion of nature. Secondly. The religion of revealed law, of sacrifices, and of typical representations. Thirdly. The religion of grace. These three forms do indeed, in some degree, and under some aspects, belong to every age of the world; but they have each a period of peculiar and marked manifestation.

The religion of nature is given first of all, in the mind of man,—in the perceptions of his reason, in the laws of his conscience, and in his moral affections. Here, he knows God, he knows truth and righteousness, and he knows his own immortality. In the world without—the heavens above, the earth beneath, the great and wide sea, the regular stepping of nature, the grandeur and the beauty, the sweet and pleasant influences pouring around in myriad streams, all that meets eye and ear and smell and taste and touch—the mind, preconstituted and prepared and richly furnished, finds an answer to itself. The religion, written within, has its corresponding writing without. The God, known within, hath his glorious manifestations without—the beauty, the majesty, the harmony and the benignity known in our deep thoughts, are abroad in the whole creation; and we are taught that He, whose finger has written his great truths and his holy laws upon our minds, sits upon the

The Episcopacy, in our country, exists under less ostentatious forms. It is modified by the influence of our civil and social institutions, and by the character of our people. It presents also a pure faith and a pious clergy. But even here it obviously contains in its very nature peculiar temptations to worldliness, display and personal ambition. Its services are decent and solemn—its prayers beautiful, affecting and appropriate. We differ not here materially. But in setting up its bishops over the presbyters, who in the New Testament form one body; in making a legitimate clerical office to depend upon episcopal ordination, and a legitimate church organization to depend upon the ministrations of a clergyman episcopally ordained; in endowing one order of men with such high and peculiar authority —there is a departure from the noble freedom, and the wise humility which so strongly characterize the Christianity of Christ and his Apostles.

Secondly: The Hierarchy with its three orders is inconsistent with the charity and high aims of the gospel.

Its character is decidedly exclusive of the claims of all others, to be comprehended within the church of Christ, except those included under its own organization. According to its cardinal principle, no one can be a minister of Jesus Christ, to preach the gospel and to administer the ordinances of his church, who has not received ordination from the order of bishops: and no body can be a church of Christ which is not episcopally constituted. It follows from this that the thousands of clergymen of other denominations with their congregations, although they preach the gospel faithfully, purely and effectually; although the Holy Spirit is given and multitudes of souls converted; although the fruits of Christianity abound in holy living and the works of beneficence; although they are sending abroad missionaries and taking no small part in the work of evangelizing the nations—still they are not the ministers and churches of Jesus Christ! It would seem that this so called divinely constituted church is, after all, no special favorite; and those who depart from its canons not heinously guilty,—since the Great Head of his church bestows gifts and graces, and high marks of approbation upon the dissenting body, no less

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under presbyters. On the contrary, the greatest corruptions of the church, the most violent contentions, and the most flagrant abuses have appeared under the Episcopate.

When I speak of denominations not under the Episcopate, I include the great body of the reformed church. In our country, I believe, all the denominations but one, acknowledge no order higher than the presbyters: for although our Methodist brethren have their bishops, they are thus styled only in designation of an office specially conferred upon them, and not as possessing a distinct and higher ministerial rank than their brethren.

The blessings of the gospel, we admit, are not confined to those portions of the church who adhere to the primitive doctrine of the parity of the ministry. But where, under the Episcopate, do they more abound? Where, more justly, than among the mountains of Scotland and New England, is the song of the prophet recalled: "How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth!"

The apostle Paul, in a passage already quoted—1 Cor. 1: 17—not only points out the peculiar office of the Christian ministry, namely, to preach the gospel; but he also designates the manner of preaching it: "Not with wisdom of words"—and this thought he expands in the following verses and chapters. In the beginning of the second chapter he is very explicit: "And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech, or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. For I determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified—and my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power."

Paul was addressing a church in a Grecian city: and in the Grecian cities there were schools both of the Philosophers and of the Rhetoricians. The "excellency of wisdom" refers

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of strength and naming them after the "stronghold" of Zion; and have been inscribing Scripture texts all over their banners —then of necessity we may be compelled to seek out, by legitimate methods, the true philosophy, which is the harmony of all minds as well as the principle of all God's works; that we may beat down these frowning and boastful fastnesses of error, and release the gospel from its long imprisonment, to go abroad again, as free and simple as when Paul carried its banner, exclaiming, "I have determined not to know any thing among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified."

We have seen how the doing away of the equality of Christ's ministers, and the introduction of the higher orders of the church, corrupted its polity, and led on those vast evils which blacken and sadden the pages on which are recorded the acts of nominal Christianity. Akin to this is the history of dogmatical Christianity.

For the ministers of Christ to aim to be any thing more than preachers of the cross, of equal rank, and unambitious pastors of the flock, was one form of error. For the professed preachers to preach any thing besides the doctrines of the cross—to foist into the system of truth, revealed from heaven, their own inventions—to know any thing besides Christ and him crucified, was the other great and pregnant form of error. They began to exist together—they co-worked together—they advanced together—they sustained each other, and they devastated the fields of truth, by the tares which they sowed. The evils which the apostle deprecated, which began to work in Corinth, but which he successfully opposed, and of which he forewarned the church in those memorable words: "For the time will come when they will not endure sound doctrine; but after their own lusts shall they heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears; and they shall turn away their ears from the truth, and shall be turned unto fables,"—these evils appeared even before the apostolical sun had set. He who has read the history of philosophy and church history together, finds no difficulty in tracing the multifarious and conflicting doctrines of the professors of Christianity to the schools of phi-

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crude, ingenious or monstrous, gathered from Plato or Aristotle, Zoroaster or Manes, from the Gnostics or the Bhudists and these are the threads of various and strange colors and materials. Such are a vast proportion of the writings of the schoolmen—the subtleties of Duns Scotus, and Magnus Albertus Beatissimus, and a multitude of others.

What prevailed in the days of our fathers is not extinct in our day. A blessed change has indeed come over the church, and is still in progress. But Arminianism, and Pelagianism, and Calvinism, and Hopkinsianism, and Antinomianism, and Emmonism, and Taylorism, and Coleridgeanism, and Transcendentalism, and Old and New Schoolism, and Perfectionism, and other *isms* are rife in the land. What is the origin of these discussions? Whence spring these warring opinions? We find not their names in the gospel. Do we find all the opinions they represent, in the gospel? One thing is certain, that, in these conflicting schools, gospel truths are not at war with each other. Let a philosophical critic examine them, and he plainly discovers the opposing elements of different philosophies. Multitudes of people who have never studied philosophy and who care nothing about it, and who, if you take them upon the plain facts, affirmations and duties of the gospel, are perfectly agreed, are nevertheless divided into alienated parties, respecting consecrated technicalities, and the artificial precision of elaborate confessions. They dispute about words because they are old and favorite words, when they all alike have the older and better things. They give each other foul names upon verbal or philosophical differences, which are unintelligible alike to the unlearned, and, alas! to not a few of the learned disputants.

While discussions are waxing louder and louder—methinks I hear the voice of the apostle, like a clear, harmonious trumpet, call to draw us away from the battle—"Now I beseech you brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you; but that you be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." And how shall we effect this? Let each minister bear in mind. "Christ sent me

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the pure fountain of truth—and in the meekness, plainness, and earnestness of one endeavoring to "save a soul from death." A return to the apostolical models, this, this will bring in the cure, and breathe upon us the balmy breath of peace.

It is to be remarked how the apostle is continually referring to the "cross of Christ," or to "Christ and him crucified. This alone he glories in—this alone he determines to know and preach. It is not difficult to discern the reason. The "cross of Christ," or "Christ and him crucified" presents us the substance of the gospel. The aim of God in sending his Son was not to institute a splendid hierarchy, nor to establish proud and learned schools of philosophy—nor even to teach the most useful sciences and arts: there was but one aim, a sublimely simple aim—"to seek and to save the lost." All the divine institutions and arrangements are made for this end. The truths revealed are revealed for this end. The ministers and agencies ordained, are ordained for this end. The rites and ordinances given, are given for this end. No part of the gospel plan is adapted for mere scientifical purposes, for the uses of the world —or for amusing or profound disquisitions; but all is for salvation—for immortality and life. Hence he who reads, or hears, or professes, and enters upon the practice of, the gospel, can consistently do so only for this end. And so likewise he who preaches the gospel, or takes any measures for its dissemination, can lawfully have no other end in view. It is not for the cause of Apollos, or Paul, or Cephas, but for the cause of Christ alone. O could we thus take and use the gospel, it would indeed be "peace on earth, and good will towards man."

Look at our missionaries. Of different sects, they are still united in preaching the great central doctrine of the cross of Christ. The enemy is so numerous and active that disagreement with each other becomes treason to the common cause. Would we but consider it—there are the same imperative reasons for our agreement at home.

The representation we have given of the ministerial office, assigning it one grade, separates it from the love of power and the competitions of ambition. The representation we have

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faithful interpreters of the Word of God. And as the Word of God is the corner-stone of all Christian Theology, so the study and interpretation of that Holy Word, must of right be regarded as the first and fundamental branch of all theological education.

Upon this foundation, Scientific Theology next rears her superstructure of doctrines, and points out their relations and adaptedness to the elements of the human mind and character; and then Practical Theology comes in to show how all these truths and doctrines may be brought home with the greatest power to the heart and conscience of mankind. These are the three great departments of Christian science,—Exegetical, Doctrinal, and Practical. But as all these, again, derive life and vigor from the light of experience, reflected from the pages of history as it recounts the dealings of God with his people in every age, and shows how the truths of the gospel have been promulgated and received; and the doctrines of the church proposed, adopted, modified, or rejected; so the History of the Church has naturally come to occupy a place as the fourth branch of theological science; not less important and essential than the other three, to every complete system of theological instruction. Such, in fact, is the system upon which all Protestant Schools of Theology in our own or other lands, have usually been founded: first, the study and observation of the Scriptures; next, the scientific arrangement and proof of the doctrines thence derived; and afterwards, the practice and application of the science with its general history. The time has gone by in our country, theoretically at least, when this order was reversed; when the Bible was appealed to merely to supply an illustration for the preacher, or to furnish proof-texts for a system of doctrines already drawn out from the storehouse of human reason.

It has ever been the glory of the Protestant Faith, that it has placed the Scriptures where they ought to be, above every human name, above every human authority. THE BIBLE IS THE ONLY AND SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE. Such is the fundamental maxim upon which Protestantism has ever rested; and will rest, so long as the truth of God is duly honored. In this maxim we have the very germ and essence of the glorious

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mankind; that the gigantic efforts of the present time to disseminate the Bible throughout all lands, shall go for nought; and that a portion of the Protestant church, verging in self-defence to an unhappy extreme, may strive to overthrow the fundamental and essential principle, on which she has hitherto reposed, as on an immovable basis.

But why should Protestants thus cast away the very foundation of their liberty in Christ? Why build up again a separating wall to divide them from the truth and love of God? The Protestant maxim has in all ages been the watchword of Christian liberty; and the abandonment of it, the signal of spiritual thraldom and darkness. The manifestation of this principle in the Reformation, was but a return to it after a long night of oblivion; it had already shone forth with equal power and splendor in the still greater renovation of God's church under the ministry of the Redeemer himself.

When Christ appeared on earth, "the Scribes and Pharisees sat in Moses' seat,"* and had enveloped and obscured the light of divine truth in the Old Testament by their traditions. Theirs was then the authority of the church; they had made themselves the interpreters of Scripture to the people; and on their dictum hung the significancy of the law and of the prophets. Against this assumption of authority, Jesus set his face at once and for ever. In one of the earliest of his public discourses, the Sermon on the Mount, he declares to the assembled multitude by several examples: "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time," that ye should do so and so; "but I say unto you," that this authority is nought.† On another occasion he exclaims: "Thus have ye made the commandment of God of no effect by your tradition;" and then he proceeds to inveigh against them in the language of Isaiah: "This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoreth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. But in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."‡ In like manner the great apostle of the Gentiles sets at nought the authority of Jewish tradition: "Why then," he exclaims to the Colossians, "as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, after the commandments and doctrines of

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" vain talkers and deceivers, especially they of the circumcision," he directs Titus to " rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith, not giving heed to Jewish fables, and commandments of men, that turn from the truth."*

Nor were all these declarations merely negative; serving only to contradict the authority of the Scribes and Pharisees and their traditions. It was not the object of the Saviour and his apostles to overthrow one mass of error in order to set up another in its place. They never claimed themselves to be interpreters of the Word of God to others. That Holy Word was free to all; it was known and read of all men; and to it Christ and his apostles ever appealed, against the objections of the Jews, as the supreme authority, before which all human cavils must be dumb. Yea, even the opponents themselves were to be the interpreters and judges. " Search the Scriptures," says our Lord, " for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of me."† The apostles, too, in their preaching, appealed always to the Scriptures, enforcing the study of them upon their hearers; and it is recorded as a trait of nobleness in the Bereans, to whom Paul and Silas preached the gospel, " that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so."‡ They went not to the Scribes and Pharisees, as the authoritative expounders of the Scriptures; but searched for themselves, in the light of God's truth and with the aid of his Spirit, which is ever vouchsafed to those who seek aright. The same great principle is inculcated by Paul, when in addressing Timothy, he reminds him, " that from a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus;" and then proceeds to enforce the thought more generally and strongly: " All Scripture is given by inspiration of God; and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works."§ This, according to the apostle, is the fruit of the Scriptures to those who search them for themselves; and thus become rooted and grounded in the Christian faith. He says not one word of their being interpreted by or according to the authority of the church

Indeed, the only occasion on record, in which the apostolic church, as such, exercised an authority in any way paramount to the Scriptures of the Old Testament, was in the final decision of the great question relative to the binding power of the Jewish ceremonial law upon Gentile converts. Many of the Jewish Christians still venerated their ritual, and believed that other converts should be subject to its ordinances. This tendency Paul labored long and vehemently to counteract, as contrary to the spirit of the gospel; and at length the authority of the assembled church and elders at Jerusalem was called in, to determine between the opposing views. This they did; not of themselves, but as the ambassadors and representatives of Christ, expressly acting by inspiration from on high: "For it seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things."* Thus was abrogated in form the Jewish ceremonial law; not by the church acting on its own authority, but from the authority of Christ himself. Their decree was neither an interpretation of Scripture, nor a tradition claiming to be of equal weight with Scripture; but it was a part and parcel of Scripture itself, resting upon the same divine authority and sanction, and promulgated under the direct influence of the same Holy Spirit.

The main argument of the church in every age, in favor of its assumed authority, has been the fear lest "the unlearned and unstable should wrest the Scriptures to their own destruction." Such was already the complaint of Peter in respect to the epistles of Paul and other Scriptures; yet he suggests no interposition of ecclesiastical authority to prevent such a result. He merely exhorts those whom he was addressing, to greater caution not to fall from their own steadfastness, seeing they were thus forewarned.† And why should more than this be necessary? Because a few of the "unlearned and unstable" abuse their liberty, shall that liberty be wholly taken away from the steadfast and the intelligent? Far better were it for the church, for her ministers and her members, to instruct and enlighten these "unlearned and unstable," and so bring them willingly to the truth; and not at once to shut them up in the prison-house of human authority.

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Let me not be misunderstood. I am not calling in question

gained by a few slight efforts, but requires years of diligence and toil. It is not, indeed, to be desired, nor would it of course be possible, for every student in a Theological Seminary to go over the whole ground here pointed out; but it is incumbent on every such student, to be sufficiently prepared to understand and profit by the labors of the many and great minds who have trod this course before him, and whose efforts have been directed to make plain the way to those who should come after them.*

II. The power of studying the Scriptures in the original languages having been thus acquired, it becomes important to take a general survey of the wide field to be cultivated, and of the methods and means by which the labor may be accomplished with the greatest facility and success. For this end, a branch of biblical science has sprung up within the last century in Germany, which has hitherto found its way slowly and with difficulty into the English language, and has as yet been fostered by very little original effort in that tongue. It is called "Introduction to the Bible;" and the object of it is, as the name imports, to introduce the learner to the best methods and means for prosecuting the study of the Scriptures. It takes the Bible as it is, as the Word of God; the evidences of its divine

* It is gratifying to mark the progress of this department of biblical learning in the United States, since its revival five and twenty years ago, chiefly through the exertions of the Rev. Professor Stuart, of Andover. That it is not now on the decline, is apparent from the fact, that besides the six editions of Professor Stuart's Hebrew Grammar, and two of that by Professor Bush, not less than fifteen hundred copies of Dr. Nordheimer's Grammar have been sold since its publication in 1838. Of the translation of Gesenius' Lexicon, also, published in the autumn of 1836, more than two thousand copies have been sold in this country, besides several hundreds ordered for England.—It may not be out of place likewise to remark, that England is now indebted to America for many other of her elementary books in the same department. Both the Hebrew and Greek Grammars of Professor Stuart have been repub-

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not more than a single original work of importance in the English language; and not one of a character adapted to popular instruction.

III. After this general survey of the whole field of biblical study, let us now bring under review more particularly the several branches. Of these, one of the first in place and importance, is the Criticism of the Biblical Text, by which we are taught to judge of the accuracy and authenticity of the Bible as it has come down to us. It is well known that the text of the common editions of the New Testament was fixed by Erasmus, on the authority of the few Greek manuscripts to which he had access; and that since his day, the collation of numerous other manuscripts, many of them older and better than those of Erasmus, has brought together a mass of various readings, differing from those of the common text, and sometimes of higher authority. It is the part of Biblical Criticism to compare and sift these readings, and to determine which of them, by weight of evidence and authority, is entitled to a place in the genuine text. The same science applies, in a similar manner, to the Hebrew text of the Old Testament; in the manuscripts of which, notwithstanding the vaunted care and exactness of the scribes and the Rabbins, vast numbers of like various readings have been found to exist.

The time, however, has gone by, when this accumulated mass of various readings, in both the Testaments, was an object of dread or suspicion to the learned or unlearned. The optimism of the external form of the Bible has been laid aside; and it is now known and felt, that in the process of transcription or printing, by uninspired men, the Scriptures are not less liable to the occurrence of slight mistakes than other books. Such are, for the most part, all the various readings, both of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments; and it is a fact long well established, that not one of these affects a single article of faith or practice, unless in the very slightest degree.

In this country, we have no biblical manuscripts, either known or yet to be brought to light. We have no vast libraries, where the dust of ages has accumulated; beneath which we might hope still to find treasures of antiquity. In Biblical

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Bible, whether it be history, or poetry, or prophecy, gospel or epistle, refers back both to the Pentateuch and to Hebrew history in later times; and is absolutely unintelligible without an acquaintance with the facts there related. Thus far, the Bible is its own best interpreter,—the only storehouse where the facts are all laid up.

But there are also in the Scriptures frequent allusions to the history of other nations besides the Jews. Egypt and Ethiopia, Persia and Assyria, Babylon and Phenicia, play no unimportant part upon the pages of the sacred record; and an acquaintance with the facts of their history not only serves to illustrate the Holy Scriptures, but greatly to strengthen their authority. Indeed, no stronger testimony to the truth and authenticity of any ancient document can ever be expected or required, than exists in behalf of the Bible upon the walls of the vast temples of the Egyptian Thebes. We find there, for example, Sheshonk, the Shishak of the Scriptures, sculptured as a colossal figure with his name annexed, leading up rows of Jewish captives to present them to his god.* In this respect, the active spirit of the present age, in deciphering the sculptured monuments and writings of antiquity, is at the same time bringing out the strongest and most incontrovertible evidence, in behalf of the authenticity and claims of Holy Writ. And it is perhaps not too much to expect, that the illustrations and confirmations which have thus flashed upon us from the deciphering of the hieroglyphic writings, are but the precursors of others, to be yet developed from the wedge-formed inscriptions of the ancient Medes and Persians.

Not less in general importance to the interpreter, is the history of the Jewish people and the neighboring nations, during the interval of time between the Old Testament and the New. This whole period had a paramount influence in forming the character of the later Jews, and shaping their opinions on theological and moral subjects; and all these require to be well understood, in order to comprehend many of the allusions and much of the teaching in the New Testament, and judge of its force and adaptation to times, circumstances, and persons. In like manner, an acquaintance with the general history of the time of Christ and of the

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manners and customs, their business and actions, their daily life and walk. These serve more than all else to bring us to a close *personal* acquaintance with that remarkable people; they enable us to be present with them in their houses, at their meals, in their affairs; to see them with their wives, their children, and their servants; in their rising up and lying down; in their going out and coming in; in short, in every thing relating to the persons and employments of themselves and families. Without an acquaintance with all these particulars, the interpreter can never be thoroughly furnished for his work. Whatever may be his qualifications in other respects, he can never enter fully into the meaning and spirit of very much of the sacred text.

It is greatly to be regretted, that this last branch, the Domestic Antiquities of the Hebrews, is just that which has been most neglected. There are perhaps books enough on the Jewish ritual; but I know of only a single important work in the English language, and that a translation, which gives any thing like a complete view of the domestic life and manners of this people.

VII. It is not necessary to dwell here on the importance of a knowledge of Biblical Chronology. This is perhaps the branch of biblical learning, which of all others has been most readily acknowledged, and most extensively and ably cultivated in the English tongue, as is testified by the distinguished names of Usher, Newton, and Hales. Yet, after all, the difficulties are by no means wholly cleared up; and many of the results as to dates, can be regarded only as conjectural estimates. Hardly any two of the chronological systems agree throughout. Even in regard to the times, in which the several books of the New Testament were written, there exists great diversity of opinion and statement. All this does not affect, however, in the slightest degree, the question of their authority; it serves only to show that the biblical student has before him no light task, while he delves in the mists of gray antiquity, in search of some faint traces, which may serve as landmarks in the course of times and seasons.

VIII. A branch of biblical study which has excited com-

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traversed and described by multitudes; while we have treatises from the highest names on the geography of Herodotus, and other ancient profane writers; the geography of the Holy Scriptures has remained unsettled and unexplored, and even the physical features of the Land of Promise are to this day in a great measure unknown. Strange as it may appear, even the efforts of British science in behalf of navigation, have not been extended to this quarter. While even the polar regions have been traversed and explored; while the results of exact surveys and soundings are laid down in the latest charts of the Red Sea, and those of the coasts of Asia Minor and Northern Africa; the coasts of Syria and Palestine, that land of the earliest history and deepest interest, have never been surveyed, and cannot be given on any map, on the basis of astronomical observation or scientific measurement. As the theatre of recent naval war, it is to be hoped that these coasts may no longer thus remain a reproach to nautical science.

Another strange fact appears in the history of biblical geography. I mean the circumstance, that of all the multitude of pilgrims and travellers who have thronged the Holy Land for the last five centuries, not one of them has gone thither with any reference to the geography of the Scriptures, or made the slightest preparation to qualify himself for instituting researches, or forming a judgment, on subjects falling within this important department. At least nothing of the kind has appeared before the public. The travellers have often been acute and observing men; but they have never inquired, in respect to the Holy Land, what was already known, or what was unknown; what was certain or uncertain; what was forgotten, or yet to be sought out. Hardly one has ever yet travelled with a sufficient knowledge of the Arabic language, to collect information for himself from the people of the land. The consequence has been, that travellers have mostly only listened to and reported the traditions and legends of the foreign monks; and no one has ever thought of seeking after what might yet remain among the common people.

These monastic traditions began early to take root and spring up; and as ages rolled on, they flourished more and more luxuriantly. The centuries of the crusades added to their number and strength; and then, and in later times, a mass of foreign

Yet I would fain hope that the time is not far distant,—and this hope I would desire to press upon the consideration of the friends and patrons of every Theological Seminary,—when the multifarious and important subjects embraced in the Department of Biblical Literature, will not be left, as now, to the teaching and direction of a single individual. One of the most essential branches, indeed, does not belong at all to a course of theological education, and ought not to form an object of elementary study within the walls of such an institution. I mean an acquaintance with the Greek and Hebrew languages. This, indeed, is admitted at once in respect to the Greek; and a previous knowledge of it is a matter of requisition in every Theological Seminary. The Hebrew rests upon precisely the same grounds; there is in it nothing of theology; it is a merely philological acquirement; yet it is not now, perhaps, demanded for admission into any seminary of our land. Still, the time thus spent in the study of it, is so much time taken away from the proper objects of such an institution; and I, for one, can never conscientiously cease to feel, and to press upon others, that a certain previous acquaintance with this language, ought to be made a condition of enjoying the privileges of every seminary for theological education.

The literature and interpretation of the Old Testament embraces a wide and difficult range of studies, entirely distinct from those belonging to the New. Nor are these latter in any degree less extensive or difficult, though of a different character. Each of these clusters of science furnishes occupation enough for the life and labors of any individual; and this is known and felt wherever theological education has been fully carried out. In all the Theological Faculties of Europe, a separate department has charge of the Old Testament, and another of the New. The same feeling of the importance and necessity of such an arrangement, has already introduced it into some of the older seminaries of our own country; and I would indulge the hope, that in due time, the example may everywhere be followed.

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tains. We are glad to fasten our eyes on a national character which is permanent, as well as pure. Honored be the country which has withstood the torrent of German neology and Parisian licentiousness. Cut off she indeed is from the polite circles of London; she is removed from being a kingdom; her regalia are now empty things, kept for a show; but she has, what is far better, the Bible and the Catechism. Her parish schools are worth ten thousand fading diadems, and, we had almost said, ten thousand Jameses and Marys, like those who once wore them. Honor to the people that would not bow down before the waxen images of Rome; that was not terrified by the High Commission of Charles I.; that never succumbed to the atrocious persecution inflicted by the ordained tools of Charles II.; and that welcomed with an outcry of joy the subversion of the Stuarts, and the accession of the House of Orange. We delight to recall the illustrious names which adorn the Scottish literary and ecclesiastical annals; Knox, "who never feared the face of man," and the prototype of much which his church and country have since been; the Erskines, ather and two sons, not decorated with literary honors, but men of holy life, of steadfast purpose, and eminently meet for the inheritance of the saints in light; and the Livingstons, the Bostons, the Rutherfords, the Gillespies, the Willisons, whose memories wear an amaranthine freshness. In other connections, we might enumerate two of the great triumvirate of British historians; and four or five honored and never-dying names in intellectual science; and two or three of the children of sweetest song, who have given an immortality, throughout the civilized world, alike to obscure tradition, to local scenery, to uncouth metres and a barbarian accent. Genius, pouring itself out on the soil where it was nurtured, and hiding itself in scenes and stories exclusively national, has won a more lasting fame than genius employed in writing the history of continents, or speculating profoundly on the universal nature of man. Adam Smith created, not an era in political science, but political science itself; still, great as are his merits, the Cotter's Saturday Night will outlive the Wealth of Nations. The philosopher speaks coldly to the practical understanding; the

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"considering how prejudicial the want of schools in many congregations hath been, and how beneficial the providing thereof will be to the kirk and kingdom, do, therefore, statute and ordain, that there be a school founded, and a schoolmaster appointed in every parish not already provided, by advice of the presbyteries; and that to this purpose, the heritors (landholders) do, in every congregation, meet among themselves, and provide a commodious house for a school, and *modify* a stipend to the schoolmaster, which shall not be under 100 merks (£5 11*s.* 1⅓*d.*) nor above 200 merks, to be paid yearly at two terms," etc. In 1693, an act had been passed, entitled: "An act for settling the quiet and peace of the church," which declared, among other things, "that all schoolmasters and teachers of youth in schools are, and shall be, liable to the trial, judgment and censure of the presbyteries of the bounds, for their sufficiency, qualifications and deportment in the said office." The whole system was arranged and completed by another act of the Parliament of Scotland, in 1699.

The object of these various acts of the government was happily attained. For more than a century after the enactments, the great body of the people in Scotland were better educated than in any other division of Christendom. The power to read and write, and an acquaintance with the elements of arithmetic were placed within the reach of almost every individual; while all classes of the people were enabled to read the Bible from their earliest years, and, with the assistance of the catechism (which was regularly taught in every school), have received the rudiments of a religious education, such as they could not have had the same means of attaining in any other country of Europe.*

During a large part of the last century, the schoolmasters, in many parishes, were qualified to give instruction in the Latin language to such as were desirous to acquire a grammar school education. A very considerable number of individuals, throughout the kingdom, have been prepared for the Universities, in the schools of the parishes in which they were born. In 1836, there were 916 separate parishes in Scotland, and the total number of schools was 1162, there being 146 endowed schools over

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and above one school for each parish. These latter are termed *secondary* or *side* schools. Generally there is but one secondary school in a parish, sometimes more. Taking the average income of these 1162 schools at £27 10*s*, which is about the sum, the annual endowment amounts to £31,955, exclusive of school-houses, dwelling-houses for the teachers and a garden. The ministers of parishes, and the landholders have the power of determining the branches which a schoolmaster, on induction, must be competent to teach. These, of course, vary somewhat in different parishes. In burghs, there is often a separate school for classics only, sometimes classics and French. Most of the teachers have received a university education. In the three counties, for example, of Aberdeen, Banff and Moray, according to a report presented in 1835, out of 137 teachers, there were only 20 who had not studied at college. The law makes no provision for the payment of assistant teachers. No person can act as schoolmaster, until he has undergone an examination before the presbytery, which has the power, should he be found unqualified, or if his moral character be objectionable, to nullify the election. The decision of the presbytery is final in all matters relating to schoolmasters; unless when a civil question arises, which may be carried by the teacher before the court of session. All parochial schoolmasters must be members of the established church, and are required, on induction, to subscribe the confession of faith and the standards. Every presbytery is understood, by means of a deputation of their members, to visit and examine the various schools within their limits, once every year. This, however, is not uniformly done. The landholders and minister have the right of fixing the fees which the scholars are required to pay to the teacher. These fees are, generally, very low. The annual income from salary and fees may be about £55, exclusive of a house and garden. In the majority of parishes, however, the schoolmasters have slight additional emoluments, arising from their being session-clerks, and, in some instances, precentors. They have, also, small perquisites for making up militia lists, enrolments under the Reform Act, etc.

Great advantages must necessarily flow from such a system

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sons in Scotland who were unable to read. The Rev. Dr. Paterson of Glasgow testified at the same meeting, that there were 80,000 persons in the limits of one synod, who could not read the Bible, and that Glasgow has a population of 60,000 persons, and Edinburgh of 50,000, not one of whom has any connection with the public worship of God, and among whom there is no reading of the Bible at home, and no catechetical instruction of children. It was also mentioned that the town of Peterhead, with 6000 inhabitants, had no place until recently for parochial education, except a single small apartment. From the report of the committee, it appears that there are now, (May, 1840,) 120 schools, with 12,000 pupils, all of whom are instructed in English, and more than 2,500 in Gaelic. The annual income is between five and six thousand pounds sterling. A majority of the committee were in favor of accepting the government-grants on the conditions annexed by the privy council. The resolution of the committee was approved by the General Assembly, with the additional clause, that nothing shall be done by the government inspectors, prejudicial to the interests of the established church.

The Secession church has, like the establishment, shown an interest in the cause of education. The number of schools, owing their origin to this church, exceeds 100. They are established, on a large scale, in the great cities, and form models of good tuition. The number of Sunday schools in Scotland is about 600, two-thirds of which belong to the Dissenters. The whole number of schools in Scotland may be estimated at about 4,600, of which 3000 are private, or voluntary schools. It is supposed that about one ninth part of the population are in the process of education.

There is a species of school established within the last thirty-five years, called *academies*, in the larger burghs, such as Edinburgh, Dundee, Perth, etc. They are under the direct care, either of the subscribers by whom they have been founded, or of the magistrates. These academies, and the ancient burgh schools, such as the High School of Edinburgh, are regarded as the best seminaries in Scotland, embracing all the necessary and ornamental branches of education, each taught by a separate master.*

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professional education, originally interrupted; or persons engaged in the actual occupations of business, who expect to derive aid in their pursuits from the new applications of science to the arts; or young men not intended for any of the learned professions, or meaning to go through any regular course of university education, but sent for one or more years to college, in order to carry their education farther than they could prosecute it in the parochial schools, before they are engaged in the pursuits of trade or commerce. And all persons may attend any of the classes, in whatever order or manner it may suit their convenience. The system of instruction by a course of elaborate lectures on the different branches of science and philosophy, continued daily for a period of six months, is admirably calculated to answer all the objects which such persons may have in view, as well as to afford much useful instruction to regular students.

The remuneration of the professors depends, in the larger universities, mainly, and in Edinburgh, it may be said, entirely, upon the fees paid by the students, or, in other words, upon the number of students. From the fact that the reputation of the professors must be greatly increased by the number of persons attending upon them, especially those who have just been alluded to, there is danger, that in proportion to the increase of auditors of this description, the important and primary object of the regular education of youth may be overlooked, examinations and exercises being gradually given up, the professor being entirely confined to lecturing. The students in the Scotch universities do not reside within the walls of the college, or in any place subject to the inspection of the university authorities. They reside wherever they choose; and after they leave the class-room, their studies and occupations are not necessarily under the inspection of the professors. In Edinburgh and Glasgow, it may be safely said, that the professors do not generally know much more of the students, (except when in their class-rooms,) than of the other youths of these great cities.

There are no endowments or establishments connected with the Scotch universities, such as fellowships for the maintenance of literary men, after their own education is finished, and

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inclination, it is in vain to hope, that many persons will devote themselves to classical literature as their peculiar pursuit, with the zeal exhibited in other countries, when they cannot thereby attain any immediate honor or future advantage.

The medical department of education in the universities of Scotland is evidently of the greatest importance. During a long period, a large proportion of the persons who have practised medicine throughout the country, and who have occupied the medical stations in the army and navy, have been educated for their profession in one or other of those universities. The medical school of Edinburgh has long possessed high celebrity, and that of Glasgow has, of late years, risen into great eminence; and there is reason to believe that this branch of academical instruction may soon attain an important rank in the university of Aberdeen. Much less attention has been paid to the study of the law. A full course does not seem to have been established at either of the universities, unless that at Edinburgh is an exception. The session for the study of divinity in the university of Aberdeen is three months; in St. Andrews, four; in Edinburgh, though nominally longer, it is not so practically; while in Glasgow it is six months. Divinity is studied almost exclusively by persons intending to become ministers of the established church; and the General Assembly has, by various acts, prescribed the course of study, and the period of attendance at the divinity-hall, which shall be sufficient to qualify candidates for obtaining a license to preach the gospel, as the means of entitling them to hold parochial livings.*

* We subjoin, in a note, some more particular information in regard to the universities, as they exist at the present time, 1840. The oldest of the universities is that of St. Andrews, which was founded in May, 1410, by Bishop Henry Wardlaw, and confirmed by a papal bull in 1411. The college of St. Salvator was erected in 1456; that of St. Leonard in 1512; and that of St. Mary in 1537; the first two were united by parliamentary statute in 1747. In the united college there is a principal (Sir David Brewster) and 8 professors; in St. Mary's, a principal (Robert Haldane, D. D.) and three professors. In the three colleges there are 20

We now proceed, in the fourth place, to the main object of this paper. What is the present ecclesiastical condition of Scotland? What are the prospects of the established church? Why have there been secessions from her ranks? How has the Scottish character been affected by the church policy? What

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and its privileges were subsequently confirmed and extended by royal charters and parliamentary statutes. The discipline is administered by a court, consisting of the rector, (now Rt. Hon. Sir J. Graham,) the principal, (Duncan Macfarlane, D. D.,) and the 21 professors. The common business of the college is managed by the principal and 13 professors. The number of charitable foundations is 29, of the average annual value of £1165, and extended to 65 students. The principal and members possess the right of nominating ten students, members of the church of England, to exhibitions in Baliol College, Oxford. University and King's College, Aberdeen, was founded by Bishop Wm. Elphinstone. A papal bull was issued for its erection on the 10th of Feb. 1495. The affairs of the college are conducted, and its discipline administered by a Senatus, which consists of the principal, (Wm. Jack, D. D.,) and 9 professors. The fees, in the complete course of instruction, in the faculty of arts, do not exceed £20. The charitable foundations are 32, of the value of £1771 per annum, and extended to 134 students. Marischal College and University of Aberdeen was founded by George, fifth earl of Marischal, by a charter, dated April 2, 1593, and in the same month, it received the sanction of the General Assembly, and in July was ratified by parliament. The number of bursaries is 115, of the aggregate value of about £1160 annually; about 67 are open to public competition. The rector is the Hon. J. C. Colquhoun; principal, Daniel Dewar, D. D. The whole number of professors is 13. The university of Edinburgh was founded in 1582, by James VI. The principal is John Lee, D. D., one of the ministers of Edinburgh. There is no chancellor nor rector. The number of professors is 32: 4 in law, 3 in divinity, 12 in medicine, and the remainder in arts. Bursaries 34, of the value of £1172 per annum, and extended to 80 students. The whole number of students, at all the Scotch universities in 1837,

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The secession of a portion of the established church was attended with important consequences. When the patrons of parishes began to exercise their rights more frequently, and with less attention to the wishes of the people, and when the people saw that they had a ready access to ministers of their own selection in the seceding churches, the opposition to presentees became more inveterate and unmanageable, and it was soon very difficult for the church courts to decide between the patrons and the people. Both parties, who now began to divide the church, admitted the constitutional necessity of a call from a parish, to become the foundation of a pastoral relation between a presentee and his parishioners. But the *moderate* (or high-church) party affirmed the legal call to be limited to landholders and elders, while the other party contended, as the original seceders had done, for the right of parishioners at large, or at least of the heads of families, to be admitted as callers. The former had the support of the government, who, by this time, perpetually interfered in the management of assemblies, and especially on every point which related to the settlement of ministers; while the latter derived their chief strength from popular favor, and from the influence of those who deprecated every measure which they thought calculated to alienate the people from the established church, and to lessen the usefulness and respectability of the parochial ministers.

Dr. Patrick Cumin, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, and professor of Church History in the University, became the leader of the moderate party, under the direction of the duke of Argyle. This party did not pretend to attempt the abolition of *calls*, in the settlement of ministers, and they always professed to require the call of landholders and elders, before they gave effect to a presentation. But under their management, it was seldom difficult to procure such a call as satisfied them, even in cases where the great body of the parishioners were hostile to the settlements. By the strongly exerted influence of the patrons, and

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generally more strict in discipline than the established church. When the Burghers and Anti-burghers united, several congregations of the former declined the coalition. These are called

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with the help of non-resident heritors, they seldom failed to effect their purpose. Many individuals,* who conscientiously believed that the consent of the congregation was essential to the pastoral relation, thought that they were bound in duty to decline to take any active part in the settlement of ministers to whom a general opposition was made by the parishioners. On the other hand, the moderate party, who controlled the assemblies, were pertinacious in maintaining the authority of their sentences; and the ministers who ventured to disobey them were subjected to the severest ecclesiastical censures. The active rulers of the church affected to despise the seceders. But every church-settlement accomplished by the strong arm of authority, in opposition to the great body of the parishioners,

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* Among these was the Rev. Thomas Gillespie, minister of Carnock. The circumstances of his deposition were these. A call, sustained by the assembly, to the parish of Inver-Reitting, in the presbytery of Dunfermline, depending, in a considerable degree, on non-resident heritors, was violently and generally opposed. The ruling party in the church determined to apply ecclesiastical censures. They ordered the presbytery to hold a meeting, and admit the presentee, and declared that the quorum should be five instead of three, which is the legal quorum. Only three ministers, however, attended. Of six members, who pleaded at the bar of the assembly conscientious scruples, one, Mr. Gillespie, was solemnly deposed. Three others were afterwards suspended, all men of unimpeachable character. Mr. Gillespie was one of the most inoffensive and upright men of his time. When he heard the sentence of deposition from the moderator's chair, he nobly replied: "I thank God, that to me it is given, not only to believe in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, but also to suffer for his sake." Mr. G. was the correspondent of President Edwards. See the Works of the latter, Lond. ed. 1839, Vol. I. p. 120, seq. Mr. G. became the founder of the Relief Synod very unwillingly. On his dying bed, he advised his congregation to apply to the church to be restored to her communion; which was accordingly done. The synod now contains 11 presbyteries, about 120 churches and about [illegible]

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opened a new dissenting meeting, and separated a new congregation from the communion of the establishment.

From 1752 to 1763, there were not many examples of the settlement of ministers when the opposition was very considerable. From 1765 to 1774, there occurred some cases, which occasioned more obstinate and protracted litigation than are to be found on record since 1688. But, by this time, the duke of Argyle had died, and Dr. Cumin no longer held the same sway as leader of the church. Dr. Robertson, the great historian, succeeded him as leader of the moderate party.* At length, the principle was avowed and adhered to, that a presentation to a benefice was in all cases to be made effectual, independently of the merits of the call or concurrence. Cases had sometimes occurred, previously, in which presentees were set aside. But this can scarcely be shown to have happened during the time of Dr. Robertson's management, merely from defects in the concurrence of the parish. To his sound sense and splendid eloquence, was conjoined the steady influence of every administration of government. The struggle with the people was, however, perpetual. The opposition to presentees was so decided, as in a great measure to engross the business of the assemblies. The parties in the church were more equally balanced than they were afterwards. The popular party were led by men of great ability and eloquence. Among them were Drs. Dick, Macqueen and Erskine, Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Andrew Crosbie, etc. The zeal of the people was at last exhausted, and the great majority of the church became convinced that the system of patronage was firmly established, partly by a long series of decisions in the Supreme Court. In a few years after Dr. Robertson retired, the people began to leave the church courts to execute their sentences without opposition, and set themselves to rear seceding meeting-houses, which frequently drew away a large proportion of the inhabitants of the parish.

For many years, during the present century, the Rev. Dr. Andrew Thompson was a leader of the popular party in the

* See the Life of Dr. Robertson, by Dugald Stewart. Dr. Drysdale, one of the ministers of Edinburgh, and afterwards the principal clerk of the General Assembly, was the coadjutor

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August, the commission of the General Assembly, by a majority of 81, prohibited the presbytery of Auchterarder from taking any steps towards the settlement of the presentee of the patron, the Rev. Mr. Young.*

In the mean time, another case occurred, which has occasioned a protracted controversy, and which, in the opinion of many, *may* end in the dissolution of the establishment. The call of Mr. John Edwards, the presentee to Marnoch, in the presbytery of Strathbogie, was signed by only *one* parishioner. Mr. E. had officiated there for several years, as assistant to the minister, and had been removed by him, on a strong expression of disapproval of his services, by a large body of parishioners. Various proceedings took place between the parties, until, in 1838, the General Assembly ordered the presbytery to reject the presentee. This order was obeyed. Thereupon the patron, acquiescing in the judgment of the church courts, offered another presentee, Mr. Hendry. Mr. Edwards then raised a civil action, and also applied for an interdict forbidding the presbytery to ordain Mr. Hendry. The presbytery referred the matter to the synod, and the synod directed them to proceed to settle Mr. Hendry. They declined, and resolved, that the Court of Session had jurisdiction in the case, and that they were bound to obey its interdict. The matter was brought before the General Assembly in May, 1839, who enjoined the presbytery not to determine the question themselves, but to refer it to the Commission, that that court might decide it. The Commission took up the case, and ordered the presbytery not to settle either party, hoping that the legislature would pass some enactment which would relieve the difficulty before the next meeting of the Assembly. In the mean time, however, Mr. Edwards had obtained a decree in the Court of Session, declaring that the presbytery had acted illegally in rejecting him, and that they were bound to try his qualifications, and, if

* In the case of Jedburgh, in which all the parishioners, except five, were totally opposed to the presentee, Mr. Douglas, 2000 left the church, in one day, in consequence of his settlement. In the instance of Biggar it was objected, and admitted by the presbytery, that the voice of the presentee could not

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they found him fit, to admit him as minister of Marnooh. A requisition was immediately made on the moderator of the presbytery, by several members, to summon a *pro re nata* meeting, in order to take the decree into consideration. The presbytery assembled, and the moderator laid before them the sentences of both the civil and ecclesiastical courts. They declined, however, to consider the ecclesiastical sentences, to continue to meet, or to enter on their minutes the dissent and complaint of the moderator. He immediately appealed to the Commission by complaint and petition. The Commission, in December, ordered the complaint to be served, and suspended the members of the presbytery from their ministerial functions. The presbytery then resolved to sustain the call in favor of Mr. Edwards, and to proceed in his settlement; though they afterwards stated, that they did not intend to *admit* him, but only meant to take him on trial. They also continued to exercise their spiritual functions; and, in addition, prayed the Court of Session to prohibit the ministers from preaching in their parishes, who had been sent down by the Commission. This latter body, at their meeting in March, 1840, sent a committee—Rev. Drs. Gordon, Mackellar, and Mr. Bruce—to hold a conference with the suspended brethren. This conference, however, owing to a misunderstanding in regard to the time and place of meeting, was not held.

At the meeting of the General Assembly, in May, 1840, the whole proceedings in relation to the suspended ministers came under review, and elicited warm and protracted discussions. In the first place, a committee was appointed to confer with the seven ministers. The committee reported that the conference left the deep impression on their minds, that the said ministers had not intended any disrespect to the church judicatories, but were influenced by the conviction, that they were obligated to submit to the judgments of the civil courts. They thought that they were bound, under the civil law, to take Mr. Edwards on trial, with a view to ascertain whether he was qualified by terms of the statute, while it was their purpose, from the beginning, to give every opportunity to state objections to the presentee. They, furthermore, stated explicitly,

M'Farlan of Greenock, was adopted, by a vote of 166 to 102: "That the sentence of suspension be continued, that the seven ministers be cited personally to appear before the Commission in August; and, if they then should continue contumacious, and refuse submission to the church-courts, that they should then be served with a libel for that contumacy, and that the Commission should proceed until the case was ripe for the next General Assembly." Mr. Edwards was cited to appear personally before the Commission in August. A special committee was appointed to advise and co-operate with the minority of the presbytery of Strathbogie, in providing supplies for the parishes of the suspended ministers. Of the results of the meeting of the Commission in August last, we have no advices.

Various other subjects, vitally affecting the interests of the church, were debated with great warmth. One of these subjects was the bill introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Aberdeen, a distinguished nobleman and Presbyterian of Scotland. It was supported by the minority—the successors of the old moderate party—on the ground, that it would tend to restore the constitution of the church, which had been subverted by the Veto-act; that it would prove a safeguard to the church against all interference from without; and be an additional safeguard against her injuring herself by any capricious exercise of her authority within. On the other hand, it was objected to the bill by Dr. Chalmers and his friends, that it merely confirmed the law as laid down in the civil courts (the judgment in the Auchterarder case for instance) and that it was an outrage on the principle of non-intrusion. On a division, 221 voted for the resolutions of Dr. Chalmers, disapproving of the bill; and 134 for the motion of Dr. Cook, in favor of it. Our limits will not allow us to advert further to the proceedings of the General Assembly.*

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* The leaders on the popular side in the Assembly of 1840, were Dr. Chalmers, Mr. Dunlop, advocate of Edinburgh, Dr. M'Farlan of Greenock, Dr. Simpson of Kirknewton, etc. Among those who voted on the same side were Sir David Brewster, Principal Dewar, Drs. Patterson and Henderson of Glasgow, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, etc. The leader on the moderate side of the house was Dr. George Cook, profes-

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The number of ministers belonging to the establishment is 1190, synods, 16, presbyteries, 80. These presbyteries send 218 ministers and 94 elders as delegates to the General Assembly. The city of Edinburgh sends two elders; 65 other royal burghs, 65; 5 universities, each one minister or one elder; churches in India a minister and an elder; total about 220 ministers and 167 elders. The number of churches in the establishment is probably between 1100 and 1200. It has been estimated, that the number of Dissenters in Scotland, of all denominations, may be about 520,000. The whole population is reckoned at nearly 2,500,000.

We have already noticed the United Secession church,* the

Ellon, Rev. Alexander Hill, D. D., professor of Divinity at Glasgow, Rev. John Hunter, minister of the Tron church, Edinburgh, Sir George Clerk, M. P., Rev. John Lee, D. D., principal of the University of Edinburgh, etc. Mr. Dunlop stated that the friends of the popular party, who petitioned parliament, amounted to 250,000 individuals; while 13,000 only signed the petitions of the opposite party. Of the 16 synods, all but three were in favor of the non-intrusion principle. These three were Shetland, where the vote stood, 14 to 2; Glenelg, by a majority of one; and Dumfries, by a majority of 12 or 14. On the other hand, it was mentioned that a large majority of the officers and members of the five universities were with the moderate party.

* We have read a considerable part of the volume of the Rev. Dr. John Brown, of the United Secession church, entitled, "The Law of Christ respecting Civil Obedience, especially in the Payment of Tribute," 1 vol. 8vo., 1839, 2d ed., pp. 539, Appendix pp. 123. In 1837, Dr. B. refused to pay the annuity-tax, on the ground that he conscientiously disapproved of civil establishments of religion of every form, the tax in question being avowedly imposed for the support of the established church. Some of his property was accordingly *distrained* and sold for the payment of the tax. This occasioned considerable excitement. Dr. Brown was attacked in the newspapers with great bitterness, especially by Dr. Haldane, (who seems to regard himself as a consecrated heresy-

original Burgher Associate Synod and the Relief Synod. In 1806, a number of individuals separated from the Burgher denomination, in consequence of opinions held by the latter respecting the total independence and incompatibility of the civil and religious authorities. They termed themselves the Associate Synod of Original Seceders. They are in favor of a national church. On the 31st of July, 1839, they voted, 39 to 13, to annex themselves to the church of Scotland. The reunion had been approved by a majority of the presbyteries of the national church. The Reformed Presbyterian Synod represent the Covenanters of the time of Charles I. They are the most rigid Presbyterians in Scotland. They have a professor of theology, A. Symington, D. D. of Paisley, 6 presbyteries and 26 ministers in Scotland, besides 4 presbyteries and 24 ministers in Ireland.

The number of Independent churches, in connection with the Congregational Union of Scotland, is 98; ministers 84; Tutors of the Theological Academy, Glasgow, Ralph Wardlaw, D. D., Rev. Messrs. G. Ewing and J. M. Mackenzie. The Scotch Episcopal church have a theological academy at Edinburgh; professors, Rt. Rev. James Walker, D. D., and Rt. Rev. M. Russell, LL. D.; number of dioceses 6; chapels, between 70 and 80, with about the same number of clergymen. It is supposed that the whole Romish population of Scotland amounts to 140,000, including the children of Catholic parents. The Catholics in Glasgow alone amount to 35,000; in Edinburgh, to 12,000. They have three dioceses, 60 places of worship, and 74 priests and bishops. There are, besides, various small sects in Scotland, as Baptists, Methodists, Unitarians, Sandemanians, Bereans, etc., which it is not necessary here to describe.

From the foregoing observations and statements, it is obvious that the Scottish national church is in circumstances of no little peril. In the language of Dr. Chalmers, "the ark is now in the midst of conflicting billows." One of the greatest difficulties is, that the civil questions, in the last resort, must be decided in *English* courts. Englishmen will not, or cannot un-

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the cause of national churches in the field of argument, to have the victory so wrested from our hands." The great object of the popular party now seems to be, to abolish patronage altogether, and to vest the right of presentation in the voters, in the communicants, or in the landholders, or in these classes jointly. But the right of patronage is private property, and may be sold or alienated like any other property.* Will it be given up peaceably, and without compensation? and will the state continue to support a church which thus trifles with private property, and with those very means which the government possesses for extending the influence of the church of Scotland, and which that church has called on it to employ, and which it has employed? It seems to us that the passing of the Veto-act was the first step towards a separation of the church from the state altogether. The abolition of patronage will be another great step. And happy the day, in our opinion, when the last link shall be sundered. It is in vain to try to make a pure church, out of one entangled with state intrigue, and supported by state funds. Dr. Chalmers and his friends may glory in proclaiming, that the Lord Jesus Christ is the only Head of the church of Scotland. But it is not so. It never will be so, as long as that church depends on the state for her support. The headship will be shared in by some duke of Argyle, lord of session, or privy counsellor. The spirituality of the church is corrupted, and it must be corrupted by the contact of worldly men. Is it not owing to this contaminating union of church and state, that there has existed in the Scottish communion, a *moderate* party, in distinction from the *evangelical*,—a party, which for a long time swayed, by a decided majority, the councils of the General Assembly, so that the fate of every measure materially affecting the spiritual interests of the church, might, with certainty, have been pre-

* The patronage of about 300 of the parishes of Scotland is vested in the crown, and 600 in noblemen and landed proprietors. Out of about 36 parishes in the synod of Orkney, the earl of Zetland has the patronage of twenty-nine! When those livings are deducted which are at the disposal of universities

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dicted; and that, though this party has of late been, happily, losing ground, while the other has been gaining, yet there is still many a parish, both in the Highlands and Lowlands, in which there is a miserable want of religious instruction, because another gospel than of Christ is preached! † These men who preach an unevangelized morality were, doubtless, the presentees of some nobleman or gentleman, who consulted his own family interests, rather than the spiritual edification of a hungry flock.

The interests of vital piety in Scotland, must necessarily languish, while Synods, Assemblies and Commissions are holding stormy debates, and while the great mass of the people are looking for deliverance, not from their glorified Head, but from a civil court, or from a Parliament, who, in general, care no more for the interests of spiritual religion, than they do in respect to the individual who shall be the next Grand Lama of Thibet. Revivals of religion may occasionally occur, as they are now said to exist in Ross-shire, but they will take place in spite of the existing condition of things, or because God will employ the bitter lessons, which his people in Scotland are reading, as an occasion of bringing rich spiritual good out of terrible evils.

We cannot close these observations without expressing our deepest conviction that a new order of preparation for the Christian ministry is demanded in the churches of Scotland. The law on the subject is well enough. It requires a four years' regular attendance at the divinity-hall, as a course of study for the church; but this is almost completely nullified by the recognizing, on the part of the Assembly, of what is termed irregular attendance, and which is in fact no attendance whatever. Students of divinity who merely enrol their names in the books of the different professors, for six years, and who deliver a certain number of discourses specified by the General Assembly, though they never hear a lecture, or receive any instruction whatever on the subject of theology, in any university, were held, till very recently, to be equally qualified with the regular students for

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* See Dr. Wardlaw's Lectures on National Church Establishments, 1839, p. 82; also Dr. Witherspoon's "Characteristics," Works, 1802, Vol. III. p. 200. See, also, the inter-

being taken on trials for a license to preach. Some modification has taken place, but it does not effect any substantial change. The acts of Assembly enjoin that every person, entering upon trials, shall be examined as to his knowledge of the Hebrew language; but they do not require that the Hebrew class should be attended; and, in point of fact, a *large proportion* of those who become ministers never have attended it.* In teaching Hebrew, the professor of oriental languages at the University of Edinburgh states, that he does not use the points, because he is satisfied, that in the time allowed him, he could do nothing with the points! So little interest was taken in the study of Hebrew, that the study of Persian—not a cognate dialect—was introduced as an inducement. The average of those who enter the Hebrew class at Glasgow was about seventeen or eighteen, when the divinity students were about two hundred. All the Hebrew students are required to be furnished with *Parkhurst's* Hebrew Lexicon. Those parts of the Old Testament, which are written in Chaldee, are not read in the class, because the students have no dictionary for that tongue! The Hebrew professor at King's College, Aberdeen, states, that he accustoms his pupils to look for the words of a dictionary; but owing to the mode in which Hebrew dictionaries are generally prepared, they have not commonly become expert at this, when the studies of the class are finished! At the Marischal College, the professor of Hebrew remarks, that "when he can get his class together, he lectures, either upon the origin of the language, or upon Hebrew antiquities. The students *scramble* for a little of the elements of the language, and then leave the class. Chaldee and Syriac are not taught, because the professor can hardly ever get his students to be masters of Hebrew!"†

With such sad statements before us, we cannot wonder at the low condition of biblical,‡ and, we might add, of classical learn-

* One year's regular attendance has been since required.

† Report on the Universities of Scotland, p. 355.

‡ "We have repeatedly expressed our warm approbation of the Biblical Cabinet, a series of translations from German

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ing in Scotland. Logic and philosophy have not been studied too much, but too exclusively. The system of education has produced strong-headed reasoners, acute dialecticians, but not accomplished Greek and Hebrew scholars. The Scottish systems of divinity which we have seen fail essentially at the very foundation. They do not rightly expound the text. How can they do this, with Parkhurst's Lexicon, and other such contrivances?

Scotchmen ought, like their southern countrymen, to become acquainted with the rich and inexhaustible stores of continental learning. Gesenius' Lexicon would not overturn the establishment. Hengstenberg's Christology would make no breach in the Confession of Faith. The grammars of Kühner, Ewald and Winer might be imported into Caledonia, salva fide et Ecclesiâ. The sturdy Pict would not be corrupted, if he should read Von Hammer, or Niebuhr, or Ranke. If the ministers of religion would do the highest good to their beloved communion, they must become earnest students of the original Scriptures, and thus be imbued with the mind of the inspiring Spirit. They may adhere as firmly as they please to the good old catechism. We honor them for it. But let them join a profound knowledge of God's word with attachment to systems of divinity, and with elevated personal holiness. Thus with the sound sense and strong logical understanding which they now possess, they will raise Scotland to a higher intellectual and spiritual eminence than any other nation of the old world can boast. Scotland will be truly a city set on a hill; like the mountains which are round about Jerusalem—the light and glory of Britain and of her colonies, now extending over every island, and on every shore.

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miserably low state of biblical studies in both countries. The works translated for the Cabinet are, in general, well selected. Most of the versions which we have examined, are made with fidelity. Some of the translators, however, are not sufficiently practised in German, and care is not taken to secure a good

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ARTICLE VII.

The Principle of Emulation as a Stimulus to Academical Study.

By Rev. Nathan Lord, D. D., Pres. of Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H.

Whoever seriously contemplates improvement in any department of patriotic or Christian enterprise will, almost of necessity, encounter two evils; first, severe misconstruction, simply because he goes upon the idea of reform; and, secondly, the danger of becoming bewildered in speculation, and of committing settled and important interests to the chances of experiment. The idea of progressiveness, although not convertible with that of innovation, evidently implies it, and awakens, in a certain class of minds, more or less of the same jealousy and distrust. At the same time, the hazards of advancing upon commonly received opinions and measures are such as few sufficiently contemplate beforehand, and none can adequately appreciate without actual trial. But to shrink from either of these evils, and to remain content in a state of admitted imperfection, through fear of odium, which, however undeserved, is certain, or, mistake, at the same time possible and fatal, is unworthy of those whom God has made, in a measure, responsible for the common weal. These alternatives are, undoubtedly, a weighty argument for the exercise of modesty and charity, of sound wisdom and discretion, but a poor apology for indifference and sloth. It is perhaps impossible for man not to err, either on the side of not doing, or of overdoing; but it were almost better to suffer the consequences of an erroneous, though honest zeal, than of heartless negligence and unbelief, or an obstinate holding to positions which time is showing to be false, or out of season and untenable.

There is, however, less danger to society than is commonly supposed in prosecuting improvements upon principles about which there can be no mistake but in the application of them.

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fied, or safe to discredit and oppose attempts, which, if successful, could result only beneficially to the community, and whose failure would argue a state of society more disordered and hopeless, from the fact that it was owing to the disapprobation of the very guardians and conservators of the public virtue.

The first issue respects the fitness of the principle of emulation, as an incentive in the education of youth; and to that the following remarks will be confined.

A distinction will be admitted between duty and interest, as impulsive principles of action. The former is a moral element, an original guide to virtue. The latter is sensuous, and peculiarly liable to the vicissitudes of the disordered mind. The one has relation to the right, to principle, to the general good, and to the will and honor of the Creator; the other to the expedient, the politic, to personal convenience and happiness, as these objects are viewed by the degenerate mind; the one purifying and elevating in its moral tendencies, in proportion to the degree of its cultivation; the other, in similar conditions, running down into a lust, and inviting to sordid and unworthy gratifications, according to the predominance of one or another class of affections. This distinction, even if not of the nature of an axiom, will hardly fail to commend itself to minds inclined to a spiritual morality, and conversant with the different stages and phenomena of mental history.

Emulation is an excitement of the selfish principle in appropriate circumstances of the social condition. It is the desire of excelling; it supposes competition; it contemplates precedence, pre-eminence. It is the action of diseased mind, subject to the irregularities and excesses of the self-will, overreaching, sequestering, or otherwise counteracting the moral sense, the law of charity, according to the strength of the constitutional bias, or the acquired stimulus. If any think the term admits of a more rational and intelligible definition, this is the only idea contemplated by those who so describe the principle in question, and who, in this view of it, discard it as immoral and of pernicious tendency both in private and public discipline.

The subject has been rarely treated by moral writers, and society has acquiesced in loose and indeterminate [illegible]

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government, or bring it into such unnatural alliance with our own short-sighted arrangements, as to dishonor it, and make it ineffectual? Shall we do this in our families, in the church of God? Have we forgotten the half-way covenant of New-England?

But, it may be said that principles of acknowledged validity and authority are yet to be restrained and limited in their application, by other principles equally true and worthy of regard; as in physics, many theories, established by general reasonings, cannot be carried out in practice, without great allowance for conflicting influences in the processes of nature. He who should abate nothing for friction, for different and opposite forces, would find himself materially wrong in his calculations, and unsuccessful in his results. He might be a consistent reasoner from partial or erroneous premises, but an unskilful machinist, or a dangerous navigator.

If by this it is intended, that, on moral subjects, different and opposite principles may be equally true and important, it is sufficient to say that such a sentiment carries its own refutation. It can never impose upon a thinking mind. If it is intended that, although moral truth is in its own nature immutable, it must be limited in its application by the opposing forces in the human will, by the errors, prejudices and passions of society, we say this is begging the question, and it is sufficient to meet it by a contrary assertion. It is not invidious to charge upon so broad a declaration the vice of submitting an acknowledged principle to the construction of a self-seeking expediency, and making a trade of our morality. It is arresting the progress of knowledge, and virtually giving our countenance to admitted error. It is holding up the lamp, but covering it with an extinguisher. It is obscuring the sun, in kindness to diseased eyes, and leaving those who otherwise would rejoice in the good light of heaven, to grope in darkness at noon-day.

That we shall not, in point of fact, attain to a theoretical perfection in the application of our general principles, in the present imperfect state of society, is doubtless true; and so far the analogy between physical and moral science is admitted. But as this admission affects not the essential truth and obligatoriness of

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which we mean law and its sanctions and the peculiar motives of Christianity, has been so partial and limited, that there is hardly a noticeable instance in which its sufficiency may be said to have been demonstrated by adequate experiment. Society has been guided by other views. Why it has been so, it is not our purpose, and it might be invidious to inquire. It is one of those mistakes in ethics which work themselves insensibly into other departments of study and action, perverting the intelligence and influence of ages. But it is unhappily real, and unfortunate for the purpose of these remarks. So extensive is the awkwardness of setting up general conclusions on such a subject, without facts, especially at a time remarkable for the utilitarian turn of the public mind, that we should entirely yield to the discouragement, were it not allowable to bring opposite theories to the test of their practical results.

And what are the facts on the other side? Let us be instructed by the history of society. It would seem that if our judgments could not be corrected by general reasonings upon the selfish principle, we might at least be startled by reviewing some of its obvious effects. It is not necessary to speak of those infractions of the social law which have marked every age with controversy, war, oppression and their kindred evils. It is sufficient, that the great labor of education itself has been, with remarkable inconsistency, and of course without success, to control the wrong propensity, on the one hand, while it has stimulated it on the other. Christianity, called in to cure the evils of a false philosophy, has been itself corrupted, and made to apologize for some of the grossest violations of its own precepts. Subserviency, intrigue, equivocation, envy, jealousy, wrath, strife, and all the host of malignant passions that are stirred up by a flattered and mortified self-love, have been absolved without confession, and have flowed out from the nursery, the school and the higher seats of learning, to disturb and desolate the world.

But it may be said that this is only the excessive acting of a right principle. We reply, it is merely the natural acting of self-love, under its appropriate excitements of competition, the very evil involved in our idea of emulation, the principle

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the precepts of Christian morality with the growing affections and capabilities of the human mind. If any judge that society has been, hitherto, too infantile and rude for such an economy, its present aspects certainly encourage the belief that a better era is at hand. The strife of moral questions is setting mind free from antiquated prejudice, and the maxims of a sensuous philosophy; and a more spiritual wisdom succeeds to appetite and force. The world is rapidly determining, in respect to all its interests, between right and wrong, law and self-will; and however violent the conflict between these opposite forces, we may not fear if the advancing spirit of education be directed by the salutary influences of the gospel. Mind—cultivated mind—will control the world, despite the dreams of ignorant enthusiasts, or the madness of atheistic levellers. But it will tend to the accumulation of spiritual and secular power, to the exactions of lordly prerogative, and to iron consolidation, unless the sway of the selfish principle shall yield to the redeeming benevolence of Christianity. Paganism, prelacy, slavery, all the forms of despotism, and the opposite extremes of revolution, anarchy, and ruin, are but developments, the action and reaction of the wrong affection. Christianity alone restores the equilibrium, the harmony of the otherwise disjointed and jarring members of the social system, and secures the proper results of its complicated arrangements. All other conservatives are vain expedients that issue in a worse excitement, a more terrible dissolution. Be it ours to apply this renovating agency, to give it circulation and direction, through the proper channels of intelligence and moral sentiment, and we accomplish what is impossible to policy or power. The sense of right will prevail when sophistry and cunning fail, and the sword is drawn in vain. For this end were we created, to obey the law of the Eternal Mind. That everlasting memorial, set up without the garnish of a false philosophy, encumbered not with human appendages, freed from the glosses of old tradition, *the law of right*, proclaimed in thunders, sealed with blood, inwrought by fire, will bring the predicted end of the divine counsels, the subjection of this world to its Redeemer. Be it ours to hasten that consummation. It is the proper glory of a rational nature. It

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far as they have already been considered, will unavoidably thrust them from their present position. They cannot, by any of these arguments, show that a *select few* are completely sanctified, without proving, at the same time, that this is the case with all Christians. But I shall have occasion to advert to this point more particularly in the course of the following discussion.

THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE.

It is somewhat remarkable that men of sense, who are engaged in a controversy, should not be agreed as to the real question in debate. What! Do not disputants themselves know what they are disputing about? Mr. Mahan charges Mr. Folsom with having misapprehended and misstated the question at issue between the advocates and the opposers of the doctrine of "Perfection." And in the following passage (Bib. Repos. p. 409), he undertakes to state it *clearly* and *definitely*. The question is, he says, "*Whether we may now, during the progress of the present life, attain to entire perfection in holiness, and whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments.* One part of the church affirm, that the perfect obedience which God requires of us, we may render to him. The other affirm that it is criminal for us to *expect* to render that obedience. One part affirm, that we ought to aim at entire perfection in holiness, with the expectation of attaining to that state. The other part affirm, that we ought to aim at the same perfection, with the certain expectation of not attaining to it. On the one hand, it is affirmed that we ought to pray that the very God of peace will sanctify us wholly, and preserve our whole spirit, and soul, and body blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, with the expectation that God will answer our prayers by the bestowment of that very blessing. On the other hand, it is affirmed that we ought to put up that identical prayer, with the certain expectation of not receiving the blessing we desire. On the one hand, it is affirmed that grace is provided in the gospel to render the Christian, even in this life, perfect in every good work to do the will of God. On the other hand, it is affirmed that no such grace is provided."

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Mr. Mahan calls the question above stated a "*simple* ques-

matters in dispute, and partly of matters not in dispute. This will be evident if we analyze the passage. He first states the question thus: "Whether we may now, during the progress of the present life, attain to entire perfection in holiness, and whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments." Here are two distinct questions, one of which, as I have explained it, we answer in the affirmative, the other in the negative. There is a sense, and an important sense, in which Christians might attain to perfection in this life; that is, they might attain to it, if they would do what they ought,—if they would rightly use all their powers and faculties of mind, and all their means and privileges;—so that their not attaining it is their own fault. We are accustomed to say that any object is *attainable*, if it may be attained on these conditions; although it never is attained; and so we answer the first question in the affirmative. The next question is, "Whether it is proper for us to indulge the anticipation of making such attainments?" i. e. in the present life. This we answer in the negative. For unless there is evidence that good men have attained or will attain to perfection in the present life, no one can properly indulge the *expectation*. These two questions Mr. Mahan puts together, and speaks of it as a *simple* question, and the question in debate; whereas it is *not* simple, and only a *part* of it is in debate. This mode of proceeding, instead of conducing to the end of free inquiry, certainly tends to throw confusion into the whole discussion.

The same is true of the other parts of the passage above quoted. After the general statement just noticed, Mr. Mahan goes on to exhibit it in various particulars, and most if not all of these, like the general statement above mentioned, are made up of two points, to one of which we assent, to the other we do not. He says: "One part"—those who agree with him,—"affirm, that the perfect obedience which God requires, we *may* render to him." But in the sense above given, *we* hold to this as much as they. "The other part affirm that it is *criminal* for us to expect to render that obedience." I wonder he should

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ness, with the expectation of attaining to it. The other part affirm that we ought to aim at it with the certain expectation of not attaining to it." Here again are two points. As to the first, that "we ought to *aim* at perfection in holiness," we agree with him. As to the other point, the *expectation* of attaining to it, we differ, if, as he intends, the expectation looks to the present life merely. Justice requires that it should be kept in mind, that, according to the common doctrine, all believers do expect *ultimately* to attain to perfect holiness. Again, he says: "On the one hand, it is affirmed that we ought to pray that the God of peace will sanctify us wholly, etc., with the expectation that he will answer our prayers by the bestowment of that very blessing; on the other hand," that we ought to pray for perfect sanctification, "with the certain expectation of not receiving" it. This statement, like the others, fails of presenting fairly the point in debate. We affirm that we ought to pray God to sanctify us wholly, and to do it with the expectation that he will, at no distant period, bestow the very blessing we ask. But as to expecting the blessing to be fully granted in the *present life*, we differ from the advocates of perfection. Once more, he says: "On the one hand, it is affirmed that grace is provided," to render Christians, "even in this life, perfect in every good work." "On the other hand it is affirmed that no such grace is provided." This is certainly a groundless charge; we all hold, as much as Mr. Mahan, that the grace provided and revealed in the gospel is all-sufficient and boundless, and that the present imperfection of believers is owing altogether to their own fault.

Mr. Mahan says, a little after: "The question is *entirely distinct* from the question, What attainments do Christians actually make?" I hardly know why he should say this, when, on the same page, he makes it one of the three questions connected with the nature and extent of the promises, whether "any have attained or will attain to entire sanctificationin this life, and when it is so manifest, in many places, that the other points he discusses are meant to bear directly upon this, and to end in it. He shows, very clearly, what is the main point as it lies in his *own mind*, when he says (Disc. p. 97): "On the supposition," that perfect holiness is *not actually attained* in this life, "how can

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this, and, in various instances, shows that he is not disposed to adopt that sense of a passage which first offers itself to the mind of the reader, but thinks it proper and necessary to look into the context, to compare different parts of Scripture, and to examine all the circumstances of the case, in order to discover the exact meaning which the sacred writers had in their own minds, and which they intended to convey to others. And although liable to err in the results of his inquiries, he is certainly right in thinking, that we cannot always determine the true meaning of particular texts, by the *sound* or even the *sense* of the words, *taken by themselves*, and that we are often unable to come to a just and satisfactory conclusion, without a careful, patient and even protracted examination.

According to this just principle, the texts which seem, at first view, to assert or imply that believers attain to complete holiness in the present life, must be thoroughly examined, and their true meaning determined. And here it should be remembered, that the prophets and apostles wrote in a very free, unembarrassed and artless manner. Their object was not to settle the disputes which might be got up by speculating, adventurous minds, but to give important instruction to men of teachable and honest hearts. Their manner of writing is indeed such, that an advocate of Universalism, or Socinianism, or almost any other error, may find texts, which, *taken alone*, will appear in his favor. The advocates of the doctrine of "Perfection," which I believe to be an error, argue very plausibly in support of their doctrine from a variety of passages, *construed in a particular way*. There are even more texts than they have mentioned, which may *appear* to favor their cause. They argue from the passages which set forth the provisions and promises of the gospel, and the prayers of believers. These passages, understood as they *possibly may be*, would seem to countenance the doctrine of perfection. But we must inquire, whether, on a fair examination, we can understand the passages in this way, consistently with other parts of the Bible, and with well known facts. The texts which Mr. Mahan quotes, and others which he might quote, *if taken by themselves, and understood in the highest and most absolute sense*, would prove that at least some believers attain to perfect holiness in this life. Job was a *perfect* and upright man. Some are said to have followed the Lord

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fection," are unquestionably to be taken in a qualified sense. And here I cannot but think that Mr. Mahan will agree with me. Job was a *perfect* man, and yet he showed plainly enough that *he was not without faults.* It is said of David that he followed the Lord *wholly* except in the matter of Uriah. But his history and his confessions leave us in no doubt, that he was chargeable with other sins, especially sins of heart. God planted Israel *wholly* a right seed. But it must be evident to all, that this expressed their character only in a *comparative* and *very limited* sense. "A bishop must be *blameless.*" But neither Mr. Mahan, nor any of his associates can think it essential to the character of a gospel minister, that he should be *absolutely sinless.* Paul said to the Colossians: "Ye are *complete* in Christ." But his epistle to them shows, that he did not think them *entirely without sin.*

I come then to this result: As a limited sense clearly belongs to *some* of the passages which seem, at first view, to favor the doctrine of "Perfection," it is quite *possible* it may belong to *others,* and it would be going too fast and too far, to decide at once, that *any* of that class of texts must be taken in the highest and most absolute sense.

In the next step of my inquiry, I fix my thoughts directly upon several of the texts which seem, at first view, most favorable to the doctrine of "Perfection." The texts I have in view are of no small moment, and I desire Mr. Mahan to join with me in a serious and unprejudiced examination of them, that we may discover what is the mind of the Holy Spirit.

I would then first ask my brother, whether his doctrine implies, that *all* true believers are *entirely sanctified,* either *now,* or *during the present life.* I know what his answer is; but I think it proper to propose the question, for the purpose of bringing out distinctly the exact *nature* and *extent* of the doctrine. In his publications, Mr. Mahan does often enough, and plainly enough, and with too much justice, represent the great body of true Christians, as deplorably deficient in their piety; and he labors with commendable earnestness, to excite them to make higher attainments. Indeed he claims complete holiness as a privilege enjoyed at present by only *a select few, a very*

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whose character it is, not to walk in darkness, but to walk in the light. Referring to *all* these children of light, he says: "The blood of Christ cleanseth us from *all* sin." He *now* cleanseth us from all sin; for the verb is in the present tense. But my brother does not understand it to mean that *all* real Christians are now, in the strict sense, cleansed from *all sin*, that is, *completely sanctified;* though he thinks the text somehow favorable to his doctrine. But it is perfectly clear, that whatever the text asserts of *any* Christians, it asserts of *all*. Let us then come fairly to the point, and inquire, what the text really means. Mr. Mahan will certainly be under the necessity of finding out *some qualified* sense, a sense consistent with what he regards as the real present state of *all believers;* for the text certainly relates to *all*. He may perhaps say, the blood of Christ *provides* for the entire cleansing of all believers *conditionally;* or that it *begins* the work of cleansing now, and secures its complete accomplishment *ultimately*. In this way or some other way, he *must* give the text a restricted sense, a sense different from what would, at first glance, be suggested by the words themselves, taken alone. He must do the same with v. 9, in which the apostle says, that, "if we confess our sins," as *all* Christians do, "he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from *all unrighteousness*." Does it mean that he *now* absolutely cleanseth all who confess their sins, i. e. the whole body of believers, from *all unrighteousness?* Mr. Mahan will answer, no. What then can he do, but, in some way, *limit* the sense? Again, ch. 2: 4, 5, the apostle teaches that every true believer keeps the word of God. And then he says: "*Whoso* keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God *perfected;* hereby know we that we are in him." He is evidently setting forth the character and state, not of a few, but of *all*, who are in Christ. Does Mr. Mahan think that the love of God is, in *his* sense, *perfect* in *all* true believers? No. He thinks it true of only a small number. But whatever the apostle here asserts, he asserts equally of *every true Christian*. Will not my brother then be compelled to find out some limitations of the sense, so as to make it apply to *all* true believers? Let him do this, and we shall see whether his interpretation of this

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pure is a high attainment, and is doubtless the same as is required in the command to *be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect.* I suppose that every Christian does thus purify himself; that is, pursues a course of purification which will terminate in perfect purity. The expression, in my view, denotes, not the particular degree of purification which the believer has already attained, but the *gradual process* of purification, and the *perfect purity* after which he aspires, and to which he will come *in the end.* As his ultimate perfection in moral purity is *certain*, it is spoken of as though it were already accomplished;—a manner of speaking which often occurs in Scripture. Thus, Peter, speaking of his condition in the present life, says: "Who am an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and also *a partaker of the glory that shall be revealed;*"—a partaker, *even now*, of that *future glory by certain anticipation.* But how will Mr. Mahan explain the purity mentioned by the apostle John, so that he may predicate it, as the apostle does, of ALL Christians, and yet make it agree with the doctrine he maintains, that only a FEW are perfectly pure, while Christians, in general, are very far from perfect purity? If he says it means *complete purity;* then he cannot predicate it of *all* Christians, nor of the greater part. If he says, it means *that degree*, or *that gradual process* of purification, which *does* belong to all true Christians, then he comes into the principle of *limiting* the sense. And if he gives a *limited* sense to this text, why not to all the other texts which appear to favor his doctrine?

But the most striking passage which I wish Mr. Mahan to assist me in examining, is 1 John 3: 9. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin, for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." Where, in all the Scriptures, can Mr. Mahan find another text, which seems to assert, so clearly and strongly as this, that Christians are *completely sanctified,—absolutely sinless?* It even declares that they are raised above the possibility of sinning. I am the more desirous of turning my brother's attention to this passage, because he seems, somehow, to have overlooked it. This oversight may be thought by some to be a matter of wonder, considering that the text, understood in the large and absolute sense, which Mr. Mahan is so fond of in other cases, would be

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the present attainment of sinless perfection to a few extraordinary saints, when the infallible Word of God attributes it to *all* believers?" It would be gratifying to know what reply Mr. Mahan would make.

We will now proceed with our examination, making it our object to determine the true meaning of the texts which seem most favorable to the doctrine of "Perfection." And here, I think, we must be satisfied, that in some of the texts, the language used is intended to set forth the *sincerity* or *uprightness* of believers, in distinction from hypocrites, and also their freedom from any such offences, as would expose their public character to discredit, or their piety to suspicion. Job was *perfect* and *upright*. The two words are doubtless of the same general import, denoting real *integrity* or *goodness*. In several instances, the Psalmist uses the strong language of self-justification, and seems at first view to say, he is not chargeable with any sin, when his meaning evidently is, that he is innocent of the crimes which his enemies laid to his charge. Even if, at any time, he was not conscious of any particular sins; he was aware that he was liable to mistake, and apprehended that there might still be some concealed evil in his heart; and with a view to this, he prayed God to search him, and see if there was any wicked way in him. In some cases, pious men under the former dispensation are said to have *followed the Lord wholly*, when the obvious meaning is, that they kept themselves from idolatry, and adhered uniformly to the worship of the true God. When the New Testament writers speak of *perfection*, they often refer to a state of *maturity* or *manhood* in knowledge or in holiness, in distinction from a state of *childhood*,—a state of *advancement* in piety, in distinction from the common state of *new converts*; and sometimes they refer to the purity and blessedness of heaven, which is the high object to which all Christians aspire. But in no case do the circumstances require that the language employed should be understood to denote *complete sanctification as actually attained in the present life*. Now such being the fact, Mr. Mahan surely has reason to hesitate, and to go into a thorough examination of the subject, before he relies upon any of the texts which he cites, as proofs of his doctrine.

But it is so indescribably important to obtain a right under-

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not, in *other ways*, not yet mentioned, help us to determine in what light they looked upon Christians in the present life, and how their language in the texts referred to is to be understood.

Are we not then plainly taught, by the current representations of the inspired writers, that *the religion of God's people, throughout the present life, is progressive*, beginning at their conversion, and advancing from one degree of holiness to another, till they arrive at a state of perfect purity and blessedness in heaven? Is not the description, which the apostle gives (1 Cor. 13) of the progress of believers from partial to perfect *knowledge*, equally applicable to their progress in *piety*? This is plainly indicated by the fact that the same apostle expressly requires believers to *grow in grace*, as well as in *knowledge*. Can it be supposed that there were any Christians in the apostle's day, who had no need to grow in grace, and to whom that precept did not belong? How plainly does the apostle show, that he regarded religion as *progressive*, by what he says to Christians at Philippi:—"Being confident of this very thing, that he who hath begun a good work in you, will perform it," —*will be performing it*, or *bringing it to a completion*, "until the day of Christ." The work of sanctification was begun, and was to be *in a course of accomplishment*—was to *be finishing, until the day of Christ*; when it would be perfected. So the Psalmist viewed it: "I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness." Had the apostle considered the good work as fully accomplished already, he would naturally have said:—Being confident of this, that He who has begun and completed a good work in you, will keep you in that state of complete holiness until the day of Christ. But instead of this, he represents the finishing of the good work as what God was *still to do*. In accordance with all this, he shortly after prays that their "love may abound yet *more and more*." In another place he speaks of all believers as changed into the image of Christ *from glory to glory*. So it is set forth in the Old Testament: "The path of the just is as the shining light, shining *more and more* to the perfect day. The writer to the Hebrews exhorts believers to "follow holi-

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rected, by the same word, to *follow after holiness*,—clearly implying that it is not yet fully attained, but is still to be an object of pursuit. It will be noted, that the writer calls those to whom he wrote, "*holy*." They were so, as all believers are, *in a measure*. For them to *follow after holiness* was to aim at *higher* measures of it,—to aspire to that *perfection* of holiness, which they had not attained. This was enjoined upon *all Christians;* showing clearly what was in the mind of the inspired writer as to their real condition. If there had been any who were already perfect in holiness, how could they have been directed to *follow after* it, as an object to be obtained by future exertions? The same word is used by Paul to Timothy: "*Follow after* righteousness, goodness, faith, love, patience, meekness." Timothy had all these virtues in a degree; but he was to *follow after* them with a view to *higher* attainments.

The *progressive* nature of holiness in Christians is implied in all the texts which speak of their spiritual *warfare*. In this warfare, they are unceasingly to oppose every kind of evil, especially the evil in their own hearts. "Their warfare is within." In this warfare all Christians are engaged. The most advanced are not exempt. The apostle does indeed say, that Christians are already crucified and dead to sin. But keep in mind that he says this of *all* Christians. Keep in mind too, that he exhorts the same Christians to *put off* the old man, which is corrupt, and to *put on* the new man; to *be transformed* by the renewing of their minds, and to *put on* Christ;—urging all this as *a duty still to be done*. In like manner, he represents all Christians as *renewed;* and yet exhorts them *to be renewed*. It all shows, that the work of dying to sin is *begun*, and is to be *constantly advanced;* that at their conversion they are *renewed*, and that, so long as they live, they are to be renewed *more and more*. If the texts which represent Christians as renewed, dead to sin, &c., are understood to imply that the work of renovation is *completed*, what can be the meaning of the other texts, which enjoin the same thing upon *all* Christians, *as a duty still to be done?* And I must again request Mr. Mahan and others, from whom I am constrained to differ, to consider well, and not to

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necessity of adopting the *qualified* sense which I have given of the texts, or of going a step farther, and maintaining, that *all* real Christians are now perfectly holy. If they allow themselves in serious unfettered thought, they cannot long retain their present position.

But I must refer to another class of texts, which will afford us additional aid in determining how we are to regard the present condition of good men,—those which represent *their desires after holiness.* It is the very nature of *desire*, to aspire after a *future good*,—a good not yet obtained. According to the Scriptures, it is characteristic of all the followers of Christ, that they *hunger and thirst after righteousness*; that is, they have a strong desire for *complete holiness*; which implies that they have not yet obtained it. If, in any part of their life, they were already "filled," why should they "*hunger and thirst?*" When David said: "My soul *thirsteth and panteth* for God," did not his desires fix upon a good, which he did not then enjoy?

Consider also *the prayers which believers offer up for themselves.* No part of the Bible exhibits a more striking view of the devout exercises of the believer's heart, than Psalm cxix. In various ways, it expresses the sincerest reverence and love for the divine law, and the most determined obedience; and, at the same time, a reaching after what had not yet been obtained. "O that my feet were directed to keep thy statutes!—Then shall I not be ashamed, when I have respect to all thy commandments.—My soul cleaveth to the dust; quicken thou me according to thy word.—Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not unto covetousness.—Turn away mine eyes from beholding vanity, and quicken me in thy way.—I have seen an end of all perfection; but thy commandment is exceeding broad.—I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek thy servant; for I do not forget thy commandments." Language like this undoubtedly expresses the moral state and exercises of all true believers on earth. It is the language of those who, with warm desire and strong purpose of heart, are following after complete sanctification. As to the true meaning and intent of the language, let the wisest and best men who use it be the judges. It is easy to invent novel and eccentric interpretations of the Bible.

ed up for the whole body of believers. Jesus said: "I pray not that thou shouldst take them out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from the evil.—*Sanctify them through thy truth.*" The work of sanctification was begun in them. Jesus prayed that it might be advanced and perfected. So when Mr. Mahan, and the followers of Christ generally pray God to sanctify their fellow Christians, they doubtless fix their desires upon a degree of sanctification not yet attained. Jesus prayed also that believers might be *one*,—referring to a degree of union far above what then existed, or ever has existed since that time.

The first Christians were in circumstances highly favorable to eminent holiness. The great truths of the gospel came to their understandings and hearts in all their beauty and freshness, from the lips of inspired Apostles, unadulterated by human mixtures, and attended with the extraordinary power of the Holy Spirit. No doubt they did attain to a remarkable degree of faith and obedience, and may properly be regarded as patterns of piety to Christians in following ages. But how were the Apostles accustomed to *pray* for them? And what must have been the desires and aims, implied in their prayers?

After addressing the Christians at Thessalonica, who had truly received the gospel, and in whom it worked effectually; and after calling them his joy and crown, and telling them that he and his fellow-laborers, in all their afflictions, were comforted over them by their faith; the Apostle says: "We pray exceedingly that we might see your face, and might *perfect* that which is *lacking* in your *faith*." And then he adds: "The Lord make you to *increase* and abound in love towards one another, and towards all men, to the end he may establish your hearts in holiness." Again, in the same Epistle: "The God of peace sanctify you *wholly*." So in Heb. 13: 21: "The God of peace—*make you perfect* in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight." In another place: "The Lord *direct* your hearts *into* the love of God." He also prayed that God would *fulfil* in them all "the good pleasure of his goodness." For the Ephesians he prayed, that God would grant unto them "to be strengthened with might by his Spirit"—that they might "know the love of

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Now what was implied in these prayers for primitive believers? The same, unquestionably, as is commonly implied, when similar prayers are offered up at the present day. Devout ministers and Christians everywhere pray for believers,—for *all* believers, that their hearts may be directed into the love of God; that their love may *increase;* that God would *sanctify* them, and sanctify them *wholly;* and that they may be filled with all the fulness of God. And if Mr. Mahan and other Christians will look into their own hearts, and see what they really mean, when they offer up such prayers, they will be likely to know what the Apostles meant. We have no evidence that the disciples ever prayed in *any* way for their Lord and Master. But if they prayed for him at all, did they ever pray for him in *this* manner? He offered up prayer to God for *himself*. But did he ever pray, that his love might *increase* and *abound*, and that God would sanctify him *wholly?*—The prayers which Christ and the Apostles offered up, and which are now offered up, and doubtless will be, to the end of time, for the whole body of believers, evidently imply, that whatever their attainments may be, they do, and always will, while here below, fall short of perfect sanctification; and that all the saints on earth are and will be in such a state, that they will always do, what Jesus never did, make continual *confession* of *sin*, and continually offer up *the sacrifice* of *a broken heart*, and a *contrite spirit*, as the sacrifice which God approves, *till they arrive at heaven.*

One thing more. All Christians suffer *affliction.* And what is the meaning and design of affliction? "The Lord does not afflict willingly the children of men, but for their profit, that they may be partakers of his holiness." "It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy statutes." The design of affliction is set forth with special clearness in Heb. 12. "Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. What son is he whom the father chasteneth not? If ye be without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons." And the writer adds, that God chastens us "for our profit, that we may be partakers of his holiness." What now must be our conclusion, but this, that, as all Chris-

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end is accomplished, the rod will be used. *When* this end is accomplished, it will no more be used." Who could express the sentiment of the sacred writer better? This is the view which gives all its force to the argument. *Till* believers are made partakers of God's holiness, the rod is used. *When* this is fully accomplished, *the rod is no more used.* Who now has this evidence of complete conformity to the divine holiness? Has Mr. Mahan, or Mr. Fitch, or any who agree with them? Are they free from affliction? Can they say that the rod is no more used with them? But would they any longer endure chastisement, if sanctification, which is the object of it, were fully accomplished? If any of them are indeed "*without* chastisement" what does the Scripture say of them? Now chastisement, if just, always implies some fault in the one who is chastised. When you see a wise and good father correcting his children, you know that he sees something amiss in them. And as divine chastisement is continued to all believers, as long as life lasts, it must be that God sees in them some fault to be corrected, or some moral deficiency to be supplied. When the end of chastisement is fully accomplished, Mr. Mahan says, "it will no more be used."

Now, the last and generally the greatest affliction which believers suffer, is *death.* And why may not this, as well as all preceding afflictions, be intended, by a wonder-working God, for their benefit, that they may, in a higher degree than before, be partakers of his holiness? Being the last, and a most remarkable case of suffering, why may it not be the means of completing their sanctification; and so the means of working out for them, in the last instance, a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory? On the very principle laid down by Mr. Mahan, as well as by the sacred writer, why is it not reasonable to conclude, that the whole end of suffering is not accomplished *before* death, but is accomplished *at* death; and that this is the reason why there is no affliction after death? And how common it has been for the wisest and best of men to look upon death in this light, and to anticipate the event, however painful, as a blessing—a means of delivering them from all remains of depravity, and of finishing in them the work of preparation for heaven! *So long as they are in this tabernacle*

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then actually give them the grace, which will *make* them perfectly holy to-day? Again, would not God have been better glorified, if Mr. Mahan and other Christians had been converted at an earlier period of their life? If so, then there was no reason why he should withhold the grace which would have converted them earlier. And as he *does* nothing and *omits* nothing without reason, it must be that he actually bestowed the grace which converted them earlier; that is, bestowed the grace which converted them before they were converted. Once more. Mr. Mahan thinks that he was a wanderer from the right way, while he was a member of this Seminary; and in his charitable judgment, all his fellow-students were in so low and lamentable a state, that "not a single individual," out of so large a number, "enjoyed daily communion and peace with God." Surely Mr. Mahan thinks God would, at that time, have been more glorified by his complete holiness and that of his brethren, than by their very partial holiness. Must it not then have been the fact, that God did actually give them the grace which *made* them completely holy? But as this grace was not given, and as he thinks there could have been no other reason for not giving it, than the one he mentions, must not his conclusion be, that it was withheld without any reason?

I have dwelt so long on this point, to show that this mode of reasoning involves the most glaring falsities, and leads to the most dangerous results. What shipwreck will any one make of the truth, who argues in this manner! It is going beyond our province, and attempting to intrude ourselves irreverently into those secret things which belong only to God. Why should we take upon us to determine, by our own fallible judgment, what the dispensations of God will be? We know what the Lord requires of *us*,—that we should glorify him by constant and entire obedience. But how he will see fit to glorify *himself*, in his sovereign Providence, is another question. And who is able to compare the different ways in which God may do this, and to determine, by his own reason, which God will prefer? Who is authorized to say, that God will not overrule the sinfulness which remains in his own children to the end of life, so as to make it the means of honoring, in the highest degree, his own infinite wisdom and grace? By this and all the

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of the texts referred to, we have found that the circumstances of the case clearly forbid us to understand them in the literal and absolute sense. And our conclusion is, that the same *may* be true in respect to the other texts, though for reasons less obvious. 3. We have found, that the terms used in some of the texts are evidently designed to express the *integrity* of true believers, in distinction from hypocrites, or their freedom from *particular sins* which were charged upon them by others, or to which they were exposed; or the *maturity* of their religious character, compared with its commencement; or perhaps the fact, that they had *all the essential parts of the new man*, though in an imperfect state. In no case is the highest sense of the words absolutely required. 4. The *current* language of the sacred writers, in a variety of respects, implies that the piety of believers during the present life is *progressive*. 5. Complete holiness is represented as an object of *desire* to believers, desire, from its very nature, fixing upon a *future* good—a good not yet possessed. 6. Complete holiness is an object of the *prayers*, which the saints offered up for themselves and for one another; implying that it was regarded as a *good, not yet obtained*. 7. *Affliction*, or chastisement, which is intended as a means of sanctification, is continued to believers up to the very close of life; implying that, so long as life lasts, they have remaining sinfulness which calls for it. 8. The most advanced saints have always been *conscious* of the imperfection of their holiness.

Now do not all these plain instructions and representations, both separately and unitedly, make known the real spiritual state of the people of God during the present life? Do they not show very satisfactorily, that it was not the design of the sacred writers to teach the doctrine, that the saints as a body, or any part of them, actually attain to sinless perfection here? And must we not, therefore, understand all the texts which, at first view, seem to favor the doctrine of "Perfection," in a *qualified* or *comparative* sense, a sense corresponding with the general teachings of the Bible, as to the actual state of believers in the present world?

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of being progressive, comes to perfection at once: suppose we had found, that believers, instead of desiring and panting after complete holiness, have always been in the habit of congratulating themselves as already possessing it; and that, instead of earnestly praying for it, they have habitually thanked the Lord, that he had already bestowed it upon them: suppose we had found that their struggle with indwelling sin is past, their warfare ended; that they have no more chastisement, and of course no faults that call for it: and suppose it to be the belief, the inward consciousness of Christians, especially of those most distinguished for their piety, that they have already attained to a state of sinless perfection: suppose all this to be true, how different would be our conclusion! We should at once agree to give all the texts referred to the largest and most absolute sense. And instead of disputing against "the doctrine of Christian Perfection," we should carry it much higher than its present advocates do. But what shall we say, and what will the advocates of the doctrine say, when it is seen that the evidence is all on the other side?

As to the many remaining topics of remark introduced by Mr. Mahan and his associates, I shall confine myself to those which seem to be of chief consequence, and shall dispose of them as briefly as possible.

PAUL AND OTHERS HELD UP AS EXAMPLES.

It is mentioned as a proof of Paul's complete sanctification, that he exhorts Christians to *copy his example*—to be followers of him as he was of Christ. The argument is, that he could not have held himself up as an example, had he not been perfectly free from sin.

On this I remark, that Paul speaks of the Thessalonian Christians much in the same manner in this respect, as he does of himself: "Ye became followers of us and of the Lord, so that ye *became ensamples* to all that believe in Macedonia and Achaia." He also speaks with approbation of the Thessalonians as *followers of the churches in Judea*, implying that those churches were worthy of imitation. This argument then would prove that the mass of believers in Thessalonica and Judea

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rily imply more than that they were distinguished for piety in general, or for some particular branch of it. It is the same at the present day. If any man, a parent, a minister, or other Christian, exhibits the character of goodness more uniformly and conspicuously than is common; who hesitates to speak of him, as an *example of goodness*, and to exhort others to the duty of imitation? Our meaning is, not that he is without any fault—far from it—but that he is a good example *in the main*, or as to the *prominent traits of his character*, or as to *what is visible*. Thus Leighton, Baxter, Doddridge, Edwards, Brainerd, Payson and others are often spoken of as safe and useful examples. But who has any idea that they were *perfectly sanctified?* Who knows not that they were conscious of many sinful imperfections? Undoubtedly the sacred writers were accustomed to speak in the same *qualified sense*. Nothing can be more manifestly contrary to all just principles of interpretation and of reasoning, than to force the sense of a Scripture word or phrase to *the highest possible pitch*, and then to argue from that extreme sense, as though it were the *true* sense, in support of some uncommon opinion.

PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTION, AND OF THE COMMON DOCTRINE.

Mr. Mahan thinks much of the *practical effect* of his doctrine; and he represents those who do not embrace it, as making void God's law by their traditions. He seems to think (Disc. pp. 44—46, etc.) that the most eminent saints on earth have done nothing effectually towards their own sanctification, because they have not been in possession of the grand secret of efficient holy action. He says: "Who would expect an army to fight under the impression of inevitable defeat?"—thus misrepresenting our views, and taking advantage of the misrepresentation to discredit our doctrine, and to give plausibility to his own. Again, not seeming to be at all sensible how strangely and totally he misrepresents the great body of ministers and Christians, he first asserts (Repos. pp. 418—19) that his doctrine involves the

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this world. And if they are disturbed with such doubts, what can they do but resort to the comforting truth, that, though they may fail of reaching complete holiness here, they shall reach it in heaven? And a small portion of true faith will bring the perfection of the heavenly state *very near*.

I have sometimes tried to account for it, that Mr. Mahan's doctrine exerts so mighty an influence over his mind and the minds of others, calling forth energies and imparting joys before unknown. He will allow me to say that I cannot ascribe all this to the *truth of his doctrine;* for I do not consider the doctrine to *be* true. And I would not undertake to pry into the secret chambers of his mind, and to judge of the unwonted movements which have been going on there. But there is a principle, implanted in our common nature, which operates powerfully in such a case, and in some minds *very* powerfully. When a philosopher, or a navigator makes a discovery, he is filled with emotions which can hardly be described; and he publishes it abroad with a zeal proportioned to his view of its importance. And its importance will be likely to rise very high, in his view, from the circumstance that *he* is the discoverer. The doctrine of perfection has indeed been long before the public. But Mr. Mahan appears not to have received it at second hand. It came to him as a new discovery. Suddenly, and in a remarkable manner, his eyes were opened, and he saw the freeness and fulness of gospel grace, and the way in which a believer can at once obtain sanctification. Now I would not, for the world, trifle with those unusual operations of his mind; for there is reason to think, that the Spirit of God was with him, and that he did actually attain to a more entire consecration of himself to God than before. But who can be sure that he was not more or less elated with the new discovery? Even the Apostle Paul, —that Mr. Mahan thinks was perfect,—even that great Apostle was in danger of being exalted above measure with the revelations made to him, when he was caught up to the third heaven. And it was found to be necessary that he should have a very humbling and long-continued affliction, a thorn in the flesh, to guard his heart from pride and self-complacency. And it cannot be going too far to suppose, that Mr. Mahan is as much exposed to this danger, as the great Apostle was. And surely it will not be amiss for him to inquire, whether his re-

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perfectly holy, *when he is not.* This would be the *belief* of *error.* And it is easy to see what effect the belief of error, particularly of such an error as this, must have upon one who is sanctified only in part. And as I am persuaded, that those who think themselves completely sanctified are mistaken, I cannot but conclude, that their opinion of themselves, is really thinking of themselves more highly than they ought to think, and that its hurtful influence upon their feelings and conduct will ere-long become visible.

My second remark is, that we, who do not believe the doctrine, are *in some danger of injuring ourselves and others by opposing it.* The preaching and the writings of those who maintain the doctrine contain a great portion of most precious truth. And it is by this mixture of truth, that the error is made plausible, and insinuates itself into the minds of others. Now the danger is, that by means of the opposition we make to the particular error which they hold, we shall be led to believe the important truths contained in their writings with less firmness, to love them with less sincerity, and to use them less profitably. The Lord preserve us from this danger, and so influence our minds and hearts, that we shall most heartily believe that portion of the truth which is exhibited in the writings referred to, and shall give it even a higher place in our thoughts and in our preaching, than we have heretofore done. Thus, while we prove all things, may we hold fast that which is good.

My last remark is, that *we ought not to be over anxious on account of the temporary prevalence of error.* We ought to exert ourselves to the utmost in the spirit of love, to defend and propagate the truth, and confute error; to cherish the sincerest desires, and offer up the most fervent prayers for the good of our fellow men, and for the advancement of the reign of Christ. Thus faithfully performing the duties which devolve on us, we may, with confidence and with quietness of mind, commit all the interests of the church to the God of truth, who will certainly take care of his own cause, and will, in his sovereign Providence, confound every false doctrine far more effectually, than we can by our arguments. And this he often does by letting error run on, till its nature is acted out, and its fruits are made

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in new discovered facts, as in seeming recollections of what had previously been concealed beneath the soul's own consciousness; although forming as real a part of its being, as its best known, its most familiar thoughts and emotions. In the other class all is external,—a posteriori,—inductive,—never exceeding the limit of those generalizations, to which experiment is the only guide. Theories here are themselves experiments. Even when best founded, they are but hasty generalizations, in which the impatient mind, in order to obtain a better field of view, ventures to assume an advance position, to be retained only in case subsequent induction should fill up the links which connect it with previously ascertained facts.

We have said that Philology possesses the middle ground between these two grand departments of science; or rather, that it belongs equally to both. Language is an emanation of the mind, and may thus be regarded as part of the mind itself. When actually formed, however, it is as clearly objective as the phenomena of astronomy or chemistry. It is what the natural sciences would be, were nature really, and not merely in the dreams of the transcendentalist, the creation of the soul that contemplates its laws. Language is the objective medium through which the mind views itself,—the *intelligible species* of its own creation (if we may use the language of the schoolmen), by which it impresses, with its own image, the *sensible species* of the external world, and transmutes them into that knowledge, which becomes a part of its intellectual being. These remarks are applicable to language in its most extensive sense, as that medium of communication from soul to soul, which, however it may vary in its modes, must be supposed necessary for every rank of being beneath him to whom all things are *immediately* present in their unveiled essences.

Its modes of investigation partake of the same character. It may be studied by the a priori, or by the inductive method. It may be regarded as a type of the soul, or as the object of experiment, having a phenomenal existence in vocal enunciation or written characters. These two methods may be united, and it is their happy union that gives rise in certain minds to that exquisite delight which is found in the study of philology; especially, that part, which relates not so much to the external dress, as to the inner spirit. Induction here is not so much

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to one of its principal merits. The delightful ease with which we pass over its pages, the interesting manner in which the author has laid open to us the processes of our own minds, the many apposite and beautiful examples adduced by way of illustration, the absence of all pedantry, its freedom from far-fetched theorizing and illogical reasoning produce such an impression of ease, truth and clearness, that we almost claim the thoughts and conclusions as our own, so spontaneously do our own minds meet those views which are everywhere presented. It is this, which makes it at first difficult for the reader to conceive the vast amount of labor which the work must have cost, the great care which must have been used in arranging principles in such natural succession, the toilsome minuteness of investigation which has produced so great a number of apposite illustrations, and that watchful avoidance of prolixity whereby the author has been enabled successfully to condense, into an octavo volume of 350 pages, such an amount of practical knowledge and philosophical investigation.

We might enlarge upon the style, arrangement and typographical beauty of the work. Its chief merit, however, as before observed, is the well-sustained union of the subjective and objective, or a priori and inductive modes of investigation. The latter, when used alone, produces an uninteresting collection of facts, and of rules, apparently arbitrary, founded upon them. Unlike the results of induction in the physical sciences, they present the phenomena of principles with continual exceptions; and these, at times, almost as numerous as the cases which seem to be embraced by the rule. The impression is thus produced, that every thing in language is arbitrary; that its principles are not to be found already deposited in the soul itself, but must be obtained only by induction from without, and retained only by the iron grasp of memory. This must be so, as long as the external manifestation is alone the object of study. A resort to the other process shows us, that these exceptions are only apparent, and that with each variety of expression, there is also connected—whether we can discover it or not—a corresponding variation in the mode of conception. The one process presents the mere anatomy of language, the other supplies it with nerves and muscles. The one furnishes the materials, the other builds them into a living, organic system.

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The former may be deduced, and deduced correctly, by a priori reasoning. The results obtained will be correct; the hypotheses will be well founded; but they will lack system. They will not be all the results. They may not be the results which are most needed. A careful study of the modes of the mind's conceptions will give us truth on which we may rely as far as it goes, but it will not give us all the truth, neither does it necessarily conduct us to those we most desire. The mind needs a guide in the examination of itself, and this guide is found in the experimental use of that objective instrument which the soul has instinctively created, and in which its most secret processes will be found to have exhibited themselves in a visible form and order. Besides, although all human minds are essentially the same, yet, from peculiar circumstances, certain modes of conception may be more common in one age and nation, than in others. In a system of general grammar, they must all be alike viewed as having their foundation in the universal laws of the mind. Those, then, which in any one language are more prominent, or so frequently employed as to become idiomatic, can only be ascertained by a careful examination of it, as an external existing thing. As, for example, the occasional use of the present for the past may be said in some degree to belong to every tongue. It may, however, be the case that a greater vividness of conception, a fondness for the descriptive rather than the narrative style, arising from the peculiar circumstances of a people, may make this a predominant trait in one language, whilst in another it is hardly known. Again, there may be something so very unusual in the condition and habits of one nation, that its dialect may exhibit peculiarities of which no traces can elsewhere be found; as in the case of the Hebrew prophetical past. This could hardly be contained in a system of general grammar, and could not well be deduced from a priori reasoning, because it depends upon a supernatural state of the soul, superinduced by a divine influence.

The almost exclusively inductive method may be said to characterize the works of Gesenius. The opposite fault is less common, although it manifests itself, in a high degree, in the writings of some of the ablest German philologists. Our author, as we conclude after a careful examination of the work, has most happily combined the two methods, and the success of

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cation of his principles. The mind is not wearied, on the one hand, with a dull collection of apparently arbitrary rules, followed by hosts of exceptions beyond the power of memory to retain, or bewildered with theories of general grammar, which have not been verified by a careful induction from the particular language to which they are applied. In almost every page we are reminded of the presence of one pervading principle, which may be regarded as the soul of the work. It seems to be assumed as the fundamental position, which every thing else is designed to illustrate, that there is nothing arbitrary in the syntax of a language; that a reason exists for every change, although that reason may not be always discoverable, or may not have been, in the majority of cases, distinctly present to the consciousness of the writer; or, in other words, that we have not the full sense of a passage, until we can enter into the variation of feeling or conception, by which a variation of expression was caused. When this is discovered, the rule of syntax no longer comes by induction from *without*, and lodges in the folds of the memory, but is found to exist *within* us, written on the soul, though now, it may be for the first time, brought forth into the light of its own consciousness. It follows also conversely from this, that for the student to give the full meaning of a passage, and to feel the emotion which gave rise to its peculiar phraseology, is to give its rule of syntax. Unless they lead to this, rules are useless; and when they do accomplish this, they absolve the memory from the difficult task of retaining them as mere abstract propositions.

We will not say that there can be no exception to a rule of syntax, as there can be none to a principle in physics when rightly understood and cleared of every thing extraneous; but we must conclude, that language is not a correct representation of the minds of those who use it, in as far as it allows of arbitrary varieties in the expression of the same subjective state. The external fact stated, or the scene described may indeed be set forth in various modes; but these arise from, and constantly follow certain modes of conception, under which the same fact or scene may present itself to different minds, or to the same mind in different circumstances. In translating, therefore, it

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case is this principle of more value than in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. The critical grammarian must then investigate the new aspect or change of conception, to which the superadded emotion is to be attributed. In one case there may be the mere historical mention of a fact, in which the writer manifests but little interest, and demands none of the reader: at another time, the same event or one in all respects similar, may be connected with certain strong emotions of the narrator. In one case, the subject and predicate may be viewed as of equal importance, or the mind may be simply occupied with the assertion of their logical connection. Here the sentence will present its ordinary grammatical form, free from all apparent anomalies. The ordinary principles of agreement in gender and number will be observed, and every thing will be adjusted to a proper balance. Again, in relating the same fact or stating the same proposition, the soul may be so occupied with one part, as to destroy this balance, and to impel to a mode of expression, giving greater conspicuousness to that which lies nearest the heart. This can only be effected by sundering the ordinary connections, and causing the emphatic word to stand out in anomalous prominence. To understand this, it is not enough to be content with external induction, which would class all these apparent irregularities as exceptions, but we must enter subjectively into the writer's state of mind, or in other words, put our soul in his soul's stead. Then do we not only understand or remember, but we are *feelingly impressed* with the fact or sentiment intended to be communicated.

The work before us is entitled to the praise of having done much to accomplish this important end. The space allotted to us would not admit of extended illustrations. We select a few portions, and dwell upon them with some degree of minuteness. Passing over the chapter on the article, we select examples from that department of agreement, which is supposed to abound so much in anomalies, and in which, in other grammars, there are so many arbitrary exceptions. Many of these are satisfactorily disposed of under the head of nouns construed collectively.

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assert a logical connection. There is associated with them an emotion of the speaker, which destroys the balance, and leads him to adopt some mode of expression, which may place the mind of the hearer in the same state. Hence if the cause of this emotion be the subject, it is separated from its verb by a difference of number or gender; or rather, the predicate is thrown into the impersonal form, and the isolated subject presents thereby a stronger claim upon the attention. Thus, for example: *A grievous vision is declared unto me:—Thy terror hath deceived thee:—A cry is heard among the nations:—Iniquity was not found in his lips:—Knowledge is pleasant to the soul.* In all these examples, as they stand in our translation, there is simply the assertion of the logical connection of the subject with the predicate, with nothing to suggest any thing anomalous in the original. Such anomalies, however, do exist, without an understanding of which we cannot put ourselves in the subjective state of the writer, or receive *all*, whether of fact or emotion, which he intended to convey. In every one of these cases, the predicate is of a different gender from the subject, by which fact, the reader is, as it were, directed to use the former impersonally, and to regard the latter as in a certain sense independent. Their best rendering into English, according to this view would be as follows:

*A grievous vision! it is declared unto me.**
Thy own terribleness! it hath deceived thee.†
A cry! among the nations is it heard.‡
Iniquity! it was not found in his lips.§
Knowledge! it is pleasant to the soul.‖

In the first example, the ordinary translation is too cold. Something anomalous in the expression was required to set forth a peculiar modification of the conception. The context will show why this apostrophic mode was adopted. The soul of the prophet, *on the watchtower*, was occupied with the vision itself, not simply with the fact of its having been declared. In the second example, there is a superadded emotion. It was not simply *terribleness*, but *thine own* terribleness, etc. This, it is true, might have been expressed by the suffix pronoun alone, but it would not have been sufficient to give that prominence

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different; for then, instead of being an appendage to a noun, it constitutes a most important part of the sentence, and is accordingly placed before the noun, at or near the commencement of the proposition." The mere order of the location of words must, we think, be regarded as belonging to the externals of a language, in the same manner as its elementary sounds and forms. For these, no doubt, reasons exist, but they pertain rather to the sensitive than to the rational or logical soul, and are, therefore, less capable of a priori explanation. Other languages, we know, assign a different place to those which are deemed the most important words, and sometimes defer them to the very close. We can, however, determine a priori, with almost as much confidence as is felt in the solution of a mathematical problem, that every language must have *two distinct modes* for expressing the difference of conception, which arises from regarding the adjective as predicative or qualificative, and that these modes when established would be almost invariably adhered to. Induction is to determine the particular method adopted; but when this is done, it belongs to the critical grammarian to explain apparent exceptions, and reduce them all, if possible, in subjection to the reason of the general rule. We think that our author has not always gone as far as he might in the application of his own principles. He allows the predicative adjective, in some few cases, to follow the noun. It may be a question, however, whether in all the instances cited as exceptions, the full sense is not better brought out by adhering to the general position, and regarding the adjective as a qualificative. Thus, Ps. 99: 2 is rendered: *Jehovah is great in Zion.* The adjective in the Hebrew has the position of a qualificative, and we cannot help thinking that by so regarding it in reality, we obtain a more vivid sense, and enter more truly into the conception of the writer: *The Great Jehovah is in Zion.* The one proposition seems to limit his greatness; the other expresses, at the same time, his universal agency and condescending protection of his peculiar people. On a careful examination of all the cases of apparent exception cited under this head, we have little doubt that they may all, in a similar manner, be reconciled with the general usage of the language.

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excellence of the work. Attempts are everywhere made, and generally with complete success, to refer all varieties of expression, to changes in the subjective state of the writer. We find this, especially, in the very full discussion of direct and indirect objective relation, which abounds in the most apposite illustrations, and renders what is generally regarded as the least interesting portion of Syntax, one of the most satisfactory in the work. All seeming departures from the more ordinary usus loquendi are regarded, not as arbitrary, but as having a real foundation in the state of the writer's soul, according as it views an event or a truth under different aspects, or with different degrees of emotion. In this way, the author accounts for the frequent omissions of prepositions in Hebrew poetry, as arising from the particular manner of viewing the relation, and the energetic conciseness of the poetical conception.

We would notice here, by the way, the accuracy everywhere exhibited in the divisions and subdivisions under each head of each chapter, and the great number of carefully selected examples, with which they are enriched. Some might fancy that there is too much minuteness. Whilst, however, so little is omitted that the subject almost seems exhausted, there is, at the same time, still less that can be regarded as redundant. The author can seldom be charged with bringing under special subdivisions, what might have been included in the general principle, although such cases may occasionally be found. It may also be thought that the book is crowded with too many examples. This, however, should be regarded as one of its chief merits. No reduction in the size of the volume could have countervailed the loss arising from such an omission, although, if collected in a body, these examples would form no small portion of the Hebrew Bible. The object could not have been to swell the work with matter easily obtained; on the contrary, there can be no doubt, that in this very department there have been bestowed the most scrupulous care, and the severest toil. He has thus furnished to his reader a most agreeable exercise, in tracing the application of principles, in the thousands of examples cited, and methodically arranged. To obviate all objections on the score of economy, it may be said, that the course adopted entirely supersedes the necessity of a praxis or chrestomathy. The student who is tolerably acquainted with the ety-

such a one a better course could not be advised, than to read this second volume, without the omission of a single reference; examining also, when necessary, the contexts in the Bible as far as is required for their more full explication. He will thus familiarize himself in the most pleasant manner with all the important principles of Hebrew Syntax, and at the same time, peruse to great advantage, in a critical point of view, no small portion of the sacred writings. Should he mark in the margin of his Bible, opposite to all the examples quoted, the number of the paragraph in which they are cited, and in his subsequent reading endeavor to associate these marked passages with the sections of the grammar to which they refer, he would adopt one of the most rapid and effectual means of rendering himself a critical Hebraist.

We proceed to the chapter on the Hebrew tenses. This may be regarded as, in some respects, the most finished and satisfactory portion of the whole work. The subject has long been viewed as presenting almost insurmountable difficulties. Many excellent scholars have been led to regard them as having in themselves no distinctive character, but to be determined in every case by the context and the *exigentia loci*. The student, on his first introduction to the language, is struck with that peculiarity by which the Hebrew is distinguished, in the use of only two tenses, the past and future, without any distinct form for the present. His surprise is increased on learning that the office of each of the tenses is reversed by simply prefixing the conjunction Vau. Indulging the hope that these rules, so unlike all his former experience, will nevertheless be found definite and fixed in their applications, he enters upon the reading of the Hebrew Bible with little apprehension of any practical difficulty. In the narrative parts they are observed with a tolerable degree of uniformity, with now and then some rather startling exceptions; but on entering upon the study of the didactic and devotional books, he finds himself perplexed at every step, and almost utterly without a guide. All the special exceptions and explanations, laid down in his grammar, fail to meet the difficulties which are constantly presenting themselves. No rule holds good for a single consecutive chapter; till at length, he ceases to pay any regard to them, and governs himself, in every case, by the apparent demands of the sense. To escape these difficul-

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thor says, is to represent the Hebrew as destitute of tenses altogether. These terms suggest nothing as to the nature of the forms to which they are applied. It is most evident that they do contain a distinction of time of some kind, and that the predominant office of the one, when standing alone, is to designate the past, and of the other the future. This most plainly appears in those cases in which the time is an essential part of the proposition, and, especially, when the two forms are antithetically employed.

We are satisfied from careful examination, that our author has adopted the only theory by which these apparent anomalies may be explained. Its novelty does not consist merely in the use of the terms *absolute* and *relative*, for these had been employed by others before him; but in the peculiar manner in which he applies them to particular examples. We would, however, venture the opinion that the author has not tested, to their fullest extent, his own views. The principles he has laid down, if carried out in all their details, might perhaps have interfered with the assigned limits of the work. But we are satisfied, that a faithful application of their spirit would introduce a most beautiful order into what has heretofore been regarded as a chaos, and deliver his own system from some apparently arbitrary exceptions which are yet allowed to remain. We fully concur with him in the opinion, that the source of all our perplexity is found in our occidental mode of viewing time. Time with us is ever on the wing. The present is our fixed point, and we are stationary in it. The future is regarded as an unreal and imaginary region, ever coming forwards and sweeping by us into the certainty of the past, whilst the latter is continually receding farther and farther from our view.

> Ut unda impellitur unda
> Tempora sic fugiunt

is the standing simile in all the occidental tongues. Hence, according to our mode of conception, the present becomes the

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ments. According to the Hebrew conception, the future world does not come to us and acquire *reality* by being made present, but we are going into it. It has as real an existence as that through which we have passed. In the prophetic vision, events are there, even now, preceding and succeeding each other. It has its relations of antecedent and consequent, of cause and effect. The Hebrew present, on the other hand, is ever the shifting station from which past or future scenes are viewed. It has only a subjective existence in the soul by which its position is determined. We may transport ourselves far back, in the annals of time, and view historical facts as still past or future to each other; or into the ages to come, and find there the existence of the same relations. The position assumed is ever the dividing point. In a simple narration of the successive order of events, the first of the series constitutes this subjective standpoint of observation, and all that follow bear to it the relation of future. In the prophetic ecstasy, the order is reversed. Events, which require the journey of ages before we can reach them, are to the Seer long since past and gone. This then is the peculiarity of the Hebrew. It ever represents facts, not in reference to a *fixed* present, but as they exist subjectively in the mind of the narrator; who views them in the relations which they bear, not to himself, or to us, but to each other. When there is a necessity for fixing the actual present, other modes, as we shall see, are resorted to.

We cannot stop to show that this conception of time is as natural as our own, and more philosophically correct. It is sufficient for us to be satisfied that it is the Hebrew mode, and the true cause of those apparent anomalies, which have so much perplexed the lovers of this ancient language. When the soul of the reader is thoroughly imbued with this view, so that the order of his conceptions begins to be influenced by it, we can easily imagine how much more life and strength will be imparted to Hebrew narration and description. The occidental style may be compared to an historical painting, in which actors and events are fixed immovably upon the canvass; the oriental to a picture, in which, by some mysterious art, they are endowed with life and motion, ever presenting a varied aspect accord-

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[illegible] are seen from varying positions.

precedes. *The work of the Lord they regard not* (יַבִּיטוּ) *nor consider* (רָאוּ) *the productions of his hands.* Is. 5: 12. The latter fact stated may be regarded as the cause of the first, and therefore preceding it in time, although not in the order of logical construction; the first as a consequence of the second, and therefore future in reference to it. *I trust* (בָּטַחְתִּי) *in thy mercy, my heart rejoices* (יָגֵל) *in thy salvation, oh let me sing* (אָשִׁירָה) *unto the Lord, for he hath, &c.* Ps. 13: 6. First, *present trust* founded on *past experience* or promises;—the second, *present joy*, with the *expectation* of its continuance;—the third (the paragogic future), *present praise*, with an ardent *desire* that it may be eternal. All these, taken together, constitute one present subjective state of the soul. The language however expresses not only this, but also all their modified relations. It may be said that the second verb here might be rendered directly in the future: *My heart shall rejoice.* But this would not give the full sense, as it would contemplate a future time detached from the present. The full emotion can only be received by discarding all occidental forms, by entering into the Hebrew mode of conception, and thus taking the sense directly from the original. We fully believe that nothing will more contribute to such a habit of reading, than a careful study of the principles laid down by our author, and that, in this respect, their constant application will serve the purpose of a living commentary, evolving not only the facts and truths, but all the thought and feeling of a passage, in a manner at once the most satisfactory and delightful.

When thus viewed, the want of a precise form for the present, and the supplying of its place by the varied use of the preterite and future, might seem an excellence, rather than a defect. We would not wholly adopt a position so paradoxical. There is undoubtedly a want of precision, in those cases in which the actual present time of an event is an essential part of the proposition. Still the opinion may be hazarded, that in description, and the expression of the states, and emotions of the soul, there is a positive advantage, in not being confined to a form which in its natural acceptation relates only to one point of time. In the examples we have cited, and others of a similar kind, the nature of the subject sufficiently indicates the present

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to the predominance of experience or faith founded upon the past, or of hope, fear, or desire in reference to the future.

In respect to the relative forms, the author makes every thing to depend upon a right understanding of the leading tense. Being in their nature merely consecutive, they are to be regarded as past, present, or future, according to the time of the principal verb to which they stand related. Careful attention must here be given to the rules laid down by the author, in order to a proper appreciation of the truth of his theory. But, there is one difficulty in respect to the relative future or וְקָטַל form which we do not think is sufficiently explained. He regards it as inversely analogous to the relative past. To be completely so, however, it should represent a future nearer to the actual present than the leading verb; that is, a future to which this leading verb is still more remotely future. There are doubtless many cases to which this view of the matter would be applicable, and in which the particle *Vau* may be rendered by the connective *when*, denoting that the verb to which it is prefixed, although subsequent in the order of construction, either actually precedes the other in time, or is simultaneous; being brought in by way of explanation, or as constituting the cause, of which the preceding verb denotes the effect. Thus, *Then shalt thou delight* (תִּתְעַנַּג) *thyself in the Lord, and I will feed* (וְהַאֲכַלְתִּיךָ) *thee with the inheritance of Jacob* (as it is in our translation), would be better rendered: *Then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord, when I shall have fed thee with the inheritance of Jacob.* Is. 58: 14. The majority of cases, however, will not submit to this explanation. The relative future will often be found to be strictly consecutive. Why then should not the וַיִּקְטֹל form be used to denote *succession* in the future, as well as in the past, since this is its natural office, and since it depends for its actual time on the leading verb? The truth is, that it is often used in this manner, when, as our author tells us, the succession of future events is to be set forth with great emphasis and solemnity, as: *I will call thee in righteousness, and I will hold thee by the hand;* just as we repeat the auxiliary *will* in like cases. But in ordinary predictions, there seems to be a propriety in the

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relative forms, the various modifications which arise from them are clearly set forth. A general proposition, which always holds true, is expressed in other languages by a present or an aorist. In Hebrew, the past or future is used, according as it is regarded as a maxim founded upon *experience*, or an inference of *necessary consequences*. We have another modification in what may be styled the *habitual future*, denoting habitual or constantly repeated acts. This is evidently an elliptical substitution for a more extended phraseology, which, if given in full, and with the repetitions which are peculiar to the Hebrew, would consist of a series of consecutive futures depending on a leading preterite. In the full expression, the future form being predominant, in the ellipsis, it is put for the whole.

Besides the וַיִּקְטֹל form the author admits of a species of relative past, not depending on a leading preterite, but on a particle of time, such as אָז, צַתָּה, טֶרֶם etc. It is regarded as substantially the same with the ordinary relative past; the particle of time standing in the place of the leading verb, so as to commence an order of succession without the connecting Vau. Cases, however, yet remain, in which the future, although apparently absolute and unconnected with any stand-point of either kind, seems to denote a past, and can hardly be rendered otherwise, without a harsh violation of the context. We are told that in such examples, "the narrator speaks of an action that has already taken place as passing before his mind; in which case he employs the future form with the force of the present." This explanation does not seem satisfactory, or, rather, it does not go far enough. It opens the door to arbitrary exceptions in a system, otherwise completely guarded against them. It seems to countenance a theory to which our author is opposed, viz. that what is commonly styled the future is primarily and radically a present. It does not explain why in those cases there is often a mixture of preterites. Would it not be more in accordance with the whole spirit of our author's theory, to regard such cases as really expressing a species of past futurity; or as examples of the relative past, in respect to which the stand-point is neither in a leading verb, nor in a particle of time, but is to be assumed as existing in the mind of the speaker, although not expressed in

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in words of another language, yet the mind may acquire the habit in silent reading of thus connecting the form with a conception so modified; and it does seem to us, that by such a process, the Hebrew poetry is invested with a power, a life and beauty which can be realized in no other way.

We would illustrate our meaning by a reference to the vision of Eliphaz, Job 4: 13. Most of the verbs here are preterites. They are mingled, however, with three futures. In the ordinary version all are alike regarded as past. Although necessity may compel us thus to render them in a concise and plain translation, we contend that the reader of the original ought to vary his conception, in the case of the three futures, and to feel that the writer intended such variation instead of a mere arbitrary change of expression. It should be regarded not as the future used for the present, and then that present used for the past, whilst preterites are strangely mingled in the description, but as a carrying back of the mind *in medias res*—to a point at which some of the feelings, which go to make up the compound emotion, partake of the characters of experience, and others, of fear or apprehension. In such cases, *events* are not so much narrated or described, as the *state* of soul which resulted from, or existed in anticipation of them. In the passage selected, the scene opens with the period, when the first mysterious presentiment of the approaching vision *was coming* upon the narrator. This is expressed by the future. *It was stealing upon me* (יִגָּנֵב), *or it was about to steal upon me, and mine ear received a hint* (*or whisper*) *thereof.* His bodily state is described by preterites: *Fear came upon me and trembling which made all my bones to shake.* A return to the vision itself, and to the mention of the approaching spirit, arouses the feeling of apprehension or foreboding fear, and the tense, true to the subjective state of the soul, changes to the future. *A spirit was about to flit* (יַחֲלֹף) *before my face, the hair of my flesh began to rise; it was about to assume a form* (*or position* יַעֲמֹד), *yet I could not discern its appearance; an image was before mine eyes, and I heard a voice, &c.* Job 4: 13. This seems to be in accordance with the idea of Jarchi in a note which the author has given on

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ing in torments. Luke 16: 23. This passage needs no comment. Certainly, the world of future misery is here set before us. I know it is said, that this was the lower Tartarean part of ἅδης, and that Abraham and Lazarus were in the upper part, and this is thought to be evident from the fact, that they were sufficiently near to each other to hold conversation. But I see no evidence that Abraham and Lazarus were in ἅδης at all. The Scriptures do not so teach us, and the supposition is altogether gratuitous. The supposed *division* of this place into the two apartments of paradise and Tartarus is of heathen and not of Christian origin. I can find no trace or intimation of it in the Bible. The fact that Abraham and the rich man were in circumstances to speak to each other no more proves that they were in different apartments of the same place, than does the fact that God and angels are often represented as speaking out of heaven to inspired men prove that earth and heaven are but different apartments of the same place. Without doubt, spirits can see each other, and hold conversation, at much greater distances, than would be possible to us. We certainly know, that the rich man and Lazarus were *widely* and eternally separated. The former "lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and saw" the latter "afar off." There was an impassable gulf betwixt them—wide enough to sever between the everlasting abodes of the righteous and wicked—between heaven and hell.

I have said that neither שְׁאוֹל nor ἅδης is ever used in the Scriptures to signify the abode of the spirits of the just. In opposition to this statement, a single passage has been referred to. David says: "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption." Ps. 16: 10. The Apostle Peter, having quoted this passage and applied it to Christ, goes on to assure us, that David here "spake of the resurrection of Christ, that his soul was not left in hell, neither did his flesh see corruption." Acts 2: 31. We have then, in this verse from the Psalms, a poetical prediction of the resurrection of Christ from the tomb, and of nothing else. The prediction is expressed, after the usual manner of the Hebrew poets, in a parallelism; the plain import of which is, that Christ was to be raised from the dead, he was to be raised speedily. His

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I have now examined the principal arguments in favor of an intermediate place; and to my own mind, they are far from being conclusive. They fail essentially in establishing the point for which they are adduced.

Let us now consider the arguments on the other side;—those which are urged to show that the souls of the righteous, at death, go immediately to heaven, into the presence of Christ and the holy angels; and that the souls of the wicked go immediately to hell. I commence with the proof of the first part of this proposition,—the souls of the righteous, at death, go immediately to heaven.

1. As much as this seems to have been indicated to the ancient patriarchs, in the promise of Canaan. These fathers of the faithful regarded the earthly Canaan as a type, an emblem of the heavenly Canaan. In the promises of an earthly inheritance, they read their title to a better country, even a heavenly. So we are assured by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And where did they think this heavenly Canaan was situated? *Directly across Jordan—the cold river of death.* They did not place it in שְׁאוֹל that gloomy and horrid region, of which the dark grave was to them but a type. No; it was heaven which they looked for. Heaven had been promised them, and heaven was the object of their hopes. Nor were their hopes disappointed. They have gone to heaven. They are spoken of in the Scriptures as those who "through faith and patience, now inherit the promises." Heb. 6: 12. Now, while their bodies are slumbering in the earth, their glorified spirits possess the promised rest above.

2. Our Saviour represents the saints, in the future life, and—as the connexion shows—previous to the resurrection of the body, as being "*like* unto the angels in heaven," and "*equal* to the angels." Mat. 22: 30. Luke 20: 36. Indeed, it would seem, that they must be more like the angels, before the resurrection of the body, than afterwards. But if they are like and equal to the angels in heaven, why should they not dwell with the angels in heaven? Why should they be imprisoned, many of them for thousands of years, as some will have it, in the centre of the earth?

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opened and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." And he prayed and said: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Acts 7: 56, 59. Who can believe that this prayer was rejected; and that Stephen, instead of being received up to heaven, was sent down to ᾅδης, where he remains imprisoned to the present time?

6. The Apostle Paul represents the whole church of God as being, at present, in *heaven*, or on *earth*. "Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named." Eph. 3: 15. I see not how this representation can be reconciled with the idea, that a great part of God's redeemed family—and probably the greater part—are now neither in heaven nor on earth, but in ᾅδης, the dark and secluded prison of unbodied souls.

7. We are taught by the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, that in the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, there dwell, not only God, the judge of all, and Jesus, the mediator of the new covenant, and an innumerable company of angels, but also *the spirits of just men made perfect*. Chap. 12: 21—24. All are represented as dwelling together, in the same holy and happy place.

8. In several passages in the epistles of Paul, the souls of the saints, while absent from the body, are represented as being with Christ in heaven. "We know that, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved"—in other words, if the body die—we know that "we have a building of God, a house not made with hands"—where? "eternal in the heavens." "We are willing rather to be absent from the body and present with the Lord." 2 Cor. 5: 1, 8. "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better." Phil. 1: 23. "Who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep," i. e. whether we live or die, "we should live together with him." 1 Thess. 5: 10. These passages of Scripture, if there were no other, are decisive. They prove, beyond all reasonable controversy, that the souls of believers, while absent from the body, are with Christ—the risen and glorified Saviour in heaven.

I know it is said, that Christ may be, in some sense, in ᾅδης, and that Paul expected to be with him there. And so is Christ, in some sense, with his people on earth; and Paul, on this ground, need have been in no strait betwixt living and dying.

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the Scriptures, it is here. It is "a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." It is inhabited by "an innumerable company of angels." It is near the throne of God and the Lamb. It is expressly and repeatedly called heaven by the Apostle John. In the commencement of his vision, he saw a door opened in heaven. And the vision throughout is a heavenly vision, in which the glorified spirits of the just are represented as mingling with angels, with Jehovah and the Lamb.

But it is time that I turn to the other part of the subject, and show, in few words, that the souls of the wicked at death go immediately to hell—the place prepared for the devil and his angels. It is admitted by the advocates of the intermediate place, that the souls of the wicked, when they leave the body, go immediately into *punishment:* but the place of their punishment, previous to the resurrection, is not hell; it is *Tartarus*—the lower and more miserable part of ᾅδης. But it is certain from the Scriptures, that Tartarus is hell—the very prison of the devils—the place prepared for their confinement and punishment. So it is represented in the only verse of the New Testament in which there is any mention of Tartarus. "God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell (Tartarus), and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." 2 Peter 2: 4. Here then is that place, prepared for the devil and his angels, into which, our Saviour has assured us, the wicked of our race shall be plunged, at the close of the judgment. "Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels." Matt. 25: 41. Beyond all question, this place is hell—the hell of the New Testament; and if it be still insisted that this is in ᾅδης, I admit it. Ἅιδης is hell; at least, as the term is commonly used in the New Testament. In two or three instances, it signifies the grave, but much more frequently, the prison of the devils and of damned souls; in which case it has substantially the same meaning with Tartarus, and Gehenna, and with the strictest propriety is rendered hell.

Whether the righteous and wicked, after the judgment, will go to literally the same places, in which they were situated

since, consisted chiefly of a collection of facts, and was especially valuable for the richness and variety of its matter, the perspicuity of its style and its adaptation to the existing state of the science in this country. It was then, as it has continued to be, eclectic in its character, and left the author uncommitted to any school of philosophy in his subsequent investigations. His first original work was the "Treatise on the Will." In this he assumed a threefold division of the mind, as the basis of the system which he has since more fully illustrated, and which distinguishes it from that of some English and American writers, who appear to have embraced all the faculties of mind in the Understanding and the Will.

The Treatise on the Will was, at the time of its publication, the only one in our language that professed fully to examine this department of mind. The work of President Edwards was not designed to be a full and complete view of the Will, but "*of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame.*" Nearly every treatise on the Will, which has since made its appearance, has been either a review, or an explanation of, an apology for, or an attack upon Edwards. This work of Professor Upham was, therefore, in some sense a novelty; but was not of that startling kind, which is fitted to excite a momentary wonder, and then be forgotten. The work advances from step to step, calmly and cautiously, without doing violence to cherished associations, without assailing existing prejudices or attempting to overthrow established systems.

After the Treatise on the Will had been published and favorably received, the "Mental Philosophy" was re-written on the philosophical basis already adopted in the Treatise on the Will, viz., that the Mind is to be contemplated in the threefold aspect of the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will. The first volume embraces the Intellect, the second the Sensibilities; so that each of the three volumes (the Treatise on the Will forming properly the third volume) is in a sense distinct; and yet all are essential to a full view of the Mind. And perhaps no other works in our language will give the student a better introduction to the outlines of a course of mental and moral training for himself, and for those he may have opportunity to

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fortifying its positions by cumulative evidence and illustration, it can be read with great pleasure and profit by many, who would find some difficulty in mastering the works of Stewart or Brown. As the best justification of our opinion, we proceed to give a brief analysis of the work itself; in which the reader, we trust, will find some interest and instruction.

The propriety of the threefold view of mind adopted in this work seems manifest on a moment's reflection; and the wonder is that it should ever have been overlooked. No other evidence of it would seem to be needed, than what is implied in the simple expressions, *I know, I feel, I will.*

However these states of mind may be connected, and however rapidly one may succeed the other, our consciousness clearly reveals to us a fundamental distinction in the mental states thus designated. But obvious as the distinction is, the author has done well to exhibit its reality and importance so fully as to remove every objection.

THE INTELLECT.

This department of mind receives and combines knowledge. In other words, it *perceives, compares* and *reaonss.* The several bodily senses are the inlets of external knowledge. The mind through these becomes acquainted with the external world, and the mental states thus occasioned are named *sensations.*

When the mind refers these sensations to certain objects as their causes or occasions, and thus has a knowledge of those objects, we are said to perceive; and the states of mind, which then exist, are called *perceptions.* The mind recalls some past or absent object, and dwells upon it till mental impressions or states arise, similar in many respects to those which the objects occasioned when present; and these mental states are denominated *conceptions.* The states of mind, which are thus furnished to us, are entitled by our author *intellectual states of external origin.*

But the mind has an *internal* as well as an *external* empire.

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standing with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understanding ideas as distinct as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly within himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with EXTERNAL objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called INTERNAL SENSE. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." Our author, perceiving the errors into which Locke fell, has wisely chosen a phraseology which covers a much broader ground than the term reflection. That knowledge which is of internal origin, considered in reference to powers by means of which it is developed, is susceptible of classification, and is arranged in the work before us as follows:

Original Suggestion. To this important source of internal knowledge, which is distinctly recognized as such by the leading writers of the Scotch school, are traced the ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, personal identity, unity, succession, duration, time and its measurements, eternity, space, power, right and wrong, moral merit and demerit, and a number of others. The reason for using the term *suggestion* we give in the language of the author. "In giving an account of the ideas from this source, we have preferred as designative of their origin, the term *suggestion*, proposed and employed by Reid and Stewart, to the term *reason*, proposed by Kant and adopted by Cousin and some other writers, as, on the whole, more conformable to the prevalent usage of the English language. In common parlance, and by the established usage of the language, the word *reason* is expressive of the *deductive* rather than the *suggestive* faculty; and if we annul or perplex the present use of that word by a novel application of it, we must introduce a new word to express the process of deduction."

Consciousness. This, considered as a source of knowledge, embraces at least three distinct things. 1, Self or personal existence; 2, a state or operation of mind; 3, a feeling of relation, that is to say, the relation of the state

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neous to the mind, although it may relate to the sensations which they produce within us; nor to the perceptions and feeling of *past times*, although we may be conscious of the recollection of them. We are not, strictly speaking, *conscious* of the existence even of our own minds; but only of their operations, and of the *belief* of their existence, which these operations indicate. We are conscious of different degrees of belief and disbelief, of doubt, uncertainty, full assent, etc., when our minds exist in those particular states which these terms express. We are concious of thinking, attending, perceiving, conceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining, and all similar mental acts and operations; not of the mental *powers* it will be noticed, but of the mental exercises or acts. We are conscious of emotions, desires, affections, and of all other mental states, which properly come under the head of the natural sensibilities. Accordingly it will be perceived, that a wide range of knowledge is opened to us here.

Relative Suggestion or *Judgment.* These two terms are used by Brown as nearly synonymous, and in the work before us the same usage is admitted, although the author remarks that "the latter term is sometimes employed with other shades of meaning." Although the number of relations is very great, which are discoverable by means of this power, it is supposed that they are susceptible of being arranged in the seven classes of identity and diversity, degree, proposition, time, place, possession, cause and effect.

Reasoning. An idea of this source of knowledge, as it stands related to the other internal sources, we give in the words of the author:

Reasoning is not identical with, or involved in consciousness. If consciousness gives us a knowledge of the *act* of reasoning, the reasoning power, operating within its own limits, and in its own right, gives us a knowledge of other things. It is a source of perceptions and knowledge which we probably could not possess in any other way. Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have a knowledge of our existence; without conscious-

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reasoning power, therefore, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its development, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency.

After defining reasoning, and describing the process of mind which takes place in every case of reasoning, the author proceeds to illustrate the two leading kinds or forms of Reasoning—Demonstrative and Moral. Demonstrative Reasoning, as is well known, is employed generally, and perhaps exclusively, with abstract ideas and the necessary relations between them. Moral Reasoning, in distinction from Demonstrative, relates to *matters of fact;* and in some respects also its conclusions differ. In conclusions drawn from moral reasoning there may be different degrees of belief, expressed by the words presumption, probability, moral certainty, and an opposite belief or opinion may not necessarily be absurd; but demonstrations do not admit of degrees of belief, and their opposites always involve an absurdity. Three processes of moral reasoning are illustrated by the writer—reasoning by Analogy, Induction, and by Cumulative Argument.

Imagination. Mr. Upham regards this as involving an intellectual, rather than a sensitive process of mind, and as closely related to the Reasoning power; from which, however, he thus distinguishes it. "Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. Imagination, as it aims to give us pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the world of reality, and consequently often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they correspond to reality or not." Such is a concise and imperfect outline of the volume on the Intellectual. We proceed now to the other great department.

The Sensibilities.

The action of the Sensibilities is easily distinguished from that of the Intellect, inasmuch as it always implies an antecedent intellectual action. "As a general thing," says

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pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect." In this department of the mind the leading distinction adopted by the author is between the *Natural* and *Moral* sensibilities. The distinction is important, as the following statement, taken from the second volume, will show.

The Natural and Moral Sensibilities appear to take fundamentally different views of the objects, in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly, as they have a relation to ourselves; the other as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks, what is GOOD? the other, what is RIGHT? The Natural Sensibilities, which are first considered, admit of a subordinate division. The result of the action of the Natural Sensibilities are found in the two classes of Emotions and Desires. Emotions precede and give rise to Desires. This is not only the order in succession of time; but it is also the order of nature."

The emotions are represented as being numerous; and as we have a knowledge of them by Consciousness, every person has a key to them, if he will learn to use it. As they arise in consequence of previous intellectual acts, their character will change in accordance with changes in the perceptions. They give rise to desires; and without careful analysis and attention we are liable to confound them with desires, from which they should be distinguished. Among other emotions of especial interest are those of Beauty. The occasions of these emotions are various. "All nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty; the Intellectual and the Sensitive, as well as the Material world." The examination of objects in reference to their power to awaken emotions of beauty admits of a twofold view. Hence we have what may be called Original beauty, and also, in distinction from it, Associated beauty. Objects may awaken emotions by means of their original and intrinsic elements; or they may do it by association with other objects. Nearly allied to emotions of beauty

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adoration; all of which and others are subjected to examination and analysis.

The Desires. These are embraced in the Second Class of mental states, resulting from the action of the Natural Sensibilities; and are distinguished from the Emotions by the position they occupy and by other characteristics. Their place, as we have already seen, is after the emotions. They are separated from intellections by the emotions which are antecedent to them; and come between the emotions and volitions; which last evidently have a subsequent place in the mind's action. They differ from emotions in having more permanency. They also necessarily imply an object, which is desired. And it is another characteristic, that their fulfilment (that is to say, the attainment of their object) always gives pleasure. The term Desires is, for reasons which are particularly indicated, employed *generically*. And under this general head the author considers a number of distinct mental states, some simple and others complex; particularly the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections.

The Affections. These are still higher in rank than the principles which have been mentioned, and distinguished by characteristic features. One characteristic of the Affections is, that they are not *simple* states, as the Appetites and Propensities may probably be, but *complex*. The Affections are emotions either pleasant or painful, exercised in view of some object; and combined with and modified by a desire of good or evil to that object. They are accordingly divided in the work before us on this basis—the nature of the *desire*—into the Malevolent and Benevolent Affections.

Under the class of the Malevolent Affections are arranged Resentment or anger with its modifications, Peevishness, Envy, Jealousy, Revenge, Fear. The author suggests the query, which would naturally arise, whether Fear should be classed among the Malevolent Affections, but as it includes the emotion of pain with the desire of avoiding the object of fear, it necessarily implies a degree of *aversion*, and seems naturally to fall into this class.

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mentally considered, are attended to. The results or actings of the Moral Sensibilities are divided into moral Emotions, viz., feelings of approval and disapproval, and feelings of Moral Obligation. The Moral emotions, like the Natural or Pathematic emotions, are immediately successive to acts of the Intellect; and the feelings of moral obligation, which succeed the emotions, may be considered, like the desires, as in immediate proximity to the Will. If we may be allowed the expression, the Will has an opportunity of acting sometimes in accordance with the feelings of moral obligation, and sometimes in accordance with the desires.

The relation of the reasoning power to the moral nature, which has led many to confound the two, and to deny the existence of the Conscience as a distinct moral principle, is carefully considered. This connexion, it is admitted, is very intimate, and yet, the two mental principles are found to be distinct. Reasoning, when in exercise, is purely an *intellectual* process, in distinction from an *emotive* or *sensitive* process. They belong, therefore, to different departments of the mind. Yet such is the connexion of the conscience with the reasoning power, that it admits of improvement or perversion by means of this connexion; and is susceptible of education as well as other parts of mind. Men may consequently be guilty of wrong consciences as really as of wrong affections. So that man is under obligation to keep a *conscience void of offence*, and to enlighten and strengthen it by the appropriate exercise of his intellect.

The various principles which are laid down under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, furnish basis enough for a consistent and durable Moral Education. This education should begin early. The earliest years of life are favorable to moral culture. It is true, the Intellect is developed *first* in the order of nature; but the Heart and the Intellect are so closely united, that emotions, both natural and moral, follow closely the intellectual perceptions and deductions. Accordingly if the intellect is early occupied, whether with good or bad principles, these principles must necessarily affect the heart. If good principles are neglected, bad ones will inevitably spring up; and as they gain strength by time and repetition, it will not be easy to dislodge them. There is no ground of discouragement if the

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instruction, communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power, which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification, and of an operative influence; and yet it may be only waiting for some more favorable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view." The importance, in this view, of correct speculative opinions, and of a knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of religious truth generally, as insisted on by Mr. Upham, will be distinctly seen.

THE WILL.

The Treatise on the Will, as it may be important for the reader to recollect, is philosophical and practical, rather than theological. It appears in a separate volume, and is sold separately; but it is bound uniformly with the volumes on the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and seems to be necessary to a complete view of this great subject. The first part of this treatise is chiefly occupied with a classification of mental powers, and with the relation of the intellect and the sensibilities to the will. The student who has examined the other volumes, will probably not regret this circumstance, as it affords substantial aid in reviewing and fixing principles more firmly in the mind. And to those, who had not this preparatory training, this course seemed absolutely necessary.

There is, however, one other important topic, which is discussed in Part I. of this Treatise, on the Distinction between Desires and Volitions. Edwards, Brown, and some other writers appear to regard them as identical. The writer of these volumes, reasoning at some length, endeavors to show that they are not so. The reader will naturally pay close attention to the various arguments which are adduced on this topic; because if there is a failure here, it necessarily vitiates the whole book. If desire and volition are identical, what need of a philosophy of the Will? Does not the philosophy of the Desires cover the whole ground?

Part II. is occupied with the difficult subject of the *Laws of the Will.* In entering on this topic, our Author seems duly impressed with the importance of the subject in hand, con-

Freedom of the Will. Whether the will has Laws, he considers as an inquiry preliminary to that of its freedom; and the method, taken to establish the general fact of the Will's being reached by Law, may be considered one of the most thorough specimens of cumulative argument to be found in the compass of moral reasoning. Our limits, however, will not permit us to give an analysis of it. We merely quote one or two of his concluding remarks.

It is in this simple proposition of the Will's subjection to Law, that we find the golden link, which binds us to the throne of God. If my Will is not subject to Law, then God is not my master. And what is more, he is not only not so in fact, but it is impossible that he should be so. But on the other hand, if my will is not independent, in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things ever attends my path; and, whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I can never annul his authority, or evade his jurisdiction.

The subject of Part III. is the Freedom of the Will.—The leading topics in this part of the Work are the Nature of Mental Freedom; Mental Harmony the basis or occasion of Mental Freedom; the Freedom of the *Will* in distinction from the mere general idea of mental freedom, sustained in a number of successive chapters by various arguments and illustrations; the consistency of Law and Freedom, and the Enthralment or Slavery of the Will. In connection with this last named topic a note is appended at the end of the volume, which is designed to throw light upon its Theological bearings.

The leading subject of Part IV. is the Power of the Will. The writer makes a distinction,—which some will perhaps regard as novel, but which if true will aid in the understanding of the nature of the Will,—between freedom and power. The titles of the chapters, as they appear in this part of the Work, are as follows: Nature of Mental Power, The Power of the Will, Self-determining Power of the Will, Differences of Voluntary Power, and Consistency of Character; followed by a chapter which concludes the whole work on the Discri-

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"Yet better were this mountain wilderness,
And this wild life of danger and distress,
Watchings by night and perilous flight by day,
And meetings in the depths of earth to pray,
Better, far better, than to kneel with them,
And pay the impious rite thy laws condemn."

We have thus, with as much brevity as the nature of the subject seemed to allow, followed the investigations of the author in his analysis and classification of the various mental powers and operations. Whether his classification is in all respects just, or not, it is certainly a great convenience to find an attempt of this nature. The outlines of a system, the several parts of which are adapted to each other, as they seem to be in the three volumes which we have noticed, afford, at least, a fair starting point for future inquiries in this department of study. We shall have failed in the design of preparing this analysis, if it shall not have the effect to draw attention to the works themselves, and to aid to some extent in entering upon their thorough study. They deserve to be studied.

ARTICLE XII.

Critical Notices.

1.—*The Correspondence of William Wilberforce. Edited by his sons, Robert Isaac Wilberforce, M. A., Vicar of East Farleigh, late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford; and Samuel Wilberforce, M. A., Archdeacon of Surrey, Rector of Brighstone, revised and enlarged from the London edition: in two volumes.* Philadelphia: Henry Perkins. 1841. pp. 336, 332.

Those who have read the life of Wilberforce will be anxious to know more of this venerable man. We have never closed a biographical work, with greater respect for the subject, or greater reverence for that religion, which could so appro-

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4.—*The Martyr Lamb; or Christ the Representative of his People in all Ages. Translated from the German of F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Author of Elijah the Tishbite, etc.* New-York: Robert Carter. 1841. pp. 288.

5.—*The Flying Roll; or Free Grace displayed. By F. W. Krummacher, D. D. Author of Elijah the Tishbite.* New York: M. W. Dodd. 1841. pp. 296.

The popularity of this attractive and spiritual writer is not at all surprising. It is seldom that a voice from Germany finds its way so directly and irresistibly to our hearts. We are constantly importing the multifarious learning of that distant land, but we are able to reckon among our treasures very little religion. The bones are very many and very dry. But Krummacher comes to us, not as a scholar, but as a Christian brother. He speaks a language which needs no interpreter, because it is the language of the heart, the world over.

These volumes are like those which have alredy been published in this country. They will be expected, of course, to bear the impress of the author's peculiar style. They abound in expositions of Scripture, sometimes fanciful, but always interesting and often exceedingly instructive. At the same time, they bring out strongly and boldly his doctrinal sympathies; and exhibit him as a fervent, orthodox and distinguishing preacher. The subjects of the first of the above named volumes are Christ and the first Sinners, Moses' Wish, David and the Man of God, Bethlehem, the Blood of Sprinkling, the New Creature, the Martyr Lamb, the Great Exchange, the Easter Message, the Easter Morning, the Walk towards Emmaus, Easter Peace, the Office of the Holy Spirit, the Christians after the Feast of Pentecost. Among other topics discussed, the author dwells upon the necessity and nature of the atonement, the agency of the Holy Spirit, etc. The subjects of the other volume are the Flying Roll, Who is he that Condemneth? the Characteristics of a State of Grace, the Abuse of the Doctrine of Free Grace, the True Church, the Ransomed of the Lord, Stephen, Solomon and the Shula-

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and New Testaments, may be regarded as one continued history of God in his relation to man. Luther calls it 'the history of all histories,' for it is an account of the stupendous miracles of the divine majesty and grace, from the beginning even unto eternity. The sermon of Peter is the simplest and at the same time, the most comprehensive of all narrations."

8.—*Popular Lectures on Geology; treated in a very comprehensive manner. By R. C. von Leonhard, Counsellor of State, and Prof. at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. With illustrative engravings. Translated by J. G. Morris, A. M., and edited by F. Hall, M. D., formerly Prof. of Math. and Nat. Phil. Middlebury College, Vt., and afterwards Prof. of Chem. and Min. Washington College, Ct., Nos. I.–III.* Baltimore: Publication Rooms. 1839–40. pp. 100, 89, 100.

The author of these Lectures is favorably known in Europe and to some extent in this country, as a distinguished professor at Heidelberg. His Manual of Geology and Geognosy, and his Treatise on Basaltic Formations have secured for him a high rank in this department of investigation. The present work is intended to be—as its name imports—*popular;* it is prepared with a particular reference to the wants of those who desire some acquaintance with geology, but who have too little auxiliary knowledge to plunge at once into the technicalities of this science. Ten lectures have been presented to the American public, the subjects of which, we presume, will give some idea of the general plan. They are as follows: Sources of Geological Knowledge, Importance of the Art of Mining in Geological Researches, Description of Mines and Miners; Sciences auxiliary to Geology,—Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Mineralogy,—general Properties of Bodies; Observations on Light, Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism and Thermo-magnetism; Chemical Phenomena, Elements, Oxygen, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Carbon, Sulphur, Chloride, Fluorine, Phosphorus; Metals; Air and Water; Combinations of Gases, and with other Elements; Acids, Alkalis, Salts; Earths and Ores; are Rocks forming at the present day? simple and compound Rocks, Forms of Minerals, Quartz, Feldspar, Albite, Labrador-spar, Mica, Augite, Hornblend, Magnetic Iron, Lime, Gypsum.

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he is always interesting; his style is well chosen and his illustrations are abundant and happy. The last three or four lectures create a desire to see the remaining numbers. Hereafter, the proprietors expect to publish a No. once in two months, till the whole shall have appeared.

9.—*Sermons on Public Worship, suited to the Times. By Samuel Nott, Jr., Author of Sermons from the Fowls of the Air and Lilies of the Field.* Boston: Whipple & Damrell. 1841. pp. 404.

The subject discussed in this volume is always important. The Christian ministry can effect but little without the aid of the sanctuary: if the courts of the Lord's house are empty or thinly attended, religion must decline. But there is reason to fear, that, in some parts of our country, the urgent necessity of sustaining public worship is not felt as it should be. The influences adverse to the Sabbath are many; and these, of course, bear directly on the ministrations of the Sabbath. The customs of society, particularly in cities, the rapid increase of light reading, lax notions of personal duty—all tend to aggravate the evil.

A work "suited to the times" in this respect, if generally read, cannot fail to be useful. This volume contains twenty discourses; the first five discuss the object, character and history of public worship; the next six, the character of the ministry required by public worship; the eight following, the character demanded of the attendants on public worship; the last is a centennial discourse. Sermons are far from being the most popular reading of the present day; these, however, will be perused with pleasure as well as profit. The style is perspicuous and animated, the sentiments are weighty and earnestly enforced. We feel as we accompany the author, that we are communing with one who is deeply penetrated with the sacredness of his office. Prevented by the Providence of God from laboring in a foreign country, he is evidently solicitous to devote himself wholly to his Master's work in the land of his birth. We trust that this effort will not be in vain.

10.—*Universalism as it Is: or Text Book of Modern Universalism in America. By Rev. Edwin F. Hatfield.* New-York; J. A. Hoisington. 1841. pp. 341.

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and Winchester would have recoiled with horror from the blank and soulless creed of Balfour, the Ballous, etc.; and the full development of this mystery of iniquity, we firmly believe, is yet to come. Abner Kneeland was once a Universalist, and many appear to be treading in his steps. The prevalence of this sect is no matter of surprise. A system, that makes such fearful havoc with the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel, must always secure numerous adherents.

The work before us is timely and valuable. "Orthodox preachers," the author observes, "in order to acquaint themselves with the peculiarities of this sect, have, in too many cases, contented themselves with an examination of the masterly argument of the younger Edwards against Chauncy, or the Calvinism Improved of Dr. Huntington, or the writings of Winchester and Mitchell. Thus informed, they have constructed a most powerful argument, and completely overthrown the strong holds of the early advocates of this peculiar creed, and they wonder that any can hold on to a doctrine so untenable, and be Universalists still. The truth is, that not a Universalist preacher in the land, so far as the author has been able to learn, does hold on to the system thus attacked. These are not their text-books. They that would know what they believe must consult more modern writers, and gather their creed from their more recent publications, and inform themselves thoroughly in regard to the latest discoveries and intrenchments of the sect, or they will labor in vain." Hence the publication of "Universalism as it is." The picture is frightful, but, we fear, too true.

The results of the author's investigations were first given to the public in the New York Evangelist. This volume is a republication of those essays, rewritten and enlarged. His diligence and fidelity are entitled to confidence, and there can be no reason to doubt the substantial correctness of this exposition.

11.—*An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will. By Jeremiah Day, President of Yale College.* New-Haven: Durrie and Peck. Philadelphia: Smith and Peck. 1841. pp. 352.

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claims to be the philosophy of Edwards served up in almost every imaginable form. The abettors of error and of truth avail themselves alike of the name and authority of Edwards, whenever they fancy, that by so doing, their cause will be subserved; and by some his doctrines are represented as leading legitimately to the most dangerous and absurd doctrines of fatalism. Now if the work were popular in its character, and likely to be read by those who take some interest in metaphysical discussion, it might be safe for its friends to leave it to make its own defence, and stand or fall according to its merits.—But, as this is not the case, it is evident that many will form their judgments of Edwards' work on second hand authority; and if from any thing, either in the character of the work itself, or in the habits of the age, his doctrines are in danger of being misrepresented or perverted, this brings a challenge to some lover of truth and friend of Edwards to stand forth as his advocate. No one could have presented himself, in this character, more able and trustworthy than President Day. His general character for extensive and thorough learning, his calm and patient habits of thinking, and especially his sincere and unprejudiced state of mind eminently fit him for his undertaking, and will secure a favorable reception for his work among all candid inquirers; and if our impressions are correct, those who take pains to read the book with care will not be disappointed. To say the least, Edwards is here dealt with by a friendly hand. Many recent attempts to sketch the portrait of this venerable man have been failures. The modern pencil and brush have so far changed his antique features and vestments, that his old friends have scarcely recognized him. But in this newly finished drawing, Edwards is professedly exhibited in his own robes, and with his own appropriate physiognomy. We cannot say that the lineaments of his countenance are not shaded, here and there, with a few modern improvements, but the great outlines are his, and his friends may embrace him as the object of their long cherished affection.

Some of the characteristics of the "Examination" are these:—First, *its faithfulness.* The Author has spared no labor in possessing himself fully of the meaning of Edwards, and has set it forth in connexion with ample proofs that it is his *true* meaning. He shows himself to be familiar, not only

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are occupied in ascertaining the signification which Edwards attached to the terms he employs; and here he finds the great source of mistake and misrepresentation concerning his philosophy, arising chiefly from the *broad*, and, in some instances, the *peculiar* sense in which he used his terms. Partial and superficial readers, not having been aware of this, have honestly, it may be, but unjustly represented him as unintentionally teaching error and even absurdity.

Another characteristic is *the independent and liberal views* which the writer entertains of the subject which he examines. He is evidently, for the substance of his views, an Edwardean —an honest and an ardent one; yet he is not a servile follower of Edwards. Favored with the additional light, which a century has shed upon a subject so continually under discussion, he finds some things to disapprove. He objects to Edwards' classification of the mental powers, and says, "a threefold division of them is needed." He also thinks that the terms "necessity, inability," etc., are not well adapted to moral subjects and relations, and that the sanction of his name to the frequent use of them has given them a general currency, in connexion with such subjects, which is likely to result in serious evil. This is doubtless an infelicity in the work of Edwards.

Dr. Day, as might have been expected, has conducted his examination with fairness and courtesy towards his opponents. He has not even called their names, thus showing, that while he will not shrink from maintaining what he considers to be the truth, he respects the feelings of those who differ from him. He has indeed felt himself called upon, in a few instances, to rebuke with sharpness the reckless manner in which some have dealt with the Work on the Will. His work must be regarded, not only as an "Examination," but as a defence of the main positions of Edwards. Dr. Day, therefore, is not uncommitted. He has fairly taken his stand by the side of his great author, evincing that all which has yet been said against the "Treatise on the Will," has neither convinced nor awed him. After explaining the meaning of Edwards' terms, he proceeds to rescue his arguments from the misconstructions and perversions which he believes have been put upon them. One view which he takes of the source of these perversions is interesting. He says: "*It is the great object of*

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mind under a threefold division, the Reason, the Sensibility, and the Will, and having, as he thinks, refuted the celebrated argument of Edwards against a self-determining will, viz., that of the *infinite series, and contingency as implying no cause*, he finds in the human mind two elements of necessity and one of freedom. The reason and the sensitivity are related to their phenomena, as substance to attribute. The will is related to its phenomena, as cause to effect. All causality is thus resolvable into will; the will being free and self-determined. This view of the will, our author urges in support of the great doctrines of morality and religion. The leading topics of this volume are the necessity and immutability of moral distinctions,—moral agency and responsibility,—extent of responsibility,—conscience,—pantheism,—evil, natural and moral,—the Divine government,—the doctrines of Scripture on these subjects.

We need add nothing to what we have said in former notices of the style and spirit of Prof. Tappan's discussions. Among the chapters of the volume before us, that on the Divine government is particularly fine, and will be attractive to such as adopt the author's philosophical views. The Divine government, he maintains, is constituted of law and power, and is universal, extending to all created things and all created minds. The fulfilment of law is absolute and necessary in respect to all physical phenomena, but is contingent where a power is committed to an intelligent being to obey or disobey. In this case the law is moral, and the subject of it is responsible for his power of obedience; and if he disobey, the wisdom and power of God are sufficient to control the results; so that here the ends of government are as secure and certain as in the physical world. In accordance with these views, the *decrees* are absolute and causative in respect to all physical events. Here the *decree* necessitates the *event*. But in his moral government, though God infallibly secures certain developments of moral character and conduct, yet the certainty of their occurrence is not founded upon *necessity*, but upon a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances of moral action. Between the decree and the working out of the great moral end there lie innumerable volitions of moral agents, and a vast number of these are exercised in violation

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principally of the substance of two discourses by Mr. Cheever, delivered, the first on the day of public thanksgiving, and the other on the first Sabbath in the year. It embraces *two parts*, which are divided into ten chapters. It is rich in the variety of its thoughts and suggestions, rendered attractive by a style of expression at once striking and chaste. The current of thought is, from a general view of the grounds of national responsibility and retributive Providence, to a more particular consideration of the opportunities and responsibilities of this country for its own and the world's evangelization. The author's illustrations from foreign sources show that he has not been an idle observer of the condition and tendencies of the institutions of the old world, while his genius makes the events of history and Providence speak in glowing and impressive language to the new.

16.—*Sketches of Conspicuous Living Characters of France. Translated by R. M. Walsh.* Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. 1841. pp. 312.

These sketches first appeared in Paris in weekly *livraisons* and were exceedingly popular. They were regarded authentic in respect to their statements of facts, and as impartial in their delineations as could reasonably be expected. The author's name is unknown; he styles himself *homme de rien*. Himself unseen, he has drawn a picture of the leading men of France, who are now upon the stage,—Thiers, Guizot, Lafitte, Soult, Lamartine, Châteaubriand, Berryer, Dupin, etc. Each is sketched with a bold and vigorous hand. It is impossible, of course, at this distance from the originals, to form a confident estimate of the fidelity of this gallery of portraits. The character of the translator, however, is a sufficient guaranty of their general accuracy. Assuming their correctness, they are a most valuable help to the just appreciation of the men, who are exerting such a mighty influence on the destinies of France. The *translation* is admirable.

Additional Notices.

We are obliged to condense our notices of the following books for want of room.

Patchwork. By Capt. Basil Hall, R. N., F. R. S.; in two volumes. Philad.

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